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Contents

Situating Historical Sociology*

Ancestors, traditions and alternatives

Historical sociology, when recognized as a legitimate endeavour (which is still not uniformly the case), is commonly traced back to classical origins in the work of Marx, Weber and Durkheim, and to a rebirth in the 1970s and 1980s. Some qualifications to this picture will seem appropriate. There are good reasons for remembering Abderrahman Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406); his *Introduction to World History* may be seen as the first major treatise on historical sociology, and twentieth-century authors in the field drew on his ideas (Ernest Gellner once described himself as a card-carrying Ibn Khaldunian). But he did not found a tradition. Another ancestor to be acknowledged is Giambattista Vico (1668–1744), whom some sociologists (including T. G. Masaryk) have taken to be the founding father of their discipline. In his case, though, the traditional line of reception – such as it is – belongs to the history of philosophy rather than sociology. Among eighteenth-century Enlightenment sources, the first to be noted is surely Adam Ferguson's *Essay on the History of Civil Society*, also occasionally credited with a foundational role. In short, there are remote but significant ancestors; but most observers and practitioners of historical sociology will agree that the main tradition to be reactivated is the classical one, and the proximate foundation to build on is the late twentieth-century body of work.

That said, we can distinguish trends and alternatives within the rough consensus. Craig Calhoun has proposed a distinction between two fundamentally opposed conceptions: against attempts to domesticate historical sociology by admitting it as simply one more specialized branch of sociology, he defends the broader idea that it should serve to reorient the discipline as a whole. The aim is, in other words, to bring about a much closer and more systematic integration of history and sociology. As Calhoun's own example shows, this latter approach is not exclusively European, but it seems more strongly represented on the European side, and some authors (notably Philip Abrams) have taken it so far that no boundaries between the two disciplines are left untouched. While the proposal for a complete merger seems unlikely to overcome the realities of specialization, we have no reservations about aligning this journal (and the department to which it is linked) with the broader definition of historical sociology; cooperation with historians has therefore been and will remain essential.

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The idea of historical sociology as an overall reorientation lends itself to different interpretations. One version, of major importance for the recent history of sociology, is the construction of paradigms meant to reflect and facilitate the historicization of social inquiry. Here the pioneering role of Norbert Elias should be acknowledged. The concept of human figurations seems to be the first case of a central category formulated in this spirit, with the explicit intention to study social phenomena as constellations in process, and with the programmatic aim of redefining basic sociological concepts in processual terms. Michael Mann's typology of social power and analysis of its networks is a more recent project in the same vein. Mann differs from Elias in that he works with a more pluralistic model of power, but his overlapping networks are no less intrinsically historical than Elias's figurations. For those who regard both approaches as one-sidedly focused on power, it seems more natural to settle for a multiparadigmatic character of historical sociology, similar to the situation that is now widely accepted for general sociology. Rather than on devising new conceptual schemes, the emphasis will then be on interdisciplinary opening and enrichment. And the integration of history and sociology paves the way for further encounters. The historical sociology of archaic states and civilizations, an important field in its own right as well as for comparative purposes, must draw on archaeological and anthropological sources; a recent and representative work of that kind is reviewed in this issue. Another promising path is a closer connection with political science, broadly understood and with particular interest in its less conventional offshoots, such as geopolitics. In this regard, Michael Mann's work deserves special mention; nobody has done more to bring historical sociology into contact with geopolitical factors and perspectives.

Modernization and its disillusions

The general orientation of our journal reflects this interdisciplinary stance. To explain more specific interests, and with a view to the contents of this issue, we should indicate key themes that have – as a result of the historical-sociological encounter – been highlighted and redefined in particularly revealing ways. Changing visions and understandings of modernization are perhaps the most visible common ground of the two disciplines, and political studies, empirical as well as theoretical, will be an integral part of any sustained reflection on this subject. Modernization theory of the kind that held sway for some time after the second world war was later criticized for relying on unhistorical assumptions rooted in mainstream sociology; notions of unilinear development, self-contained trajectories of nation-states, and progress embodied in advanced societies were rejected as illusions. The rethinking that now seems to have produced a paradigm shift is best described in terms of historicization and pluralization. Different paths to modernity, dependent on cultural legacies, social forces and political constellations, are now widely pursued subjects of comparative analysis. Although a certain idea of distinctive modern cultural and institutional features must be retained, they are increasingly defined without normative judgment; the equation of progress and modernization is questioned at the root level, although progress in specific areas can still be envisaged. But even when normative meaning and force are ascribed to some components of modernity (most often subsumed under the concepts of emancipation, citizenship or autonomy), they turn out to be intertwined with destructive and regressive aspects in ways often difficult to decipher.

The twentieth-century experience of wars and totalitarian regimes, only recently given its due in debates on modernity, is the most massive reminder of these interconnections. All the abovementioned aspects are commonly subsumed under the idea of multiple modernities, introduced by S. N. Eisenstadt in the 1990s and later adopted by other authors who do not always share his specific interests. For present purposes, suffice it to say that the multiplicity in question is itself multiple: the term refers to the plurality of components (institutional and cultural), patterns (national, regional, civilizational and global), trajectories (short-term and long-term), and overall interpretations (ideological, sociological and philosophical).

It is now often argued, on good grounds, that an idealizing vision of the nation-state inspired the notion of society used by early modernization theorists. Conversely, modernization theory served to support simplistic ideas of "nation-building", and they could – as recent experience shows – be put to dubious political use. A corrective against these trends, gradually assimilated into broader debates, is to be found in the work of historians (and to some extent historical sociologists) who have tried to understand nations as historical phenomena and focused, more or less explicitly, on processes of nation formation. It is worth noting that scholars coming from or working in Prague have been particularly active in this field; Hans Kohn, Karl Deutsch, Eugen Lemberg, Ernest Gellner and Miroslav Hroch are the obvious names to mention, and it may be added that Jaroslav Krejčí's last major work contains the outlines of an original approach to nation formation, which the author did not have time to develop. An important corollary of this historical perspective on the world of nations is that any study of national phenomena must pay attention to their international and transnational contexts. The latter aspects are now often emphasized as alternative foci to be set against traditional fixation on the nation-state, but the real task is to grasp the changing interrelations of the different levels, always important but not to be construed in any supra-historical terms.

Authors and themes in this issue

It is no exaggeration to say that a certain image of the nineteenth century (more precisely, in this case, the years 1815 to 1914) as the time of progress par excellence was decisively important for the rise of modernization theory. Moreover, a tendency to exaggerate both the peaceful character of European history in this period and the ascendancy of the nation-state helped to round off a picture of the century as a paradigm phase. Bo Stråth's proposal for a new narrative, centred on the repeated failure of peace treaties meant to end all wars, stresses the interconnection of geopolitics, international relations, and social transformations, and the links between warfare, welfare and democracy are a particularly striking example of this. Although twentieth-century experiences clearly determine the background to this (or any other) reading of the nineteenth century, some new horizons will emerge when the twentieth century is taken as a direct object of analysis. Peter Wagner does so and raises the question of possible meanings of progress after a transformation of the world that can be roughly dated to the 1980s. This sea change was from the outset subject to mythmaking; but as Wagner argues, it was neither a transition to postmodernity, nor a neoliberal revolution, nor the beginning of the end of socialism. Rather, this decade saw the exhaustion of a certain model of progress, supposedly anchored in the

Enlightenment and conducive to human liberation. In retrospect, it appears to have been based on resistance to domination. Its decline raises the question of a more positive pursuit of autonomy, collective as well as individual. Such interpretations pose problems that also have some bearing on the alternative modernity that collapsed at the end of the 1980s. The Soviet model justified itself as a breakthrough and a vehicle of resistance to domination, but its most determined critics denounced it as an extreme form of domination, coming unprecedentedly close to suppressing resistance altogether. Historians and sociologists, seeking to understand the Soviet trajectory and to avoid sweeping preconceptions, tried to find ways around this dichotomy, but no consensus emerged from their debates; nor did the abrupt collapse of the Soviet Union settle the matter. Mikhail Maslovskii discusses the question of Soviet modernity with a view to clarifying the terms of debate rather than finding a conclusive answer. He stresses the heterogeneous sources of the regime and the complexity of the transformations that followed its demise.

The modern vision of progress and its guiding values are discussed from another angle by Pierre Rosanvallon. His contribution is the text of a lecture given in Prague in 2015. Rosanvallon is one of the foremost contemporary theorists of democracy, and his writings have explored the historical transformations, ideological elaborations and conceptual dilemmas of democratic political cultures. The present text sums up the results of his reflection and proposes a new definition of the society of equals; it is to be conceived in the spirit of social liberalism, and although critical of the currently dominant neo-liberal project, it should link up with the new individualism of singularity.

The transnational dimension appears, in one guise or another, in all the abovementioned papers; Marci Shore's account of Jews and cosmopolitanism approaches it from a distinctive viewpoint. The history of European Jews in the twentieth century is marked by to diverent trends occasionally clashing in individual biographies (there were conversions in both directions): on the one hand the development of a particularly articulate and persistent national movement, on the other a uniquely cosmopolitan tradition, active across a broad spectrum of cultural genres and ideological currents, and variously indebted to the Jewish legacy but not bound by inherited assumptions. This latter aspect has been somewhat undervalued in Jewish studies, and it has not been a focus of attention for the recent advocates of cosmopolitanism. Marci Shore's wide-ranging discussion brings this achievement into proper perspective and invites further contextualizing reflections. The two lines taken by Jewish thought in twentieth-century Europe were to a significant extent responses to the national exclusionism that tended to portray the Jews as its ultimate adversary. At its most extreme and destructive, in the Nazi movement and regime, this current transcended the limits of nationalism; the quest for a racial empire must be regarded as a perverted form of universalism. The overall failure of the Nazis to mobilize international support along these lines led to a lack of interest in specific cases and episodes, but recent scholarship has been correcting that attitude. David O'Donoghue's essay examines one such case, the presence and the unofficial state connections of Nazis in Ireland during the second world war. The Anglo-Irish relationship, still highly contested at the time, makes this example particularly interesting.

Johann Pall Arnason, Nicolas Maslowski
issue editors

The Nineteenth Century Revised: Towards a New Narrative on Europe's Past*

BO STRÅTH**

Pozměněný pohled na devatenácté století: K novému příběhu o evropské minulosti

Abstract: The conventional history of Europe, connecting the Enlightenment heritage with our time, makes a huge detour around the violent nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth one. The article explores the European peace utopias of 1815, 1918 and 1951, and their eventual loss of suggestive force, and argues that they link today's global Europe to the post-Napoleonic world two hundred years ago. This connection, through a series of illusions and disillusions about the nature of politics, represents a different view on the nineteenth and twentieth century than the conventional teleological narrative about fulfilment of the Enlightenment promise of progress. The analysis of the bicentenary chain of shifts between postwar, prewar and war should not be read in terms of a teleology necessitating a new war; the point is, rather to draw attention to the fragility and openness of historical processes. The new narrative outlined here emphasizes that there was no necessity in the development towards today's Europe; the story is full of alternatives, and highlights the role as well as the responsibility of human agency. No solution appears as a necessary result of impersonal forces, everything has depended, and continues to depend, on human choice.

Keywords: Europe; integration; utopia; peace; Vienna; Versailles

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The European Commission is in search of a new master narrative. On several occasions, ex-president Barroso has stressed Europe's need for a new narrative and initiated work on it. A new narrative, or a new interpretative framework, a new mobilizing language, is – as he argues – the tool to stop the ongoing upsurge of nationalist ideologies and xenophobia, a development that threats to tear Europe apart.

The Commission is right in its argument that there is an existential need for a new convincing language that would again make Europe a central domain of hopes and expectations. Europe today teeters upon a precipice; the apparent choice placed before its people seems to be one between dissolution and a union subordinated to the demands of the bond markets. Behind the strident political rhetoric that accompanies this dilemma lies a profound failure of political imagination that emerges from a deeply a-historical view of Europe's past. There is an urgent need for a more realistic history that rejects any teleological understanding of Europe as a self-propelling project on a steady advance towards

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** Bo Stråth, Emeritus Professor in Nordic, European and World History, University of Helsinki. E-mail: Bo.Strath@gmail.com.

a predetermined goal. Instead, the historical fragility of European peace and progress, so evident today, needs to be highlighted. Yes, a new narrative, but what narrative?

The conventional history that connects the Enlightenment heritage with our own time makes a huge detour around the violent nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century. Doing this, it ignores the recurring violence so obvious today. It seems that this is the story that the Commission wants to reanimate. Thereby it ignores an alternative historical legacy worth remembering, which highlights the dark ambiguities of the European inheritance, which intertwines warfare and welfare. Europe's past is warning as much as promise.

Europe's peace utopias in 1815, 1919 and 1951, and their eventual loss of suggestive force, connect today's global Europe with the post-Napoleonic world two hundred years ago. This connection through a series of illusions and disillusions about the nature of politics represents a different view on the nineteenth and twentieth century than the conventional teleological narrative about fulfillment of the enlightenment promise of progress. The analysis of the bicentenary chain of shifts between postwar, prewar and war should, emphatically**,** not be read as a teleology moving towards a new war, but draw attention to the fragility and openness of historical processes. The new narrative model must emphasize that there was no necessity in the development towards today's Europe, it was full of alternatives. The narrative road must highlight the role and responsibility of human agency. It must argue that no solution has been the necessary result of impersonal forces, everything has depended, and continues to depend, on human choice. A new narrative about Europe, a new historical understanding of today's Europe, an interpretation of its past must emphasize the fragility of human projects, the openness towards the future, and the responsibility of human agency.

What connects our time with the violent time two hundred years ago, following the French revolution, is a chain of postwar peace treaties under the motto of 'never again' – prewar–war–postwar treaty of never again – prewar–war–postwar treaty of never again, where the question is whether the third postwar is still a relevant description of our time. This question is, of course, an impossible question, since it can only be answered through the filter of a new war, but nevertheless worth reflection.

Three postwar utopias of peace connect the revolutionary world of warfare around 1800 with our time: the Vienna peace treaty in 1815, which tried to stabilize Europe after the revolution and the Napoleonic wars, the Versailles peace treaty in 1919 after World War I and the Paris treaty on a European Coal and Steel Community in 1951. The third peace utopia was the response of never again to World War II after the victors had failed to agree on a peace to negotiate with (Vienna), or impose on (Versailles) the loser, which like in Versailles was Germany. The peace was an armed peace and a new friend-enemy demarcation dividing the camp of the former victors, the West against the East: the Cold War. The motto of 'never again' narrowed down from a claim for permanent world peace in 1815 and 1919 to a rejection of war between Germany and France.

It is important to emphasize that there was no necessity in this development, which was full of alternatives. A new master tale must confront the conventional narrative about Europe as a self-propelling machine fuelled by Enlightenment values and belief in progress, but must carefully avoid outlining a negative counter-narrative about a continuous European tragedy of fate from postwar to prewar and war. The futures in the past were as open as ours.

The connection of today's global Europe with the post-Napoleonic world two hundred years ago, through the three peace utopias and their eventual loss of suggestive force, represents a different view on the nineteenth and twentieth century than the conventional teleological narrative about fulfillment of the enlightenment promise of progress. A crucial question, silenced in the conventional understanding of Europe's past, deals with how postwar became prewar.

The search for answers to this question focuses on a series of tensions which marked the European bi-century since 1815: between economic integration and social disintegration, i.e. between property and poverty, between constitutions legitimizing authoritarian power and constitutions legitimizing parliamentarian power, between geopolitics for purposes of military and commercial power and international law for the regulation of the global geopolitical conflict. These tensions had to do with the securing of welfare, the creation of political and cultural community, and the ordering of the world.

The nineteenth century has conventionally been seen as an epoch during which the ideas of the French revolution – freedom, equality and solidarity (brotherhood) – began to be implemented. It was in this period that the long, problem-ridden yet irreversible road from authoritarian rule towards constitutional monarchies and ultimately also parliamentary democracies began. Industrial capitalism spread, transforming poor societies into wealthy ones. European empires laid without much noise a web of military, economic and cultural power over the world. Seen in this light, the Vienna peace treaty of 1815 translated the experiences of the French revolution and Napoleon into a century of continental peace and stability.

However, this imagery, connecting fundamental enlightenment values to the present is too simplistic. It offers little insight into the reasons behind the outbreak of two connected world wars and the Russian revolution. Nor does it explain the continental experiences of totalitarianism in the twentieth century. The nineteenth century was far from a teleology of political and economic development from authoritarianism and penury to democracy and general wealth, as the dominating narrative suggests.

In the bicentenary sequence 'postwar–prewar–war–postwar–prewar–war–postwar', 'postwar' meant the concerted attempts at European unification under the motto of never again, prewar meant the erosion, and war the collapse of these attempts. The postwar designs were all attempts to transcend the nations as the locus of political community. They all aimed at creating a European order or community, in Versailles the goal was even a global international community around the League. The repeated attempts to transcend the nation as an organizational principle do not add up to teleological understandings of Europe. In the prewar and war phases, nationalism replaced the vision of never again through international cooperation. Nationalism defeated the dreams of European unification.

The utopia of legal regulation of international politics

The postwar visions of never again were utopian. Historically 'never again' is certainly formally true in the sense that history never repeats itself. To be sure, there are reiterative structures, *Wiederholungsstrukturen*, but the point is that these connect with an infinite spectrum of new elements. Therefore, although they might be similar or analogous, no

historical situation is identical to another [*Koselleck 2003 (2000)*]. In our case, 'never again' was and is utopian in the somewhat different sense that it maintains that social conflicts and claims for change of human conditions can be avoided through legal arrangements. The belief in the potential for the elimination of conflicts and in predictability and management of the future through international rules and agreements constitutes the core of the utopian fantasy in the three cases referred to here.

The utopian belief in question here, which began in Vienna in 1815, is that interstate stability based on intrastate stability, domestic social peace, could be achieved through a 'de-politicization' of interstate relations by means of a peace treaty and various models of political economic growth. According to this vision, international and domestic order and stability constituted one another and could be established via international treaties and a political economy of growth which provided the grease for social peace.

This approach to utopia plays down utopia as a dream of taking down heaven to earth or as an apocalyptic final destruction of the old, existing world as the basis of the final construction of a new world. It is an approach to utopia that keeps it at the level of political practice within a stable legal framework rather than political dreams, although, admittedly, there is no clear distinction between these categories.

This approach to utopia focuses precisely on those utopias which functioned as attempts to stabilize, to prevent dramatic change, to 'freeze time', to organize an order ever more conceived in terms of stability through progress. The focus is not on utopia as revolution but on utopia as social and political stability through economic progress. Utopias emerged to stabilize progress. In all three cases the notion that stability required a functioning economy of growth defined in global terms was central.

The organization of stability and order appealed to law, in particular international law, which was mobilized as a stabilizing instrument and as a means of preventing revolutionary violence or mass wars. Utopian beliefs in law as a regulatory framework enclosing politics prevailed in these situations. This understanding of utopia refers to its harnessing of everyday politics. Everyday utopia is the belief in the future as progress, and at the same time stability through managing and mastering the world, the belief in a project with a clear normative design and architecture.

Utopia in this sense is an instrument in the contested territory and grey zone between the extremes of revolution and anti-revolution, where history is a struggle about the future, where politics is muddling through, and where there is a continuous negotiation and re-negotiation of values. The utopian belief in a stable regulating order and in some permanence provides some clarity – illusory or not – in this foggy terrain.

This approach connects to and draws on Martti Koskenniemi's *From Apology to Utopia,* which adopts a critical view on the relationships between international law and politics, arguing that a professional cadre of international lawyers emerged in the nineteenth century and that central to their self-understanding was the notion that politics and law were separate units. They saw (international) law as a prescriptive norm, which set the rules of the game of (international) politics [*Koskenniemi 2005: 17–19, 54–60, 563–576*].

In order to provide such a prescriptive norm (international) law would have needed the capacity to predict all conceivable situations requiring political action, a condition, which, of course, was and remains impossible to fulfill because history does not repeat itself and therefore does not serve as *vitae magistra*. The international lawyers' argument

that (international) law was enshrined in universally valid rules reflecting the will of the legislator, and that they had the tool to translate universal natural law to concrete positive law covering the full range of possible cases, was normatively powerful but not a very useful guide when political actors looked for legal advice in specific situations or when they showed little regard for the legal framework. Critics held that legal rules and principles have no reality and argued that the performance of international lawyers was mere utopian hypothesizing. Legal concepts were either utopian speculation by international lawyers or instruments of political struggle to advance interests, international law as apology. The view emerged that (international) law was not enshrined in rules reflecting some superior and universally applicable will of the legislator but in broad politics responding to power political interests or functional needs of society, which were redefined continuously in changing concrete historical situations, although legitimized by references to the norm. Rather than being an a-political prescription of political action, law was used to legitimize concrete political practices and expressions of will and interest, which could not have been foreseen when the law was made. This was law as apology, law as justification of whatever political decision as opposed to law as binding political practices regardless of behaviour, will or interest.

Neither utopian legal prescription of what to do nor apologetic political description of what has been done can be consistently preferred, however, because law cannot predict every situation that requires political action, nor is it able to legitimize every political action *ex post*. The use of law oscillated between prescription and description, utopia and apology, law *ex ante* and law *ex post*, but at some point the movement ceased and the peace treaty of never again lost attraction both as legal lodestar and as retrospect point of reference.

This view on utopia, and the interplay between legal rhetoric as prescription and as description is a tool to understand the establishment and final destruction or erosion of the three peace utopias. Law is both utopia and apology although not at the same time; utopia, in that it tries to define and add a regulatory framework to a middle ground of no conflicts and apology since legal arguments are brought forward in order to retrospectively justify actual political decisions even if they violate the utopian norm, and at some point it loses relevance.

A new narrative on the past of today's Europe needs to address this relationship between law and politics. However, the issue is more complicated. The design of a political economy of growth was central in all three peace treaties and the relationships between economic theory and politics can be described analogically. The economists elaborated mobilizing narratives about how the economy functioned. These narratives were as utopian as the legal peace treaties. They promised to provide blueprints for lasting economic progress and social justice. The most convincing tales during the bi-century since Vienna were the classical and neoclassical theories in the wake of Adam Smith, Karl Marx's critique of this liberal narrative, J. M. Keynes's attempt to reformulate it by paying more attention to the role of the state and the psychology of the masses, and Friedrich Hayek's purge of the economy from state influence under the term 'neoliberal'. In one sense these narratives succeeded each other chronologically, in another sense they co-existed in a growing number over time. One of them might have been predominating for a certain time, even been hegemonic, but the others existed as sub-currents of more or less latent challenges. They

all co-existed, intertwined as well as demarcated. These tales of the economists were all utopias in the same sense as the peace treaties of never again. They pretended to provide the prescriptions for economic growth and social wealth. However, they all failed in their prescription for a better world. Their normative *pre*scription became ex post *de*scriptions of political decisions legitimized through references to the economic theory, even if the decisions were far from the theoretical prescriptions.

The social and the national questions

Nationalism – together with democracy – was the great threat to the order that the Directorate wanted to establish in Vienna. Nationalism remains the great threat to the European order in the present. Nationalism is an Ariadne thread through the two centuries since Vienna, which is not to say that it has been a constant. Nationalism has shown many shifting faces and phases.

In the vein of Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson, Eric Hobsbawm, Anthony Smith and many others one can see nationalism as a social construct, an attempt to construct community against the backdrop of the challenges of modernity which often resulted in experiences of a lack of community and social cohesion. Gellner, in particular, emphasized the nation as the community produced by the modern state. Modern school teaching and mass alphabetization were important conveyors of nationalism. One of the most efficient instruments in the intellectual building of nations through nationalism was the imagery of ethnic demarcation to other nations with language as the most distinctive mark. Ethnicity was a basic building material of nationalism [*Gellner 1983; Anderson 1982; Hobsbawm 1990*][1]. Of course, propagators of nationalism do not regard the nation as constructed but as given. Nevertheless, or exactly therefore, primordialist or essentialising theories of ethnicity or national self-determination must be rejected. Ethnic identities are politically constructed, manipulated and changed.

Not only ethnicity through language but also other demarcations like religion were used in the construction of nations through nationalism. Histories and traditions were constructed and mobilized in order to underpin the demarcations between fictions of nations demarcated by imageries of Us and Them, friend and enemy. History was used as retrospective mythology based on selection of facts to remember, but also of what to forget as Ernest Renan phrased it in a classic statement: "Forgetting history, or even getting history wrong are an essential factor in the formation of a nation, which is why the progress of historical studies is often dangerous to a nationality" [*Renan 1882*]. Critical history might in other words not only be constructive but also deconstructive and ideologically explosive.

[1] They all conflated nation as community and nationalism as ideology. Miroslav Hroch [1985] also made a crucial contribution in the constructivist vein through his analysis of the occupational composition and background of nationalist activists in some of Europe's small nations during the nineteenth century [*Hroch 1985*]. To a large extent, the construcivists built on Hans Kohn's seminal work [*Kohn 1969 (1944)*], where nationalism appears as an artificial historical construct, a nineteenth-century addition to older feelings of love for one's place, language and customs. Anthony Smith [1991] relativized the constructivist approach by the argument that modern nations did not crystallize *ex nihilo*. In most cases they emerged from earlier ethnic communities which shared traits such as language, traditions, memories, beliefs in common descent, and sense of collective identity.

However, there was also the understanding of the nation in the French revolution, less in terms of (ethnic) demarcation to other nations than in terms of unification of the citizens around a programme for political and social rights within a state nation: civic nationalism. This was the kind of liberal nationalism that Giuseppe Mazzini, a generation after the French revolution, propagated linking it to cosmopolitan ideas.

A key question deals with how the nineteenth and twentieth century debates on the social question, thematized since the 1830s, and on the class question, thematized since the 1870s, connected to and influenced ethnic and civic versions of nationalism. In economies and polities reorganized through the spread of industrial capitalism, ethnic groups defined in homogenizing terms competed for scarce resources in the same labour or housing or educational or other markets, and proved to be less homogenous than they were meant to be. In their competition, at least for the disadvantaged, group pressure for special favours through 'affirmative action' was a powerful weapon confronting the imagery of national unification [*Hobsbawm 1992*].

In these processes of destabilization of national unity strangers came to be defined in xenophobic terms. Jobs and wages were defended against strangers in situations of tighter labour markets and uncertain future prospects. Reactions to social disintegration aimed at national reintegration of a new kind. The basis of today's French *Front National* and other similar nationalist movements all over Europe is recruited from the lower classes. Eric Hobsbawm has explained the connection between nationalism and poverty:

> But for those who can no longer rely on belonging anywhere else, there is at least one other imagined community to which one can belong: which is permanent, indestructible, and whose membership is certain. Once again, 'the nation', or the ethnic group, 'appears as the ultimate guarantee' when society fails. (…) xenophobia looks like becoming the mass ideology of the 20th century *fin de siècle*. What holds humanity together today is the denial of what the human race has in common [*Hobsbawm 1992: 7–8*].

Bottom-up pressures for national integration led to top-down attempts to control and canalise the pressures. The responses to the social protest covered a broad spectrum from bottom-up populist people's tribunes and top-down Bonapartism to conservative paternalism. Bismarck's imagery of state socialism or social nationalism, which rather than emphasising citizenship or ethnic belonging offered a social paternalism, instead of political rights or ethno-cultural similarity a moral tie linking subjects with the state, mutated into the paternalist Soviet system where the citizens, as in Bismarck's world, were not citizens but subjects presumed to be neither politically active nor ethnically similar to each other, but loyal and grateful recipients. Both orders produced dependency rather than agency.[2]

Hobsbawm's *fin de siècle* ethnic nationalism in Eastern Europe was the alternative to social paternalism that emerged after the implosion of the Soviet empire. It spread to the core of Western Europe in the 2000s as an alternative to the promises of the 1990s of prosperity through market, civil society and global networks of smooth governance. With the implosion of the Soviet Union eroded also the social imaginary of the Western welfare states. The restructuring of the economy, in particular the labour markets since the 1970s, was speeded up and accompanied by the new market language. The liberal market nations

[2] See Verdery [1992] and for Bonapartism, or caesarism, Prutsch [forthcoming].

succeeded the social state nations in Western Europe. When doubts about the social capacity of the market nations emerged against the backdrop of persisting mass unemployment on precarious labour markets and of growing income cleavages the xenophobic ethnic nations also revived in the West, conjured up from history as a new asylum of social justice and peace also in the West.

The struggle with nationalism – in the double sense of struggle *against* it and *with* it as an ideological tool – was at the beginning, for the Vienna Directorate, a struggle with civic nationalism demanding popular sovereignty, as opposed to constitutional monarchical rule in more or less enlightened forms of absolutism. There was certainly an ethnic dimension in the definition of the nation but that dimension was rather played down. The ethnic dimension was more present in the early post-Vienna dreams about Italian and German unification or claims for national sovereignty in Southern Europe, but the focus was on civic claims. Giuseppe Mazzini's project for a European unification of the new liberal nations based on people's sovereignty is a case in point. The demarcation between the nations was in his project compatible with cosmopolitan cooperation among them.

Liberal civic nationalism had few answers when the spread of industrial capitalism in the 1830s brought forward what was called the social question, which demonstrated that national unification under the label of popular sovereignity did not necessarily mean social unification. Industrial capitalism split the nations between those with property and those with poverty.

Social conservative, social democratic and gradually also social liberal approaches tried to combine a civic and a social definition of the nation. The social conservatives did it more in social paternalist top-down forms in order to integrate the subjects of the ruler rather than emancipate them as citizens. The social democratic bottom-up approach driven by the growing class language from the 1870s onwards focussed on the enlargement of the citizen rights to the lower classes. The social conservatives developed concessions as a strategy to prevent revolutions, the social democrats struggled for a social definition of citizenship. The conservative model worked with imaginaries of social monarchy, state socialism, social nationalism or national socialism as a counter-solution to the class struggle socialism. The social integration of the nations occurred as competition between top-down and bottom-up approaches.

The work on social integration led to attempts to strengthen the national unification through strong Us-They/friend-enemy demarcations. Ethnic nationalism underpinned conservative social nationalism. Social imperialism was one expression of the unification of the ethnic and the social in a perverted Darwinian / Spencerian perspective of nations in competitive struggle for survival on world markets. The entanglement of the social and the ethnic was a strong mix which linked welfare to warfare and played down the role of civic nationalism. The entanglement paved the way towards 1914, which is not the same as saying that it caused the world war, since this was a much more complex issue. However, the social-ethnic nationalism was one crucial factor behind the outbreak of the war.

Nationalism supported empire. This was obvious in the national/imperial unifications of Italy and Germany, where the social-ethnic nationalism was particularly crucial in the German case. The French empire collapsed in 1871 when the German one stood up. However, the Third Republic performed as a civic-ethnic/racial empire supported by a civic-ethnic/racial nationalism. The British empire was like the French republic on a civilizing

world mission. In the Russian, Habsburg and Ottoman multi-ethnic empires nationalism was rather used as a device to negotiate degrees of national autonomy within the empires. Finland, Poland and Hungary represent different approaches in that respect.[3]

Versailles 1919 tried to combine civic nationalism and democracy under a world confederation for peace. Mazzini's project recurred, and like his without any special attention to the social question. The liberal attempt faced two great challenges:

1) Free trade, followed up with the gold standard for monetary stability, failed to cope with the social disintegration. This was obvious at the latest during the Great Depression when the social protests enforced general abandonment of the gold standard, and promoted protectionism which linked up with more ethnic forms of nationalism. Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and the Scandinavian countries were among those countries which managed to maintain a strong civic dimension of the protectionist social nationalism. The decisive trend in the wake of the break-down of the Versailles order went in the social-ethnic totalitarian direction, however.
2) Minorities took Woodrow Wilson's promise of national sovereignty seriously and reinforced the ethnic dimension in their claims. The ethnic struggle about who was included in the civic nation changed the peace conceptualisation of the nation in Versailles. A particular and fateful bias in the peace utopia was that the principle of national sovereignty was not applied for Germany.

Whereas the nineteenth-twentieth century development of social nationalism often went together with ethnic nationalism, there was continuously a social-democratic and social-liberal approach which sought to combine social and civic nationalism. The shifting power relationships between these two trends in various parts of Europe determined the shape of nationalism.

The Cold War brought the (West) European rescue of the nation state around the idea of welfare through economic growth and free trade. A division of labour emerged in the European integration project between the community and the member state levels. This (West) European model for a civic social nationalism in national welfare communities of destiny in the framework of the Cold War was the closest the continent came to Mazzini's ideal of a merger of national sovereignty and international cooperation in a *sui generis* arrangement. As opposed to Mazzini's vision the model in the 1950s and 1960s was based on an elaborated political economy which de-ethnicized the West-European nations and transformed them to national communities of destiny based on the provision of welfare. This was the utopia of Keynes, building on a different Us-They demarcation than ethnicity, namely ideology, the demarcation between liberal Western and communist Eastern Europe. The civic nationalism promoted by the European integration project had a more distinct social profile than Mazzini's model and the key word was welfare rather than citizen. Nationalism is maybe not the right label, since it was less the matter of a loud ideology propagating the nation as opposed to other nations than softer feelings of national community and allegiance which emerged through welfare. Another difference was that the West European unification was far from Mazzini's cosmopolitan cooperation between the nations. It was a unification of states, rather than nations, prepared for war in the iron cage of the Cold War. Allocation of welfare was a key tool in this preparation for warfare.

[3] For a comparison of the Russian and Ottoman empires, see Brisku [forthcoming].

The collapse of the Bretton Woods order and the transformation of the labour markets in the 1970s with mass unemployment and social marginalisation eroded the social integration and its imagery of affluent society. The new segmentation on the labour markets around company-specific schedules which differentiated between fixed and occasional employment broke down national solidarity patterns and identity constructions since the 1870s. The Keynesian utopia of the European rescue of the nation states lost also apologetic credibility as a legitimising point of reference.

Hayek replaced Keynes as a utopian guide. In the Hayekian neoliberal utopia the social dimension was lost, and the new civic nations were based on individual market-oriented European and national citizens. 'Privatisation' was a new key word meaning the outsourcing of welfare commitments from the public sphere to private entrepreneurship. After 1990 and the collapse of the Soviet empire the utopian prescription was in that respect the same in both Eastern and Western Europe, but the consequences were much more palpable in the East where hordes of Western economic experts recommended massive sales of state property to private interests as the fast royal road to democracy. The privatisation project in Russia but also in other parts of the former Soviet Union like Ukraine ended up in a system of superrich oligarchs.

For most of the former Soviet satellites in central and Eastern Europe the door to membership in the EU opened. The internal market promised Western capital investments in the East for the reconstruction of the Central and East European economies with growing employment prospects and increasing wages there, and, in addition, employment possibilities in the West for labour from the East. The neoliberal theory promised to have the key to fast modernisation in Eastern Europe which also was the key to democracy. However, the neoliberal promise and prescription for Eastern Europe propagated by the Western economic experts and governments met with resistance from the populations in the West. The Western populations imagined cheap labour *from* the East forcing down wages in the West, and cheap labour *in* the East inciting companies to move there with jobs from the West. The fear of such developments made deep inroads into the middle classes in the West who put pressures for protection on their governments. The social question was no longer an exclusive concern of the lower classes. The horizons of expectations outlined in the East after the fall of the Soviet system narrowed down to gloomy perspectives of wage dumping and loss of jobs in the West, and of discrimination and exclusion ('social tourism') for labour from the East on Western labour markets, perspectives which triggered xenophobic sentiments and ethnic nationalism.

Welfare and warfare

Nobody knew better how to exploit and politically shape the entangled dynamics of the social and the national issues than Otto von Bismarck. He appropriated the social question from the socialists and the national question from the liberals. He combined welfare and warfare in a programme for a new kind of social integration of all classes and for German imperial unification through a series of wars against the neighbouring states of Denmark, Austria and France. The fact that he did not hesitate to get rid of competition from the Habsburg**s** by excluding German-speaking Austria from the national unification demonstrates his capacity to adapt strong ideological rhetoric to *Realpolitik* and his capacity to

steer opinions rather than riding on them. Bismarck deconstructed the foundation of the peace utopia in Vienna and put Europe on a new track. The imagery of social monarchy based on a unification of *Kaiser* and *Volk* was his loadstar. He tried to keep his model at a European level, but he released forces that he could not stop. After the unification in 1871, at first seen as a final goal, he was drawn into colonial expansion in the 1880s. Wilhelm II thought that Bismarck was too cautious and dismissed him in 1890. The emperor radicalised Bismarck's politics and connected his vision of social monarchy to the politics of social imperialism.[4]

On the basis of warfare and welfare Bismarck confronted and nullified the Vienna peace treaty. Before him Cavour had done the same for Italy, although there the goal of the unification was rather the completion of Mazzini's liberal unification project than the integration of the working class, which hardly existed as a class in Italy at this time. In Vienna the goal had been to contain the continental power of Russia against the maritime power of Britain through a protective belt of German and Italian states monitored by Prussia and Austria. This balance between the land and the maritime powers was maintained in Europe but soon developed into a conflict in Asia. After German unification the British-Russian polarity became a British-German-Russian triangular tension where France sided with Britain, and later also with Russia, and Austria and Italy with Germany. The Vienna polarity became multipolar. The growing social tensions after 1870 rejected the free trade ideology and protectionism spread across Europe emphasizing the reinforcement of national borders. Protectionism was an instrument to decrease social tensions and promote feelings of national community but increased international tensions.

Major ruptures in the bicentenary European search for a global political economy occurred in the 1870s, the 1920s/1930s, and the 1970s/1990s. In all three ruptures the crucial problem was the linkage between welfare and warfare. The rupture in the 1870s took the form of a geopolitical shift as Bismarck and Cavour confronted the Vienna peace and the British hegemony through the establishment of a new kind of power balance based on a pact system and empire building.

Germany and Italy were similarly central in the next rupture which took place during the 1920s and the 1930s. Their imperial expansion confronted the peace utopia of Versailles and their transition from democracies to totalitarian regimes was entirely at odds with the programme championed by Woodrow Wilson. Italy followed by Germany developed alternative politics when the attempts in 1919 to reestablish a liberal economy failed. The emphasis on state and welfare in fascism and Nazism thus constituted a degree of continuity with Bismarck's policies, which also took place against the backdrop of a deep crisis of economic liberalism. The instrument for domestic peace was warfare. Until the mid-1930s Roosevelt was very interested in the German and Italian crisis therapies in his own search for a solution to the economic collapse in 1929. It was only when the German and Italian warfare politics inside and outside Europe (beginning with the conquest of Ethiopia) became too ostentatious that he demarcated himself from the nazi and fascist regimes.[5]

[4] For social monarchy, see von Stein [1848 (1842); 1855]. For social imperialism, see Wehler [1969; 1977 (1973)].
[5] For Roosevelt's interest in the German and Italian crisis therapies, see Schivelbusch [2005].

The third rupture in the 1970s and 1980s – connected to the end of the reconstruction boom in both the West and the East and the emergence of a new international order in the wake of de-colonialism – occurred in the framework of economic stagnation leading to the end of the era of planned economy in mixed or pure form, ten years earlier in the West than in the East. In the ex-post neoliberal explanations the collapse of the American economic and political hegemony in the Western sphere and of the Soviet hegemony in the Eastern sphere of the Cold War was frequently referred to as the consequence of overly expansive social welfare programmes which suffocated economic entrepreneurship. A more credible explanation might point instead to the crippling cost of the arms race of the Cold War and the wars in the Third World (most prominently Vietnam and Afghanistan), hot parts of the Cold War. This remains a question for further comparative research. However, the rupture meant – that much can be said – that the mutually reinforcing dynamics of welfare and arms race, driven by and driving the Cold War, came to an end. In that sense there was a difference as compared to the previous ruptures which had reinforced the welfare-warfare dynamics. It seems that these long-term dynamics, at work since the 1870s, in the end overexploited the financial scope of the bipolar world of the Cold War.

The end of the Cold War meant, in terms of political economy, that the belief in the social capacity of the state eroded. The US-dominated international order of Bretton Woods was replaced by American influence over the economic and political affairs of the world, through the ideological power of neoliberalism and the key concept of globalization. The breakthrough of neoliberalism was the consequence of the collapse of the Bretton Woods order in the 1970s which resulted in a long-term shift from industrial to financial capitalism as the hub of the economy. Whereas the economic crisis in the 1870s had precipitated liberalism into a deep and long-lasting crisis, the outcome of the economic crisis a century later was the triumph of what was called neoliberalism, inspired by the economic theory of Friedrich Hayek. One of the most important achievements of neoliberal politics was the break-up of the centenary welfare-warfare compact. Welfare was outsourced from public financial schemes and privatized and warfare changed character from preparations for war through mass armies to small scale emergency expeditions. The war on terror required different approaches than the Cold War. What Putin's ongoing attempt to reanimate the old model means in this respect is a question for the future.

In terms of its practical manifestations neoliberalism might more accurately be referred to as hyperliberalism. At the moment of its triumph the historical glance was directed towards an idealized epoch of free trade in the nineteenth century, which had never existed. For the rest, it was directed towards the future and historical experiences were thrown overboard. The period became history-less. The liberal turn around 1990 represents in a way the most dramatic rupture with the past since 1815. There was a far greater degree of continuity when democracy during the second rupture turned into totalitarianism in the 1920s and 1930s. The *consequences* of totalitarianism were certainly dramatic but they should be understood against the backdrop of a long European history of violence, authoritarian regimes, and absolutism, enlightened or not. Moreover, democratic responses competed with the totalitarian reactions to the world crisis. The response was less hegemonic than in the 1870s and the 1970s. The liberal triumph in 1990 was in the end as brief as the triumph in 1919, however. We are still living through the rupture of the 1970s like the

world in the 1920s and the 1930s, after the brief parenthesis created in Versailles, connected to the rupture in the 1870s.

A fourth rupture is discernible since the collapse of the neoliberal financial markets around 2010, but since we are still living in this rupture it is difficult to analyze it with sufficient clarity. However, there is historical continuity in the continued relevance of the relationships between the social and the national questions, and between welfare and warfare.

Democracy, populism, authoritarianism and totalitarianism

For the peace-makers in Vienna, democracy together with the connected concept of national sovereignty, was the great threat to order and stability. After the French revolution, democracy connoted disobedience and disorder. Kant avoided the term when he wrote about perpetual peace and preferred an international order of civic republics. The frequent constitutions which were written during the half century after the American independence declaration in 1776 dealt with regulation of the balance of power between the king and the representatives of the people [*Grotke – Prutsch 2014*]. The representatives of the people did quite obviously not represent the whole of the population as in today's understanding of democracy, but represented an expansion of the power basis from the aristocracy to the educated and propertied middle classes, but this was a representation that competed with the royal claim that the monarch represented the people. With the growing incomes of the working classes and with emerging mass societies based on faster communication to transport people and information, claims for broader participation in the political system grew stronger. The power basis for competition with the king grew. These claims had two targets: universal suffrage, first by implication understood as universal male suffrage, but with growing claims for the inclusion of women in the term 'universal', and on the basis of general elections, increasing claims for more power to the parliaments through the institutionalization of parliamentarianism as principle, i.e. that the governments were responsible to the parliament rather than the monarch. In these struggles democracy became an ever more mobilizing term during the last third of the nineteenth century.

The struggle for parliamentarianism in Europe was tough and its success uneven. It was far from an irresistible development which somehow, sooner or later, had to lead to a triumph of democracy. The model for many of those struggling for parliamentary democracy was Britain, but there, too, the issue of universal suffrage was subject to great conflicts during the whole of the nineteenth century. Parliamentarianism in Britain meant still on the eve of World War I a power concentration based on the merger of old landed aristocracy and new industrial capital on the one side and the monarchical power centre on the other. The suffrage was extended through reforms in 1832, 1867 and 1884, but it was only in 1918/1928 that women were also granted suffrage rights. Extended (male) voting rights did not necessarily go hand in hand with extended parliamentary power. The votes could also support or confirm authoritarian regimes like in Bismarck's and Wilhelm II's *Reich*. Bismarck saw universal suffrage as an instrument to secure legitimacy for his rule. He could draw on the experience of Napoleon III who based his power on a referendum [*Prutsch forthcoming*]. There is continuity to Orbán and today's Hungary in this respect. The conclusion of the nineteenth century historical experience is clear: neither parliamentarianism nor universal suffrage did necessarily mean democracy.

The two world wars brought growing power to the masses and to the parliaments. The masses were needed in the total mobilizations of the wars which implied that their voices and influence grew. In Northern and Western Europe this development increased the strength of the parliaments, but in Central and Eastern Europe the collapse of the Habsburg and Ottoman empires led rather to populist authoritarian regimes. The developments in Italy and Germany demonstrated how razor-thin the edge between democracy and totalitarianism was.

A recent academic discussion sees fascism as an anti-liberal democratic civil society movement. The point is the distinction between liberal democracy in the sense of representative parliamentarianism and more direct forms of democracy [*Riley 2010; see also Müller 2011; 2015*]. Hitler was appointed as chancellor within a democratic order, although at that time run by emergency decrees. The Weimar republic was a very interesting but brief experiment. Max Weber, who just experienced its beginning before he died, wrote in *Politics as a Vocation*, that politics is a strong and slow boring of hard planks. It takes both passion and perspective [*Weber 1919: 66*].[6] The problem was that the politicians in the Weimar republic hardly followed this prescription for the patient work on compromises between clashing interests. In particular, the social democrats and the communists failed to agree on a strategy to prevent Hitler and on a strategy to confront the economic crisis and the mass unemployment; the two parties thus bear a special responsibility for the *Machtergreifung* in addition to that of the aging president and the entourage of advisors who formally put the Nazi leader in power.

After World War II, Weimar rather served in Western Europe as a warning example, reinforced through the other warning example, the Stalinist regime in the Soviet Union and its satellite regimes installed by coups under the label of 'people's republics' in Central and Eastern Europe. The insight in Western Europe was that democracy could be dangerous and had to be controlled. The Nazi vocabulary of *völkisch* and the appropriation of the term people's republic by the communist postwar regimes demonstrated that 'the rule of the people' could be the point of reference for politics in very different directions; yes, indeed, it could even be manipulated. Mass politics did not necessarily lead to democracy. Populism, authoritarianism, and totalitarianism belonged as much as representative parliamentarianism to the European experiences of the era of the two world wars and one cannot speak about a European democratic standard with exceptional totalitarian cases. The experience was that democracy was fragile and could change its features. Democracy could contain the germ of its opposite.[7]

A realistic reading of the historical experiences since Vienna suggests that democracy did not emerge from the enlightenment or the French revolution. It was in any case not an immediate enlightenment heritage, as little as it was an immediate heritage from ancient Greece. Democracy broke through after the massive mobilization for two world wars and the experiences of these wars. Furthermore, totalitarianism was at least as much as democracy the consequence of this mobilization and these experiences.

[6] "Ein starkes langsames Bohren von harten Brettern mit Leidenschaft und Augenmaß zugleich."

[7] For the fragility of democracy and its entanglements with populism or mutation into totalitarianism, see in particular Müller [2011; 2015] but also Riley [2010] and Prutsch [forthcoming].

This was the situation that the founding fathers of the European integration project and architects of the third peace utopia reacted to. They wanted a predictable order. Whereas the era of the two world wars was experienced in terms of populism, authoritarianism and totalitarianism as much as, or more than democracy, with a mix of traditional and charismatic as much as rational rule strategies, to stay with Weber's scheme, they now wanted democracy guided by rational rule. Technocrats, who knew how welfare for the people could be combined with allegiance to the political leadership but differently than in the Third Reich, and who knew how European economies of growth could be established through the application of the Keynesian/ordoliberal toolkit became the guardians of democracy defined through demarcation from the people's democracies in Eastern Europe. Full employment, a fair distribution of incomes and property, and the interactive dynamics of mass consumption and mass production constituted the economic framework of a political order which was experienced as stable and based on confidence in the future. Democracy and its economic framework were hierarchically and technocratically organized in an order described as the European rescue of the nation state [*Milward 1992*]. The key to democracy was not politics but wise rule-governed administration.

This West European model of democracy through division of labour between (Western) Europe and its nation states lasted for a couple of decades during the reconstruction boom. It was only now that the nation states came closer to strong amalgamation of the two concepts. Earlier there were states and nations with a shifting degree of overlap but seldom fully congruent.

The collapse of the Bretton Woods order and of the labour markets in the early 1970s marked the end of stability and predictability. The Keynesian/ordoliberal toolkit ceased to function and the labour markets based on fixed jobs under conditions of full employment were fundamentally changed with lasting mass unemployment and social marginalization as new phenomena, which eroded the legitimacy of the technocratic democracy based on the political management of the economies, and narrowed down the horizons of expectations.

The search for a new organization of the economy and of labour markets in the 1970s and 1980s resulted in the shift from the Keynesian to the Hayekian utopia, with a different view on the issue of democracy. Not technocratic organization of the economy but the market was now the key to democracy. The market nations replaced the technocratic state nations and democracy and citizenship was defined in new ways. Instead of government understood in state administrative, technocratic and hierarchical terms came the language of 'governance' as the new custodian of democracy, understood in horizontal civil society network terms. The focus shifted from democracy as organized top-down by state institutions to bottom-up achievements by self-organizing citizens driven and promoted by the market. The dynamic growth in the new globalized economy would absorb the outcasts and re-integrate them onto the labour markets.

The belief in the democracy-through-market model weakened in the 2000s against the backdrop of experiences of growing social inequalities, not least between Eastern and Western Europe in the context of an enlarged European Union. The earlier cleavage between Northern and Southern Europe had been bridged by expectations of growth on the internal market and of cash transfers for regional support in Southern Europe. The euro crisis in the wake of the collapse of the financial markets in 2008 has dramatically

destroyed this vision and added a North-South cleavage to the East-West one. A new moralistic language with an essentialising dimension is permeating Europe building a divide between Northern and Southern Europe. The key concept in this development is debt, which in the Germanic languages in Germany and Northern Europe has a double meaning. *Schuld*, *skuld* covers not only debt but also guilt. *Schuld/skuld* is not only something you owe to a creditor in a technical sense but has also a religious connotation of sin with a Christian protestant subtext. Puritan asceticism and rigidity as ideals in the North are played off against stereotypes of lust for life and voluptuousness in the South. Religious symbols are giving meaning to the financial crisis that shakes Europe and which nobody really understands in a technical sense.

The ongoing renationalization and de-Europeanisation of Europe and the more radical nationalism since the 2000s, in particular since the collapse of the global financial order in 2008 and the subsequent state debt and euro crisis, has had an obvious impact on the issue of democracy in Europe. What, more precisely, is the character of this impact is remains to be seen.

The changing preconditions of democracy should not only be related to the immediate effects of the euro crisis, however, but also to a long European history, since Vienna and earlier, of an anything but stable development of democracy. One might say that the fall of communism and the triumph of market liberalism did not perpetuate liberal democracy as the ideology triumphing around 1990 suggested, but the challenges continue following a long historical pattern.

Parliamentarian representative democracy was always an ideal but far from a European standard. The question is what the economic crisis since 2008 and, more generally, the fast digital development of global financial capitalism has meant for the preconditions of representative democracy with its centre in the legislative assemblies of the nation states.

Conclusion

The historical connection of welfare and warfare and the reiterative sequence of post-war never again-prewar-war outline an alternative view on Europe's past, different from the conventional narrative about a progressive fulfilment of the enlightenment promise through a slow and tough but at the end implacable triumph of constitutional monarchy over authoritarianism and absolutism, and of the transformation of monarchic rule into people's rule and democracy.

Revolutions and wars promoted the search for peace and stability through legal rules and a viable political economy. However, the idea of a legal framework for politics and theoretical prescriptions for the political management of the economy was difficult to implement. Future challenges and the political reactions to them were much less predictable than the legal rules and the economic theories assumed. The spread of industrial capitalism linked new forms of private property concentration to new forms of poverty, economic integration to social disintegration. The responses to experiences of social disintegration were not only state socialism like in Bismarck's Germany but also ethnic nationalism striving for social reintegration around new friend-enemy imaginaries. Welfare went hand in hand with warfare and social imperialism. The continuous social-democratic attempts after 1870 and in the end also social liberal attempts to achieve social integration through

gradual reforms could not conceal the fact that Europe on the eve of 1914 was still mainly authoritarian, and the fact that Germany applied universal male suffrage and Britain was ruled through the Parliament did not mean democracy. The argument is that democracy did not follow from enlightenment philosophy but from the mass mobilization for the world wars, which, however, led to totalitarianism as much as democracy in Europe. The present squeeze of democracy in Europe, between xenophobic nationalism and social disintegration provoked by the global economic integration of the financial markets has a long history behind it. The trajectory of democracy is much shorter.

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Bo Stråth was 2007–2014 Academy of Finland Distinguished Professor in Nordic, European, and World History and Director of Research at the University of Helsinki; 1997–2007 professor of contemporary history at the European University History, Florence, and 1990–1996 professor of history at Göteborg University. Bo Stråth's research has focused on the philosophy of history and the political, social and economic theory of modernity, from the perspective of a conceptual history, with special attention to the question of what keeps societies together or divides them, and how community is constructed. Publications include The Political History of European Integration *(co-authored, Routledge 2010) and* Europe's Utopias of Peace *(Bloomsbury, forthcoming).*

From Domination to Autonomy: Two Eras of Progress in World-sociological Perspective*

PETER WAGNER**

Od panství k autonomii: Dvě období pokroku z hlediska světové sociologie

Abstract: In recent decades, the belief in progress that was widespread across the two centuries following the French Revolution has withered away. This article suggests, though, that the diagnosis of the end of progress can be used as an occasion to rethink what progress meant and what it might mean today. The proposal for rethinking proceeds in two big steps. First, the meaning of progress that was inherited from the Enlightenment is reconstructed and contrasted with the way progress actually occurred in history. In this step, it is demonstrated that progress was expected through human autonomy, but that it was actually brought about by domination and resistance to domination. A look at the short revival of progress after the middle of the twentieth century will confirm this insight and direct the attention to the transformation of the world over the past half century, on which the second step focuses. This socio-political transformation is analyzed as spelling (almost) the end of formal domination. The current era has often been characterized by the tendencies towards globalization and individualization as well as, normatively, by the increasingly hegemonic commitment to human rights and democracy. A critical analysis of the current socio-political constellation, however, shows that the end of formal domination does not mean the end of history; it rather requires the elaboration of a new understanding of possible progress. Progress can no longer predominantly be achieved through resistance to domination, but rather through autonomous collective action and through the critical interpretation of the world one finds onself in.

Keywords: modernity; progress; autonomy; domination; resistance

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Between 1979 and 1989 the world changed. 1979 is the year of the second oil-price hike, of the Iranian Revolution, of the election of Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and of the publication of Jean-François Lyotard's *Condition postmoderne*. 1989 is the year of the fall of the Berlin Wall, during which political scientist Francis Fukuyama declared "the end of history" and philosopher Richard Rorty put his suggestion that social and political thought may already have had "the last conceptual revolution it needs" between book covers. Lyotard claimed that societies are not as intelligible as social

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** Prof. Peter Wagner, ICREA and Department of Sociological Theory, Philosophy of Law and Methodology of the Social Sciences, University of Barcelona, Diagonal Nord, Diagonal 690, 08034 Barcelona. E-mail: peter.wagner@ub.edu.

and political thought had assumed and were far from having embarked on a historical trajectory of linear evolution. Iran, in turn, had long been seen as being on a stable course of "modernization and development", but the overthrow of the Shah regime demonstrated that other avenues are possible. Ten years later, the beginning of the end of Soviet-style socialism, in contrast, seemed to confirm the view that "there is no alternative", to paraphrase Margaret Thatcher, to market capitalism and liberal democracy. In their characteristically different ways, Fukuyama and Rorty assessed and welcomed this new situation in society and politics as well as in intellectual life.

Despite their all-too-evident flaws, Lyotard's, Fukuyama's and Rorty's ideas captured an important aspect of their time. We may call this aspect: the end of progress. On the face of it, Lyotard suggested that progress was not – or: no longer – possible, whereas Fukuyama and Rorty claimed that all significant progress had already been achieved. The upshot, though, is the same: if the diagnosis is correct, progress is no longer possible in our time. Even the relentless theoretical optimist, Jürgen Habermas, declared his adherence to the spirit of the time by calling the end of Soviet socialism a "catching-up revolution" [*Habermas 1990*]. Like the hare in the tale, "progressive" political activists around the world found themselves at the end of their race in the face of the liberal-democrat hedgehog who smilingly says "I am already here".

But now it seems that, like the hedgehog couple, liberal-democratic philosophy of history has played a mirror trick on humankind. Upon arrival, the final destination of the journey did not at all correspond with the image that had been used for publicity. From the 1990s onwards, unbound capitalism has led to increase of inequality, worsening of working conditions, and the dismantling of the welfare state there where it existed. There are now large areas on the planet where lawfulness no longer exists, and violence is ever more widespread. Furthermore, the ecology of the planet is ever more imbalanced, moving us rapidly closer to the moment at which living conditions will dramatically deteriorate due to climate change. All we can expect, therefore, seems to be a continuation of wars and violence, poverty and inequality, exploitation and oppression, interrupted only, at best, by spatially and temporally limited periods in which relative peace, well-being, equality and freedom can be obtained. The optimism of those who thought that the promise of progress has already been fulfilled has yielded to the pessimism of those who thought that lasting progress is unachievable. The only possible meaning of progress in our time, as Claus Offe [2010] recently suggested, is the avoidance of regress.

The following reasoning starts out from the assumption that we cannot just accept the end of progress. Instead we should use this diagnosis as an occasion to rethink what progress meant and what it might mean today. The proposal for rethinking will proceed in two big steps. First, we will try to reconstruct the meaning of progress that we inherited from the Enlightenment and contrast it with the way progress actually occurred in history. In this step, we will try to demonstrate that progress was expected through human autonomy, but that it was actually brought about by domination and resistance to domination. A look at the short revival of progress after the middle of the twentieth century will confirm this insight and direct our attention to the transformation of the world over the past half century, on which the second step will focus. This socio-political transformation, which I referred to earlier as the destructuring of organized modernity [*Wagner 1994*], will be analyzed as spelling (almost) the end of formal domination. The era after

organized modernity has often been characterized by the tendencies towards globalization and individualization as well as, normatively, by the increasingly hegemonic commitment to human rights and democracy. This is reflected in the view, cited above, that all possible progress has already been achieved. A critical analysis of the current socio-political constellation shows that the end of formal domination does not mean the end of history, but it does require the elaboration of a new understanding of possible progress. Progress can no longer predominantly be achieved through resistance to domination, but rather through autonomous collective action and through the critical interpretation of the world one finds oneself in.

From autonomy to domination: a short history of progress

The strong idea of progress

In the most general sense, progress means improvement in the living conditions of human beings, not least in their ways of living together. Progress is always temporal; it refers to improvement through a comparison over time. In this general sense, human beings have always been concerned with progress, to the best of our knowledge. They have seen it happening and have reflected on the reasons for it, not least on the conditions for bringing it about. They have also witnessed decline and have reflected on possibilities of avoiding it. Observing their past, they have sometimes made distinctions between improvements in some respects and decline in others. Mostly, they did not expect improvements to be lasting accomplishments. Everything that could improve could also deteriorate again, and was likely to do so at some point.

However, something very particular occurred in Europe during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The expectation arose that comprehensive improvement was possible, improvement in all respects. And such improvement would not necessarily be only temporary. It could be sustained in the long run, and every future situation could be subject to further improvement. Furthermore, such comprehensive improvement was not only possible; it was even likely to happen because one had gained insight into the conditions for it to emerge. This change of expectations was the invention of progress. As we shall see, it is these events to which those of the present provide the mirror. They mark the moment when the race between hare and hedgehog started. We will not be able to run it again, but to understand where we are now we have to review its course.

By 1800, the re-interpretation of the idea of progress had such pronounced effects that historians have spoken of a "rupture in societal consciousness", more precisely associated with the French Revolution as the moment of breakthrough of the new concept [*Koselleck – Reichardt 1988*]. In possibly the most striking formulation, Reinhart Koselleck has captured the emergence of the new idea of progress as the separation of the horizon of expectations from the space of experience, thus as the wide opening of the horizon of time [*Koselleck 1979*]. That which was possible in the future was no longer determined by the experiences of the past.

In comparison with any view of improvement held before, the new concept of progress marked a radical break. It connected normative advances in the human condition with a long and linear perspective. And it disconnected those advances from direct human agency; progress itself came to be endowed with causal agency. We can call this a strong

concept of progress. It envisaged a positive transformation in the human condition of a radical kind that had never been considered as even remotely possible before. Doing so, it detached the normative expectations regarding the future from the current evidence about social life in Europe – the place where this concept emerged – during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Put in these terms, one immediately recognizes our current distance from this conception of progress. We are not inclined to hold this strong belief any longer. Our doubts concern both the underlying philosophy of history, with its normative-evolutionist thrust, and the "method", namely the detaching of expectations from experiences. Turning things around, it is precisely to better understand our experiences with progress that we need to inquire into the assumptions on which this concept of progress was built.

This inquiry quickly yields a first and very general result. Those whom we call Enlightenment thinkers shared one basic assumption on which everything else was built: they saw human beings as capable of autonomy and as endowed with reason. Reason allowed them the insight into the problems they were facing and the development of the means to solve them. Autonomy allowed them to choose the adequate means and to take the appropriate action. This is what enables improvement in terms of solving problems. Furthermore, human beings have memory and can learn. Therefore, rather than every generation having to address the same problem again, successive generations can build on the achievements of the earlier ones and improve on them. This connection of reason, autonomy and learning capacity is what creates the conditions for historical progress of humankind.

If this is so, one further question immediately arises, namely the question why there was not more and more sustained progress in human history up to 1800. But this question, too, found a plausible answer at the time. Humankind then stood only at the "exit from self-incurred immaturity" (Immanuel Kant). It had not yet dared to make full use of its capacity to reason; and often enough human beings had not been free, they were living under various forms of domination. But this was about to change, not least as a consequence of Enlightenment thought, so one assumed. And once the conditions for human beings to live autonomously and reason freely were created, then progress would impose itself and could no longer be stopped. With this additional insight, we not only understand why there was not that much progress before 1800; we are furthermore given reasons why expectations about future progress under conditions of autonomy should detach themselves from the past experiences made under conditions of "immaturity".

The two preceding paragraphs are a caricature of Enlightenment thought. Hardly any thinker can be found who endorses this reasoning in such a simplistic way. But a caricature exaggerates features that are indeed there, and so does this one. In other words, without maintaining some commitment to the beneficial combination of freedom and reason, it would have been impossible to arrive at the strong notion of progress described further above, and to display the optimism that goes along with it.

Progress misconceived

In historical reality, however, freedom had by far not been achieved by all. Rather, a minority of free human beings exercised their autonomy with a view to dominating nature, others outside their own society, and the unfree majority in their own society. And this domination, in turn, was increasingly resisted by this unfree majority, by the

dominated others elsewhere and also by nature. Much of the "progress", in the sense of transformation of the human condition, over the two centuries dominated by the strong concept, therefore, was not due to the interaction between free human beings, but resulted from domination and the resistance to domination.[1] Intellectually, clearly, the European nineteenth century stood in the shadow of the Enlightenment and its commitment to autonomy. But in terms of practices and institutions much less so. With the Vienna Congress of 1815, the revolutionary period was over for the time being. The revolutionary moments of 1830, 1848 and 1871 signal that the imaginary of autonomy was alive in Europe. But their occurrence and their suppression also demonstrate that European societies had not at all yet been transformed in the light of this imaginary. For reasons of this discrepancy between intellectual change and socio-political change, observers have misinterpreted the European nineteenth century as a history of progress based on autonomy and, accordingly, have exaggerated the consequences of autonomy. Critical theorists from Marx to Weber to Adorno, and with an echo in Lyotard, have assumed that the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries witnessed the undermining of autonomy in the process of its realization. Actual historical practice, however, was not shaped by generalized autonomy, but rather by the combination of an increase of autonomy of the European elites with domination over nature, over the majority of the European population and with colonial domination. From the elites' point of view, this combination generated progress. From the point of view of critical theorists, it did not, but these theorists failed to recognize how progress had been derailed: not by the consequences of autonomy as such, but by the limited exercise of autonomy in combination with domination.

In some respects, the socio-political transformations engendered by such domination and the resistance to it may indeed have spelt progress, at some moment and in some place, in the sense of normative advances: progress of knowledge and material progress, but also progress of emancipation, inclusion and recognition. But such progress was not achieved on the grounds hypothesized by the advocates of the strong concept of progress. The important conclusion to be drawn from this insight, then, is that the withering away of progress in the recent past cannot be due to flaws in the Enlightenment idea of a progressive articulation of freedom and reason. That idea cannot even be said to have been refuted, as Lyotard put it. Because the conditions for its application were not fulfilled, rather, there was no way of knowing by experience whether it was flawed or not. In a world marked by domination, we do not know how and with which outcome human beings make use of their reason.

A short-lived return of progress

By the middle of the twentieth century it already seemed that the concept of progress had virtually been abandoned. In his posthumously published "Theses on history" of 1940, interpreting a painting by Paul Klee, Walter Benjamin evokes the image of the angel of history. The angel is looking towards the past, "one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet", but is driven towards the

[1] Some readers may see here an affinity to the reasoning proposed by critical theorists from Marx onwards, and some such affinity indeed exists. However, Marx and other critical theorists erred by following Enlightenment thinkers in the assumption that the era of full autonomy had already begun.

future, "to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward", by a storm. "This storm is what we call progress." In this reading, what for more than a century had been called progress is seen as indeed having powerful agential capacity, driving history, which is not in the hands of human beings. This image draws on the strongest version of the concept of progress that we identified at the beginning, progress itself as an agent. But now this "progress" has turned out to be an agent of destruction. A few years later, after the defeat of Nazism and the end of the Second World War, Karl Jaspers in *The origin and goal of history,* evokes a different image for a similar purpose: "World history may look like a chaos of chance events – in its entirety like the swirling waters of a whirlpool. It goes on and on, from one muddle to another, from one disaster to another, with brief flashes of happiness, with islands that remain for a short time protected from the flood, till they too are submerged" [*Jaspers 1953: 270*].

These authors try to interpret the disastrous first half of the twentieth century, and they come to the conclusion that there is no hope for progress, or worse, in Benjamin's image, that the direction of history is one of increasing destruction. In the light of our earlier observations, however, we can read these philosophies of history much more contextually: What they signal is not the end of progress in general, but the end of European domination that engendered a particular kind of progress. This contextual reading finds confirmation in a second, comparative observation.

Apparently unperturbed by these European worries, namely, the concept of progress re-emerged, even in a rather strong form, but at a different site, in North America, reflecting the new hegemony in the world after the end of the Second World War. Looking from a position of victory rather than defeat, US authors often expressed optimism about addressing and solving the problems that still remained. In academic terms, this optimism was most clearly and strongly expressed in the sociology of modernization, which is the philosophy of history attached to the functionalist theory of "modern society", as most prominently elaborated by Talcott Parsons.

This thinking drew on the Enlightenment commitment to freedom and reason, but developed yet another interpretation of it. Progress was now possible on the basis of the institutionalization of autonomy in a functionally differentiated "modern society". It was suggested, on the one hand, that societies could be based on autonomy and initiative without risking unpredictability, because freedom was exercised in well-defined institutional frames, and on the other hand, that such initiative within these frames would produce further improvement through economic growth and scientific advance. This state had supposedly already been reached in some societies, most notably in the USA, and it was approached in some West European societies, while so-called Third World societies had embarked on a more long-term, but equally progressive path of "modernization and development". Thus, the European despair of mid-century was swept away by the US enthusiasm of the 1960s. Even the last major political problem from the US point of view, the presence of Soviet socialism, would be solved by gradual processes of convergence driven by functional requirements.

But this enthusiasm proved to be short-lived: The protest movements of the 1960s, domestically as well as internationally, challenged the idea that an institutional situation had been reached in which smooth progress was possible. In turn, the failure of these movements to bring about significant political change in the West, jointly with the return

of economic crises, triggered the declaration of the end of all grand narratives, another declaration of the end of progress. It was as if the history from 1789 to 1940 repeated itself in fast motion between 1945 and 1979.

Thus, we need to take a closer look at the recent past to understand what happened to progress. More precisely, we need to ask three questions about the past half century: First, we need to understand in new terms the socio-political constellation that was created between the end of the Second World War and the 1970s, also known as the "trente glorieuses", given that it had been misconceived as the functionally efficient institutionalization of freedom. Secondly, it remains an open question why decades of intense critical activity by social movements that often understood themselves as "progressive", between the 1960s and the 1980s, resulted in the withering away of progress. And this withering away of progress itself, thirdly, needs to be more closely scrutinized. Just as the return of progress after the Second World War was short-lived because it was based on an erroneous socio-political diagnosis, the disappearance of progress from the political agenda may be due to a misreading of recent occurrences – and may be short-lived as well.

From formal domination to autonomy and critical interpretation: towards a new idea of progress

Progress within borders: organized modernity and its discontents

The global socio-political constellation around 1960 was widely perceived as relatively consolidated, as expressed in the then widespread use of the three-worlds image: a First World of liberal-democratic capitalism, a Second World of Soviet-style socialism; and a Third World of developing countries. This imagery was sociologically conceptualized from the First-World point of view as oneself having reached modernity, the status of "modern society"; the Second World constituting a deliberate and organized deviation but with trends of convergence of those two worlds; and the Third World still needing to undergo processes of "modernization and development". These "worlds", in turn, were composed of societies as unit elements, each of which, according to the dominant perception, had clearly demarcated borders and a state as a central institution with the effective power of monitoring the borders and organizing social life within the borders according to unified rules.

This imagery of orderliness and control also – in only apparent contradiction – extended to the expectations of progress. The stability of institutions was expected to channel change on predictable paths, making it possible to reap the benefits of progress without running the risks that come with entirely open horizons of the future. To grasp this ambiguous orientation towards the future, as both open and already known, it is useful to briefly distinguish dimensions of progress and their state at around 1960. *Progress of knowledge* was expected to be endlessly available for the benefit of society, but at the same time one had the closing of the last "knowledge gaps" in view, thus ruling out any unpleasant surprises in the further pursuit of new knowledge.[2] *Economic progress* was similarly to be

[2] The lead projects that then captured the scientific-technological imagination, significantly, have since then either been abandoned because of unsurpassable limits that made them unreasonable or seriously put into question because of the uncontrollable dangers that come with them: supersonic airtravel, manned space exploration, nuclear energy.

channelled into predictable paths. Keynesian demand management, socialist planning, and the development of a national industrial economy through import substitution policies were the strategies, as suited to one of the three "worlds" each, by which economic growth could be reached without suffering the cyclical downturns that had marked the earlier history of capitalism. Applying these government techniques, economic progress would not only be steady but also lastingly high, thus providing the material background for also accomplishing social and political progress.

While epistemic and economic progress namely were meant to continue in a controlled way, social and political progress were thought to be completed and consolidated. For *social progress*, emphasis was placed on inclusion, to be reached with the extension of the welfare state regimes so as to protect all members of society against all conceivable risks, "from the cradle to the grave", as Winston Churchill put it in 1943. In Europe, both Western Europe and socialist Europe, even though by different means, comprehensive social inclusion was largely accomplished by the 1960s. In the USA, it was announced as the core objective of the "War on Poverty", the key component of President Johnson's "Great Society" programme. In "Third World" societies, similar social progress was at best distantly on the horizon. Inclusion within the "First World" relied on firm boundaries towards the "Third". Significantly, furthermore, social progress through welfare state measures meant a standardization of life-situations and, together with a male bread-winner full-employment economy, of life-courses. Individualization, therefore, was not a central criterion for social progress at the time. *Political progress* was conceived in a similar manner, as accomplished in some parts of the world and as accomplishable everywhere, provided that a restricted view on such progress was accepted. Accomplishment was defined as free and equal "conventional" political participation, through which governments were elected that both had some degree of accountability towards the citizenry and were capable of designing and implementing policy programmes. This was reached in the "First World", had found a particular interpretation in the "Second", and would be reached through political modernization in the "Third". The restricted view entailed that the existing states should be the containers of political progress, and that within them a suitable balance between participation in collective self-determination and effective implementation of the common rules was created, in all situations of doubt giving priority to the latter over the former.

This brief characterization of the state of progress, in terms of different dimensions, allows us to recognize that the ambiguous orientation towards progress in the organized modernity of the post-Second World War period, as both open and known, expressed a novel relation between experience and expectations. The experiences of the first half of the twentieth century, in particular, had suggested that the widely open horizon of expectations permitted the rise of undesirable, even disastrous experiences. In the terms developed above, these experiences had shown the limits of progress through domination, in particular the limits emerging from the risk that resistance to domination would lead to undesirable outcomes. The conclusion from those experiences was to narrow the horizon of expectations without closing it entirely, through the institutions of organized modernity. Or in other words, this was an attempt to select from the wide range of historically generated possibilities the limited number of those that appeared to be both functionally viable and normatively desirable.

With hindsight, one can see that this "choice" – resulting from decisions of the early post-war political and economic elites – was only temporarily sustainable because of this ambiguity towards progress, which led to contradictory orientations. On the one hand, the progressive imaginary created two centuries earlier was now to be taken more seriously as a guide to socio-political practices. In public debate, the existing socio-political constellation was no longer presented as a power regime in principle equal to others in history, but as a socio-political order subject to normative justifications. Thus, claims based on that imaginary – for individual liberty, collective self-determination, social justice – could not just be suppressed. They had to be addressed, in some way or other; and if they were not, pressure for change was likely to continue.

On the other hand, the particular form that this socio-political order took was shaped by the contingency of the moment. In this contingent context, significantly, the USA were the plausible site for developing the new view of progress for a number of reasons: They had been less directly a source of the disasters of the first half of the twentieth century. They had risen to be an economic power and transformed the economy into mass-consumption capitalism, thus had been successful in addressing the question of material needs. They had a reputation of greater political inclusion than European societies, despite the subjection of the native population and the discrimination of the African-American population; they thus appeared to have marked the direction of political progress. And up to this moment they had had a smaller role in colonial domination than Europe, presenting themselves rather as one of the first postcolonial societies.

More generally, the contingency of the moment entailed that the conclusions drawn from the earlier experiences were to be implemented in the context of existing state boundaries, economic structures, gender relations, colonial domination. These contingent elements had a double meaning: they were there and thus unavoidable ingredients for the building of organized modernity; but they were not justified as such and often difficult to justify. They were used to build the institutions within which further progress was to occur in a channelled, controlled way; but they could turn out to be barriers to desirable progress and thus could be challenged by critique and protest.

This characterization provides a key to understanding the dismantling of organized modernity which proceeded at a rapid pace from the 1960s onwards. In the then so-called Third World, movements for national liberation called for decolonization and collective self-determination, these struggles reaching a high point around 1960. In the then so-called First World, the year 1968 marked a climax of workers' and students' contestation, often seen as the combination of a political and cultural revolution, the former calling for intensification of political participation, the latter for widening the space for personal self-realization. In the then so-called Second World, protest called for both wider spaces of individual expression and for forms of collective self-determination that were not limited by the dominant interpretation of historical materialism, including self-determination as political collectivities that had not been recognized as such. In the wake of 1968, time-honoured issues were returned to the political agenda, with greater force and urgency, by the feminist movement and the ecological movement, calling for equality as well as recognition of difference and for critical reflection on the industrial transformation of the earth respectively. During the later twentieth century, new movements of the poor and excluded emerged in response to the consequences of

global economic-financial restructuring, calling for social justice and inclusion. Where democracy had been abolished by military regimes, they merged with movements for the restoration of liberty and democracy. And where exclusion and oppression had a marked ethnic/racial component, contestations centered on political and cultural claims for collective self-determination.

Most of these movements can be called progressive because they advocated social and political progress by evoking the existing imaginary of such progress and by denouncing the restrictions that had been imposed on its realization. Some of these movements, furthermore, called for a rethinking of progress, criticizing the form in which progress had historically been conceived and supposedly realized. This is true for critics of epistemic-economic progress, pointing towards the increasing separation, and often contradiction, between actual epistemic and economic practices and the requirements for good answers to epistemic and economic problems. Such critics often challenged the very mechanism of progress in these areas, as it was conceptualized historically. Some critics of social and political progress, in turn, called for a reconsideration of the contingencies that led to the present view of such progress, rather than of the principles. This is true for movements that challenge current polities and their borders as providing inadequate frameworks for collective self-determination. It is also true for protest that calls for rectification of historical injustice. While such calls may be interpreted as calls for social progress, they also insist that equal freedom in the present is an insufficient way to reach such progress.

Protest and progress at the end of formal domination

If the 1960s and the 1970s, to some extent also later years, were marked by strong protest movements, and if we have good reason to see these movements as having aimed for progress, to a considerable degree successfully, why then did progress wither away during this same period? To answer this question now in more detail, we need to make some general conceptual and historical observations and then consider those in the light of this most recent socio-political transformation, the destructuring of the organized modernity of the second postwar period.

Socio-political change often occurs through re-interpretation of concepts that underpin the self-understanding of societies [*Wagner 2012, ch. 3*]. Progress, then, is enhanced by re-interpretations that are suggested by the observation of persistent problems and the search for novel solutions to them. Social and political progress, in particular, is driven by protest against unsatisfactory situations: situations in which problems are addressed in ways that lack normative justification and/or functional efficiency. Across the nineteenth and much of the twentieth centuries, as suggested above, domination has been the prevailing engine of "progress", whereas critique of domination has been a crucial way of re-interpreting progress. Equal freedom was not the historical starting-point of the march of progress, in contrast to the postulate of Enlightenment thought. Rather, it became the core component of the socio-political imaginary of progress, defining the goal of progress yet to be achieved. Instead of already effectively guiding prevailing practices, this imaginary inspired the resistance to those practices. Prevailing practices in Europe, and later "the West", namely, brought "progress" about through domination: over nature, over other societies, and over sizable parts of the population in their own societies.

Before the Second World War, these practices of domination were still explicitly justified, even though they were increasingly contested. After the War, though, the mobilization of societies for war and the justification of war as a fight against illegitimate regimes changed the situation [*Halperin 2016*]. The organized modernity of the postwar period meant to bring the prevailing practices in line with the socio-political imaginary. The societies of the First and Second Worlds claimed to be inclusive and egalitarian in social and political terms and committed to collective self-determination, even though in different understandings. The right to collective self-determination of the colonized societies was increasingly recognized, even though often after colonial wars and civil wars and by some colonial powers earlier than by others.

Looking now again at the progressive movements that destructured organized modernity, it is possible to compare them with earlier such movements. There are three main components to them: Most similar to earlier protest, first, there were movements aiming at removing the remnants of formal domination. As such, they have proven to be enormously successful by the 1990s. The anti-colonial movement largely reached its aim with the end of the last European colonial empire, the Portuguese one, in 1974 and with the end of apartheid in the early 1990s. Dictatorships and authoritarian regimes could no longer be maintained. The feminist movement secured full legal equality for women in many countries by the 1970s, preceded by socialist countries much earlier, though not in most predominantly Islamic countries, an exception being Turkey. Civil rights movements, broadly understood, fought formal discrimination in many matters, such as ethnic and linguistic minorities, sexual orientation, race, many of which are removed from law books, even though they often continue in practice.

Second, the ecological movement aimed at ending the instrumental exploitation of nature and at returning the notion of economic progress to a substantive understanding of human material needs. In a sense, this is protest against domination, namely domination over nature, but not protest against domination by some groups of human beings over others. The current record of this kind of protest is ambiguous. It has had considerable success in bringing the ecological issue onto the societal and political agenda. Nature-transforming activities are now in much greater need of justification than they were half a century ago, often even subject to institutional procedures of evaluation before being approved. At the same time, however, the scale of nature transformation has further increased: the industrialization of many "emerging" economies far outweighs the de-industrialization of "advanced" economies; and resource extraction techniques and processes go ever further in transforming nature. The prevailing notion at this moment, expressed in the debate about climate change, is that destruction proceeds at higher speed than the attempts at halting or reversing destruction.

Thirdly, some protests aimed at re-interpreting the emphases given to components of social and political progress. In societies where inclusion had largely been achieved but had led to the standardization of life-courses, individualization became a core concern. In societies where state capacity had been given priority over actual practices of collective self-determination, claims for intensifying political participation were made. This protest took a rather novel attitude to progress: it no longer aimed at overcoming formal domination, it aimed at redefining the social and political setting in substantive terms. It, too, was quite successful in one sense, but much less so in another: It succeeded in undermining the

dominant socio-political self-understanding within the varieties of organized modernity. But it failed in elaborating a new hegemonic self-understanding that would be normatively superior to the preceding one, and thus mark progress.

In sum, the progressive movements that resembled most those of the earlier past, those aiming at overcoming formal domination, have largely been successful. Their success explains the core components of the withering away of progress: Progress through domination was increasingly limited by successful resistance to domination. And the more resistance to domination marked progress, to the point of nearing the end of formal domination, the less central this kind of progress will be for the future.

Due to the fact that this kind of progress was the one that had been in the centre of critical thought, the ambivalent notion of exhaustion/completion of historical progress could arise. During the 1990s, specifically, there was a widespread sense that critique had been disarmed in the ongoing socio-political transformation, and it was difficult to see if and how it could be reconstructed. At the same time, within critical debate this apparent success was hardly ever perceived as success, and this at least for some good reasons: new problems arose and old problems returned, namely the ecological crisis and social injustice respectively, and the political capacity to address them decreased, even dramatically so.

A look at the South African situation is enlightening in this respect. Under apartheid, South Africa had a vibrant critical-intellectual debate focusing on the connection between racial domination and the particular form of South African capitalism. At the same time, it had a forceful social and political movement for national liberation, the core concern of which was the end of colonial domination by claiming equal freedom and equal rights for all South Africans. This domination was the target of critique, and its overcoming was what progress meant. With the end of apartheid this aim was reached. At the current moment, South African society faces numerous problems, most of which can be traced to the legacy of colonial domination: pronounced structures of social inequality due to apartheid segregation and injustice; an economy that is focused on resource extraction for a global market rather than satisfying the needs of the South African population; a public administration that had been created to serve well a minority but is inadequate for the needs of the majority in terms of education, health, transport infrastructure etc. At the same time, there is a societal and political majority committed to an agenda of social transformation and to addressing these problems. But critical-intellectual debate is weak and disoriented, and there is considerable ambiguity about the kind of progress that is possible and how it can be reached as well as pronounced doubt about whether any significant progress is possible at all. South Africa is not exceptional. Rather, it is exemplary because of the radical transformation it recently experienced by moving from violent formal domination to the commitment to personal and collective autonomy. It shows us that it is necessary to explore more insistently what progress means after the abolition of most institutional forms of domination. We need to understand how to translate the widely held idea of self-propelled progress as emerging from the Enlightenment combination of freedom and reason, once formal domination has been overcome, into a view of progress as a problem of collective self-determination, of collective agency.

For the remainder of this article I want to insist that it is erroneous to overlook or denigrate the enormous progress that has been made in overcoming formal domination – factually erroneous because the achievements exist, but also politically erroneous because

this view leads to an underestimation of normative forces in history. But I also want to demonstrate that the regress that has occurred was part of the same socio-political transformation that spelt the (near) end of formal domination and that it is even related to protests that aimed at progress. In other words, critique and protest provide re-interpretations that aim at normatively superior solutions, but they are not in control of the interpretations they provide and may end up supporting regress, the consequences of which outweigh the progressive achievements.

The trap of hegemonic discourse: the erasure of space and time

The protests that worked towards the dismantling of the conventions of organized modernity appeared in the form of rebellion against imposed constraints, in normative terms, or as consequences drawn from the insights into functional deficiency, in some instances as a combination of both criticisms. But they contained only a weak image of a constructive re-interpretation of modernity. The key elements of this image are all related to the aim of ending formal domination: the general idea of equal individual rights, such as in the women's movement, the civil rights movement in the USA or the struggle against apartheid; the idea of inclusive collective self-determination, or: democracy, in liberation from colonial rule (including the particular case of South Africa) and from authoritarian rule as in Southern Europe, East Asia and Latin America; and the ideas of freedom from particular constraints in the forms of commercial freedom, media freedom, freedom of movement, and of freedom for self-realization.

In the light of these objectives, much of the socio-political change that occurred can be described in terms of normative achievements, of progress: of recognition, of freedom, of equality. This, precisely, is where the success of contestations can be located. When looking at the overall socio-political transformation, however, qualifications have to be added. Assessing recent change in terms of overcoming formal domination tends to overlook the fact that institutional components of organised modernity that were not as such containers of formal domination were dismantled in parallel. The normative assessment of these processes, however, is much more ambivalent, to say the least: The capacity of states to elaborate and implement public action diminished. In particular, the centre-piece of organized modernity, the steering of national economies was abandoned. As a consequence, commercial and financial flows are increasingly beyond any control. More generally, institutionalized collective action was delegitimized in the conceptual shift from "government" to "governance". In parallel, the institutional frames for collective self-determination have been weakened, partly deliberately in favour of supranational or global co-operation, partly because of an alleged escape of socio-political phenomena from the view and grasp of political institutions.

Every major socio-political transformation entails the dismantling of existing institutions. But this dismantling is often accompanied by the building of new institutions, or by giving new purpose and meaning to existing institutional containers. The transformation of European societies from the middle of the nineteenth century to the early twentieth century, in terms of increasing inclusion and recognition, is a strong example for the building of collective institutions to address problems that the earlier restricted liberal modernity of Europe had created. The contestations of organised modernity in the late twentieth century, in contrast, have often had the oppressive, exploiting or excluding nature of existing

institutions as their target, and have therefore been aiming at de-institutionalization in the first place. As an unintended side-effect, this orientation has tended to incapacitate collective action: on the one hand, because specific existing institutions are weakened, and on the other, because institutional rebuilding in general is delegitimized in the name of some generic concept of equal individual and collective freedom.

There was a moment in this exit from organized modernity, during the 1980s and early 1990s, when this weak image of an ongoing re-interpretation of modernity gained stronger contours. At this moment, much public political philosophy suggested that a generalized commitment to individual freedom and to collective self-determination was about to be globally and unproblematically implemented. It would be accompanied and underpinned by an idea of economic freedom that suggested that constraints to economic action are both freedom-limiting and dysfunctional for economic performance and thus need to be removed.

These politico-philosophical ideas translated into a political discourse about "human rights and democracy" and an economic discourse about a strong return to market freedoms and free trade, both in temporarily hegemonic positions. Furthermore, these discourses found partial institutional expression in various forms: in the abolishing of domestic forms of economic regulation; in the lowering of international barriers to economic exchange; in the introduction of the "responsibility to protect" principle in international law in tension with the principle of state sovereignty; in elements of the internationalization of penal law; in the tendency to identify public protest movements with an expression of collective self-determination, among others.

Let me come back to the hare and the hedgehog. At the beginning of the race, the male hedgehog described its telos as a world of free human beings creating steady progress through their interactions, and the hare started to run. When much later the hedgehog's wife told the exhausted hare that the race was over and won, the hare could not believe that this was true, but was not able to say why. He could not tell the difference between the two hedgehogs. This is the problem critical thinking about progress faces today: What is the difference between the promise of emancipation and equal freedom more than two centuries ago and the apparently widespread institutionalization of equal freedom today?

In other words, the question is what is wrong, if anything, with the discourse about "human rights and democracy" and the idea that any elimination of constraints is an increase in freedom. The problem consists in the fact that there is clearly something right about these notions, that they point to valid normative concerns, while at the same time that which is wrong with them is much more difficult to identify. The commitments to freedom, human rights and democracy present themselves as normatively uncontestable. The abolition of constraint to human action and of power over human beings appears self-justifying. This, however, is exactly the trap of hegemonic discourse: On the one hand, freedom and democracy are those basic normative concepts that one has to embrace. In this sense, they are indeed self-justifying. On the other hand, they are presented as the unsurpassable reference of all political debate, overruling all other considerations, which they are not. Even though valid and crucial, these concepts are not sufficient to guide political debate on their own. Rather, they open up further questions that need to be answered by drawing on other resources as well. To avoid falling into the trap – or better: to get

out of it, since much of current debate is trapped – we need to recall the time-honoured insight that comprehensive evaluative concepts tend to be essentially contested. They may be valid in a very general sense, but they do not lend themselves to application in the straightforward sense that specific action in the world can be derived from these concepts and equated with steps towards realizing them.

The history of these concepts is marked by a curious oscillation. As inalienable rights and popular sovereignty, they emerged with the Enlightenment and inspired the late-eighteenth-century revolutions. Political debate after the revolutions, though, devoted much energy to criticizing the concept of abstract freedom and prevailing notions about the constitution of modern polities. And in fact, socio-political transformations of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century re-introduced notions of social bonds and collective commitments. Current debate can usefully draw on the earlier period of conceptual critique and transformative practice. The retrieval of those debates, however, will be insufficient unless it is connected to the socio-political transformations of our time. Exactly with this objective in mind, we have tried to reconstruct the dominant self-understanding of the varieties of organized modernity after the Second World War as well as the dynamics that led to their destructuring. The public political philosophy that briefly became dominant afterwards needs to be interpreted as the spontaneous conceptual reflection of this destructuring. Within sociological research, the idea arose that collective phenomena of all kinds – state, nation, class, society – were disintegrating, due to two dominant tendencies, the ones of globalization and individualization. Like the sociological theorem of globalization and individualization, the public-political discourse suggested that there was – and: should be – little, or nothing, between the individual human being and the globe. Every social phenomenon that stood in-between tended to be considered as having freedom-limiting effects. Significantly, the notion of democracy, which presupposes a specific decision-making collectivity and thus appears to stand necessarily in an intermediate position between the individual and the globe, tended to be redefined. Rather than referring to a concrete, historically given collectivity, processes of self-determination were, on the one side, related to social movements without institutional reference, and on the other side, projected to the global level as the coming cosmopolitan democracy. We can characterize this conceptual tendency as the *erasure of space*. In a second step, we can identify a similar tendency towards the *erasure of time*. The individual human beings in question are seen as free and equal, in particular as equally free. Thus, their life-histories and experiences are no longer seen as giving them a particular position in the world from which they speak and act. And political orders are seen as associations of such individuals who enter into a social contract with each other, devoid of any particular history.

This is the image of a utopia. Progress is here the liberation from determination by the space and time one was born in. The image can historically be found in theories of social contract, from John Locke to Jean-Jacques Rousseau. But for these authors, and including their predecessor Thomas Hobbes, these were thought-experiments trying to find the bases on which peaceful human living together was possible at all (for Hobbes) and on which further improvements in the human condition would arise. In the outgoing twentieth century, in contrast, this image evoked imminent possibilities. It suggested the progress that was immediately on the horizon. This idea of liberation was then often sustained by a mode of critique that – in general, quite rightly – does not "deduce from the

form of what we are what it is impossible for us to do and to know; but (…) will separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think".

Such critique has been a major force for the dismantling of organized modernity from the 1960s onwards, be it in the struggle against colonial domination or in the Northern "1968". But it has also for too long and too often embarked on "the affirmation or the empty dream of freedom", leading into misconceived "projects that claim to be global or radical". These projects are those that aim at the erasure of time and space. They come in a variety of political forms: from the idea of individual enterprising selves relating to each other through self-regulating markets to the idea of individual human rights without any notion of the agency that guarantees these rights to the idea of cosmopolitan democracy devoid of an understanding of forms of political communication.

What, then, is to be done? In the words of the author already quoted before, the "work done at the limits of ourselves must, on the one hand, open up a realm of historical inquiry and, on the other, put itself to the test of reality, of contemporary reality, both to grasp the points where change is possible and desirable, and to determine the precise form this change should take" (all above quotes: [*Foucault 1984: 46*]). Without historical inquiry and reality test, the abstract reasoning about freedom and its consequences in terms of dismantling boundaries and forgetting experience, rather than an ally, becomes the opponent in the struggle over interpreting our present and identifying that progress that is both possible and desirable.

Outlook: preparing a reality test for identifying future progress

Everything preceding in this essay can be read as a contribution to this historical and conceptual inquiry. The last step to take is to provide at least some elements for a test of current reality for possible and desirable progress. At the current moment, the utopian image of progress as liberation from the constraints of historical time and lived space still exists, but it has lost plausibility and persuasiveness to a considerable degree. This is due to occurrences that have been interpreted as signs of its inadequacy, such as: a sequence of economic crises across the world; increasing concern about past injustice impacting on the present; the increased awareness of the consequences of human-induced climate change; regional crises of democracy; lack of criteria for evaluating international conflicts. In the light of such occurrences, attempts at reconstruction are currently being made that are consciously situated in social space and acknowledge the historicity of human social life.

In some way, the events in Teheran in 1979, often referred to as the Iranian Revolution, are an early example of such reconstruction. As specific as the Iranian circumstances were, they can now be seen as an opening towards a broader understanding of political possibilities in the present, since then intensified not only by the strengthening of political Islam but also by "emerging" novel political self-understandings reaching from the variety of "progressivist" political majorities in Latin America to the transformation-oriented post-apartheid polity in South Africa to post-communist China. The acceleration of European integration since the Maastricht Treaty, accompanied by intense debates about the European self-understanding, is generally recognized as a major such attempt at regionally based world-interpreation – even though it is currently sometimes seen as on the verge of

failing. More recently, the emergence of BRICS entails a further proposal to re-constitute specific spatiality – the global South – and temporality – rectification of past Western (Northern) domination. These observations suggest that one can analyze the present as an ongoing attempt at re-interpreting modernity, with again significant regional varieties against the background of earlier experiences with modernity – in a context of greater connectedness that should not be misunderstood as actual globalization in the sense of erasing boundaries. This attempt is far from reaching a new consolidated form, but a key preparatory task for elaborating an adequate new concept of progress lies in identifying the main contours of these present processes of re-interpretation.

Against the background of the preceding observations, we can understand the past half century as the transformation of a globe composed of a set of consolidated regional, indeed: spatially defined, interpretations of modernity into a globe with de-structured social relations of highly variable extension and significance, but with the projection of a boundaryless setting populated by unattached individuals looming large. In very general terms, then, the current struggle over re-interpretations of modernity is characterized by two fundamental tensions: – the tension between those who hold that the acceptance of the principle of equal freedom supports a view of the human being as holder of equal rights *in this time*, on the one side, and those who hold that the consequences of past experiences, not least experiences of oppression and injustice, weigh on the present and that there is a need for differential consideration of rights and normative claims, on the other. This is the question about the *temporal configuration of the present*; – the tension between those who hold that *boundaries* limit the expression of autonomy, both political and economic, with negative normative and functional consequences, on the one side, and those who hold that boundaries are a precondition for the exercise of collective autonomy, which in turn is a necessity for the creation of spaces of personal freedom, on the other. This is the question about the *spatial configuration of the present*.

It is evident at the briefest look that there is intense struggle over the adequate resolution of these tensions in the contemporary world. A new notion of progress is needed to help identifying the way towards the most adequate resolution. At the least the contours of it can be suggested here: In conceptual terms, it will replace the strong concept of progress as an almost self-propelled force of history with a notion that focuses on agency, imagination and critique. In contextual terms, it will need to address the situation of our time, in two main respects. After the end of formal domination, first, future progress needs to be progress in the practice of collective autonomy, thus political progress. Politics need to be understood today in terms of a radical commitment to democratic agency, giving different meaning to the widely used concept of "democratization", which in practice often entails a decreasing capacity to act. The daunting task is to, at the same time, reverse the recent decline of state-based political capacity, create political capacity in global coordination, and do so in unprecedented forms of democratic agency. The building of such democratic collective agency needs to go along with the definition of the central problems that such agency should address. That is why, second, the other key concern of our time should be progress towards a more adequate interpretation of the world we live in. Such progress can only be achieved in struggle against those who have an interest in promoting world-interpreations that leave their privileges intact. After the end of formal domination, current work at world-interpretation needs to focus on the identification of new forms of

domination, in particular those that deny the current relevance of historical injustice by claiming that all human beings are now equal and equally free in the present. And it needs to combat the hubristic inclination of considering human beings as actually capable of mastering all aspects of their existence on this earth. Elaborating such a notion of progress for our time, therefore, will invite us to rethink the relation between our space of experience and our horizon of expectations.

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Peter Wagner is ICREA Research Professor at the University of Barcelona and currently Principal Investigator of the European Research Council-funded Advanced Grant project "Trajectories of Modernity: comparing non-European and European varieties". His recent and forthcoming publications include: Sauver le progrès *(La Découverte 2015; English version:* Progress: A Reconstruction*, Polity, 2015);* African, American and European Trajectories of Modernity: Past Oppression, Future Justice? Annual of European and Global Studies, vol. 2 *(ed., Edinburgh University Press, 2015);* The Trouble with Democracy: Political Modernity in the 21st Century *(co-ed. with Gerard Rosich; Edinburgh University Press, forthcoming 2016);* The Greek Polis and the Invention of Democracy *(co-ed. with Johann Arnason and Kurt Raaflaub, Wiley-Blackwell, 2013).*

The Soviet Model of Modernity and Russia's Post-communist Political Transformation

MIKHAIL MASLOVSKII*

Sovětský vzorec modernity a postkomunistická politická transformace Ruska

Abstract: The article discusses political processes in post-Soviet Russia from the perspective of the multiple modernities theory. A study of Russia's political transformation on the basis of this approach allows us to reconsider the obstacles to democratization that existed in the 1990s and the socio-cultural preconditions for de-democratization in the 2000s. The author draws on Johann Arnason's analysis of the Soviet model of modernity. From this perspective the Soviet model possessed only some civilizational traits and did not lead to a sustainable civilizational pattern. Nevertheless, remnants of that model and the imperial legacy of the Soviet period influenced Russian politics of the last two decades. The dynamics of democratization and de-democratization in Russia represent a case of path dependency which is both post-communist and post-imperial.

Keywords: civilizational analysis; modernity; Soviet model; Russia; political transformation

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Political processes in post-Soviet Russia have been discussed mostly from the positions of transitology as a branch of political science which tends to lack the historical dimension. It has been argued that transitological approaches usually ignore the historical legacies that influenced the course of social and political transformations in Eastern Europe [*Blokker 2005*]. But it should be admitted that the limits of the 'transition paradigm' were already recognized by some political scientists after the first decade of post-communist transformations [*Carothers 2002*]. In historical sociology recent political processes in Russia were analyzed by Charles Tilly who considered them an example of de-democratization [*Tilly 2007*].

Approaches to the study of post-Soviet Russian politics have been classified in different ways. According to Motyl [*2011: 10–11*], political transformation in Russia can be explained as the result of 1) political culture, 2) structural or institutional forces, or 3) elite decisions. The first viewpoint rejects the possibility of genuine democratization on the grounds that Russian political culture remains non-democratic. The second approach emphasizes the incompatibility of the construction of stable democratic institutions with the institutional legacies of totalitarian and imperial collapse. The third explanation focuses on the role of elites in dismantling democratic structures. As far as the cultural approach is concerned the main focus in most studies is on political culture but not on the broader issues of socio-cultural change. At the same time research on Russian politics still insufficiently uses the theoretical approaches of political sociology.

* Prof. Mikhail Maslovskii, Sociological Institute, Russian Academy of Sciences, 7th Krasnoarmeyskaya 25/14 St.-Petersburg & National Research University Higher School of Economics, Myasnitskaya st. 20, Moscow. E-mail: maslovski@mail.ru.

Since the middle of the 20th century mainstream political sociology has been developing within the modernization paradigm influenced by structural functionalism. However, some alternatives to this paradigm also emerged. According to Spohn [*2010: 50*], the main counter-trends against functionalist evolutionism include critical political sociology focused on political power and inequality; neo-Marxism focused on class conflict in capitalist development; post-structuralist and post-modernist approaches; and, finally, global political sociology in which a special place belongs to the civilizational multiple modernities perspective. Richard Sakwa has emphasized recently the importance of the civilizational perspective for the study of Russian politics. This scholar discusses the advantages of civilizational analysis over the mainstream transitological approaches in the field of post-communist studies [*Sakwa 2012: 45–50*]. However, Sakwa does not make a distinction between different versions of the multiple modernities theory. The differences between two most elaborate formulations of this theory have been considered by Wolfgang Knöbl [2011].

The present article is seeking to contribute to sociological analysis of the transformation processes in post-Soviet Russia on the basis of the multiple modernities approach. The article draws on the version of this perspective that considers both cultural and political factors of social dynamics. Particular attention is devoted to evaluation of utility of the multiple modernities theory for analyzing the impact of civilizational and imperial legacies on Russian transformations. It is assumed in the article that for a better understanding of Russia's post-Soviet trajectory of development it is necessary to transcend the boundaries between theoretically oriented historical sociology and the current perspectives on post-communist societies.

The Soviet model of modernity from the perspective of civilizational analysis

Civilizational analysis as a paradigm of historical sociology has been developed by Shmuel Eisenstadt and elaborated by Johann Arnason, Björn Wittrock and other scholars. Eisenstadt's theoretical contribution consists first of all in his analysis of the Axial Age civilizations but it is his discussion of multiple modernities that is most relevant for contemporary political sociology [*Eisenstadt 2001*]. Thus Eisenstadt demonstrates the influence of the cultural programme of modernity on the formation of constitutional-democratic regimes and reveals the role of cultural factors in the peculiarities of political institutions in non-western states [*Eisenstadt 1998*]. But it has been argued that Eisenstadt tends to over-emphasise the role of cultural-religious mechanisms that programme the processes of social and political change and mostly follows the 'path dependency' thesis [*Knöbl 2010*]. According to Peter Wagner, Eisenstadt's strong idea of 'cultural programme' can be applied to 'classical' civilisations rather than to contemporary versions of modernity [*Wagner 2010*].

The relevance of civilizational analysis for political sociology has been discussed by Willfried Spohn. He argues that civilizational foundations and frameworks 'generate different programmes of political modernity and processes of political modernization'. From this perspective empires, world religions and regional economies 'have a crucial impact on state formation, nation-building, national integration, political cultures, public spheres and collective identities, and thus contribute to the varying constellations and trajectories of

political modernization' [*Spohn 2010: 60*]. However, in contemporary Russia it is the Soviet civilizational and imperial legacies that seem particularly important. It can be assumed that Johann Arnason's version of civilizational analysis that focuses on both cultural and political factors of civilizational dynamics is most relevant in this case.

Arnason's approach to the multiple forms of modernity is widely discussed in contemporary historical sociology. At the same time his analysis of the Soviet version of modernity has attracted relatively less attention than some other aspects of his work. Thus in a special issue of *European Journal of Social Theory* devoted to Arnason's theoretical contribution there is no article discussing exclusively his study of the Soviet model although Willfried Spohn considers his interpretation of non-western civilizations including the Soviet case. As Spohn notes, Arnason's book *The Future that Failed* should be seen as 'a highly original civilizational approach to the communist regimes in Russia and other parts of the world that deserves further theoretical development and comparative research' [*Spohn 2011: 30*]. It is true that Arnason's book was written before the full elaboration of his civilizational theory. However, he also addressed the problematic of communist modernity in several other works [*Arnason 1995; 2002; 2003; 2005*].

First of all Arnason considers the Russian cultural and political tradition which combined a peripheral position within the western world with some traits of a separate civilization. In particular, he focuses on the character of the imperial modernization in Russia. He argues that the origins and the later transformation of the totalitarian project could only be understood with reference to that background [*Arnason 1993: 21*]. A parallel can be drawn with the approach of Richard Pipes who considers Soviet totalitarianism the result of 'the grafting of Marxist ideology onto the sturdy stem of Russia's patrimonial heritage' [*Pipes 1994: 501*]. But Arnason believes that the Weberian concept of patrimonialism is insufficient for understanding the character of imperial rule in pre-revolutionary Russia. In his view, Eisenstadt's work on the social and political structures of empires is more relevant for this purpose.

According to Arnason, the Soviet model incorporated both the legacy of imperial transformation from above and the revolutionary vision of a new society. Their synthesis led to a 'reunified and rearticulated tradition' which served 'to structure a specific version of modernity' [*Arnason 2002: 87*]. For Arnason, the impact of the imperial legacy was manifested in the fact that the Bolshevik government inherited the geopolitical situation and internal structural problems of the Russian empire but also the tradition of social transformation from above. In his view, the civilizational aspect of the Soviet model can be seen 'in the twofold sense of a distinctive version of modernity and a set of traditional patterns which it perpetuated in a new setting' [*Arnason 1995: 39*].

Arnason distinguishes between two types of communist regimes: the charismatic variant leading to autocracy and a more rationalized oligarchic one. For Arnason, the Soviet regime was not simply a more extreme form of bureaucratic domination. While arbitrary rule of the party apparatus did not correspond to the standards of rational bureaucracy, its methods of control and mobilizing capacity were beyond the classical Weberian model. Arnason draws the conclusion that the Soviet mode of legitimation included elements of all three Weberian types but, nevertheless, it represented a new and original phenomenon. At the same time charismatic legitimation was essential to the Stalinist autocracy. In fact, Arnason regards the Stalinist dictatorship as a new form of charismatic domination. He

agrees with Robert Tucker that Stalin's main achievement was the invention of a new strategy of revolutionary transformation from above.

However, a different interpretation of the concept of charisma has also been used in the study of Soviet communism. According to Stefan Breuer, the Soviet political regime represented a specific form of charismatic domination. He draws on the concept of 'charisma of reason' which was applied by Weber to the French revolution of 1789. Breuer argues that the Bolshevik regime that tried to reconstruct the whole society according to a rational plan could be considered the embodiment of such charisma of reason [*Breuer 1992*]. He regards the early Bolshevik government as a 'charismatic community of the ideological *virtuosi*'. Breuer analyses the early Bolshevik government and provides a general account of the Soviet system as a whole but he does not discuss in detail the character of the Stalinist dictatorship. Nevertheless, the concept of charisma of reason is hardly applicable to the Stalinist regime [*Maslovskiy 2010: 11–12*].

In the early 1920s the Bolshevik leaders did not see Stalin as a potential head of the party. As Gudkov [*2011: 492*] claims, Stalin's charisma was an 'artificially produced authority of the infallible leader'. The myth of the 'great Stalin' was the result of mass propaganda, total control over information and systematic terror. Apparently one could speak of a clash between the impersonal charisma of reason of the 'old Bolsheviks' and the largely artificially produced Stalin's personal charisma in the second half of the 1920s. By the middle of the 1930s the emphasis was shifted from manufacturing of Stalin's personal charisma to invention of the new tradition. This culminated in publication of the Stalinist 'holy scripture' *The Short Course of History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)* in 1938. As Arnason notes, this book published at the end of the great purge 'gave the charismatic leadership a traditional basis through a mythical account of party history' [*Arnason 1993: 111*].

Klaus-Georg Riegel has offered a Weberian analysis of Marxism-Leninism as a political religion. This scholar discusses the transition of the Bolshevik party as a community of 'ideological virtuosi' into a 'hierocracy' under Stalin. Riegel argues that the Lenin cult already established during his own lifetime 'laid the foundations for a political and sacral tradition which could be selectively used by the Stalinist hierocratic power' [*Riegel 2005: 109*]. Riegel draws a parallel with Weber's analysis of the rise of professional priesthood. For Weber, the emergence of a church is accompanied by rationalization of dogma and rituals. Accordingly, the holy scriptures are provided with commentaries and turned into objects of systematic education. On the other hand, Arnason believes that there was rather 'a partial functional equivalence between Marxism-Leninism and traditional theological systems' [*Arnason 1993: 116*]. He emphasizes that the Soviet ideology continued both the scientific trend and 'redemptive visions' in Marxism.

In historical studies of Stalinism two approaches can be identified which stress the modernity of the Stalinist regime or its neo-traditionalist aspects. On the one hand, the modernity approach focuses on such phenomena as planning, 'welfare-statism' and techniques of surveillance. On the other hand, the neo-traditionalist approach concentrates on the 'archaicizing' phenomena like patron-client networks, ascribed status categories and 'mystification of power' [*Fitzpatrick 2000: 11*]. In fact, this distinction reminds us of the discussion in Weberian sociology of two possible ways of routinization of charisma: rationalization and traditionalization. But most historians of the Soviet period do not refer

to theories of historical sociology. It has been noted that representatives of the 'modernist' approach to Soviet history 'are implicitly beginning to participate in a methodological shift towards "multiple modernities", even though Eisenstadt and his edited volume on the multiple modernity theme has apparently not yet drawn their attention' [*David-Fox 2006: 538*]. Nevertheless, the civilizational perspective in historical sociology can bridge the gap between the two above-mentioned approaches in Soviet studies.

According to Arnason, there were significant differences between 'the prewar and the postwar constellation'. As he writes, 'the autocratic regime and the enlarged empire seemed to reinforce each other: Stalin's rule was re-legitimized by victory and expansion, and his charismatic leadership served to contain centrifugal trends within the bloc' [*Arnason 1995: 46*]. On the other hand, the imperial legacy re-emerged as a more independent factor after 'downgrading' of the totalitarian project. During the stage of 'oligarchic stabilization' the Soviet system turned to global expansionism instead of internal mobilization. At this stage the international prestige of the Soviet regime was particularly important for its legitimizing effort at home [*Arnason 2002: 79*].

This part of Arnason's analysis can be compared with the neo-Weberian perspective on the problem of legitimacy of power offered by Collins [1986] who discusses the influence of international prestige of the state on the legitimacy of its political regime. But it should be noted that Collins does not consider ideology an independent variable. In his view, ideology always follows geopolitics. On the other hand, Arnason believes that the ideological component of the Soviet foreign policy reinforced the discrepancy between ambitions and resources. In particular, Arnason considers the consequences of the Sino-Soviet split for the fate of the global communist project. Soviet hegemony was questioned when a challenge came from China as an alternative geopolitical centre. Evidently, the conflict between the two geopolitical centres undermined the global position of the communist model. Arnason argues that there was a civilizational side in the Sino-Soviet split as well as in the crisis of 1968 in Czechoslovakia. In both cases the forces in conflict were separated by 'cultural barriers to communication' [*Arnason 1995: 48*].

In his discussion of the period from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s Arnason distinguishes between two main trends in the dynamics of the Soviet regime: the internal one of re-traditionalization and the external one of globalization. While Arnason has referred to re-traditionalization connected with reactivation of the imperial legacy by the Stalinist regime, he also discusses it during the Brezhnev period. In his view, this trend was evident in attempts to present the 'Soviet way of life' as a specific tradition [*Arnason 1993: 213*]. In the ideological sphere there was a conservative shift towards defense of 'really existing socialism'.

Finally, Arnason's analysis of the Gorbachev reforms should be considered. Arnason disagrees with those observers who regarded the reformist turn of the Soviet leaders as the triumph of civil society or a kind of 'revolt of the middle classes'. He believes that the reformist centre was not acting in response to civil society but rather following its own strategy. As he argues, the reformist leadership remained confident that the communist project could be 'revitalized'. Thus the idea of *glasnost* reflected 'an optimistic view of Soviet culture as an established tradition and of its self-reflective potential' while underestimation of the national problems could be seen as a result of 'belief in the unifying and assimilating power of the Soviet culture' [*Arnason 1995: 51*]. For Arnason, economic

experiments of the Gorbachev period also confirmed the Soviet leaders' belief that the civilizational framework remained solid.

In his brief account of the situation in post-Soviet Russia soon after the collapse of the USSR Arnason mentions decomposition of both state and society and social vacuum that was left behind by the Soviet model. He also observes that post-communist transformations in Russia can be seen as 'a new phase of the ongoing interaction between the Russian and the Western trajectory, rather than as the coming of age of an indigenous society or a wholesale conversion of an imported model' [*Arnason 1993: 211*]. While Arnason does not discuss in detail the processes of social and political change in Russia, his approach can be applied to the problematic of post-Soviet transformations. As Spohn argues, the evolutionary modernization theory which is mostly used in transition studies cannot account for reversals in economic and political liberalization but Arnason's ideas can add new explanatory dimensions to transformation research [*Spohn 2011: 32*].

The Soviet civilizational legacies and Russian political culture

Civilizational approaches to Russian politics tend to emphasize the influence of non-democratic cultural heritage. This is also characteristic of Huntington's 'clash of civilizations' thesis [*Huntington 1993*] which became influential in political discourse in the 1990s. However, representatives of civilizational analysis in historical sociology criticized Huntington's approach as one-sided, ideologically motivated and lacking a solid theoretical foundation. It has been argued that in contemporary world 'there are no intact civilizations of the kind presupposed by those who prophecy a clash between them' [*Arnason 2006: 52*]. Huntington tends to oppose the West as a kind of apex of modernity to other presumably non-modern civilizations. According to Casanova [*2011: 259*], the main flaws of Huntington's view of civilizations are 1) an assumption that the world religions have some unchangeable core essence; 2) considering civilizations as territorially bounded geopolitical units; 3) assertion of western hegemony that can turn the prediction of clash of civilizations into a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Huntington's thesis has been widely debated in Russian social sciences and referred to by some members of the political elite. But the perception of Huntington's ideas depended on the position of Russian scholars and politicians in the ideological spectrum. Representatives of the liberal camp appreciated Huntington's interest in the cultural aspects of the world politics but most of them were dissatisfied with the way he defined civilizations and interpreted their interactions [*Tsygankov 2003: 63*]. From this viewpoint, Huntington overlooked the processes of globalization and overemphasized civilizational conflicts. The picture of world politics as a series of clashes between civilizations was considered a manifestation of Western ethnocentrism. At the same time proponents of the statist ideological position were mainly in agreement with Huntington's thesis. Most of them accepted Huntington's view that civilizations were the key units in the world politics fighting for power and prestige. However, it was argued that Huntington's actual goal was 'to counterpose the West against all other non-Western civilizations rather than to warn about the clash of various civilizations with each other' [*Tsygankov 2003: 65*]. Unlike Huntington, the Russian statist intellectuals tended to stress not so much Orthodox but Eurasian identity of the Russian civilization.

From the perspective of civilizational analysis in contemporary historical sociology post-Soviet Russia can hardly be considered a distinct civilization. The idea of 'Orthodox civilization' which was shared by Huntington and some Russian traditionalists seems to be ill-founded. While the civilizational identity of the Soviet system was formed by Marxism-Leninism as a kind of political religion, there is no such identity in today's Russia. From the viewpoint of the multiple modernities approach one can speak of a Soviet model of modernity that possessed only some civilizational characteristics. According to Arnason [*2002: 68*], the 'secular religion' of Marxism-Leninism did not penetrate society to the same extent as historical religions. Unlike Stephen Kotkin and other historians who regard Stalinism as a civilization [*Hedin 2004*], Arnason focuses on the process of re-traditionalization during the Brezhnev period. But he argues that this trend did not lead to a sustainable civilizational pattern.

Nevertheless, some traces of the Soviet model can still be seen in today's Russian society. Thus the impact of the Soviet legacy on Russia's post-communist political culture has been emphasized in the works of researchers from the analytical Levada Centre particularly Lev Gudkov and Boris Dubin. They largely draw on the model of Soviet person as a social type that was elaborated by Yurii Levada who was generally perceived as the foremost Russian sociologist of the 1980s and 90s. But although Levada's intellectual authority is widely recognised in Russian social sciences the actual influence of this scholar's works remains rather limited. Nevertheless, his theoretical approach is central for Gudkov's and Dubin's analysis of post-communist transformations in Russia.

For Gudkov, the 'Soviet person' can be regarded as an ideal-typical construction on a par with *homo economicus*, 'authoritarian personality' and the like. Gudkov [*2011: 56*] believes that this type should be seen as paradigmatic for non-western variants of modernization and disintegration of totalitarian regimes. He regards the 'Soviet person' as a normative pattern that had influenced the mass of population of the totalitarian state. The key features of this pattern were 1) exclusiveness or specificity of the Soviet person, incompatibility with other types of personality; 2) 'belonging' to the state, expectation of paternalistic care and at the same time taking for granted arbitrary actions of the authorities; 3) levelling, anti-elite dispositions; 4) combination of superiority and inferiority complexes [*Gudkov 2011: 57*]. These contradictory, antinomian characteristics presumably defined the behaviour of the masses of population in the USSR.

Some of the empirical studies of Levada Centre conducted in the 1990s and 2000s were supposed to demonstrate what traits of the Soviet person persisted in the situation of large-scale social change and to what extent they continued to influence people's behaviour. On the basis of these studies Gudkov makes a conclusion that the anthropological type of Soviet person should be considered the main obstacle to the modernization processes in post-communist Russia. As he argues, the Soviet person's fundamental distrust to the world and the experience of adaptation to violence make this human type incapable of accepting complex social relations of modern society.

Gudkov applies the concept of 'abortive modernization' to the Russian transformation. He emphasizes that in sociological systems theory modernization means the processes of functional differentiation of the social system and the emergence of more complex forms of integration and communication between its parts. At the same time Gudkov claims that in Russia modernization has been systematically blocked. The strains and conflicts

within the social system that required its further differentiation has been resolved instead by rejection of complexity, simplification of the system and pushing it on a more primitive level. Such 'restoration' effects were not accidental but represented an intrinsic trait of this socio-cultural system [*Gudkov 2011: 378*].

According to Gudkov, the transformation process in Russia has not been accompanied by a genuine change of the old totalitarian institutions but rather by an 'exposure' of those institutions in a new context. As a result of this process the social system has been replaced by an agglomeration of 'enclaves' which are mechanically united into a weekly integrated whole. Despite the attempts to build the 'vertical of power', the centralized state is losing control over different segments of society. For Gudkov, disintegration of the totalitarian system is an uneven process. The new trends are mostly visible in the economic sphere while the army, police and legal institutions have changed very little since the Soviet period. On the whole the transformation process in post-Soviet Russia has been characterized by degeneration of institutions, absence of mechanisms of horizontal integration in society, conflicts of different systems of values and the resulting *anomie*, spread of corruption at all levels of the administrative apparatus [*Gudkov 2011: 370–371*].

Gudkov claims that the political regime in Putin's Russia is specific since it is the result of disintegration of totalitarianism which was a unique political phenomenon. He regards it as a novel type of regime with a new legitimation system and new technologies of power. On the one hand, Gudkov refers to 'imitation traditionalism' substituted with 'modernization rhetoric' and imitation electoral democracy as the means of legitimation of the regime. On the other hand, he believes that the basis of the regime is not some traditional institutions but the structures of political police. Gudkov defines 'Putinism' as a 'system of decentralized use of the institutional resources of violence belonging to the violence structures that have not changed since the period of totalitarian regime but have been appropriated by the power holders in their private or group interests' [*Gudkov 2009: 16*].

Another scholar from Levada Centre, Boris Dubin, considers the issues of collective identity and historical memory in post-Soviet Russia. In his works the formation of imaginary collective identity in Russia is discussed in relation to the 'others' represented by the countries of East Central Europe and former Soviet republics. As Dubin argues, in the 1990s the idea of Russia's particularity and specific way of development was spreading in public opinion and the discourse of power. The basis of identification in this period was 'symbolic alienation' from 'others' [*Dubin 2011: 11–12*]. The traces of totalitarian mentality and the 'besieged fortress' psychology characteristic for the Cold War period continued to influence Russia's public opinion in the 2000*s* [*Dubin 2011: 38–39*].

In discussion of historical memory Dubin largely focuses on memory of the war. According to the data of numerous public opinion surveys, the victory in the Great Patriotic War is regarded by the majority of Russia's population as the most important event in Soviet history. Dubin poses the question of when and how the image of war was constructed in the public opinion. In his view, this image was formed particularly from the middle of the 1960s to the end of the 1970s. Soviet literature, cinema, mass media and the system of education contributed in varying degree to the construction of this image. While the official myth of the war remained predominant there were also alternative viewpoints presented in non-conformist literature and art. However, it was the official Soviet myth that was largely revived in the 2000s.

It is noteworthy that Gudkov [*2011: 493–495*] draws similar conclusions as a result of analyzing the dynamics of the 'Stalin myth' in Russian public opinion. He devotes particular attention to the Brezhnev period when there was a conservative shift in the Soviet ideology. The victory in the war became the focus of the new version of legitimation of the political regime and the core element of collective identification. For Gudkov, the image of Stalin as military leader which had been formed during that period largely persisted in the post-Soviet years. As Gudkov emphasizes, the variety of attitudes to Stalin in today's Russian society points to the existence of different forms of political culture and different moral positions. At the same time the legacy of Stalinism has not been overcome in Russian society and there is still too little critical reflection on the nature and consequences of totalitarian rule [*Gudkov 2011: 498–500*].

The formation and preservation of collective identity represent a kind of symbolic politics. Dubin refers to ritualistic and ceremonial character of Russian politics. The specific features of such politics include: 'symbolization of the absence of alternative' represented in the figure of the president; 'memorization of collective identity' connected with the growing importance of symbols of the past; mediatization of politics that presupposes the existence of a mass of non-participating 'viewers' [*Dubin 2011: 240–241*]. A vivid example of these trends can be seen, according to Dubin, in the political rituals connected with the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the victory in the war in 2005. The victory was presented as an integrative symbol which was supposed to demonstrate the historical continuity of the state from the Soviet epoch to the present moment.

As Dubin argues, the collective identity of Russians is defined by two main symbols: the border separating 'us' from the 'others' and the power vertical which is seen as isolated from any social ties. These symbols which are characterized as archaic and non-modern presuppose the existence of non-organized, undifferentiated mass. The construction of collective identity 'bears the traits of imperial domination that had taken root in the decades of Stalinist totalitarianism and persisted in a milder form in the last Soviet decades' [*Dubin 2011: 245–246*]. For Dubin, the social processes in Russia can be seen as dynamics of 'mass society' without modernization of its core institutions. It is in such situation that the symbolic and ceremonial aspects of politics become particularly important.

The main trends in collective identification in Russia are regarded by Dubin as the following: growth of isolationism and xenophobia; rejection of any change and acceptance of *status quo*; the position of non-involvement and rejection of responsibility for the course of events [*Dubin 2011: 235*]. In the 2000s there was a decline in collective orientations connected with the outside world as a 'generalized other'. Dubin claims that the idea of Russia's specific way of development is perfectly compatible with what he calls 'an agreement of mutual irresponsibility' between the masses and the power [*Dubin 2011: 260*]. For the Russian authorities this idea means first of all the absence of any outside control. At the same time the majority of the country's population prefers to choose passivity and non-involvement. Adaptation to the existing social conditions has become the basic strategy of peoples' behaviour.

For Dubin, the structuring of the Soviet epoch was completed in the mass consciousness in Russia by the middle of the second post-Soviet decade. Public opinion surveys emphasize the importance of the beginning of that epoch (October revolution of 1917) and its end (disintegration of the USSR). Between these two events the victory in the war

and Yurii Gagarin's space flight are considered particularly significant. At the same time the Brezhnev period with its relative well-being and social homogeneity is seen by most of the population as the best time in 20th century Russian history. However, persecution of dissidents and the war in Afghanistan are not articulated in the mass consciousness. In the 2000s public opinion in Russia generally expressed nostalgia for the 'golden age' of Brezhnev's rule. It is paradoxical that the 'most mediocre period' in Soviet history has become in the collective consciousness 'a fulfilled utopia of equality, unity and well-being'. But in any case 'the quintessence of the Soviet should be seen not in Stalin's but in Brezhnev's years' [*Dubin 2011: 121*].

It should be noted that the multiple modernities approach to the Soviet model also focuses on the process of re-traditionalization during the Brezhnev period. Apparently this approach has much in common with the viewpoint of Dubin and Gudkov. Thus, according to Dubin [*2011: 267*], the Brezhnev period was the apex of the Soviet 'socio-political and civilizational order'. At the same time the discussion of Russian transformations in Gudkov's writings owes much to the Parsonian modernization theory that regards the West as the apex of modernity. Gudkov's idea of 'abortive modernization' also presupposes the existence of the only form of modernity exemplified by the West. The tendency to regard communist societies as 'pre-, anti- or pseudo-modern' [*Arnason 2002: 61*] which was common in western sociology of the 1990s can be seen in Gudkov's works as well. As he claims, the Soviet legacies should be identified with anti-modern elements. Nevertheless, these statements can be questioned from the viewpoint of the multiple modernities perspective in contemporary sociology [*Maslovskiy 2013: 2020–2021*]. The Soviet system can be seen not as a deviation from the only road to modernity but as a specific form of modern society that possessed distinctive civilizational features.

The Soviet imperial legacies in Russian politics

Within the last few years the subject of empire became rather popular in Russian political and academic discourse. It has been argued that 'imperial rhetoric' can be found practically in all parts of the Russian political spectrum. But the meaning of the term 'empire' remains different in the nationalist and liberal camps as well as in the 'discourse of Russian power' while all these ideological positions are weakly connected with interpretations of empire in the works of historians, sociologists and political scientists [*Malinova 2008: 100–101*]. It should also be noted that interpretations of the concept of empire by Russian researchers are often weakly connected with analysis of imperial power structures and post-imperial transformations in western social science. Thus Eisenstadt's classical study of the political systems of empires and the multiple modernities approach are hardly ever mentioned in these discussions.

An original approach to the concepts of nation-state and empire has been offered by Krishan Kumar. He argues that, on the one hand, nation-state and empire actually have more in common than is usually believed. On the other hand, the idea of a 'natural succession' from empire to nation-state should be considered misleading. From his viewpoint, empires and nation-states can in principle be seen as 'variable forms of "political imagination", alternative possibilities that were open to political elites depending on the circumstances of the times' [*Kumar 2010: 120*]. Apparently the focus on 'political

imagination' has much in common with the multiple modernities perspective in historical sociology.

Kumar notes that a particular ethnic group might come to identify itself with the empire it founds. He believes that the sense of identity of imperial peoples can be called 'imperial nationalism'. As he puts it: 'Like nationalists in relation to their nation, imperialists feel that there is something special or unique about their empire. It has a mission or purpose in the world. This may, again as with nationalists, endow imperial peoples with a sense of their own superiority, a feeling of inherent goodness as of a people specially chosen to carry out a task. Imperialists, like nationalists, are true-believers' [*Kumar 2010: 130*]. At the same time Kumar stresses that imperialist ideologies are mostly universalistic, not particularistic. He argues that imperial nationalism insists on 'a higher form of nationalism, one that justifies the nation in terms of its commitment to a cause that goes beyond the nation' [*Kumar 2010: 132*].

According to Kumar, empires as 'pre-modern' forms have not just been succeeded by more modern nation-states. Actually empires have persisted alongside nation-states. Moreover, although finally empires have lost ideological legitimacy 'that has not stopped them from continuing under other names' [*Kumar 2010: 137*]. Kumar claims that the disappearance of empires has been relatively recent and we can still see around us the traces of their existence. 'If empires belong to history, it is to that aspect of history that has an inescapable afterlife' [*Kumar 2010: 139*]. Actually it is the afterlife of the Soviet empire that should be the focus of our attention in discussing the political processes in today's Russia.

Post-Soviet political transformation in Russia has been analyzed in a comparative-historical context by Stephen Hanson. This scholar has emphasized the need to bring history back in the studies of Russian political processes. As Hanson [*2003: 145*] notes, by the middle of the 1990s post-Soviet studies became 'an ordinary part of comparative politics'. But he believes that the end of Soviet studies as an interdisciplinary subfield resulted in breaking the dialogue between historians and social scientists. On the other hand, while post-Soviet studies have moved away from the historical approach to social and political change, there was a resurgence of interest in comparative-historical studies in the field of comparative politics. For Hanson, the historical approach is essential for understanding the dynamics of political transformation in post-Soviet Russia.

Hanson considers the political regime that emerged in Russia after the collapse of communism an example of 'post-imperial democracy'. This concept is defined as 'a situation in which a new democratic regime is born within the core nation of a formally imperial polity immediately after its disintegration, and where reasonably fair and open democratic elections are held for at least a decade after imperial collapse' [*Hanson 2010: xxii*]. It should be noted, however, that the USSR had never been a 'formally imperial polity' and the fairness of elections in Russia was questionable even during the first post-Soviet decade. Hanson engages in a comparative analysis of political processes in the Third Republic in France, the Weimar Republic in Germany and post-Soviet Russia. In his view, there were many similarities between these three cases. He believes that the legacies of past imperial institutions constrained the new elites in similar ways since all three post-imperial democracies inherited semi-modernized economies and a great deal of social support for authoritarian politics. But it should be remembered that the routes to modernization were different in these countries.

As Hanson claims, in all three cases the imperial collapse was followed by a period of political instability and uncertainty before the consolidation of a new regime. However, the character of this new regime was different in each case: democracy in France, dictatorship in Germany and 'weak state authoritarianism' in Russia. In Hanson's view, political ideology was the main factor leading to these particular outcomes. Hanson focuses on party formation in the three countries. He claims that in France and Germany ideological parties tended to defeat pragmatic parties and the new regime consolidated along the lines of the most successful ideology. In Russia no ideological party succeeded and all parties were finally subordinated to the authoritarian state which lacked a clear and consistent ideology. As he argues, in post-Soviet Russia 'the absence of *any* compelling new political ideology – whether democratic or antidemocratic – has generated a situation in which all political parties are too weak to challenge even a very weak state' [*Hanson 2006: 345*].

Hanson draws the conclusion that ideology plays a crucial role in determining the fate of uncertain democracies. However, the concept of political ideology seems to be insufficient for explaining the interaction of political and socio-cultural processes in Russia. On the other hand, it can be admitted that there was no coherent state ideology in Russia in the 2000s. References to an unofficial discourse of nationalism and to the great-power rhetoric of the Russian authorities could not change this conclusion. But the great-power rhetoric increased dramatically in the course of the presidential campaign of 2012 and it became even stronger during the Crimea crisis in March 2014 and the consequent military conflict in eastern Ukraine. Apparently one can speak of the formation of a new state ideology. While this ideology lacks coherence and remains rather eclectic the mass propaganda campaigns in Russian media impose that ideological discourse on large sections of the country's population. It remains to be seen for how long the annexation of Crimea will be regarded by the population as a great achievement of Russian authorities and whether the rise of the geo-political prestige of the Russian state in the eyes of its citizens can compensate for economic decline.

According to Hanson, there were no substantial differences between the three countries considered in his work. 'Neither the formal institutions of presidential-parliamentary rule, nor antidemocratic legacies of empire, nor even levels of cultural support for authoritarianism differed substantially at the outset of the Third Republic, Weimar Germany, or post-Soviet Russia, yet the outcomes of party formation and consolidation were decisively different' [*Hanson 2010: xxv*]. It can be assumed, however, that some other factors affected these outcomes. In the case of Russia it was not only the imperial legacy but also the legacy of the Soviet model of modernity. Apparently the character of 'cultural support for authoritarianism' was different in the only post-communist society among post-imperial democracies. In fact, Hanson agrees that the Russian outcome partly reflects 'the cumulative cultural disgust with "ideology" in general in Russia, in a country where Marxism-Leninism has become farcical, fascism is associated with the horrors of the Second World War, and liberalism is seen by many as a plot hatched in the West to destroy the country' [*Hanson 2010: xxv*]. But it seems that these cultural traits deserve more attention.

It is characteristic that Hanson criticizes the civilizational approach to Russian politics and culture. He considers Richard Pipes and Samuel Huntington representatives of such approach but he disregards the multiple modernities theory which focuses on the dynamics of various civilizations of modernity. In fact, Hanson [*2003: 147*] has discussed

the possibility that the Soviet system 'might represent a completely different *type* of modernity – a separate, and ultimately self-destructive, "civilization" (as Stephen Kotkin has provocatively put it)'. Nevertheless, he does not take into account the analysis of civilizational aspects of the Soviet model of modernity in comparative-historical sociology.

Different viewpoints on the role of imperial legacies in post-Soviet Russian politics have been presented by scholars. Thus Dmitri Trenin argues that Russia has become a post-imperial state. At the same time Russia's post-imperial agenda was to remain a great power. Russia was seeking to preserve this status even after the disintegration of the Soviet empire [*Trenin 2011*]. But Trenin makes a conclusion that any kind of restoration of empire is impossible. On the other hand, Marcel Van Herpen emphasizes that Russia has been an empire for the past 500 years. He claims that while there was an "empire fatigue" in Russia during the first post-Soviet years it came to an end in the 2000s and Russian leadership sought a partial restoration of the lost empire [*Van Herpen 2014*]. From this perspective he considers the second Chechen war and Russia's military conflict with Georgia in 2008. For Van Herpen, today's Russia is a neo-imperialist state.

The approaches presented by Trenin and Van Herpen provide two extreme positions on the issue of imperial legacies in Russia. It seems that a more balanced viewpoint should be somewhere in the middle. An original approach has been offered by Pierre Hassner who regards Putin's Russia as a 'virtual empire'. According to Hassner [*2008: 11*], Russia's foreign policy can be understood only if post-imperial humiliation and resentment of the people and 'neo-imperial ambitions' of its leaders are taken into consideration. However, today's Russia lacks the resources to support confrontation with the West and a coherent ideology justifying such confrontation. As Hassner claims, in this situation the ruling elite chose to pretend that Russia is again becoming a superpower. Virtual empire is intended to strengthen the legitimacy of the current political regime inside the country.

It has been argued that the Russian elite is using foreign policy for strengthening the state, consolidating itself and mobilizing the population on the basis of suspicion towards the outside world [*Shevtsova 2007*]. According to this viewpoint, Russia's actions on the world stage are largely caused by the regime's domestic needs. Thus opposition to the West derives mainly from the need to have a mighty opponent whose existence justifies the maintenance of a centralized state. The imperial imagery is used by the Russian authorities for increasing the level of legitimacy of the political regime.

For a long time it seemed impossible that the Russian 'virtual empire' might strike back. But the persistence of imperial imagery finally resulted in a new turn in political development of the Russian state. The annexation of Crimea apparently meant a shift from post-imperial to neo-imperial policy. A detailed analysis of this new situation is beyond the scope of the present article. Nevertheless, it can be assumed that the multiple modernities perspective in political sociology will be fruitful in the study of imperial legacies of the Soviet model and its impact on today's neo-imperial policy of the Russian state.

Conclusion

The experience of Russia's post-Soviet political transformation proved to be a difficult case for democratization studies. Apparently we should be looking for new theoretical perspectives that can account for the persistence of authoritarian trends in Russian politics. The

multiple modernities civilizational approach can be seen as an important theoretical resource for understanding post-Soviet political processes. However, civilizational analysis concentrates mostly on long-term political trends. The study of Russia's transformation from this perspective can result first of all in reconsidering the obstacles to democratization that existed in the 1990s and the socio-cultural preconditions for de-democratization in the 2000s.

Political transformation in post-Soviet Russia represents an authoritarian turn of a post-imperial democracy. But this case should be seen as a specific historical constellation. On the one hand, the new political regime in Russia emerged as a result of disintegration of the communist version of modernity. This separates Russia from those post-imperial democracies which belonged to the Western world. On the other hand, Russia was the core of the former Soviet empire. In this respect it differs from other post-communist states. The dynamics of democratization and de-democratization in Russia can be considered a case of path dependency which is both post-communist and post-imperial. From this perspective the authoritarian political culture of the Soviet epoch and the Soviet imperial imagery are the main obstacles to democratization in today's Russia. Apparently the Soviet civilizational legacies are less persistent than legacies of a religious tradition. On the other hand, the imperial imagery proved to be strong enough to affect a major change in Russian foreign policy.

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Mikhail Maslovskii is a professor of National Research University Higher School of Economics and a senior researcher at the Sociological Institute of Russian Academy of Sciences, St.-Petersburg. His research dealt mostly with Weberian and neo-Weberian approaches in historical sociology. He also discussed application of the multiple modernities perspective to Russian and Soviet history. His publications in English include: Max Weber's Concept of Patrimonialism and the Soviet System *(The Sociological Review 1996),* The Weberian Tradition in Historical Sociology and the Field of Soviet Studies *(In V. Oittinen: Max Weber and Russia 2010);* Social and Cultural Obstacles to Russian Modernisation *(Europe-Asia Studies 2013).*

Jews and Cosmopolitanism: An Arc of European Thought

MARCI SHORE*

Židé a kosmopolitanismus: Oblouk evropského myšlení

Abstract: Isaac Deutscher, raised in his youth to be a Talmudic scholar, instead became a communist. In 1958, he addressed the World Jewish Congress on the topic of "The Non-Jewish Jew." There was a Jewish tradition – Deutscher began, citing Spinoza and Marx, Freud and Luxemburg and Trotsky – of breaking with Jewish tradition. Jews had always been restless and rootless, always lived on the borders of various heritages, languages, and cultures, at once in and apart from society. Victimized by religious intolerance and nationalist sentiments, Jews longed for a universalist *Weltanschauung*. It is true that "non-Jewish Jews" played a disproportionate role in the history of European Marxism. Yet Jews' contributions to Marxism might be understood in a larger context: namely, that "non-Jewish Jews" have played a disproportionate role in the intellectual history of modern Europe much more broadly. This essay is an attempt to place the relationship between Jews and Marxism in a larger context – less the larger sociological context than the larger intellectual context of European modernity.

Keywords: Jews; cosmopolitanism; Marxism; phenomenology; post-structuralism; psychoanalysis; Critical Theory; avant-garde

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On 21 November 2013 Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych unexpectedly refused to sign an association agreement with the European Union. Around 8 pm that evening a thirty-two year-old Afghan-Ukrainian journalist named Mustafa Nayem posted a note on his Facebook page: "Come on guys, let's be serious. If you really want to do something, don't just 'like' this post" [*Nayem 2014*]. He proposed a meeting at 10:30 pm, near the monument in the middle of the Maidan in Kiev. That was the beginning of a revolution. Nayem had spent his childhood in his native Afghanistan before moving to Ukraine around the age of eight. He speaks Ukrainian and Russian and Persian and English. History is often made by such cosmopolitan types.

There were Ukrainian Jews who played a prominent role in the Ukrainian revolution initiated by Mustafa Nayem. At a certain moment these Ukrainian Jews on the Maidan began to refer to themselves, half-ironically, as "Zhido-Bandera" ("Judeo-Bandera"). Seventy-some years earlier, Stepan Bandera had been the leading of an antisemitic Ukrainian fascist organization – hence the self-conscious irony. The phrase "Zhido-Bandera" contains as well an intertextual reference to "Zhido-komuna" ("Judeo-Bolshevism," spelled żydokomuna in Polish), a virtually untranslatable anti-Semitic – and anti-communist – pejorative

* Marci Shore, Associate Professor of History, Yale University, Department of History, 320 York Street, P.O. Box 208324, New Haven, CT 06520-8324. E-mail: marci.shore@yale.edu.

referring to the impression that Marxism in general and Stalinism in particular was a kind of Judeo-Bolshevik conspiracy.

In 2004, the Russian-American historian Yuri Slezkine opened his book *The Jewish Century* with the statement, "The Modern Age is the Jewish Age, and the twentieth century, in particular, is the Jewish Century" [*Slezkine 2004: 1*]. Slezkine went on to make the very controversial argument that "zhido-komuna" was not merely a myth; there *was* something special about the relationship between Jews and communism. By the time Slezkine wrote this book, explanations for the relationship between Jewishness and Marxism, Bolshevism in particular, had generated a large literature. Stanisław Krajewski emphasized the elements of rationalism and moralism shared by Judaism and communism, and the traditions of textual learning and social justice deeply rooted in both [*Krajewski 1996*]. Aleksander Smolar wrote of Jews' desire to flee ghettoized particularism to a utopian brotherhood of all peoples, a place where Jews would be welcomed as rootless individuals [*Smolar 1986*]. Others have similarly pointed out that in times of virulent antisemitism, communism promised racial blindness, equality and justice for all. Slezkine makes the argument that Marxism, like Zionism, offered a solution to the "Jewish predicament" – in particular an "absence of dignified manliness." Slezkine's most radical metaphor is one he takes from Isaac Babel: embracing communism, becoming Soviet, was a way for the emasculated Jew to finally be able to satisfy a Russian woman in bed.

Among the most famous Jewish Marxists was Isaac Deutscher (1907–1967), raised in his youth to be a Talmudic scholar. Instead Deutscher became a Polish communist and later a renegade Trotskyite, expelled from the Communist Party of Poland in 1932. A quarter century later, now living in England, he addressed the World Jewish Congress on the topic of "The Non-Jewish Jew." There was a Jewish tradition – Deutscher began, citing Spinoza and Marx, Freud and Luxemburg and Trotsky – of breaking with Jewish tradition. Jews had always been restless and rootless, always lived on the borders of various heritages, languages, and cultures, at once in and apart from society. Victimized by religious intolerance and nationalist sentiments, Jews longed for a universalist *Weltanschauung* [*Deutscher 1968*].

It is true that "non-Jewish Jews" played a disproportionate role in the history of European Marxism. Yet Jews' contributions to Marxism might be understood in a larger context: namely, that "non-Jewish Jews" have played a disproportionate role in the intellectual history of modern Europe much more broadly. For even in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, an age seemingly dominated by nation-building paradigms, cosmopolitan intellectuals continued searching for universal truths. Universalism is a way of perceiving the world; cosmopolitanism is an identity – and a capability: to be conversant in multiple languages, to have access to multiple literatures, to move among multiple cultures. As Deutscher understood well, the connection between cosmopolitan identity and universalist thought has its own logic: a search for ways to understand the world that would transcend national frameworks. He suggested that there was a special kind of insight born of marginality, that borders might serve as a privileged vantage point from which to glimpse a larger whole. In European history, it was disproportionately Jews not wedded to "Jewishness" who conceived of the universalist concepts and theories that have formed the central narrative arc of a modern history of ideas. The sketch that follows is an attempt to place "zhido-komuna" in a larger context – less the larger sociological context than the larger intellectual context of European modernity. Central to European modernity in all spheres

of intellectual life was the struggle to overcome alienation. "Thus the Jews stood for the discontents of the Modern Age as much as they did for its accomplishments," Slezkine wrote, "Jewishness and existential loneliness became synonyms …" [*Slezkine 2004: 75*].

Marxism

"Non-Jewish Jews" gained prominence in European intellectual life in the century following the Enlightenment – above all with Karl Marx (1818–1883). Born in Prussia, Marx was raised in a middle-class, assimilated Jewish family amidst both Enlightenment and Romantic philosophy. Decisive was his reading of G. W. F. Hegel (1770–1831), for whom history did not proceed arbitrarily, but rather moved inexorably in a certain direction, producing a meaning that could only be grasped retrospectively. This movement did not take place along a smooth line, but rather in leaps forward, its momentum propelled by "dialectics." Hegel insisted on the creative necessity not only of conflict, but also of destruction. Every process for him was one of struggle between incompatible forces; it was this clash that generated forward movement. Most critical was what Hegel called *Aufhebung*, from the untranslatable German verb *aufheben*: to lift up; that is, at once to cancel and synthesize, abolish and assimilate, preserve and overcome. In this way things always contained within themselves both their own negation and their own fulfillment. And by means of *Aufhebung* – this principle of perpetual absorption and resolution in an ever higher unity – historical processes possessed an inner logic, and human history moved forward towards ever greater self-realization. The movement was merciless: history, Hegel described, was "the slaughter-bench at which the happiness of peoples, the wisdom of States, and the virtue of individuals have been victimized" [*Hegel 2004: 21–22*].

Marx absorbed two further aspects of Hegel's thought. The first was the collapsing of the distinction between facts and values: that which triumphed was by definition that which *should* triumph. The second was Hegel's idea that all of the variegated aspects of the universe were part of an organic, totalistic whole. "*Das Wahre ist das Ganze*," Hegel famously wrote. "The true is the whole" [*Hegel 1970: 24*].

In February 1848, Marx and Friedrich Engels published *The Communist Manifesto*, which presented not only an historical model, but also a prophecy. "A spectre is haunting Europe – the spectre of Communism," the manifesto began [*Marx – Engels 2002: 72*]. This spectre was not a ghost from the past, but rather a spectre *to come*. Marx and Engels' theory of the future proceeded directly from their theory of the past. History, for Marx, was History in the Hegelian sense: historical movement was dialectical. In the modern world the site of contradiction was the exploitative bourgeois order, which eventually would produce in the exploited proletariat the consciousness that this order must be violently overthrown, that private property must be abolished, and that a society must be established where each person worked according to his ability, and received according to his need. "What the bourgeoisie therefore produces, above all," Marx and Engels wrote, "are its own grave-diggers. Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable" [*Marx – Engels 2002: 78*]. In time not only would private property be abolished, but the state itself would also wither away, together with national distinctions. "Workers of the world unite!" Marx and Engels concluded *The Communist Manifesto.* The proletariat's overthrow of the bourgeoisie would happen around the world. For Marx the factual was the normative: the worldwide proletarian

revolution was destined to occur. He had disdain for romanticism and idealism, even for "utopian socialism," which depended upon voluntarism. In this sense Marx was heir to the Enlightenment: reason was always right. What was objectively necessary was also subjectively good.

For Marx, everything not part of the primary economic relationship between oppressors and oppressed was derivative. Only material conditions were generative historical factors; ideas were not causes. Human consciousness itself was likewise derivative, determined by socio-economic conditions. By implication human nature was not innate, but rather emerged from a given political-social-economic situation. "Consciousness," Marx and Engels insisted, "does not determine life, but life determines consciousness" [*Marx – Engels 1994:* 112]. Thus Marxism's defining philosophical features were determinism and totality. Like Hegel, he insisted on thinking big: for Marx it was not possible to solve one problem without solving them all. Once one was inside Marxism, it purported to explain everything. And this proved peculiarly seductive.

Among the most intellectually significant Marxists of the next generations were Rosa Luxemburg (1871–1919), Georg Lukács (1885–1971), and Leon Trotsky (1879–1940). A revolutionary from her youth, Rosa Luxemburg grew up in a Jewish family in a Polish town under Russian rule. A founder of both the Social Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania and the German Communist Party, she was an uncompromising internationalist. She was also Lenin's most important interlocutor on various matters, including the question of "rushing History."

In 1902 Lenin published *Chto delat'?* (*What Is To Be Done?*) proposing a revision to the Marxism of *The Communist Manifesto*. Lenin fully agreed with Marx that History was moving inexorably in a certain direction. He agreed, too, that the proletariat would acquire class consciousness and come to understand the need to rise up and overthrow the capitalist order. For Lenin, though, this was taking a frustratingly long time. In *Chto delat'?* Lenin called for a conspiratorial, tightly-knit, highly centralized Party, led by a vanguard of professional revolutionaries who would bring class consciousness to the proletariat. That is, they would enlighten workers as to their predestined revolutionary role – and thereby nudge History along.

Rosa Luxemburg disagreed. She believed that Lenin's centralism too tightly separated the core cadre of leaders from the proletarian masses – in whom she had considerably more faith. For her the idea of an elite vanguard was a dangerous one: for an elite, she believed, would always turn conservative in the end. The only potential for sustained radicalism she saw in the proletariat. Moreover, she insisted on respect for historical phases. "The logic of the historic process," she wrote in 1904, "comes before the subjective logic of the human beings who participate in the historic process" [*Luxemburg 1961: 93*]. History must be allowed to shape consciousness; History would do its job.

Georg Lukács (1885–1971) admired Rosa Luxemburg very much. He valued in particular her understanding of the dialectical unity of theory and *praxis*, and her appreciation for Marxist totality. "In her work," Lukács wrote, "we see how the last flowering of capitalism is transformed into a ghastly dance of death, into the inexorable march of Oedipus to his doom" [*Lukács 2002: 32–33*]. Nonetheless, Lukács sided with Lenin: Luxemburg underplayed the role of the Party and overestimated the "elemental spontaneity of the masses." For Lukács everything depended on the class consciousness of the proletariat.

It was consciousness that was the link between theory and *Praxis*, and the Party that was the embodiment of class consciousness. He argued, too, against "vulgar Marxism," which "opportunistically" waited for History to play itself out. He believed that the proletariat must *act*, sometimes with ruthless force; he believed in violence as historical necessity.

If Rosa Luxemburg was the leading Marxist internationalist of her generation, Lukács was the leading Hegelian universalist, devoted to the idea that reality could only be grasped as a whole. Nothing could be understood, or resolved, in a piecemeal fashion. For "the whole system of Marxism," Lukács wrote, "stands and falls with the principle that revolution is the product of a point of view in which the category of totality is dominant" [*Lukács 2002: 29*].

By the time Georg Lukács completed *History and Class Consciousness* in 1922, Rosa Luxemburg was no longer alive. On 15 January 1919, she was among the leaders of the German Communist Party captured in Berlin during the Spartacus rebellion. Together with her comrade Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg was shot, her body thrown into the Spree River.

"She was a woman of genius," Leon Trotsky (1879–1940) wrote of Rosa Luxemburg in his eulogy. Trotsky recalled having heard Luxemburg speak at a congress in Jena, when "small and fragilely built she mounted the platform of the congress as the personification of the proletarian revolution" [*Trotsky 1919*]. Trotsky himself was born to a family of Russian Jewish peasant farmers. He was a Menshevik, a Marxist who resisted Leninism – until 1917, when joined Lenin in Petrograd in carrying out the Bolshevik Revolution. Trotsky became one of the Revolution's heroes. Yet following Lenin's early death in 1924, he lost the power struggle to Stalin, and was forced into exile.

In was in exile, in the 1930s, that Trotsky wrote *The Revolution Betrayed*. Under Stalin, Trotsky argued, bureaucracy had swallowed the revolutionary vanguard. Freedom of criticism had vanished, and the masses had been pushed away from the Party leadership. Not only had the Soviet system become ossified, but so, too, had a new privileged class arisen. Soviet Party officials rode in limousines, and the Soviet Union had surpassed the capitalist countries in its inequality. Trotsky called for a new revolution, this time a revolution against "bureaucratic absolutism" [*Trotsky 1996: 289*].

Trotsky called for something else as well. In 1917, Lenin had deeply believed that once the communist revolution happened in Russia, workers all around the world would follow more or less at once. When the worldwide workers' revolution failed to occur, Stalin announced the doctrine of "Socialism in One Country." For Trotsky this, too, was a betrayal of Marxism. He insisted, in contrast, on "permanent revolution": ultimately socialism would prevail in one country only when it prevailed around the world.

History did not go Trotsky's way. Inspired by visions of an egalitarian utopia, communism in practice turned into Stalinist terror. Like the French Revolution, the Bolshevik Revolution devoured its own children. Trotsky was only one of many. Stalin's henchmen pursued him across continents, until in 1940 Stalin finally succeeded in having Trotsky murdered in Mexico, by ice pick.

Imperial cosmopolitanism

Marx and his followers, while "objectively" optimists, tended to express their optimism with a brutal edge. A much gentler optimism characterized the philosophy of Ludwik Zamenhof (1859–1917), a native of Polish-, Russian-, Yiddish-, and German-speaking

Białystok. A Polish Jewish optometrist, Zamenhof was a cosmopolitan from a provincial town who studied in Warsaw, Moscow and Vienna. These years of the rise of nationalism were years of increasing ethnic tensions in both the Russian and Habsburg empires, and Zamenhof became obsessed with the idea that it was the problem of communication across national lines that was responsible for so much ill will and misunderstanding. "Though language is the prime motor of civilisation, and to it alone we owe the having raised ourselves above the level of other animals," he wrote, "difference of speech is a cause of antipathy, nay even of hatred, between people" [*Zamenhof 1889*].

In Warsaw in 1887, Zamenhof, under the pen name "Dr. Esperanto" – "Dr. Hopeful" – published *An Attempt Towards an International Language*. There he proposed the worldwide adoption of Esperanto, a new language he himself had invented. The etymological and structural influences were European; the grammar was perfectly regular; and the language perfectly phonetic, for Zamenhof had designed it to be as easy to learn as possible. His vision involved no abandonment of already-existing languages – Esperanto was created to be a universally shared second language. It was an extraordinary linguistic achievement. In 1905, the year of massive demonstrations, protests and strikes throughout the Russian empire, some 700 language enthusiasts came to Boulogne-sur-Mer for the first World Esperanto Congress.

Ludwik Zamenhof's universalist project was implicitly a European one – at a time when "Europe" as such did not yet exist. To the extent that it did, it did so largely in the minds of Europe's "non-Jewish Jews." The writer Stefan Zweig (1881–1942) expressed this poignantly. An aesthete from a bourgeois Jewish family steeped in Viennese culture, Zweig grew up in the twilight of the Habsburg Empire. Later he called the Vienna of those years a "world of security" in an age of reason. Nineteenth-century liberalism with its optimistic faith in progress set the tone of Zweig's bourgeois world. "It was sweet to live here," he wrote, "in this atmosphere of spiritual conciliation, and subconsciously every citizen became supranational, cosmopolitan, a citizen of the world" [*Zweig 1964: 13*].

Stefan Zweig grew up in Viennese coffeehouses, which constituted then a civil society unto itself. It was a time and space of worship of Art, and Zweig's generation was blinded by its faith in the purely aesthetic. In Café Griensteidl would gather the writers of Jung-Wien, Arthur Schnitzler and Hugo von Hoffmannsthal among them, nearly all of them were of Jews by birth. And Jewishness was important to Zweig – or rather, it was important in its absence of particularity. In a letter to the Zionist Martin Buber, Zweig wrote, "I have never wanted the Jews to become a nation again, and thus to lower itself to taking part with the others in the rivalry of realities. I love the Diaspora and affirm it as the meaning of Jewish idealism, as Jewry's cosmopolitan human mission" [*Stanislawski 2004: 124*].

Zweig's world came to an end on 29 June 1914, with a single shot fired in Sarajevo. Patriotism prevailed and European nations turned against one another. Yet this did nothing to change Zweig's feelings towards nationalism in general or Zionism in particular. In 1917 Zweig wrote to Martin Buber, explaining that what he valued most in his Jewishness, was the "absolute freedom to choose among nations, to feel oneself a guest everywhere, to be both participant and mediator. This supranational feeling of freedom from the madness of a fanatical world has saved me psychologically during these trying times, and I feel with gratitude that it is Judaism that has made his supranational feeling possible for me" [*Stanislawski 2004: 125*].

Cosmopolitanism for Zweig was not only an identity, but also an ideology. Like universalism, it was for him synonymous with "Europeanness." When it was no longer possible to travel in Europe without a passport, this was for Zweig an expulsion from paradise. He fought against it. A devoted cultural attaché for a Europe that did then exist, Zweig travelled from country to country, promoting Europe's intellectual unification, giving lectures in Switzerland and Holland, in Belgium and Italy, speaking in German and French and English and Italian.

Zweig's was a failed project. "Europe" did not then come into being. Instead, in 1933 Hitler came to power in Germany; the following year Zweig fled Austria. From wartime exile, he wrote *Die Welt von Gestern: Erinnerungen eines Europäers* (*The World of Yesterday*), a work of overwhelming nostalgia, a memoir that was less an autobiography than a eulogy to a lost world. It was his generation, "we, who once knew a world of individual freedom" who "know and can give testimony that Europe once, without a care, enjoyed its kaleidoscopic play of color." *The World of Yesterday* appeared in 1943 – posthumously, for Zweig had committed suicide in Brazil the previous year.

Zweig believed that it was not by chance that psychoanalysis was born in Vienna. He valued his friendship with Sigmund Freud (1856–1939), who even in the blissful "world of security" saw many causes of human misery. From the beginning, Freud was interested in solving the great mysteries of human existence. He studied medicine at the University of Vienna during the reign of positivism, with its objectivist, materialist, empiricist inclinations. Psychology, like biology, was understood then as something that could be explained by physical forces and chemical reactions. A speculative thinker, Freud broke away from positivism by asserting that the mind could be the cause of its own illness. Illness, that is, could be caused by *ideas*.

The tripartite model Freud developed of the self was a universal one: each person possessed an id (*das Es*), a superego (*das Überich*), and an ego (*das Ich*). The id was libido, pure desire, and included the twin drives of Eros and Thanatos. Eros was the life instinct, the drive for sex and survival. Thanatos was the death instinct, the drive for aggression and (self-)destruction. The superego was society internalized as conscience. It was left then to the ego to mediate between the guilt of the superego and the desires of the id.

"The first of these displeasing propositions of psycho-analysis is this," Freud told his audience during a lecture, "that mental processes are essentially unconscious, and that those which are conscious are merely isolated acts and parts of the whole psychic entity" [*Freud 1989: 25*]. For Freud every self was divided into a conscious and unconscious part, and it was the latter – that psychic closet into which everything too traumatic for the conscious mind was tossed – that was more determinate. More or less everything important happened in the unconscious.

Freud's model was in a sense dialectical: the self was always in conflict with itself. Further, the self was a closed-energy system, characterized by "the return of the repressed": sublimated trauma and desires did not disappear, but rather reappeared as neuroses or other symptoms of mental illness. Thwarted aggression would always turn inwards. Yet this thwarting of aggression was necessary, he argued in *Civilization and Its Discontents*, for society required the repression of Eros and Thanatos, an exchange of happiness for security. Civilization, in short, was responsible for our misery. Yet the repression inherent in civilization was a necessity: there was no other choice.

Freud shared with Marx a predilection for grandiosity. In essence both of these thinkers asked the same question: why were people unhappy in the modern world? They gave very different answers. While Marx embraced materialism, Freud revolted against materialism by insisting on the agency of ideas. In Freud's mind Marxism was based on the flawed premise that man was good and only private property had corrupted his natural goodness. Freud, in contrast, rejected the idea that aggression was created by either property or capitalism. The aggressive instinct, he believed, was primordial and universal. Marxists, in turn, called psychoanalysis the last bourgeois attempt to stave off the revolution.

As Freud developed it, psychoanalysis was the process by which the unconscious was coaxed into revealing itself. Yet unlike in Marxism, in psychoanalysis there was no happily ever after. Culture was paid for by repression, and all civilization was built on individual suffering and renunciation. Psychoanalysis might alleviate some of the symptoms, but success could only ever be partial. For Freud, unlike for Marx, there was no way out.

In fact against the objectivist materialism of both Marx and the nineteenth century natural sciences emerged from the Austrian Empire two distinct subjectivist rebellions: the psychoanalytic self and the phenomenological self. Both involved rejections of positivism, and both argued that understanding the world meant understanding the primacy of the individual human subject. Yet these two subjectivist rebellions were otherwise very different. Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) was Freud's exact contemporary. Born in Habsburg Moravia, Husserl was a German-speaking Jew who, together with his wife, rejected both Judaism and Jewishness. Of Malvine Husserl Emmanuel Levinas once wrote, "*Madame Husserl parlait de juifs rigoureusement à la troisième personne, pas même à la deuxième*" [*Schuhmann 1988: 119*].

While Freud was concerned with what was hidden, Husserl was concerned with what was illuminated. His philosophy began with epistemological questions: what is knowledge? Where do we begin? How can we know the world? "How can I, the cognizing subject," Husserl asked, "know if I can ever really know that there exist not only my own mental processes, these acts of cognizing, but also that which I apprehend?" [*Husserl 1990: 16*]. Like René Descartes and Immanuel Kant, Husserl desired to clear away everything uncertain and begin afresh, building a science on a foundation of what could be known absolutely and universally. For Kant, the *Ding-an-sich* – the "thing in itself" – referred to what lay beyond the limits of knowledge: the real thing was that which could not be known. Husserl rejected this Kantian fatalism. The more optimistic Husserl was interested in the *possibility* of knowledge. And phenomenology emerged as a philosophy of radical subjectivity with a claim to objective truth.

For Husserl "the world" was a singularity, the most all-encompassing context, the widest whole. The subject – the self, the "I," the "transcendental ego" – was a second singularity, the center of this whole. Objects, for Husserl, were always transcendent – that is, they lay *outside* of our consciousness. Only human beings had transcendental egos, meaning only we were reflective beings with the possibility of transcendence. And transcendence, for Husserl, meant the subject's ability to reach outside of himself to the objects comprising the world.

Husserl's prose style was that of a mathematician: dry and technical. Yet he was very much a humanist in the sense that he regarded the human subject as the source of all meaning. Knowledge *was* possible, but not apart from human beings, for knowledge was inextricably bound up with human consciousness. The problem of knowing was

a universal one, it was the problem of transcendence: how could we – subjects, transcendental egos – reach the object? In other words, how could we transcend ourselves as subjects to know the world? Husserl denied that the subject and the object were separated by a gaping abyss; he insisted rather that subject and object, while distinct, were inextricably connected by "intentionality." For Husserl consciousness was *intentional* – that is, directed towards something, like a transitive verb that required an object. Consciousness was always consciousness *of something*. The transcendental ego "burst forth" towards the object, overcoming the seemingly unbridgeable distance between them. In this sense, the parts preceded the whole: that is, the *a priori* connectedness between subject and object preceded a separate existence of either.

There was a critical difference between Freud and Husserl's respective understandings of subjectivity. For Freud, there was no transparency: the self was always concealed from the self; the real was the hidden. For Husserl in contrast, the most essential self – "pure consciousness" or the "transcendental ego" – was transparent, and what was real was by definition what appeared. In this way phenomenology's transcendental ego was both radically subjective and curiously generic.

After the Nazis came to power in 1933, the aging Edmund Husserl was cast out of the University of Freiburg under the rectorship of his own protégé, Martin Heidegger. Less than two years later, nearing the end of his life, Husserl wrote to his friend of many decades, the founding Czechoslovak president Tomáš Masaryk. In the letter Husserl expressed his wish that Masaryk's vision for the new state of Czechoslovakia come true, a vision of a "*Staatsvolk* not divided by the various languages, but rather mutually enriched and elevated by their participation in linguistically formed cultural achievements. You inculcated in me this ideal all those years ago in Leipzig! May the Republic through such political-ethical ennoblement become the foundation for the renewal of *European* culture, direly endangered by nationalist degeneracy" [*Husserl 1994: 120*].

Masaryk's Czechoslovakia did not then have long to live. The time of the Masaryks and Husserls, the Zweigs and Zamenhofs and Freuds, had passed. In the three preceding decades, among Husserl's talented students had been the Germans Hans Lipps and Martin Heidegger; the Pole Roman Ingarden; the German Jews who converted to Christianity Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Adolf Reinach, Max Scheler, and Edith Stein; the Russian Gustav Shpet; the Czech Jan Patočka; and the Russian Jew who had come to Göttingen from Kaunas via Kharkov and Strasbourg, Emmanuel Levinas. They had come to Germany from Lemberg, Vienna, Moscow, Breslau, Cracow, Strasbourg and Prague. They had come to try to understand subjectivity apart from race, nation, or class. In an age of nationalism, the students of phenomenology gathered around Husserl – first in Göttingen and later in Freiburg – represented a last moment of imperial cosmopolitanism in Central Europe. By 1935 that had come to end.

Words and feelings

God's death, announced by Friedrich Nietzsche in 1882, brought a lurking threat of nothingness [*Nietzsche 1975: 126*]. In politics, nation and class arose as alternative identities. In philosophy, teleology and subjectivity arose as alternative structures for thinking about the world. The tension between subjectivity and telos was to define European

thought throughout the twentieth century. This was true in the aesthetic realm as well, where "non-Jewish Jews" played a disproportionately large role in twentieth-century modernism.

Like Freud and Husserl, Franz Kafka (1883–1924) was a subject of the Habsburg monarchy, and an assimilated Jew from the Czech lands who wrote in German. He lived in *fin-de-siècle* Prague, a city in linguistic and cultural transition. The city's Jews occupied a liminal position – and yet at once a central one in German-Czech cultural dialogue. Kafka, together with his friends Franz Werfel (1890–1945) and Max Brod (1884–1968) – the "Prague Circle" of German expressionists – represented a certain de-nationalized German culture. In a 1911 diary entry, Kafka wrote of his own Prague German as a "deterritorialized language, appropriate for strange and minor uses" [*Spector 2000: 28*]. He was painfully conscious of himself as an outsider to all national communities – Czech, German, and Jewish alike. "What have I in common with Jews?" he wrote in his diary in 1914, "I have hardly anything in common with myself" [*Kafka 1965: 11*].

Giving expression to anxiety and alienation was Kafka's great contribution to European literature. His novel, *The Metamorphosis*, opened with the line: "When Gregor Samsa woke up one morning from unsettling dreams, he found himself changed in his bed into a monstrous vermin" [*Kafka 1972: 3*]. For Kafka it was the uncertainty of reality, the absence of stable identity that made this world so difficult to live in. He expressed poignantly the fear of acting, the impotence of the outsider, the anguish of solitude, and the torments of the psychological self, which had no fixed identity.

Kafka suffered from anxiety, depression, neuroses, migraines, and various psychologically-induced ailments. When he died very young, however, it was of tuberculosis. Before his death he was involved in various unsuccessful relationships with women, most famously with his Czech translator, Milena Jesenská, an independent-minded woman attracted, at various times, to feminism, communism, bisexuality, cocaine, and the avant-garde.

The avant-garde was "second-wave" modernism. The (anguishes of the) psychological self at the center of "first-wave" literary modernism revealed themselves to be existentially unbearable. Avant-gardists fled from this subjectivity, turning instead to the materiality of language. From the beginning of the century linguistics and poetics were growing more intimate. At the center of this nexus was the precocious polyglot Roman Jakobson (1896–1982), who during the First World War, while still a teenager, was among the small group of Moscow students who founded the Moscow Linguistic Circle. The following year Viktor Shklovsky (1893–1984) and Osip Brik (1888–1945) were instrumental in forming the Moscow Linguistic Circle's Petersburg counterpart, the Society for the Study of Poetic Language. Jakobson took part, too, in the Petersburg meetings, which were hosted by Osip Brik's wife and the futurist poet Vladimir Mayakovsky's muse Lilia Brik (1891–1978).

From these circles came Russian Formalism, committed to "literature as such" – that is, the study of aesthetic devices, considered unto and for themselves. Never had linguistics and literature been so close, and no one did more to effect this coupling than Roman Jakobson. As the Formalists studied the autonomous nature of poetic language, the Russian futurists invented a poetry of the "self-sufficient," "self-valuing" word [*Khlebnikov – Kruchënych 1967*]. Words were material things, independent of the things they signified, and poetry, for Jakobson, meant "language in its aesthetic function" [*Jakobson 1992: 179*].

The new poetry of the avant-garde broke with representation in favor of the "laying bare" of the aesthetic device.

"Art was always free of life," Viktor Shklovsky declared, "and its color never reflected the color of the flag which waved over the fortress of the city" [*Erlich 2006: 129*]. These linguists and poets were polyglots and cosmopolitans, and Russian Formalism shared with phenomenology a search for universal principles. It shared much more than that, however. Among Formalism's most important contributions was Viktor Shklovsky's idea of *ostranenie,* "estrangement," or "making strange." In 1917 Shklovsky proclaimed the purpose of art: to break the spell of automization, the automatization that "eats away at things, at clothes, at furniture, at our wives, and at our fear of war" [*Shklovsky 1990: 5*]. *Ostranenie* shocked us out of our habitual state; it "return[ed] sensation to our limbs" [*Shklovsky 1990: 6*]. In essence the aim of Shklovsky's *ostranenie* was that of what Husserl called "bracketing": that is, to make us self-conscious about what we were seeing, about how objects appeared to us.

In 1920, in the midst of the Bolshevik Civil War, Jakobson left Russia for Prague. Once there, Jakobson tried to persuade Shklovsky to join him. "To live in Prague and believe that you're living in Europe is foolish," Shklovsky wrote to Jakobson. He added, "Do you wear round glasses? All the Jews are wearing them, don't be an assimilator" [*Baran 1999: 116–119*]. Although Shklovsky preferred Berlin, Jakobson was not to be lonely in Prague. There, as in Moscow and Petersburg, he continued his manically energetic social, intellectual, and artistic life. He founded the Prague Linguistic Circle, at whose meetings "seldom was Czech without an accent heard. Even those who hardly knew how to speak any other language but their native Czech acquired a queer pronunciation after some time" [*Součková 1978: 2*].

Jakobson became involved, too, with the Czech avant-garde group, Devětsil, who like the avant-gardes in other places, found inspiration from varied sources. One was linguistic structuralism, in which Jakobson played a leading role. The critical insight here, first articulated by the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure, was that language was a form, not a substance. Further, the linguistic sign – the unity of signifier (*signifiant*) and signified (*signifié*), the word and the thing it represented – was arbitrary, defined only by contrast and obtaining only within a given system [*Saussure 1996*]. This decoupling of form and content gave the avant-garde tremendous freedom: suddenly words were things, you could do what you wanted with them. Avant-garde poets disregarded disciplinary distinctions; they played with atonal meters, with rhyme and assonance and alliteration, setting aside what would traditionally be considered the meaning of words. They wrote sound poems, nonreferential verse, and poetry in graphic form. They rejected grammatical rules and played with words like toys. This break with referentiality had a still more profound dimension: for art, then, had no obligation to mimic life, and it was the avant-gardists, before the socialist realists, who made the leap from art as representation to art as transformation.

In general the avant-gardists refused to acknowledge any hitherto obtaining rules – be they of literature, of convention, or of *politesse*. The result was much provocation and some scandal. The avant-gardists took rather literally the announcement by Nietzsche's madman of God's death, and Zarathustra's declaration that "what is falling we should still push" [*Nietzsche 1978: 209*]. The old world was dead, and now all was possible. Modernity was emptiness, a space for play. It was a nihilism that resembled less catastrophism than it did

nothingness in the sense that Jean-Paul Sartre would later articulate it: absolute nothingness as absolute freedom.

All of this took place against the background of the crisis of liberalism and the rise of nationalism. In the wake of World War I, Wilsonian self-determination had prevailed in Eastern Europe. The richly multicultural Habsburg Empire fell, and in its place new states were created, founded on the principle that national and state borders should coincide. Now the cosmopolitanism that had characterized so much of intellectual life under empires gave way to the self-conscious internationalism of the avant-garde. Like Leon Trotsky and Rosa Luxemburg, the avant-garde artists and writers were adamant internationalists. Yet now this stance betrayed an implicit acceptance that no longer could cosmopolitanism be taken for granted: now borders had to be deliberately transgressed.

The various European avant-garde movements – futurism and dadaism, constructivism and surrealism – were created by a cast of colorful characters, a disproportionate number of whom were "non-Jewish Jews." These included the Russian Jewish constructivists in Berlin, El Lissitzky (1890–1941) and Ilya Ehrenburg (1891–1967), who published the multilingual avant-garde journal *Veshch'/Gegenstand/Object*. Geometric forms, the constructivists believed, possessed universal meaning. These included, too, Tristan Tzara (1896–1963), founder of dada, who declared in his 1918 manifesto, "I am against systems, the most acceptable system is on principle none" [*Tzara 2002*]. The Romanian-Jewish-Swiss Tzara was himself a national nihilist par excellence who embraced disunity: "People are different. Diversity creates interest for life. There is no common basis in human minds" [*Tzara 1922*]. Of Tzara and the dadaists Roman Jakobson wrote, "They do not object to the war ('still today for war' (*heute noch für den Krieg*)), yet they are the first to proclaim the cause of erasing the boundaries between yesterday's warring powers ('me, I'm of many nationalities' (*Je suis, moi, de plusieurs nationalités*))" [*Jakobson 2002*].

The Polish-Jewish graphic artist Henryk Berlewi (1894–1967) spent the years 1921 to 1923 in Berlin, in the company of Hungarian, Russian, and German painters and poets. In 1923 Berlewi returned to Warsaw, and founded, together with Aleksander Wat (1900–1967) and another futurist friend, a graphic design advertising agency. Like Berlewi and like the constructivists in Berlin, the young polyglot futurist Wat had explicitly internationalist aspirations. In July 1921 he and two friends, Bruno Jasieński (1901–1938) and Anatol Stern (1899–1968) sent a letter to the Russian futurist Vladimir Mayakovsky: "Polish futurists, establishing contact with futurists from all countries, send the Russian futurists fraternal greetings. Beginning in September of the present year we will publish in Warsaw the first large international journal-newspaper devoted to universal futurist poetry in all languages."[1]

Europe's ashes

The avant-garde's conviction that anything was now possible revealed itself to be darkly true. In his story "The Eternally Wandering Jew," written in the mid-1920s, Wat described Europe as "cannibalistic, impoverished, mystical, sadistic, prostituted" [*Wat 1990: 8*].

[1] Bruno Iasenskii, Aleksander Vat, and Anatol' Stern to Vladimir Maiakovskii, Warsaw, 1 July 1921, 2852/1/599, Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Literatury i Iskusstva, Moscow.

Fifteen years later Europe was much worse: by the mid-twentieth century, Europe was a bloodbath.

This fact was to define the arc of Europe's intellectual life. The philosophers of the Institute for Social Research (*Institut für Sozialforschung*) established in 1923 at the University of Frankfurt were Hegelians and Marxists of varying sorts. All of them had come under the influences of Marxism, psychoanalysis, and phenomenology. Nearly all of them were German Jews, including Theodor Adorno (1903–1969), Walter Benjamin (1892–1940), Max Horkheimer (1895–1973), Herbert Marcuse (1898–1979), and Wilhelm Reich (1897–1957). Collectively they developed "Critical Theory" – a synthetic, interdisciplinary blend of philosophy and social science. Beginning from a dialectical understanding of history, Critical Theory integrated Freudian psychoanalysis with phenomenological notions of subjectivity and a revised, Western Marxism. Critical Theory was explicitly normative: it was concerned with explaining not only how things were, but also how they should be. Individual happiness and fulfillment, the Frankfurt School believed, depended upon a transformation of society. All of these thinkers were preoccupied with the integration of theory and *praxis* – despite the fact that they themselves, rarely politically engaged, led rather bourgeois lives.

The Frankfurt School philosophers were assimilated German Jews on the Left, deeply tied to German culture. They were, in fact, Weimar's Germany intellectual elite. Almost every one of them denied the relevance of Jewishness and the Jewish question in Germany. In the end, though, their subjective conviction of belonging objectively proved to no avail. When the Nazis came to power in Germany, Walter Benjamin, who "knew Goethe's work inside out the way a devout Christian might know the Bible," fled to Paris [*Perloff 2004: 80–81*]. After the Gestapo confiscated his apartment there, he intended to emigrate to the United States via Spain and Portugal. Yet Benjamin arrived at the Spanish border town one evening in September 1940, only to learn that the Spain had just that day closed the border, and the refugees would be returned to France. That night he took his own life.

Walter Benjamin's colleagues fared better. Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse and Reich all reached the other side of the Atlantic. And it was, there, in American exile, that they learned of the Holocaust. It changed all of them. For Adorno, as for many of his contemporaries, Auschwitz came to be that which revealed all hidden meaning. The Holocaust had forced the Frankfurt School philosophers to question the meaning of modernity: had it meant enlightenment or had it meant terror? It was in the immediate wake of the news of Auschwitz that Adorno and Horkheimer wrote *The Dialectic of Enlightenment*, posing the question of whether it was possible to draw a line between Enlightenment and totalitarianism.

The authors of *The Dialectic of Enlightenment* aimed to expose the many contradictions, paradoxes and dialectical processes that characterized the path from eighteenth-century Enlightenment to twentieth-century Nazi totalitarianism. The Enlightenment project of looking upon the world as an object to be molded by people had resulted in domination as a mode of behavior. People had always insisted on the very ideology that enslaved them, and the desire to be enslaved "always already" co-existed with the desire to be free: "The strain of holding the I together adheres to the I in all stages, and the temptation to lose it has always been there with the blind determination to maintain it" [*Horkheimer – Adorno 1996: 33*]. The totalitarian quality implicit in Enlightenment rested on the dialectic inherent in the individual's surrendering subjectivity as a means of achieving subjectivity:

the self was sacrificed to the self, and the negated self was lost to the herd. The result of man's sacrifice of himself was ultimately a false society in which everyone was superfluous and everyone was deceived. Ultimately, Enlightenment was self-negating.

Hannah Arendt (1906–1975), Adorno's contemporary who very much shared his intellectual background, was also among his fiercest critics. She, too, fled Nazi Germany, first to Paris and later to New York, where in 1943 the news of the Holocaust reached her. "What was decisive," she said, "was not the year 1933, at least not for me. What was decisive was the day we learned about Auschwitz" [*Arendt 2003b: 13*].

Like Adorno and Horkheimer and so many others of their generation, Arendt was consumed with the need to understand what had happened. In the years immediately following the war she wrote *Origins of Totalitarianism*, a study born in part of the observation of Nazism's and Stalinism's essential similarities. Yet in contrast to Adorno and Horkheimer, Arendt rejected any kind of Hegelian historical determinism and insisted that Nazism was a departure from the Enlightenment's trajectory and a deviation from Western history. Arendt searched for the origins of both racialism in general and antisemitism in particular, of imperialism, of the breakdown of liberalism and the modern democratic state, of totalitarianism. She emphasized ideology itself, and the dehumanizing nature of teleology. She sought a genealogy of the destruction of human subjectivity that lay at the heart of the totalitarian experience. Totalitarianism, having recruited its perpetrators from the atomized masses, required the extinguishing of individual identity on the part of both victims and perpetrators. By the time the victims were led to the gas chambers, their selves were already dead. Yet this was true of their executioners as well: in exchange for an end to their isolation, the selves of the perpetrators, too, were extinguished.

"We may say," Arendt wrote, "that radical evil has emerged in connection with a system in which all men have become equally superfluous" [*Arendt 1973: 459*]. In this way "the distinguishing line between persecutor and persecuted, between the murderer and his victim, is constantly blurred" [*Arendt 1973: 453*]. This distinction between victims and oppressors was one of the critical boundaries effaced by totalitarianism, together with the distinction between public and private spheres, and between truth and falsehood. "What meaning has the concept of murder when we are confronted with the mass production of corpses?" she asked [*Arendt 1973: 441*]. All was possible in this fictional world. And the Nazi camps served as laboratories where this conviction was being verified.

Arendt ended *Origins of Totalitarianism* by speaking about "radical evil" and "crimes which can neither be punished nor forgiven" [*Arendt 1973: 459*]. Later in her life, though, she was to consider whether Nazi evil was not only radical, but also banal. In 1961, she traveled to Jerusalem for the trial of Adolf Eichmann, who had organized the transports to Auschwitz. In *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, she maintained that what was striking about Adolf Eichmann was not that he was evil, but rather that he was ordinary. Not especially intelligent, Eichmann was rather an obedient bureaucratic interested in career advancement. "The subject of a good government is lucky," Eichmann said in his own defense, "the subject of a bad government is unlucky. I had no luck" [*Arendt 1977: 175*]. Arendt found Eichmann to be "incapable of uttering a single sentence that was not a cliché" [*Arendt 1977: 48*]. "The longer one listened to him," she wrote, "the more obvious it became that his inability to speak was closely connected with an inability to *think*" [*Arendt 1977: 49*]. In Arendt's opinion, this man, whom the Israeli prosecutors desperately wanted to portray as

the embodiment of evil, failed to emerge as a monster. On the contrary, she wrote, "it was difficult indeed not to suspect that he was a clown" [*Arendt 1977: 54*]. This is precisely why he was so terrifying. This was not the only point Arendt made in *Eichmann in Jerusalem* that enraged so many Jewish readers. For she wrote, too, of the *Judenrats'* role in facilitating Eichmann's task, and suggested that had Europe's Jewish communities been unorganized and lacking in leadership, it would have been much more difficult to exterminate them.

Arendt has long been accused of blaming the victims; of exculpating German culture; of distinguishing insufficiently between Germans and Jews. Though she was Adorno's critic, Arendt nonetheless shared with him and the Frankfurt School thinkers a universalist understanding of the Holocaust. The lesson of totalitarianism, they believed, was not about Germans or Jews. The lesson of totalitarianism was rather about the pathologies of European modernity. For very many people the idea that the Germans were simply evil had a certain appeal, as it offered the possibility of sleeping soundly at night, far away from any Germans. Arendt's idea that it was neither in the essence of Germans to be executioners nor in the essence of Jews to be victims was an infinitely more disturbing one. For if the Holocaust was rather the exploitation of a universal human potential, then no one should ever sleep soundly again. "For many years now," Arendt wrote after the war, "we have met Germans who declare that they are ashamed of being Germans. I have often felt tempted to answer that I am ashamed of being human" [*Arendt 2003a: 154*].

After modernity

The generation of intellectuals who followed Adorno and Arendt have continued to struggle with the same post-totalitarian questions. They have continued to be haunted by Marxism's path to Stalinism, and haunted by Auschwitz. In August 1968 Czechoslovakia's attempt to create "socialism with a human face" was violently put down by Warsaw Pact tanks. And so did Marxism, the last and most enduring of modern Europe's grand narratives, die in Europe. It left behind an intellectual void: how, now, was one to make sense of the modern world?

Jacques Derrida (1930–2004) was an Algerian-born French philosopher of Jewish origin, influenced both by structuralism and phenomenology. His early work began in dialogue with Claude Lévi-Strauss (1908–2009), probing structuralism's contradictions and limitations. Structuralism posited that meaning was always relational and existed only within a given system. Meaning was contingent, but also stable. Structuralism, then, presupposed a totality: the system – that is, the structure – had to be whole; it had to have boundaries to hold the meaning in place.

Yet what if, Derrida asked, life were not like a chessboard, and the boundaries of the structure were not so clear? What if there were no closed structures? For structuralists, the relationship between the signifier and the signified might have been arbitrary, but the sign still constituted a unity amidst a heterogeneity of signs. Derrida began to question this unity. In order for a stable unity to exist, he argued, there must be a "transcendental signified" – be it God, *Geist*, the Self, or some such thing. That is, structures needed a center, a grounding point, a way to contain the play of signifiers and so establish stable meaning.

And what if there were no God, no *Geist*, no capitalized version of History, no stable subject, no unifying first principle of any kind? In that case, Derrida said, the "absence of

the transcendental signified extends the domain and play of signification infinitely" [*Derrida 1978: 280*]. "Play" was an important concept for Derrida. The signified was always a product of an infinitely complex interaction of signifiers, these signifiers were "always already" in play, working with, against, off of, and around one another. Each sign bore traces of other signs within itself, each signified was "always already" entangled with other signifiers and signifieds, perpetually in motion. For this reason a given sign was never exactly the same as it had been in a previous instance. Language was by its very nature unstable, prone to undermine itself. Meaning always flickered.

The post-structuralism of which Derrida was the most articulate theorist was based on the idea that there were no closed texts, or closed structures of any kind – that life went on, so to speak, and therefore no determinate meaning was possible. By this Derrida did not wish to imply, however, that no meaning was ever possible. He only wished to imply that no *stable* meaning was possible. Meaning was always present in excess: there was no lack of meaning, but rather a surplus.

Derrida's post-structuralism belonged among the ideas loosely grouped together as "post-modernism": a rejection of all grand narratives and a loss of faith in stable meaning. For Derrida this philosophical stance was political, and he believed it to be ethical as well: it deconstructed ideologies. He understood it as an antidote to the way of thinking that had led to Stalinism and Nazism.

Derrida's friend Hélène Cixous (b. 1937) shares with him a similar background: a French Algerian of Spanish-German-Slovak Jewish heritage, Hélène Cixous spent her childhood in multilingual, multiethnic Oran, where her mother spoke to her in German. Later Cixous moved to Paris, where she became a professor of English literature and founded the *Centre de Recherches en Etudes Féminines*. "I was no one," Cixous wrote in an essay about how she came to writing. "'Being' was reserved for those full, well-defined, scornful people who occupied the world with their assurance, took their places without hesitation, were at home everything where I 'was'-n't, except as an infraction, intruder, little scrap from elsewhere, always on the alert" [*Cixous 1991: 16*].

A feminist and post-structuralist, Cixous has long been preoccupied with the "the Other": how to know, feel, be the Other. At Stanford University in 1998 she presented the lecture, "The PasSage through the University or How I started on my request for '*je est un autre*.'" For Cixous the impossibility of stable, grounded meaning is mirrored in the impossibility of stable, grounded identity. Among the themes of her work are homelessness and wandering, rootlessness and the "diaspora effect," and the tragedy – and beauty – of cosmopolitanism. "In German, I weep," Cixous wrote, "in English, I play; in French, I fly, I am a thief. No per*man*ent residence" [*Cixous 1991: 36*].

Epilogue: Anti-utopianism

So did the twentieth century end with post-modernism's skepticism towards the possibility of a single, unified truth. In both Derrida's and other versions, post-modernism was the decisive break with Hegel. No longer was there any plan, any order, any direction, any faith in the resolution of contradictions. Isaiah Berlin (1909–1997) was quite far from being a post-structuralist. Yet he shared Derrida's conviction that what was authentic defied a closed, harmonious system in which all the pieces fit together and made sense.

Berlin shared, too, the broader critique of teleological narratives. Hegelian thought, in his description, was "like a very dark wood, and those who once enter it very seldom come back to tell us what they have seen" [*Berlin 2003: 74*].

A Russian Jewish émigré to Britain, Isaiah Berlin spent his life in dialogue with British, American, French, Russian, German, and Jewish intellectuals of both the present and the past. Among his interlocutors, living and dead, were Rousseau and Marx and Tolstoy, Chaim Weizmann and Anna Akhmatova, Stephen Spender and Aleksandr Herzen.

In the 1930s, Isaiah Berlin was among the very last liberals in Europe. He was also perhaps a post-modernist *avant la lettre*, in his distrust of all absolute truth claims and utopian projects. Berlin's work was framed by a critique of the Enlightenment distinct from that of Horkheimer and Adorno: Enlightenment thought denied tragedy in favor of an insistence on harmony, compatibility, the possibility of knowledge and the idea that truth, happiness, virtue were elements of a whole. This, for Berlin, had always been a misunderstanding: for society was not a harmonious whole. On the contrary, we were fated to live in a world of irreducible multiplicity. He warned of the danger of relating everything to a single vision, and insisted on the value of human freedom, which necessitated imperfection. All of the great social engineering projects contained within themselves totalitarian potential. There could be no utopia, for tragedy was inherent in the human condition: there would always be competing and irreconcilable goods, we would always face the necessity of choice. Berlin's simplest point was also his most profound: some good things necessarily excluded other good things.

Tony Judt (1948–2000) is in many ways heir to Isaiah Berlin's legacy: in his lucidity, in his talent for distilling abstruse thought; in his distrust of utopian visions. Following a commitment in his youth to socialist Zionism, Judt spent much of his adult life grappling with the implications of both Zionism and Marxism [*Judt – Snyder 2013*]. Raised in London, of East European Jewish origin, Judt lived for extended periods of time in France and in the United States. An historian of modern Europe, he was also politically *engagé* as a public intellectual. In 2003, in his *The New York Review of Books* essay "Israel: The Alternative," Judt took a sharp tone: "the founders of the Jewish state had been influenced by the same concept and categories as their fin-de-siècle contemporaries back in Warsaw, or Odessa, or Bucharest; not surprisingly, Israel's ethno-religious self-definition, and its discrimination against internal 'foreigners,' has always had more in common with, say, the practices of post-Habsburg Romania than either party might care to acknowledge" [*Judt 2003*]. Now, however, the time of separatist social engineering projects with aspirations towards ethno-national exclusivity had passed. Israel, Judt argued, was an anachronism.

With a relentlessly harsh clarity, Judt engaged Israel's contradictory aspirations: the desire to be a Jewish state and the desire to be a democracy. These presented a vivid example of Isaiah Berlin's view of ethics: the desirable was not always compatible. Judt supposed that, whether for better or for worse, the two-state solution had long been doomed to failure, and that the true choice now was the one between an ethnically cleansed Israel and an integrated multinational state of Jews and Arabs.

"But what if," Judt posed the question, "there were no place in the world today for a 'Jewish state'? What if the binational solution were not just increasingly likely, but actually a desirable outcome? It is not such a very odd thought. Most of the readers of this essay live in pluralist states which have long since become multiethnic and multicultural. 'Christian

Europe,' *pace* M. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, is a dead letter; Western civilization today is a patchwork of colors and religions and languages" [*Judt 2003*].

The essay generated sharp controversy. "Where is this beautiful cosmopolitan planet, this merrily deracinated family of man, in which Israel is the disfiguring exception?" wrote *The New Republic* literary editor Leon Wieseltier in an angry rebuttal [*Wieseltier 2003*]. Judt's article also provoked accusations of a "new antisemitism": through the writings of Judt and likeminded others, Alvin Rosenfeld wrote, "the arguments for the elimination of the Jewish state – every anti-Semite's cherished dream – are contributed by Jews themselves" [*Rosenfeld 2006: 27–28*]. Yet the position Judt took in that essay was rather the classic position of Deutscher's "non-Jewish Jew": the cosmopolitan intellectual familiar with many cultures (British, French, East European Jewish, Israeli, American) and languages (English, French, Hebrew, German, and Czech) while belonging fully to none of them, who is committed to searching for solutions that transcend national categories. What Judt took from Isaiah Berlin was less political than philosophical: namely, the idea that ethics are possible even though an ideal society is not. There are such things as better and worse choices, better and worse forms of social and political organization. There is, however, no possibility of a perfect world – be it a universalist or a particularist one. Post-modern era's skepticism towards absolute truth claims has often been (mis)interpreted as nihilism. Judt, in any case, was not a post-modernist. Not was he was a triumphant liberal: what he articulated was not "the end of history"; it was not liberalism superseding Marxism in a post-communist age.

It was rather, the overcoming of all potentially totalizing utopianisms through an anti-utopianism that was for Judt, as for Berlin, not nihilism at all, but rather a universal moral imperative.

"Israel: An Alternative" was part of Judt's settling of accounts with his former self – both Zionist and Marxist. Judt's anti-Zionism resembled the anti-communism of Arthur Koestler or Aleksander Wat: a bitterness whose core is self-criticism. The passion of his critique was the kind of passion that comes from having once been on the inside. This was true as well of his most controversial book, *Past Imperfect: French Intellectuals, 1944–1956*, an excoriating attack on Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, Louis Aragon, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Emmanuel Mounier, among others, the best and brightest of the French intellectuals who after the Second World War become not only "fellow travellers," but also Stalinist apologists.

Past Imperfect is a book about the peculiar responsibility of intellectuals; it is also a book about Eastern Europe. What Judt names "the great silence" is the silence about "the blood of others." Sartre was silent about the Rudolf Slánský trial, silent about the "Doctors' Plot," silent about the "Night of the Murdered Poets" that brought a macabre end to a great Yiddish literature in the Soviet Union. Judt described this as "double-entry moral bookkeeping": a special set of standards applied to Soviet communism; the West – Sartre and his friends believed – could not criticize communism because Western intellectuals were distorted by bourgeois capitalist thinking. "Nothing in Sartre's other achievements comes close to me to compensating for his refusal to intervene or even speak out when faced with the show trials in central Europe," Judt insisted nearly two decades after he'd written *Past Imperfect*.[2]

[2] Tony Judt, personal correspondence, 21 April 2009.

Past Imperfect, a book about West European intellectuals who betrayed their East European counterparts, is a deeply autobiographical book. A member of the generation of 1968, Judt experienced that revolutionary year in Paris, "jump[ing] up and down quite so enthusiastically at the demonstrations as we shouted Ho, Ho, Ho Chi Minh."[3] He saw only belatedly that in 1968, history was being made much less in Paris than it was in Warsaw and Prague. He came to understand this through friendship – with Jan Gross and Irena Grudzińska Gross, with Barbara Toruńczyk, Aleksander Smolar and Adam Michnik, all of whom, precisely at that moment in May 1968 when Judt was jumping up and down shouting "Ho, Ho, Ho Chi Minh," were sitting in communist prison.

Tony Judt died of Amyotrophic lateral sclerosis in 2010, at the age of sixty-two. He did not live to see his friends and colleagues on both sides of the Atlantic, in Western Europe and Eastern Europe, come to Kiev in May 2014 to support the Ukrainian revolution that began with Mustafa Nayem's Facebook post. In his address opening the Kiev congress, Timothy Snyder spoke of "the tradition of Tony Judt, the great historian of Europe of his era, who understood that the West made no sense without the East, and politics no sense without ideas" [*Snyder 2014*]. This congress of intellectuals in support of Ukraine was originally the idea of Leon Wieseltier. He and Judt had been friends for many years, but after the publication of "Israel: An Alternative," Wieseltier no longer spoke to Judt. If Tony were here, Wieseltier told Snyder as they were organizing the conference, he would have been the first person I would have asked to come.

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Marci Shore is Associate Professor of History at Yale University. She teaches European cultural and intellectual history. She received her M.A. from the University of Toronto in 1996 and her PhD from Stanford University in 2001. Before joining Yale's history department, she was a postdoctoral fellow at Columbia University's Harriman Institute; an assistant professor of history and Jewish studies at Indiana University; and Jacob and Hilda Blaustein Visiting Assistant Professor of Judaic Studies at Yale. She is the author of The Taste of Ashes: The Afterlife of Totalitarianism in Eastern Europe *(Crown, 2013),* Caviar and Ashes: A Warsaw Generation's Life and Death in Marxism, 1918–1968 *(Yale University Press, 2006) and the translator of Michal Glowinski's* Holocaust memoir The Black Seasons *(Northwestern University Press, 2005). Currently she is at work on a book project titled* Phenomenological Encounters: Scenes from Central Europe.

From Equality of Opportunity to the Society of Equals

PIERRE ROSANVALLON*

Od rovných šancí k společnosti rovných

Abstract: Any attempt to reaffirm equality as a fundamental democratic value faces two tasks: it must respond to social and cultural changes accompanying the most recent phase of capitalist development, and it must reactivate the original context of the democratic transformation that brought equality to prominence, in close conjunction with other aspects of an innovative vision. At the outset, equality was interpreted in terms of "a world of similar human beings, a society of autonomous individuals, and a community of citizens". In this context, equality was closely linked to liberty, but their interconnections were also open to historical changes. Later developments – including the shift to a more organized kind of capitalism, two world wars and the rise of a temporarily successful rival version of modernity – led to significant upgradings of equality. But during the past half-century, the case for equality has been undermined by historical trends. Mutations of the capitalist economy, on the level of organization as well as production, and the disappearance of a really existing alternative, lent support to a new type of individualism. Drawing on Simmel's distinction between the individualism of similarity and the individualism of distinction, the present phase can be interpreted as a radicalization and democratization of the individualism of distinction into an individualism of singularity. A social-liberal strategy, aiming at a reconciliation of liberty and equality, must take this new individualism on board and understand it as a social relationship, thus maintaining critical distance from neo-liberal ideology.

Keywords: equality; democracy; individualism; capitalism; social liberalism

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The 20th century way of reducing inequalities

The two principal classical means were: (1) the reduction of social risks (unemployment, disease, disabilities, and the loss of income deriving from such situations); (2) the limitation of income disparities.

The *reduction of social risks* derived from the introduction of the welfare state as a system of social insurance. Ever since the 18th century (and the French revolution), the major problem had been reconciling the *principle of solidarity* (society has a debt towards its members) with the *principle of responsibility* (each individual is master of his own life and must take control of himself), and linking rights with behavior, as it were. The solution was not self-evident. In fact, the limitation of the right to public aid initially presupposed that the sphere of application of individual responsibility could be clearly identified in social life. What happened was quite the opposite: industrial economic development progressively demonstrated the limits of a system of social regulation solely governed by the principles of individual responsibility and contract. In the area of responsibility, it became

* Pierre Rosanvallon is professor at the Collège de France, chair in Modern and contemporary history.

increasingly difficult to discern what could be imputed to the individual and what depended on other factors.

Considering some individual situations (unemployment, disease, disabilities) as *risks* changed the way they were considered. They were transformed into social problems. The mechanisms of the welfare state regarded such risks as statistical facts. As such, they could be calculated and treated through insurance mecanisms. It was included, above all, in a process of socialization of responsibility.

The *reduction of income disparities*, on the other hand, had been related to the characteristics of modern firms after World War II. In such firms, wrote Galbraith in his *Modern Capitalism* [1965], "power had passed ineluctably and irrevocably from the individual to the group". This observation was crucial to his description of what might be called the "de-individualization" of power and the socialization of responsibility. For the author of *The New Industrial State*, this transfer of power to the organization had a number of implications. First, it reflected the disappearance of the Schumpeterian entrepreneur: "The entrepreneur no longer exists as an individual person in the mature industrial enterprise." The technostructure, a veritable collective mind, had replaced him. The advent of this impersonal power also reflected the fact that the success of the firm depended more on the quality of its organization and the pertinence of its management procedures than on the exceptional talents of this or that individual. It could therefore perform quite well even though staffed by perfectly ordinary people. The point is important enough to warrant another quote: "The real accomplishment of modern science and technology consists in taking quite ordinary men, informing them narrowly and deeply, and then, through appropriate organization, arranging to have their knowledge combined with that of other specialized but equally ordinary men. This dispenses with the need for genius. The resulting performance, though less inspiring, is far more predictable." Talent was thus taken down from its pedestal.

For Galbraith, these changes meant that the role of the firm's CEO was reduced to that of just another cog in the machinery of the organization. The socialization of responsibility and productivity due to this type of organization changed the nature of the social question, in Galbraith's view. The productive efficiency of the system inevitably redistributed wealth and reduced inequality. The lot of the individual benefited from what were seen as collective achievements. No one could claim these accomplishments as his own. Executives were better paid than workers, of course, but only within the framework of a functional hierarchy of skills (and recall, by way of illustration, that Peter Drucker stated at the time that the pay ratio between the top executive and the humblest worker should be no greater than 20:1). The structure of industrial relations and of collective bargaining also played a major role.

These two factors were consolidated by historical, political and economical elements:

(1) *The reformism of fear*. After World War I as well as World War II the fear of communism pushed towards social reform and redistribution liberal or conservative governments in Europe. To quote Emile de Girardin: "We must choose between a fiscal revolution and a social revolution."

(2) *The implicit reformulation of the social contract following the world wars.* The experience of World War I thus marked a decisive turning point in democratic modernity. It restored the idea of a society of *semblables* in a direct, palpable way. It revived the oldest

meaning of the idea of equality, captured by the Greek word *omoioï*. The first sense of the epithet *omoïos* applied to *polemos*, or combat: it characterized a battle "that is equal for all, that spares no one". The *omoioï* were therefore equals in the sense that they had fought together, had experienced the common lot of the soldier in battle. World War I not only demonstrated this aspect of equality through the fraternal experience of combat but also publicly validated it in all combatant countries through the organization of national funerals to honor the "unknown soldier" fallen on the field of battle. The cult of the unknown soldier was carefully staged to heighten its symbolic significance, attesting to the importance bestowed on the humblest citizen as representative of the entire nation. The anonymity of the unknown soldier expressed in exemplary fashion the idea of radical equality, of strictly equivalent value: the most obscure individual embodied what was best in everyone and became the ultimate measure of the social order. In 1918, *everyman* became the incarnation of the social individual.
Fraternity in combat and the commemoration of sacrifice are complex phenomena, but they helped to pave the way to greater social solidarity. The benefits awarded to veterans led to a general reconsideration of social benefits and other redistributive transfers.

(3) *The pace of economic growth after World War II in Europe.* An annual growth of 5% until the mid 70's also produced resources for redistribution and reduction of inequalities.

The great reversal

The elements of context (reversed on every point) are: (1) reduced growth: the 30 years boom after World War II belongs to the past; (2) the end of the reformism of fear: the new politics of fear is destructive of solidarity (e.g. immigration …); (3) absence of strong collective experiences, growing individualism. The result of these elements is *société d'éloignement*, or a distanced society.

The notion of risk no longer has the previous capacity to understand in a single way social problems. For three reasons:

a) *The nature of social problems.* Phenomena of exclusion, such as long-term unemployment, unfortunately often define *stable conditions*. Thus we move from an unpredictable and circumstancial approach of "social breakdowns" to a more deterministic view, in which situations of breakdown cannot easily be reversed. Because of that, a whole selection of the population is no longer part of the world of insurance and there are new forms of economic insecurity, no longer only the loss of income.

b) *New types of risk.* The notion of risk is certainly still relevant. But it has changed its scale, as has been correctly emphasized. An increasingly serious problem today is *catastrophic risk*: natural risks (floods, earthquakes), major technological accidents, large-scale damage to the environment. These threats no longer concern individuals, but entire populations, even nations. The distribution of the risks undertaken by insurance can no longer be operative in this case, as was realized clearly when the issue involved finding an adequate framework to compensate victims of natural catastrophes.

c) *The return of the centrality of the idea of individual responsibility.* The return of the importance of personal behavior in a situation. The veil of ignorance (as John Rawls called it) that accompanied the social contract is now irreparably torn. From now on,

we shall have to rethink solidarity, with clearer knowledge of the situation and chances of each individual. The accepted norms of justice will have to be defined in the direct encounter between groups and individuals. The exercise of solidarity will become more directly political; it will be identified with the formulation of the social contract itself.

Today, a new force of disintegration is invisibly at work in the progress of information and will inevitably affect the universe of social insurance. The acceptance of solidarity is now beginning to be accompanied by a demand for control over personal behavior. The smoker will soon be required to choose between his vice and the right to equal access to care, and the alcoholic will be threatened with payment of social surcharges. As the social cost of individual attitudes appears more distinctly, solidarity and freedom will part company. The decline of the insuring society is also manifested in this way.

For these three reasons the very bases and the scope of the "insurance society" have been very seriously damaged. Solidarity now means more often *assistance* than *insurance*.

The former *capitalism of organization* on the other hand has been profoundly transformed. The capitalism that began to emerge in the 1980s differed from earlier forms of organized capitalism in two ways. First, its relation to the market changed, as did the role assigned to stockholders. Second, labor was organized new way. Fordist organization, based on the mobilization of large masses of workers, gave way to a new emphasis on the creative abilities of individuals. Creativity thus became the principal factor of production. Phrases such as "cognitive capitalism" and "productive subjectivity" were coined to describe this change. *Quality* has thus become a central feature of the new economy, marking a sharp break with the previous economy of quantity. Work routines have consequently become more diverse and product offerings more varied.

In such a context the previous version of a socialized system of production have given way to the vision of an addition of personal contributions. The old idea of the centrality of organization has been replaced by the centrality of individual energies.

On the other hand, the mode of production in the new capitalism of singularity was shaped by the economics of permanent innovation. The Schumpeterian entrepreneurs returned. Evidence of this can be seen in the fact that the list of leading firms in the major industrial countries remained relatively constant from 1950 to 1980. Some firms on this list were decades old. During the 1990s, however, the hierarchy underwent considerable change. In the United States alone, the leading firms in terms of stock-market capitalization were relative newcomers such as Microsoft, Apple, and Oracle, while many once-giant firms had disappeared. The industrial and financial landscape was transformed everywhere, and this further accelerated the shift to new modes of organization and labor mobilization.

These changes, which precipitated a crisis in societies ruled by the spirit of equality as redistribution, also had sociological and ideological dimensions. They justified more individualized salaries and huge differences if considered as grounded on strict individual contribution (e.g. the pay of world-class football players). *Unearned* income has been criticized, but not *earned* income.

The result of such (for a long time) invisible and progressive transformations is now plainly visible with the "results" in terms of inequalities and the fact that the very idea of equality has entered a deep crisis.

That's where we are at today.

What are the options? Three are on the table

The first is the populist one. It is a return to the evils of the late 19th century, at the time of the first globalization, namely: aggressive nationalism, xenophobia, protectionism, understood as answers to unbridled capitalism. National protectionism was then sustained by a purely negative vision of equality. Barrès put it bluntly: "The idea of 'fatherland' implies a kind of inequality, but to the detriment of foreigners." In other words, the goal was to bring (some) people closer together by exploiting a relationship of inequality. This negative equality in relation to outsiders was reinforced in Barrès's mind by the desire to organize another community of the rejected, this one internal rather than external: namely, "the crowd of little people", humble capitalists and workers united in opposition to the "big barons" and "feudal lords".

National protectionism reduced the idea of equality to the single dimension of community membership, which was itself reduced to a negative definition ("not foreign"). Indeed, the constitution of an identity always needs a demarcation, a separation, a mirroring effect of some sort. But identity must be linked to a properly positive idea of shared existence to produce a democratic sentiment of membership. This is what distinguished the revolutionary nation of 1789 from the nationalist nation of the late nineteenth century. The former was associated with the formation of a society of equals, but the latter conceived of integration solely in the non-political mode of fusion of individuals to form an homogeneous bloc.

The second option is nostalgic politics, asking for a revival of civic republicanism and/or of the past values and institutions of former social-democracies. The late Tony Judt recently pleaded for such a reaction in his book-testimony *Ill Fares the Land*. Although there is a great nobility in such a vision, it unfortunately doesn't take seriously enough the irreversible character of the individualism of singularity, not to be confused with individualism as selfishness and atomism. The crucial point is that the great reversal is not the consequence of a *broken contract* or of *moral depravity*. It derives from historical and political factors as well as structured transformations affecting the mode of production and the nature of the social bond. Neo-liberalism has, at present, been the main active *interpretation* of such changes. To neo-liberalism, market society and the perspective of generalized competition as accomplishment of modernity is considered as the desirable form of humanity and of personal achievement. But neo-liberalism should not be mis-interpreted. It is not only a victorious and negative ideology. It is a perverse *instrumentalisation* of singularity. As an example, modern firms use singularity as a means of production without any consideration for the self-realization of workers. Hence new types of social conflicts about respect and moral harassment. The problem is that critiques of neo-liberalism very often neglect the positive aspiration to singularity and that they do not take into account the fact that it profoundly modifies judgments as to the viable forms of equality as well as the tolerable forms of inequality.

Nostalgic politics is in fact not viable for two main reasons: Firstly, there is no return to the preceding capitalism of organization. An economy driven by innovation is now irreversible. This is different from the necessary denunciation of financial capitalism: this one can and should be reversed.

Second, if unbridled individualism, in the moral sense of selfishness and of a decline in civic values, should be criticized and reversed, they are also elements recognized as

positive in the contemporary movement of individualization. We have to consider a striking paradox: the new age of inequality and diminished solidarity has also been a time of heightened awareness of social discrimination and tolerance of many kinds of difference. The picture is contradictory, to say the least, and while some ground has been lost, there have been undeniable advances in regard to the status of women, acceptance of differences of sexual orientation, and individual rights generally. If we want to understand recent changes in our societies, we must take note of all of these divergent tendencies. One way to do this is to look at the *internal* transformation in the "society of individuals". This did not suddenly appear at the end of the twentieth century. For more than two centuries it has formed the framework within which modern institutions have developed. Succinctly put, what we need to understand is the transition from an individualism of universality to an individualism of singularity.

Revolutionary individualism does not refer to a social state or moral fact. As we saw earlier, the term did not appear in the revolutionary period. It describes the constitution of man as both legal subject – the bearer of rights guaranteeing freedom of thought and action, property, and autonomy – and political subject, sharing in sovereignty through exercise of the right to vote. The term therefore defined a way of making society, a novel approach to creating a social and political order in place of the old corporatist and absolutist order. Revolutionary individualism was therefore intimately related to the idea of equality and recognition of human similarity. It characterized a relational form, a type of social bond, and not the condition of a single social atom taken in isolation. Georg Simmel used the phrase *individualism of similarity* to describe in general terms the tendency of European societies in the eighteenth century. His point was that the aspiration to autonomy and liberty was intimately related to a universalist egalitarian ethos. The individualist perspective, he argued, "rested on the assumption that individuals freed of social and historical fetters would turn out to be essentially similar to one another". In this context, liberty and equality were overlapping values. Once imposed orders, disciplines, and structures were removed, individuals would be able to assert themselves fully as human beings. Everyone would become "a man *tout court*".

Besides such a social consideration of individualism, individualism also had a psychological dimension. But it was only most fully and recognizably achieved in the artistic realm. Artists defined their identity in terms of dissidence from the common run of mankind. They turned away from a bourgeois society defined by conformism, that is, by the bourgeois class's inability to exist other than as a prisoner of its own narrow objectives and lack of imagination. Artists also stood apart from the supposedly gregarious masses, which they took to be slaves of immediate self-interest and unreflective passions.

This *individualism of distinction* was the precursor of today's *individualism of singularity*. The present individualism of singularity can be seen as a generalization of the individualism of distinction. Distinction became commonplace and lost its elitist connotations: in short, it was "democratized". This process inaugurated a new phase in human emancipation, defined by the desire to achieve a fully personalized existence. Its advent was closely related to the growth in the complexity and heterogeneity of social life and therefore to changes in the nature of capitalism. At a deeper level, it was also linked to the fact that the life of each individual is now shaped more by personal history than by personal condition.

It has also provoked a new consideration of the idea of responsibility. The *neo-liberal* mantra and *new managers* have taken into account such transformations but they have *used*, *turned around*, and *manipulated* them.

The point is that the progressive stand has to take into account what is positive in this new individualism of singularity, and to denounce the kind of *utilitarian reductionism* that is now at work.

The third option can be labelled as the social-liberal one. It takes into account the transformations I mentioned (this is a positive point) and proposes as a new progressive approach/solution a radicalization of the notion of *equality of opportunity*. In political terms, the so-called third way made of it a political ideology, when the development of the former theories of justice, known as *luck egalitarianism* proposed an intellectual model for it. For a good understanding of such a conception, we have first to consider traditional definitions of equality of opportunity.

The first is the *legal* one, which is also a negative one. During the French revolutionary period, equality of opportunity was understood in such negative terms: it was identified with the elimination of privileges and legal or corporate barriers to social mobility. By incorporating this program, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen gave a minimalist definition of equal opportunity by establishing a legal framework of equal rights. All careers were formally opened to talent and virtue, but the social and cultural inequalities that determine each individual's actual starting point (and which are essentially inherited through the family) were ignored.

The second is the *social* one, with three possible dimensions: institutional, corrective, statistical. With this in mind, the notion of equality of opportunity was expanded to eliminate such distortions. We might then speak of *social* (as opposed to legal) *equality of opportunity*. There are essentially two ways of implementing this. The first is institutional, with the goal being to create an artificial environment from which existing sociocultural differences have been eliminated and in which the ordinary rules of society do not apply.

From the beginning this was the project of the republican schools. These were meant to be open to all and to create the equivalent of an ideal counter-society, a "classless microsociety". The rules under which the schools functioned were intended to arrive at an objective classification of individual students based solely on their personal attributes. The hope was to achieve an *institutional equality of opportunity*.

A second way of neutralizing sociocultural differences was also envisaged. The intention was to compensate for initial handicaps afflicting certain individuals and groups. We can describe this as *corrective equality of opportunity* – an instrumental approach. There are many ways to design correctives for inherited social and cultural inequalities. All involve selective or adaptive distribution: of human capital endowments (Gösta Esping-Andersen), of cash (asset-based welfare), of primary goods (rights and material goods for John Rawls), of resources (Ronald Dworkin), of capabilities (Amartya Sen), of means of access (to institutions, networks, or help for Gerald Cohen). Recent theories of justice have placed particular emphasis on this point, seeking the best ways to achieve the ideal of equalizing the conditions under which individuals compete in a fair contest for meritocratic rewards.

Equality of opportunity is most commonly related to conditions early in an individual's life. But discrimination also occurs later in life, reducing the likelihood that members of certain groups will arrive at certain desirable positions. "Glass ceilings" of one sort or

another exist owing to a variety of handicaps that distort social relations. The result is not institutional discrimination but discrimination as a social fact, reflected in statistical measurements, such as career disparities between men and women, denial of certain posts to women, or ethnic discrimination in hiring. The law and the courts can help to remedy such discrimination when the facts are clear, but there is also a need for more general social remedies. Efforts in this direction fall under the head of *statistical equality of opportunity*.

The *radical version of equality of opportunity* proposed a unified and global approach to the concept. Two views, in the writings of Ronald Dworkin and Gerald Cohen, paved the way for a new horizon: (1) an active radical version: a true equality of opportunities, a logic of constitution; (2) an indirect radical version: choice/circumstances, a logic of compensation (taking into account the notion of responsibility).

Dworkin pushed the idea of compensated meritocracy quite a long way. He even argued that because "natural" talents are individual resources, those who do not have them should be adequately compensated for their lack. His work was praised by many who believed that both an intellectual and political response had to be found to critiques that accused the redistributive welfare state of encouraging passivity and reliance on welfare assistance.

The Marxist analytical philosopher Gerald Cohen took the argument a step further, however, by treating the distinction between choice and chance as a criterion for distinguishing between acceptable inequalities and differences calling for corrective policy interventions. Following Cohen, a number of authors laid the foundations of what has been called "luck egalitarianism". This radical version of equality of opportunity insists on neutralizing all consequences that can be ascribed to chance in the broadest sense of the term. Rather than emphasize the positive consequences of individual choices, which are always difficult to establish, they accentuate the negative, arguing that anything that is not clearly attributable to individual effort should be subject to compensatory redistribution.

There are three limits to such a view. The first is a *paradoxical* one. This radical version of equality of opportunity is intellectually appealing but unsustainable in practice, because its conceptual underpinnings are paradoxical. If all consequences of chance and circumstance must be compensated, the range of policies to correct potential handicaps is subject to unlimited expansion. Virtually nothing is the result of a pure choice. Each of our actions and decisions is informed by social factors and therefore subject to a variety of deterministic mechanisms. Luck egalitarianism also relies, paradoxically, on an idealized view of the individual and individual responsibility. On the one hand it advocates extreme "generosity" on the part of the redistributive state, but on the other hand it is strictly unmoved by the consequences of choices deemed to be authentically personal, no matter how devastating. For a luck egalitarian, it can be just for an individual to ruin her life because she makes a tiny error of judgment. One sees this asymmetry clearly in some of the examples proposed by John Roemer, one of the principal proponents of this view. If a person is run over by a truck in a marked crosswalk, he argues, it is just for him to be indemnified, but if the same person is run over after "choosing" to cross the street elsewhere, he must bear the consequences of his decision. Here, then, the choice/chance distinction has resulted in a step backward with respect to the historical trend toward greater socialization of responsibility. What we have here is a combination of "progressive sociology" with "conservative ontology".

To base a theory of equality of opportunity solely on the distinction between voluntary and involuntary behavior is also likely to generate social distrust. The effect would be to cause people to pay closer attention to the behavior of others, who would then become objects of resentment, stigmatization, or suspicion. Distributive justice would enter into fatal conflict with social ethics. It is in fact inapplicable.

The second limit is a *sociological* one. If we adopt the radical approach, *individuals have to be de-socialized* in order to treat them as true equals. A case in point: the French revolutionary Michel Le Peletier proposed to create schools based on meritocratic ideals. In his 1793 report, he referred to these schools as "houses of equality". The idea was to take young children between the ages of five and twelve away from their families. This was believed to be the crucial period for shaping young minds. At school, "in accordance with the sacred law of equality", all would be given "the same clothes, the same food, the same instruction, and the same care", so that "only talent and virtue" would set them apart, as meritocracy required. The family, which otherwise would shape the destinies of these children, was thus designated as the enemy of equal opportunity. This idea justified the republican goal of creating "schools of opportunity", but the practice fell far short of this ambitious ideal.

The problem of inheritance in a democratic system was understood in similar terms. Here, too, the initial concern was to enhance equality of opportunity by reducing the material basis for the reproduction of inequality.

In France, the Saint-Simoniens proposed in this direction the suppression of inheritance. In America, Thomas Jefferson favored heavy taxation of bequests in order to prevent the reproduction of inequality and the emergence of a caste of rentiers. In his work, the word "inheritance" was often linked to "feudalism" and "aristocracy", and he believed that landed property had to be subdivided constantly in order to preserve a government of liberty and equality. In 1778, he sponsored a Virginia law that granted 75 acres of land to all residents of the state. In his eyes, a democratic society belonged to the living; the dead played no role. Inheritance empowered the past, transforming once legitimate differences into unacceptable inequalities.

The only way that an individual could be made fully responsible for his own achievement was thus to eliminate the influence of his family through education and limitation of inheritance. Ultimately he would then become a child of society alone. Ideally, however, he would also have to be divorced from his history, or be allowed to start his history over at any time. This problem stemmed from the idea that initial positions also had to be equalized. Life is such that there is no true initial position, because each individual situation is constrained in various ways by what came before. To envision *permanent equality of opportunity* was therefore a contradiction in terms: there would be no opportunity to seize or effort to make if outcomes were equalized at every turn. Equality of opportunity would then be reduced to simple economic equality. Here is yet another way that equality of opportunity fails to establish a theory of justice. The idea wavers constantly between two extremes: pure social equality and simple equality of rights. It may serve as a guide for specific reforms but cannot point the way to a true social philosophy.

The third limit is a *political* one. A society subject to the meritocratic principle alone would be rigidly hierarchical. This was the society envisioned by the Saint-Simonians. They went farther than others in making the elimination of inheritance and destruction of the

family central tenets of their doctrine. They never tired of repeating the slogan "Shame on hereditary idleness! Honor merit and work!" Saint-Simonians were committed to a society strictly organized around abilities, which they believed to be objectively and hierarchically ranked. Prosper Enfantin went so far as to say that Saint-Simon's followers "believe in *natural inequality* among men and regard such inequality as the very basis of association, the indispensable condition of social order".

A hundred years later, Tawney criticized the Saint-Simonian position for offering "equal opportunities to become unequal". And Young in his *Rise of Meritocracy* painted a very dark portrait of meritocracy in which the old aristocracy of birth was supplanted by a new aristocracy of talent that was even more oppressive because it believed its ascendancy to be justified on the most impeccable grounds. Indeed, the more fully the program of radical equality of opportunity is achieved, the more strictly hierarchical the result: this is another impasse to which the doctrine leads.

Theories of equality of opportunity can and should serve as a basis for *policies* of reduction of inequalities, they can inspire corrective actions, but are incapable of establishing a general social theory. For the reasons I mentioned, but also because at the end they consider the form and legitimacy of inter-individual differences and have nothing to say about social structure in itself. That is why we need a positive theory of social equality representing a fourth avenue.

The society of equals

What we need is a new model of solidarity and integration in an age of singularity. If more redistribution is clearly needed today, it has to be relegitimated. How? Through a redefinition of equality with a universalist dimension. That is to say a return to the revolutionary vision, in France and in the United States, of equality as a *social relation*, and not as an arithmetic measure. Equality was then understood primarily as a relation, as a way of making a society, of producing and living in common. It was seen as a democratic quality and not only a measure of the distribution of wealth. This relational idea of equality was articulated in connection with three other notions: similarity, independence, and citizenship. Similarity comes under the head of *equality as equivalence*: to be "alike" is to have the same essential properties, such that remaining differences do not affect the character of the relationship. Independence is *equality as autonomy*; it is defined negatively as the absence of subordination and positively as equilibrium in exchange. Citizenship involves *equality as participation*, which is constituted by community membership and civic activity. Consequently, the project of equality as relationship was interpreted in terms of a *world* of like human beings (or *semblables*, as Tocqueville would say), a *society* of autonomous individuals, and a *community* of citizens. Equality was thus conceived in terms of the relative position of individuals, the rules governing their interactions, and the principles on which their life in common was based, and these concepts in turn corresponded to three possible representations of the social bond. The rights of man, the market, and universal suffrage were the underlying institutions. Economic inequalities were seen as acceptable in this framework only if they did not threaten the other modes of relational equality that defined the society of equals. These representations, which were formulated in a precapitalist world, were undermined by the industrial revolution, which initiated the first great

crisis of equality. In order to overcome the second great crisis, we must recapture the original spirit of equality in a form suitable to the present age.

Today the principles of singularity, reciprocity, and commonality can restore the idea of a society of equals and revive the project of creating one. It is these principles that must serve as the basis of legitimacy for new policies of redistribution. Realizing a society of equals in such a direction should be the new name for social progress with a *universalistic dimension*. Today, this is a crucial point, we are in need of a universalistic approach to rebuild solidarity. Because the so-called "social question" is not only about minorities, poverty and exclusion, it is also about the reconstruction of a common world for the whole society.

The society of equals as a society of singularities

The aspiration to singularity can take shape only in the individual's relation to others. If the meaning of a person's life lies in his difference from others, then he must coexist with them. It is important, however, to distinguish between singularity and autonomy or identity. Autonomy is defined by a *positional* variable and essentially static. Identity is defined by *constitutional* variables; a composite quality, it is basically given, although it may evolve over time. By contrast, singularity is defined by a *relational* variable; it is not a state. The difference that defines singularity binds a person to others; it does not set him apart. It arouses in others curiosity, interest, and a desire to understand. Equality of singularities does not imply "sameness". Rather, each individual seeks to stand out by virtue of the unique qualities that he or she alone possesses. The existence of diversity then becomes the standard of equality. Each individual seeks his or her own path and control over his or her history. Everyone is similar by dint of being incomparable.

This form of equality defines a type of society whose mode of composition is neither abstract universalism nor identity-based communitarianism but rather the dynamic construction and recognition of particularity. This shift has significant implications. First, it suggests that individuals now seek to participate in society on the basis of their distinctive rather than common characteristics. The value of singularity is thus directly social. Singularity is not a sign of withdrawal from society (individualism as retreat or separation). Rather, it signals an expectation of reciprocity, of mutual recognition. This marks the advent of a fully democratic age: the basis of society lies not in nature but solely in a shared philosophy of equality. It follows, moreover, that democracy as a type of political regime is no longer distinct from democracy as a form of society.

One central element of such a democratic society of singularities is gender equality. The problem is the fitness of men and women to live together as equals. Men and women do not exist separately at first only to enter into communication later on. Relation is the very condition of their existence. They are "individuals in relation", whether as cooperators or competitors. Indeed, they constitute the best possible example of an equality of singularities. "In gender difference," Étienne Balibar suggestively argues, "we are dealing with a supplementary singularity. (…) Equality here is not neutralization of differences (equalization) but a necessary and sufficient condition of the diversification of freedom." Precisely so. Gender relations are thus the most powerful expression of the individualism of singularity. The question of women's rights was first of all a question of their *relation* to men and not simply of their possession of certain attributes.

The gender distinction is fundamental to a deeper understanding of the egalitarian ideal and a laboratory for exploring ways to intertwine similarity and singularity ever more closely. Republican abstractions must therefore be viewed with a skeptical eye, as must the idea that gender distinctions will ultimately disappear.

The principle of reciprocity

Tocqueville placed great stress on the idea that selfishness is "to societies what rust is to metal". Today, one might say that the absence of reciprocity is the most important source of corrosion. Many studies have shown that political commitment is conditional, depending on how individuals perceive the commitment of others. More specifically, people are more likely to contribute to collective projects or expenditures if they believe that other citizens feel the same way. Conversely, any perceived disruption of reciprocity can lead to withdrawal in one form or another. Inequality is most acutely felt when citizens believe that rules apply differently to different people or when they see intolerable differences in the way different individuals are treated by certain institutions. They resent the double standard and the sense that they alone are "playing by the rules" while others find a way to circumvent those same rules for their own advantage. Richard Sennett has noted "modern society's hatred of parasitism". Sentiments such as these are a crucial source of social distrust, which in turn undermines the legitimacy of the welfare state and fosters aversion to taxes. Other consequences include the increasing prevalence of insurance fraud and tolerance of petty corruption, as if these transgressions were justifiable compensation for perceived imbalances. Distrust thus leads to generalized resentment and erosion of the public spirit.

If the breakdown of reciprocity is the driving force behind the rise of social distrust and therefore of resistance to greater solidarity, no task is more urgent than to restore reciprocity as a first step toward a society of equals. Two things are needed: a redesign of the mechanisms of solidarity and a return to universalistic policies. In order to separate fantasy from reality when it comes to unequal treatment of individuals and groups, we first need to gain a better understanding of the facts. Equality as reciprocity means above all equality of treatment and involvement. Unless situational inequalities are clearly established, the fantasy machine is free to wreak havoc. Fiscal and social statistics must therefore be made transparent if democratic debate is to be fair and productive. Abuse of the welfare and tax systems must be vigorously opposed in order to maintain confidence in these institutions.

Commonality

Civil citizenship and the notion of human rights that goes along with it have reshaped the very idea of the individual. But citizenship is also a social form. The citizen is not merely an individual endowed with certain rights; he is also defined by his relation to others, his *fellow citizens.* What Émile Benveniste tells us about the etymology of the word *civis* is especially enlightening in this regard. The Latin *civis*, he argues, was originally a term applied to people who shared the same habitat. Implicit in the meaning of the word was a certain idea of reciprocity. It was thus a term of relative order, as can be seen by comparison with the root of the Sanskrit and Germanic words for friend, relative, and ally. The *civis*

was a person who joined with his peers in the construction of a *civitas*, a common society. I propose the term "commonality" as a name for this dimension of citizenship, citizenship as a social form, as distinct from its legal definition.

Commonality is today under serious attack with the development of various forms of social separation, the secession of the rich being the most visible and shameful one. But regional separatisms are also everywhere on the rise in Europe. It could be said in that respect that a process of *denationalization* of democracies is on its way (nation defined as a space of social redistribution in the context of an experience of limited universalism).

What goes with such transformation is the temptation to replace equality with homogeneity. Homogeneity is today the driving force behind populist movements. What democracy needs in the age of denationalization is a more active, creative concept, a more complex understanding of the common, encompassing three primary dimensions: participation, mutual comprehension, and circulation.

Pierre Rosanvallon (b. 1948) began as an activist, before being a theoretician. After his studies, he became economic then political advisor to the CFDT Trade Union (1969–1972) and to its leader. He became a primary theorist of the "second left", publishing l'Âge de l'autogestion *[1976]. He works in the academic sphere since 1978, and became intellectually close to Cornelius Castoriadis, François Furet and Claude Lefort. In 2001, Pierre Rosanvallon was elected Professor at the Collège de France. His work has been translated into 22 languages and published in 26 countries.*

Nazis on the State Payroll in 1930s Ireland

DAVID O'DONOGHUE*

Nacisté v irských státních službách ve třicátých letech

Abstract: The Austro-German population of Ireland in 1936 was 529. Approximately 25% of the adult male cohort were, or became, members of Hitler's Nazi Party (NSDAP). A small cadre of senior figures in the party were active in recruiting new members as Nazi Germany's fortunes rose from 1933 to 1939. Some 32 Germans and Austrians resident in pre-war Ireland have been identified as Nazi Party members, although a small number of these were exchange students rather than full-time residents. This paper examines the six NSDAP members who held senior positions in the Irish public service. As Irish state employees they were in a contradictory position: swearing loyalty to Adolf Hitler's Third Reich while attempting to hold down important jobs on the Irish state payroll. Dr. David O'Donoghue's article scrutinises the activities of these six men, as well as explaining how they tried, by varying degrees, to serve two masters. The paper also examines their wartime and post-war lives.

Keywords: Germany; Third Reich; Ireland; Nazi party; public service

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Some 75 years after the outbreak of World War II, the living links with that fraught period are beginning to fade. It may come as a surprise to a younger generation, untouched by global conflict – not to mention many older people – to learn that there was a thriving local branch of the German Nazi Party (*Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei* or NSDAP) in Ireland in the 1930s.[1]

Even more unusual is the fact that six members of that party held senior positions in various sections of the Irish public service. But the country was never awash with Nazis, so to speak. In fact, the Austro-German colony in pre-war Ireland was quite small. At its height in 1936 it numbered 529, but by late 1939 this figure had fallen to 400. *Neutral Ireland and the Third Reich* [*Duggan 1985: 58*] puts the German population at 529 in 1936, and 460 in 1946, while Carroll's *Ireland in the War Years* [*Carroll 1975: 36*] estimates it at approximately 400 in 1939. This decline was due in part to the fact that many Germans and Austrians – who for the most part had made good lives for themselves in Ireland – chose to rally to the Swastika flag when the Third Reich went to war. Others, however, found themselves trapped in Germany when war broke out at the start of September 1939 and never returned.

A week after the outbreak of war, around 50 Germans opted to avail of a one-off opportunity to return to the Fatherland. Ireland's wartime Taoiseach, Éamon de Valera,

* Dr. David O'Donoghue works in the Irish Parliament in Dublin. E-mail: odonoghue9@gmail.com.

[1] Unless otherwise stated, all references to the six NSDAP members on the Irish state payroll in the 1930s are from Irish Military Archive files, as follows: G2/0360 (Fritz Brase); G2/0130 (Adolf Mahr) and G2/130 (Mahr's intercepted letters file); G2/0078 (Friedrich Herkner); G2/0245 (Otto Reinhard); G2/0235 (Friedrich Weckler); and G2/0143 (Heinz Mecking).

negotiated a special deal with the British government granting the Germans safe passage through Britain. Referred to by Irish officials as the 'repatriation party', they sailed from Dún Laoghaire aboard the mailboat *Cambria* on Monday, 11 September 1939. With hindsight, those Germans sailing home might have been better advised to stay in Ireland, both for their own safety and to better serve the Third Reich. But fear of a British invasion and/or internment, led them to leave. The departure of so many Germans with a detailed knowledge of Ireland, meant that German military intelligence had to send no fewer than 13 agents to Ireland, by submarine and parachute, from 1939 to 1943, [*O'Halpin 1999*]. This detailed list omits Abwehr agent Oscar Pfaus who visited Dublin in February 1939 to establish links with IRA leaders following the start of the S-plan bombing campaign in England on 16 January 1939. Pfaus arrived in Dublin on 3 February 1939 but did not meet the IRA leadership (Seán Russell, Jim O'Donovan and Moss Twomey) until 13 February. He left for Germany, via London, the following day [*Hull 2004*].

In 1930s Ireland, Germans had enjoyed something of a golden age. The Nazi party's membership – numbering from 50 to 75, depending on whether exchange students are included – pledged loyalty to Adolf Hitler. Their Christmas parties were held at the Gresham Hotel, while other social events took place at the Red Bank restaurant in D'Olier Street and at Kilmacurra Park Hotel in County Wicklow.

But who were these Germans and Austrians who rallied to the Nazi party colours in pre-war Ireland? The first Ortsgruppenleiter, or local branch leader, of the party in Dublin was a Prussian band-master called Fritz Brase who, in 1923, became the first director of the Irish Army's new school of music, with the rank of colonel. He was a somewhat odd choice to head up the new army's musical output, but the Cumann na nGaedheal government was anxious to avoid appointing any British personnel to top jobs (it was only two years since the end of the Anglo-Irish war) and, presumably, they couldn't find a suitable Irish candidate. The army has sought an 'expert military musician' in France from the ranks of the Garde Republicane, but without success [*The Irish Times 1939*].

Fritz Wilhelm Brase was born in Hanover on 4 May 1875 and arrived in Ireland on 1 March 1923, when the civil war was still going on. He was accompanied by his wife Else, aged 35, who was 12 years his junior. After living initially in an army barracks, the Brases established their family home at Wilfield House, Sandymount Avenue, Dublin – a large building with French windows looking onto extensive gardens. Their daughter Mona was born in 1924.

Colonel Brase rearranged many traditional Irish jigs and reels to sound like thundering Prussian martial airs, with the aid of his assistant, another German military musician, Christian Sauerzweig, who also held the rank of colonel. From 1924 to 1936, both men managed to establish no fewer than three army bands under the umbrella of the Irish Army's school of music.

While Sauerzweig chose not to follow his boss into NSDAP membership, Brase got into hot water in the mid-1930s when he wrote to the army's chief of staff, Major General Michael Brennan, seeking permission to set up a branch of the Nazi party in Dublin. Brase was either unaware of, or chose to ignore, the obvious conflict of interest that his request implied – an Irish army colonel swearing loyalty to the Third Reich. But Brennan saw the point, telling the German in no uncertain terms that he would have to choose between the party and the army. Brase wanted the best of both worlds, however, and

opted for a compromise: retaining NSDAP membership while relinquishing his job as party group leader.[2]

In May 1940, Sauerzweig was voicing concerns about Brase's activities to an army colleague, Captain Connery. The latter informed his superior officer, Captain O'Sullivan, who passed the German's comments on to Col. Dan Bryan the head of army intelligence, G2. Sauerzweig revealed that immediately after the outbreak of war (i.e. in early September 1939) 'Col. Brase burned a large number of documents in a boiler house attached to the school of music. This was repeated at a later date and on each occasion the attendant who was looking after the boiler was ordered to leave by Col. Brase.'

Sauerzweig added that he and Brase attended the funeral (at Dean's Grange cemetery, Dublin, on 8 April 1940) of a consular secretary at the German legation Robert Wenzel (another NSDAP member) wearing their Irish army uniforms. But after the ceremony 'Col. Brase approached the grave and gave the official Nazi salute'.[3]

Records held in Berlin show that Brase joined the Nazis on 1 April 1932, just a month before his 57th birthday. Brase appears to have been indiscreet in not bothering to keep his party membership a secret from his employers. For instance, on 26 April 1939, he sent a brief telegraph message to Adolf Hitler at the Reich Chancellery in Berlin, as follows: 'Hertzlichste glueckwuensche dem Fuehrer' (Heartiest good wishes to the Führer). Hitler's 50th birthday was on 20 April. By this time, military intelligence was keeping a secret file on Brase's activities, including his birthday greetings to Hitler. Brase retained the rank of colonel and ran the army school of music until his death, aged 65, on 2 December 1940 (while still a serving officer). Pressure from the military's top brass is the most likely reason that Brase relinquished his post as local Nazi leader in 1934 although, as mentioned earlier, he remained an ordinary rank and file NSDAP member.

Brase's successor as local party branch leader was another Irish state employee, Dr Adolf Mahr, an Austrian archaeologist who had arrived in Dublin in 1927 to join the staff of the National Museum in Kildare Street (he was promoted to the top post of museum director in 1934 by Éamon de Valera's cabinet). Mahr scoured the country buying artefacts for the museum but, like other party members, he had a hidden agenda. After taking over as party leader in Ireland, Mahr set about building up the NSDAP's membership and was quite successful in doing so. At least 23 Germans were recruited to the party during Mahr's 1934–39 term in charge. And Mahr's efforts on behalf of the Nazi party were not restricted to German citizens. According to Irish military intelligence files, he 'made many efforts to convert Irish graduates and other persons with whom he had associations, to Nazi doctrines and beliefs'.

Adolf Mahr's recruitment methods have been described by a leading expert on Irish German relations in the 1933–45 period, Lt. Col. John P. Duggan, as 'bully boy tactics'.[4] Prospective party members appear to have been given the choice of joining the NSDAP or leaving Ireland. Visiting Germans had to report first to Mahr or face a reprimand. Using his virtually unlimited power within the small German colony, Mahr was able to get two diplomats (Georg von Dehn Schmidt in 1934 and Erich Schroetter in 1937) packed home

[2] The details of Brase's brush with the army top brass were confirmed to the author by Cmdt. Peter Young, director of military archives, as interviewed on 29 January 1991.
[3] O'Sullivan memo to Bryan, 17 May 1940, in file G2/0360.
[4] Author's interview with J. P. Duggan, 8 June 1991.

to Berlin for not toeing the party line [*Duggan 1985*]. Perhaps understandably, from then on, the German legation was staffed by loyal party members. They included: Schroetter's successor, Dr Eduard Hempel; Hans Boden; and an SS officer, Henning Thomsen, who was transferred to Dublin from Oslo early in 1939. Mahr's heavy-handed tactics may also explain why a Malahide-based Lutheran minister, Wilhelm Tanne, felt obliged to join the party (in October 1934), even though the German Protestant churches, for the most part, opposed Hitler – as did the Catholic Church.

From 1934 to 1939, Mahr was Germany's *de facto* top representative in Ireland. Dr Mahr even represented the Irish branch of the Nazi party at the May 1937 coronation of George VI in London where he was joined by Ribbentrop, then Hitler's ambassador to the Court of St. James.[5] In the circumstances, it can hardly be considered a coincidence that Mahr secured a post as head of the Irish desk at the wartime Foreign Office in Berlin when Ribbentrop was Foreign Minister. Mahr also directed radio propaganda broadcasts to neutral Ireland from 1941–45.

In pre-war Dublin, the German legation at 58 Northumberland Road supplied Mahr with regular reports on the comings and goings of German and Austrian nationals, including Jews whose Irish addresses and movements were recorded in ominous detail. Yanky Fachler, a leading historian on Jewish affairs, links these lists of Jews' arrivals and addresses to the accurate total of 4,000 Irish Jews earmarked for extermination that appears in the 1942 Wannsee Conference minutes. Fachler describes the German legation's activities as 'The clearest evidence yet that the Nazis intended to round up Jews in Ireland'.[6]

Meanwhile, the German legation's radio transmitter was being used to send secret political, economic and military information to Berlin. Éamon de Valera eventually ordered the seizure of the transmitter in December 1943 following pressure from the US ambassador, David Gray. (The American diplomat was an uncle of Mrs Eleanor Roosevelt, the US President's wife.)

Nazi party members like Adolf Mahr and Fritz Brase found themselves in an awkward position as state employees in the 1930s because, essentially, they could not serve two masters without a conflict of interest arising. Nor were they the only NSDAP members who tried simultaneously to serve the Irish state and Nazi Germany. Four others were in the same predicament.

Friedrich Herkner was born on 25 October 1902 in Brüx, Bohemia. He was appointed professor of sculpture at the National College of Art in Dublin on 18 March 1938. He was accompanied by his wife Lydia (born 7 April 1906). Before coming to Ireland, he had studied sculpture for eight years at the Vienna Academy of Arts, following which he taught at a private school for graphic arts in Aussig, Czechoslovakia. Despite Herkner's wide experience, civil servants at the Department of Education in Dublin seemed more concerned about his linguistic abilities. A letter dated 14 January 1938, noted that the Czechoslovakian teacher 'does not speak Irish and his English is still rather weak'.[7]

[5] Author's interview with Mahr's daughter, Mrs. Ingrid Reusswig, 28 July 1994.
[6] Fachler to author, 26 August 2014.
[7] Correspondence between the Civil Service Commission and the Department of Education is contained in Herkner's Department of Education file T. 361.

Despite the Irish functionaries' misgivings, however, Herkner got the job at an annual salary of £350. He stayed initially at the Grosvenor Hotel before moving to 25 Palmerston Road, Rathgar.

Herkner had only been in his new job for 18 months when he decided to join about 50 Germans and Austrians leaving (as previously outlined) for Germany following the outbreak of war. As he was about to board the mailboat for Holyhead, Herkner told an *Irish Times* reporter that 'several of the party were of military age and were returning to Germany to join the colours. They had all been advised by their Legation to leave. One never knew how long the trouble would last and several of them had to return for economic reasons' [*Irish Times 1939*]. Herkner subsequently fought with the German army at Stalingrad and Novogrod before ending up as a prisoner of war. In the immediate post-war period he did restoration work on war-damaged monuments in Germany and Austria [*Turpin 1995*].

Herkner's case is unusual in that he was the only Nazi on the Irish state payroll to be reinstated after the war. The College of Art had used temporary teachers from 1939 to fill not only Herkner's role but also that of his assistant, Wilfried Dudeney, a British national who had left Dublin on 26 September 1939 to join the British army. While Dudeney was unable to be demobilised in 1946, the first that officials in Dublin heard of Herkner was in a letter smuggled out of Germany (where he was in a POW camp in Heidelberg) in January 1946. The brief note stated: 'Now the war is over, I am able to return.' But since all postal communications with Germany, apart from military and diplomatic ones, were suspended, the officials could not send a reply. Herkner wrote again, this time from Vienna, on 21 February 1946 explaining that: 'When the war broke out I was ordered to leave Ireland for Germany, from the German Minister (Hempel), because I got in the meantime German nationality through the occupation of Austria.' This is an odd statement, given that Herkner was Czechoslovakian, unless he is referring to the fact that Bohemia was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1902, the year of his birth.

Despite the fact that Herkner was stuck in occupied Vienna without a passport, by July 1946, his return to Ireland was being backed by the Departments of Education, Finance, Justice, Industry and Commerce, and External Affairs. They also wanted Dudeney back, but the latter wrote to make it clear that he would not return if Herkner resumed his old job (both men had fought on opposite sides in the war). Dudeney was willing to take Herkner's job if the latter did not return, however. After much toing and froing, Herkner was able to leave Austria and resumed his old post on 23 May 1947 with a salary of £600 per annum.

Herkner was due to retire when he turned 65 on 25 October 1967, but the Catholic archbishop of Dublin, John Charles McQuaid, intervened (not in writing, but by phone) to seek a contract extension 'on grounds of hardship'. Herkner was by then a widower with two young adult children to support: Kaethe (24) a ballet dancer; and Hans (20) a student laboratory assistant. But McQuaid, who would retire in three years himself, was no longer the all-powerful figure of the 1940s and 1950s. The Department of Education told the ageing archbishop that a plea of hardship could not be sustained since Herkner's annual pension would be £563, not to mention a tax-free lump sum of £1,503. But an olive branch was offered to McQuaid since the professor was allowed 42 extra days' work in order to complete a further year of pensionable service. Herkner eventually retired from state service on 6 December 1967 with 22 years of pensionable service under his belt.

Herkner's other son, Reinhardt, is not listed as a dependant in the DoE file. In view of McQuaid's intervention on behalf of Herkner in 1967, it is possible that the archbishop also helped the sculptor to get his job back 20 years earlier, although there is no such written evidence in Herkner's Department of Education file. It is known, however, that McQuaid sometimes lobbied senior civil servants by phone or face to face, rather than by letter. For example, DoE file T.361 contains nothing in writing from McQuaid. Yet DoE memos refer to the archbishop's phone calls, presumably made via his private secretary. (Herkner initially retired to Switzerland but continued to exhibit regularly at the Royal Hibernian Academy, Dublin. He became an academy member in 1979. He died in Dublin on 27 June 1986, aged 83. Herkner's public sculptures include a bronze Madonna and Child in St. Patrick's Cathedral, Dublin.)

Otto Reinhard was appointed director of forestry in the Department of Lands in 1935, having beaten 69 other candidates to get the job. By 1938, the German forestry expert had an annual salary of £1,500 (approx. €124,000 in current values) and had bought a large Victorian house in its own grounds, with a private tennis court, at Silchester Road, Glenageary. Reinhard applied to join the Nazi party on 30 June 1939 and was admitted on 1 September 1939. His contribution to Irish forestry from 1935 to 1939 is generally seen as positive. But his contacts with the small NSDAP group had attracted the attention of G2's Col. Dan Bryan who noted that Reinhard 'frequents Kilmacurra Park Hotel'. The County Wicklow hotel was a regular meeting place for Nazi party members. In a secret memo, Col. Bryan added: 'Reinhard very shrew customer. Has thorough topographical knowledge of eastern seaboard.'[8]

On 18 August 1939, Reinhard left Dublin with his wife Gertrud and their two children for a month's holiday in Kassel, Germany. The family were stranded there following the outbreak of war and, despite Reinhard's request for Irish diplomatic assistance to return through Britain, he was unable to get back. The German was subsequently called up for army service with the rank of captain. He then offered his forestry expertise to the authorities in Berlin who put him in charge of timber production in the Carpathian Mountains in Romania, where he remained until being recalled to work in forests surrounding Berlin in February 1942.

In stark contrast to Herkner's case – and despite both men being employed on temporary annual contracts – Reinhard's employers in Dublin moved swiftly to terminate his contract when he didn't resume work in September 1939. Reinhard survived the war but died of an untreated kidney infection in February 1947, aged 49.

Friedrich Weckler was born in Stuttgart on 16 February 1892. He arrived in Ireland in 1926 to work for Siemens-Schuckert on the Shannon hydroelectric scheme. In 1931, he was appointed chief accountant for the Electricity Supply Board (ESB). He joined the NSDAP on 1 June 1934. According to his military intelligence file, Weckler was being monitored by Garda special branch detectives who noted his attendance at German functions in Kilmacurra Park Hotel in County Wicklow in May 1939. The police file remarked that the German was unmarried and his hobbies were golf and gardening.

His file contains voluminous correspondence about alleged signalling activities in late 1940 from Weckler's home 'Santa Maria', Vico Road, Dalkey – he had moved there

[8] From the Irish Military Archives file G2/0245, undated memo initialled by Dan Bryan.

six months earlier from a flat in nearby Sorrento Terrace. (Of the six Nazis in Irish state employment, only Weckler and Brase remained in Ireland when war broke out.) The house, on Dublin's south coast, was put under surveillance by a detective and an army signals expert from 28 October to 25 November 1940 during which time they noticed lights being switched on in the early hours and a signalling lamp being used in the garden to send codes, including VE-VE-VE-T/O.[9]

But the authorities were unable to link Weckler to the signalling activity. It is worth noting that the owner of another house on the same road, 'Pine Hill', regularly left the lights on all night to guide German bombers to UK targets [*O'Donoghue 1998*].

Weckler was later promoted to the post of company secretary, while retaining the position of chief accountant, making him part of the ESB's top management team. He became a naturalised Irish citizen but died prematurely, aged 51, in 1943. According to his military intelligence file he 'became a Catholic in his final days'.

Heinz Mecking was born in Klein-Reken, Germany on 22 September 1902. An expert in German boglands, he first worked for the Heseper Torfwerk company in Meppen. On the recommendation of George Klasmann (boss of the Klasmann turf company where Mecking later worked and to whom he was related by marriage), Mecking joined the Turf Development Board (the forerunner of Bord na Móna) as an adviser in late February 1936. He arrived in Ireland on 24 February 1936 with his wife Hertha and their one-year-old daughter. His annual salary was £900.

Mecking had joined the NSDAP on 1 June 1931 and, as such, was the only German on the Irish state payroll to have joined the Nazi party before being hired as a public servant. According to the TDB's managing director, Todd Andrews, Mecking's 'one genuinely important contribution to bog work [was] the introduction of piece rates', thus greatly reducing development costs[10]. But his advice on drainage was 'disastrous', since Irish bogs need to drain for seven years before production, compared to only two years in Germany.[11]

Mecking was actively involved in Nazi party activities, according to a military intelligence profile dated 9 April 1945 (in his G2 file). He was leader of the German Labour Front (*Deutsche Arbeitsfront*) in Ireland and attended a Nazi party conference in London in December 1938. In January 1939, a leading NSDAP official, Admiral H.E. Menche, visited Dublin to install Mecking as Ortsgruppenleiter in succession to Adolf Mahr (a post Mecking held from June to September 1939). The Garda special branch also noted that Mecking's home at 'Nanville', 13 Beechwood Road, Ranelagh, was used for meetings (one lasted over seven hours) of Nazi party members, including Karl Künstler, Karl Krause, Dr. Robert Stumpf and Dr. Adolf Mahr.

On 11 September 1939, Mecking joined the so-called 'repatriation party' aboard the mailboat sailing for Holyhead and then Germany via London. He joined the German army and after the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, was sent to oversee turf production for the winter campaigns of 1941–42 and 1942–43. He was eventually taken prisoner by

[9] VE-VE-VE is a standard calling up signal in morse code. The author is grateful to Lt. Col. Ted Shine of the Defence Forces' Ordnance Office for this information. Weckler's file does not mention what messages were being sent or to what recipient.

[10] David Andrews to author, 12 October 2013

[11] P. Rowland and T. McKenna to author, 12 February 2013.

the Red Army and died – of oedema (dropsy) and starvation – in a POW camp at Tiraspol, Soviet Moldova, on 18 December 1945.[12]

Adolf Mahr was assisted in his Nazi party duties by a Dublin-based Siemens director, Oswald Müller Dubrow, who operated as Mahr's deputy in the Nazi party's Auslands-Organisation which kept an eye on Germans living abroad, enforced discipline among party members, and produced regular reports for Berlin.

Other party members living in Ireland included: Heinrich Greiner who had come here in 1935 to help start up the Solus lightbulb factory in Bray; Hans Hartmann, based at UCD from 1937 to 1939, where he studied Irish language and folklore. During the war, Hartmann broadcast Nazi propaganda in Irish from Berlin and later from Luxembourg and Apen; Hilde Poepping, an exchange student at University College, Galway; Karl Künstler, an engineer with Siemens; and Robert Stumpf, a radiologist at Baggot Street Hospital. In 1939, Stumpf and his wife – who was also a medical practitioner – invited some Irish doctors and their wives on a tour of the Third Reich.

According to Irish military intelligence, Adolf Mahr and Otto Reinhard were both employed during the war in 'one of the German intelligence sections which dealt with matters concerning a landing in Ireland'. This may be a case of mistaken identity by G2 concerning Reinhard. At least one G2 file mentions the fact that an Abwehr agent, Jupp Hoven (who was based in Ireland pre-war) occasionally used the cover name 'Otto Reinhard'. The German army had drawn up detailed documents for an invasion of Ireland to coincide with the invasion of England in 1940. In mid-August that year, IRA men Seán Russell and Frank Ryan were to be landed on the Dingle peninsula by U-boat. The plan was aborted when Russell died of a perforated ulcer aboard the vessel. He was buried at sea. Ryan returned to Germany where he died in 1944.

In July 1939, a letter was delivered to Mahr's Dublin home from an SS war-maps office in Prague thanking him for his 'efforts'. A short time previously, the museum director had left Dublin, officially for his annual holidays in Austria and to attend the sixth international congress of archaeology in Berlin that August. Unofficially, however, Mahr had planned to attend the Nazis' annual rally at Nuremburg in September (which was cancelled on the outbreak of war).

Since early 1939, Mahr had been feeling the pressure from top Irish officials over his Nazi party role, and had been shadowed both by the Garda special branch and the army's military intelligence section. But, in the 1930s, were de Valera and his ministers aware that Nazi party members were on the state payroll? The answer would appear to be that a few top civil servants were but the Taoiseach only became aware of what was happening in February 1939. For example, Todd Andrews, who was managing director of the Turf Development Board in the 1930s, recalled in his 1982 memoirs that: 'As German triumph followed German triumph in Europe, he (Heinz Mecking) became increasingly uninvolved in his assignment (for the TDB). He set himself up as a Nazi intelligence agent photographing railway stations, river bridges, sign posts and reservoirs (…) When war broke out he had to return to Germany – with reluctance. He thought that he would be more useful to his country acting as an intelligence agent in Ireland' [*Andrews 2001: 162*].

[12] Additional material on Mecking supplied to author by Mr. Hans Heinz Mecking, Friesoythe, Germany, in letter dated 22 July 1991.

Todd Andrews' son, David (a former Irish foreign minister) insists that his father only became aware of Mecking's Nazi activities after the war.

In February 1939, the secretary of the Department of External Affairs, Joseph Walshe, reported to de Valera on his meeting with the newly arrived German diplomat Henning Thomsen: 'I suggested to him, as I have frequently done to his Minister (Hempel) and his Minister's predecessor (Schroetter) that the existence of a Nazi organisation in Dublin (…) having as its chief member and organiser an employee of our State (Mahr) was not calculated to improve relations between our two Governments.' The formal memo reveals that Walshe had been aware of what he called 'the Nazi cell in Dublin' since 1936, yet nothing had been done about it, apart from monitoring party members' movements and intercepting their mail [*de Valera 1939*].

In fact, when it came to dealing with Nazi party members in Ireland, the Dublin Government's hands were tied because, according to the rules, civil servants like Mahr were barred only from membership of Irish political parties, not foreign ones. In addition, spies such as Jupp Hoven (who studied at Trinity College and, during the war, together with Helmut Clissmann and IRA man Frank Ryan, tried to set up an Irish brigade of the German army) and Professor Ludwig Mühlhausen (who had taken hundreds of photographs of Sligo and Donegal in 1937, some of which later ended up in a German Army invasion handbook) could not be touched because they had not broken any law. In 1937, a senior civil servant, Leon Ó Broin, reported Mühlhausen's spying activities to a senior army officer, only to be told that it was not illegal to take holiday snapshots [*O'Donoghue 1998*].

Very few NSDAP members of the German colony returned to live in Ireland after the war. Helmut Clissmann was flown back in 1949 with the help of the then Irish Foreign Minister, Seán MacBride, who provided a visa as a favour to the German's Sligo-born wife Elizabeth 'Budge' Clissmann (née Mulcahy). MacBride and Mulcahy had been close associates in the republican movement in the 1930s. In 1947, as we have seen, Professor Herkner got his old teaching job back at the National College of Art.

But Adolf Mahr was never to set foot on Irish soil again. On his release from Falling Bürstal internment camp in Germany in April 1946, Mahr sought reinstatement as director of the National Museum. But, under pressure from opposition T.D., James Dillon, de Valera heeded the advice of his military intelligence chief, Colonel Dan Bryan, that allowing the return of such a 'blatant Nazi' would be 'unwise'.

Conclusion

The six Nazi party members on the Irish state payroll in the 1930s were attempting a difficult if not impossible balancing act – earning their livelihoods from the Irish state, while swearing loyalty to the Third Reich. And as the Second World War drew nearer, the position of these Nazis became increasingly untenable. Some, including Otto Reinhard and Adolf Mahr, were stranded in Germany when war broke out. Others, as we have seen, opted to avail of safe passage – negotiated by de Valera with London – through Britain on 11/12 September 1939, eight days after the declaration of war. Some may well have returned to Ireland if that had been an option, but when the chips were down they did not refuse to aid Hitler's war effort.

What remains a mystery, however, is how people like Otto Reinhard (who ran the Irish forestry service from 1935 to 1939) and many of his NSDAP colleagues could turn their backs on a country that had provided them with top jobs, an enviable standard of living, good career prospects, and security for them and their families. The alternative – which they might have worked out had they bothered to consider it – was to risk losing all in a conflict provoked by a fascist tyrant who had turned Germany into a police state.

Members of the German colony in Ireland can hardly have been in any doubt about the direction Germany had taken since Hitler became chancellor on 30 January 1933. So why did they favour Nazi Germany over their host country? Was it a case of dangerously divided loyalties, misguided feelings of obligation and/or duty, coercion by Adolf Mahr, or a somewhat naive belief that the war would be quickly won by Germany and they could thus resume their former activities in Dublin? It may have been a combination of some or all of these factors. But those who opted to join the Nazi party had, in doing so, sworn allegiance to the Third Reich and may therefore have felt beholden to the Führer above all else. Others may simply have wanted to help their country in time of war. Whatever the reason, however, most of them paid a heavy personal price for their dubious political beliefs.

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Dr. David O'Donoghue is an author and historian specialising in Irish-German relations in the 1933–1945 period of national socialist rule in Germany. His books include: Hitler's Irish Voices: the Story of German Radio's Wartime Irish Service *(Somerville Press, 2014); and* The Devil's Deal: the IRA, Nazi Germany and the double life of Jim O'Donovan *(New Island, 2010).*

Stefan Breuer: *Der charismatische Staat. Ursprünge und Frühformen staatlicher Herrschaft.* Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2014, 319 pages

This is an important and immensely learned book. To the best of my knowledge, there has been no comparably detailed attempt to trace the emergence of early states in different regions of the Old and the New World. Drawing on a vast array of anthropological, archaeological and historical sources, Breuer analyzes the transition to statehood in Oceania (where the process was, as he argues, not completed), the Andean region, Mesoamerica, China, Mesopotamia, Egypt and the Aegean. The general stance of his analysis might be described as consistently sceptical about claims made on behalf of archaic political forms; he thus regards widely shared views on early evidence of state power in the Andes, the ancient Near East and the Bronze Age Aegean as misguided. Such doubts also explain the absence of the Indus civilization from his research programme. Its political framework was, as he suggests, probably a cluster of chiefdoms, characterized by a "nonstate type of complexity" (p. 36). In fact, there would be valid reasons to omit this case, even if the criteria of early statehood were to be relaxed: the evidence is, as many scholars in the field have agreed, more enigmatic than in the other relevant instances, and it does not translate into the kind of narrative that Breuer constructs for other regions and civilizations.

But if the merits of the empirical content are massive and obvious, the conceptual framework seems more directly questionable. Breuer takes his clue from Max Weber's distinction between charismatic, traditional and legal-rational domination, and draws on recent clarifications grounded in more careful readings of the sources (to which he has been a major contributor). But apart from a comment to be noted below, late in the book and immaterial to his discussion of the early state, he does not suggest any revisions at the basic conceptual level. At this point, we may register a prima facie objection to the proposal set out in Breuer's long introduction (pp. 9–37). The typology of domination is one of the most markedly unfinished parts of Weber's work; it went through many versions, and the last ones belong to the final phase of Weber's career; many questions concerning the relationship between the three types and the contextual meaning of each one in particular remained unanswered. In a book dealing with early states, this unfinished conceptual scheme is applied to a field which Weber hardly touched (the main exception is Egypt, but as Breuer shows, his over-modernized views on this subject must now be corrected). It seems unlikely that this major extension can leave the frame of reference unaffected, all the more so when the latter is still in the making.

Not that Breuer regards the Weberian scheme as sufficient for his purposes. He wants to combine it with categories and models developed in recent decades by anthropologists and archaeologists. There is everything to be said for that kind of interdisciplinary contact, and not doubt that those who deal with prehistoric, stateless or archaic societies can still learn some lessons from classical sociology. But a mutually induced critical reflection might take us further than a mere combination of resources. To get a tentative idea of that option, we must first take a brief look at Breuer's choices.

On the positive side, it is worth noting that Breuer is highly critical of the more faddish notions that still enjoy some popularity among archaeologists, especially the attempts to identify "world systems" in every historical stage and every geographical region; as he argues, they rely on systemic models that are either defined too rigorously to be applicable outside their original modern context, or too loosely to carry any specific meaning (the latter applies to André Gunder Frank's macro-historical escapades). A holistic prejudice is also evident in neo-Marxist interpretations of the "mode of production" as an overarching structure; but here Breuer finds an opening to the kind of neo-Weberian analysis that he wants to develop. It is the "epigenetic civilizational theory" formulated by Jonathan Friedman and Michael Rowlands, and originally conceived as a way of bringing divergent paths and multilinear evolution into a structuralist-Marxist vision of history. One of its key themes is the control over "imaginary conditions of production", seen as a possible

and in fact frequent but not necessary road to statehood. These "imaginary conditions" consist of beliefs, symbols and rituals; they should obviously be thematized in their own right, not just in relation to production, and such a turn would seem to link up with Weber's comments on the ideas that chart the paths of human action. From there is a direct line of thought to the cultural worlds that crystallize around constellations of ideas. But this is not the road Breuer wants to take. His extensive and meticulous work on Weber has never confronted the question whether a comparative analysis of civilizations was emerging as the unifying goal of Weber's project.

The approach chosen in the book under review is starkly opposed to civilizational analysis. Breuer collapses the worlds of beliefs, symbols and rituals into the Weberian category of charisma. Recent scholarship has undeniably shown that this notion is more ubiquitous and more significant in Weber's work than mainstream interpretations tended to admit; but it has also highlighted Weber's failure to define it in a clear and consistent way. If it is to be used in the systematic fashion envisaged by Breuer, a minimum of stabilizing content is required. Breuer's solution to the problem is to describe charisma as a "trans-epochal phenomenon, linked to anthropological constants that are relatively resistant to the social and the natural environment" (pp. 18–19). This claim is not substantiated by anything more than a general reference to "biocultural" and cognitive-psychological foundations. But if that is where we are supposed to look, the first step would be to face the unending and multi-faceted controversy about the relative weight of natural and cultural factors in the making of human destinies. The dispute is at least as vigorous in anthropology as in any other discipline, and at least for those of us who tend to think that the defence of culture as human creation is a more convincing stance than any naturalist reductionism, the identification of charisma with an infra-cultural core is implausible. And Breuer does not move in that direction; instead, he returns to Weber and defines charisma in terms of non-everyday (*ausseralltäglich*) dimensions of social life. We can, in that sense, speak of charismatic objects, symbols, experiences and activities. As often noted, Weber never clarified the relationship of this fundamentally transpersonal and primarily religious meaning to the emphatically personal and primarily political one that figures in his sociology of his domination; for Breuer's argument, it is essential to shift the balance towards the former side, and he therefore criticizes Weber for conflating the routinization (*Veralltäglichung*) and objectivation (*Versachlichung*) of charisma with its de-personalization, understood as a step towards disappearance and displacement by traditional or legal-rational domination. For Breuer, the most decisive transformation of charisma is its institutionalization, and it includes – especially in the early stages discussed in the book – a personal component. "Kingship and the state" are thus to be explained as results of "an institutional turn of charisma" (p. 41).

This is an attempt to integrate the different aspects of charisma, more efficiently than Weber did, and make the concept more suitable for explanatory purposes. The problem is that it starts with the very vague notion of a "non-everyday" (perhaps more precisely "trans-everyday") dimension. For phenomenologically inclined readers (including the present reviewer), the most obvious response is to take this term as a shorthand reference to distinctions within the lifeworld, and if the historicity of the latter is taken seriously, we must consider cultural variations in the meaning, extent and importance of phenomena or perspectives defined as transcending the framework of everyday life. That line of thought leads to a comparison of cultural world-articulations. Breuer hints at such possibilities with reference to Philippe Descola's efforts to re-centre anthropology around a comparative analysis of basic world-views, but then neutralizes that idea by positing a rough correlation between Descola's models of world-views and stages of social development (pp. 19–20). The issues raised by Descola's work are too complex to be discussed here, but a familiar classical source may help to take our point further. In Durkheim's *Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, the distinction

between everyday and non-everyday spheres seems to converge with the one between sacred and profane; this is one among several manifestations of the original omnipresence of religion. Durkheim's argument is empirical, based on what he thought was an exemplary case, as close to human origins as sociological or anthropological inquiry could get, and should not be mistaken for an unconditional equation of the sacred with a realm beyond everyday life (an inverted version of that claim seems to be at work when it is proposed to replace the notion of sacred rulership with that of the charismatic state). Durkheim did not live to develop the projects foreshadowed at the end of *Elementary Forms*. But it seems clear that if he had gone on to deal with the later history of religions, he would have taken note of their varying impact on the distinction between everyday reality and dimensions beyond it. Moreover, he outlined a model of socio-cultural differentiation that would allow us to trace the emergence of key institutions from the original all-encompassing religious framework, and although this programme was not carried out, the overall thrust of his work suggests that he did not regard this differentiating process as exclusively modern. To mention only the most prominent cases, it seems clear that the spheres of politics, philosophical and/or scientific inquiry, and aesthetic creation have their specific ways of transcending everyday reality. It is true, and reflected in Durkheim's comments on certain trends of the modern democratic imagination, that projections and appropriation of the sacred appear in these other contexts; but this secondary sacralization is a separate problem, and should not be obscured by conceptual levelling. The notion of charisma seems either too loaded with connotations derived from its most familiar pre-Weberian use (the informal authority of religious virtuosi), or – if separated from that context – so vague that it threatens to bring on the night in which all cows are black.

To sum up, this conceptual analysis does not support the proposal to redefine archaic state power as charismatic rather than sacral. The widely accepted notion of sacral rulership allows for varying forms. Kingship was clearly the most common type; divine kingship in the strict sense was a specific and relatively rare version; the relationship to the sacred differed from one civilization to another and from one historical phase to another. For example, the contrast between Egyptian and Mesopotamian kingship was not as clear-cut as earlier scholars assumed, but some basic divergences are still acknowledged; on the other hand, the Egyptian imaginary of divine rulership obviously underwent significant changes (both these points seem to be confirmed by Breuer's analyses). Further distinctions raise the question of divided or secondary power centres. The division of power between king and temple is a recurrent and controversial theme in discussions about the most archaic civilizations. Similarly, the balance of power between the sacral ruler and the economic, military and administrative elites of the society in question what subject to change and often difficult to assess. Here we need only underline the point that these differentiations – all taken into account in Breuer's analyses of particular cases – are perfectly compatible with the general notion of an archaic state anchored in the sacred.

Any definition of archaic statehood must prove its worth by helping to grasp the emergence of the state as a historical process; and in that context, it should also do justice to the pre-comprehension that Breuer shares with virtually all authors working in the field: the view that this innovation represents a major turning-point in human history. A minimalist conception of the state as a regulating centre with a territorial domain does not meet these criteria. For a more adequate model, Breuer draws on Max Weber's general theory of the state (in contrast to the specific one, focused on the rational bureaucratic apparatus invented in the West, and favoured by some later readers of Weber's work). When it came to characterizing state power in cross-cultural and trans-epochal terms, Weber stressed the monopoly of legitimate force. It has rightly been objected that many early political formations, intuitively and more or less unanimously classified as states, were far from achieving such a monopoly. Breuer therefore suggests a more historical version of

Weber's claim: political associations (*Verbände*) that show a tendency to monopolize legitimate force should be characterized as states (p. 15). Obviously, the cases to be compared – especially the very numerous ones where the evidence is exclusively archaeological – will often be difficult to assess on that basis. But that does not invalidate the implicit basic point: a historically grounded theory of the state must be conceived in processual terms. Unfolding dynamics of state formation and transformation, rather than stable types or permanent structures, are the main theme to be clarified. This was the general message of Norbert Elias's work, to some extent blurred by his one-sided focus on the infrastructures of statehood (the aspects that Breuer wants to subsume under charisma were largely neglected), but a more multi-dimensional approach can nevertheless build on his insights and extend them into new fields. In particular, the emergence of the state is to be analyzed as a process, rather than an invention or a once-and-for-all historical watershed. To quote the concluding statement of Breuer's introduction, "the state is certainly domination in space", but a closer examination of statehood "cannot do without the *longue durée* and thus the dimension of time" (p. 37).

As Breuer explicitly notes, this emphasis on temporality applies to the early state no less than to later formations. We might ask whether that view is easily compatible with his attempts (in the empirical chapters) to draw a clear line between states and pre-state societies (the question becomes particularly acute when the state is contrasted with the chiefdom, supposedly a category with clearly defined content and boundaries. If we treat pristine state formation as a long-drawn-out and emergent process, we may be able to identify turning-points and convergences of multiple trends, as well as blockages and reversals; but it becomes more difficult to pinpoint a take-off that would mark the beginning of a new form of political life. The problem is compounded by the incomplete and elusive character of the record. It is now widely accepted that political organization is part and parcel of tribal societies, and it is no less clear that the trends culminating in the archaic states and civilizations, studied by archaeologists and historians, were conducive to major transformations. We will most likely have to accept permanently blurred borderlines and transitions between these two states of affairs.

With that in mind, another look at the sacral connection may be useful. It should help to gain a better view of the shift to statehood, but it will also have to be adapted to the conceptual and evidential limits indicated above. A convenient starting-point is Marcel Gauchet's theory of the early state, not mentioned in Breuer's discussion (an understandable omission, since Gauchet does not engage in the concrete historical analysis that is all-important for Breuer). Gauchet's interpretation of the emerging state as a "sacral transformer" is the cornerstone of a "political history of religion" that has aroused controversy, especially about later historical stages, but it has yet to be assessed in the context of archaeological and anthropological debates. As it stands, it is no doubt too dependent on notions of an abrupt break; a more processual version could still retain the idea of a reorientation, turning away from patterns of order ascribed to mythical ancestors and towards an empowering of rulers with some kind of sacral (not necessarily outright divine) status.

This view is not incompatible with a multi-linear conception of primary state formation. Max Weber had noted the varying power balance between priests and warriors in early phases of social development, and the long-term effects of such constellations. Breuer links both sides of this agonistic relationship to charisma, more systematically than Weber did, but tones down the role of military charisma, as against the magical and religious types. He stops short of ascribing primacy to the latter, but a revised version of Gauchet's thesis can take us further in that direction. A complex conception of the sacred, drawing on Durkheim but expanding his definitions, would combine three aspects. The sacred, in contrast to the profane, is – as Durkheim duly emphasized – the dominant side of a fundamental division; it is also, as he less clearly saw, central to the constitution of the world as a unifying horizon and a field of meaning; and it is, as he implicitly recognized, an

enduring but mutable frame of reference for the structuring of social power. In short, it would seem to possess an integrating capacity lacking in other factors involved in the rise of the state. Breuer is no doubt right to insist on the multiple lines of development contributing to this process, and his argument is backed up by the "dual processual theory" of American archaeologists (in fact, the duality in question seems to have multiple meanings for different authors: it refers to monocratic and oligarchic power structures as well as to priestly and military leadership, and sometimes to patrilineal and matrilineal succession). But I do not think that his empirical analyses include a clear case of military state-building bypassing the sacral connection.

At this juncture, a brief comparison with another foray into the same field may be in order. Norman Yoffee's book on the early state and its interpreters [*Yoffee 2004*] is mentioned in a footnote to Breuer's introduction, but does not enter into the subsequent discussion. There are some basic affinities between the two books. Both authors set out to demolish theories that exaggerate the strength and the dimensions of early states; Yoffee links these retrospective illusions to neo-evolutionist views, whereas Breuer is less concerned about that background and – as some of his formulations suggest – more receptive to certain evolutionist ideas. But more importantly, there are three distinctive aspects of Yoffee's argument that seem relevant to the issues raised by Breuer. In the first place, Yoffee develops a more explicit critique of the tendency to equate the institutions of surviving tribal societies (our supposed "contemporary ancestors", as he calls them) with those of prehistoric ones; and on that basis he questions the notion of the chiefdom, which turns out to be very difficult to define in precise terms and very dependent on selective projections of anthropological evidence into the past. Secondly, he proposes to study the rise of the state in connection with processes of differentiation and integration, both types being defined in ways that go beyond functionalist assumptions while emphasizing the distribution and concentration of power and wealth. Finally, neither wealth nor power develop independently of ideas about their proper uses and possibilities, and the role of ideologies in the rise of early states thus becomes an important theme, however difficult it may often be to grasp his aspect of the picture.

Within the limits of this review, it is not possible to discuss Breuer's regional case studies in detail. An adequate response would, at any rate, require specialist knowledge of each field. But some strengths of the argument should be underlined. Breuer notes the importance of interstate relations, and the very different forms they could take in various parts of the world. There is, for example, a very marked contrast between interstate dynamics in Mesoamerica and China. He signals the importance of great empires in the Old World (p. 15), and is well aware of the pioneering turn towards empire in the Near East (beginning with the third-millennium expansion of Akkad). He is no doubt right to reject over-enthusiastic attempts to depict late fourth-millennium Uruk as an empire and his account of the very gradual Egyptian shift to empire-building, culminating in the New Kingdom, sounds convincing. The refusal to recognize the Inca state as an empire seems more problematic. Here the unquestioning application of the Weberian concept of patrimonialism obscures the originality of a state that achieved extraordinary power despite limited technological resources (Breuer is, however, on the right track when he criticizes traditional narratives, still accepted in some recent literature on the Incas, that describe them as coming from nowhere; in fact, they built on a long history of state formation). Another instance of misplaced scepticism might be the conclusion that Oceania did not make it to statehood. It is not clear, at least not to the present writer, that Breuer has effectively countered the claims of other authors – notably Patrick V. Kirch – who have found evidence of archaic state structures in Polynesia. And to add a last comment on empirical shortcomings: The trajectory of the Hittite state in Anatolia, whether we define it as an empire or not, would have merited inclusion alongside Egypt and Mesopotamia, all the more so since Breuer mentions the interesting hypothesis that the collapse of this great power, very likely brought about by internal fissures

and conflicts, may have been a decisive factor in the regional crisis of the Late Bronze Age.

As I mentioned at the beginning, Breuer does foreshadow one fundamental criticism of the kind that strikes at the very core of Weber's sociology of domination. This happens in the course of a chapter devoted to ancient Egypt, a civilization with an exceptionally long and continuous history. But there were also significant shifts and innovations within its framework, and it is logical to raise the question whether traditional domination replaced the original charismatic pattern. If I am not mistaken, Breuer tends towards a positive answer, but realizes that Weber's typology does not provide a sufficient reason to defend it. As he writes, Weber envisaged the transformation of everyday routines into custom, tradition and ethos; Breuer objects that "an ethos never emerges from repetition and mimesis, only from reflection, distance and explication" (p. 257).[1] This is a far-reaching concession from an author otherwise very inclined to stay the Weberian course, and we should at least note the most obvious implications. Reflection, distance and explication were at work in all the great historical traditions, and they produced very different conceptions of legitimate power; it may even be questionable whether the notion of legitimacy is uniformly applicable. It is not at all clear or plausible that a general conception of traditional legitimacy would make sense. As Breuer notes, the Weberian concept won't do, and neither he nor anybody else has produced an acceptable alternative. The relationship to the sacred is certainly a recurrent theme, but its various articulations are worlds apart (it is enough to think of the Chinese mandate of heaven, the Islamic caliphate, and the medieval Western Christian notion of the king's two bodies). Moreover, a general model of sacral legitimacy would lump these traditions together with archaic civilizations. And there is a further (for our purposes final) comment to add. If reflection, distance and explication were active in premodern traditions, they were doubly so in the modern era. Taking that as a cue, it quickly becomes clear that the notion of legal-rational domination is far too narrow and covers only one aspect of the problematic that has figured in modern traditions of reflection and debate on the legitimacy of power. We need a broader framework, but here I can only suggest that Shmuel Eisenstadt's bipolar conception of democracy, constitutional and participative, and his analysis of the paradoxes resulting from this combination might prove more useful than the standard Weberian approach. It should be added that both the constitutional and the participative pole can appear in extreme and mutually estranged forms that amount to a negation of democracy. All this is beyond the scope of a review. But we seem to have reached a point where a radical reconstruction of Weber's sociology of domination becomes urgent.

Johann Pall Arnason

[1] I take the liberty to note that I argued along similar lines in an essay on Max Weber [*Arnason 2012*].

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Marcin Kula: *Kartki z socjologii historycznej*. Warsaw: Scholar, 2014, 253 pages

In 2014 Marcin Kula, a rigorous Polish historian and historical sociologist well known to readers of "Historical Sociology" had already published three books with the term "historical sociology" in their titles. The first one was *Kartki z socjologii historycznej* ("Pages from Historical Sociology"), published by Scholar, a reputable Warsaw publishing house. The second and the third are published versions of his lectures in historical sociology, entitled *Trzeba pracować i produkować. Wykłady z socjologii historycznej* ("It is Necessary to Work and Produce. Lectures in Historical Sociology") and *Trzeba mieć*

pieniądze ("It is Necessary to Have Money"), co-published by the Muzeum Historii Polskiego Ruchu Ludowego and Instytut Studiów Iberyjskich i Iberoamerykańskich UW. What makes the books interesting is the way in which the author uses the very notion of "historical sociology", a term that does not often appear in the titles of Polish scholarly books. When it does, the respective publications deal at most with certain concepts of historical sociology, and rarely offer studies in it.

Here I would like to deal only with the former book, which – as the title suggests – is a collection of papers that have been previously published elsewhere. It opens with a brief introduction which explains the author's concept of historical sociology. For him historical sociology is a meeting place of history and sociology and an alternative (or rather an indispensable supplement) to the historiography that concentrates on sources in order to reconstruct "what really happened". Hence, it deals with broader research issues, attempting to acquire knowledge that reaches beyond the phenomena being studied (p. 8). Although such a disciplinary program may seem obvious, it is not at all clear whether any social science is able to do accomplish this. In my personal opinion the essential service that history may offer to sociology is a clear demarcation of spatial and temporal limits of analysis – ergo, the necessity to narrow the range of possible generalizations. Thus, Kula's idea of historical sociology is probably more challenging than it looks, and one may wonder to what extent the author himself is really ready to follow it …

Apart from the introduction the book contains seventeen, mostly short, papers on a wide range of topics, from individual social and historical phenomena to more general ideas. They do not seem to be arranged in any particular order, neither by the subject material, nor by chronology of writing. Two texts concern migration – the opening one, entitled "Nations and migrations", and the fifth one, dealing with various rulers' attempts to limit their populations' international contacts. The paper on factors that influence spatial organization of cities is supplemented by the essay on moving of capital cities, while the more general piece on students as rebels – by the paper on the Polish "March" events of 1968. Other texts deal with such subjects as Polish rock music, sport (especially great international sport events), violence in history, and the feeling of fear (including public fears). The second paper in the collection is an essay on work and national stereotypes related to it, while the fifth one deals with the idea of modernization and modernization programs in Polish history. A thirty page essay deals with the twentieth century as the supposed age of thinking people. For a student of nationalism the paper entitled "Is national culture national?" may appear interesting. Two of the texts seem more personal, one containing a list of issues for a possible book on Marshal Piłsudski (that the author does not intend to write himself), and a three page reflection on the Polish cult of Pope John Paul II. Interestingly the collection contains one text already familiar to "Historical Sociology" readers – a variation of the paper on the Communist sociotechnics published in the 2/2011 issue.

To assess such a wide-ranging collection of papers is by no means an easy task, especially when they are – as in case of the Kula's book – impressionistic essays rather than systematic studies. Of course, certain criteria apply even to essays, while the brief yet programmatic introduction enables us to pose the question whether the author managed to follow the approach he proposed.

The general impression after reading the essay is mostly positive. One must appreciate the author's erudition and his broad yet detailed knowledge on such distant subject as Polish political life during the interwar period or urban development, both in Europe and overseas. The most interesting texts seem to be those dealing with topics best suited for the essayistic form, such as the reflection on the idea of modernization, or suggestions for a possible book on Piłsudski, which exemplify Kula's qualities as a remarkable figure of Polish intellectual life – his ability to see things ignored by the dominant (i.e. right-wing and nationalist) perspective and his disregard for nationalist mythology. On the other hand, sometimes – as in the case of the text on rock music – Kula seems to be reaching

the very limits of his professional expertise. All in all, as a collection of historical (I would not dare to say: historical-sociological) essays the book is indeed attractive and worth reading.

The question of the actual relation of the essays to historical sociology and in particular to the ambitious program outlined in the introduction is quite another matter. In my opinion the answer to it is positive in the case of those papers that concentrate on concepts and ideas, such as the already mentioned pieces on the idea of modernization. Those dealing with "harder" phenomena, such as migration and urban development still offer interesting, sociologically relevant observations, and often illuminating impressions. But do they add to more general knowledge, as the author's concept of historical sociology suggests? In my opinion in order to offer sociologically relevant knowledge on those "harder" phenomena one should use precise conceptual instruments and employ careful, disciplined analysis. An example of a text in which the author's approach turns out to be counterproductive is the essay on national culture. The very idea of "national culture" purposefully conflates a few different concepts: the word "culture" as a symbol of usually abstract and rarely well-defined spiritual values, culture as production and consumption of art (mostly perceived as a supposed transmitter of the former), as well as culture as a medium of communication. In the case of academic writings they all blend with the all-embracing, anthropological concept of culture typical for mid-twentieth century cultural anthropology. As a result, any serious attempt to deal with the national culture issue must start (and may probably end) with disassembling the concept. Otherwise – as in case of Kula's essay – it turns into an idle presentation of examples that prove the obvious fact that the term "national culture" is a mere political symbol. Using examples from various epochs and region, disregarding temporal and geographical diversity and without taking into account their specific social contexts, which appears in some of the papers, including those on capital cities movements or migrations, was by no means problematical in their original publication or conference context. I have the impression that some conceptual refinement would turn the reflection on the twentieth century as an age of thinking people into an entirely different text too. Still, what seemed appropriate in individual texts, published individually, among more conventional studies in scholarly journals or conference proceedings, looks much more problematic in a collection of essays entitled "Pages from Historical Sociology" – even when the reader employs a less ambitious idea of historical sociology as a social science discipline that respects particular historical contexts of the studied subjects and realizes the spatial and temporal limits of its own findings.

All in all, Kula's book forms a fine collection of well written and insightful historical essays, full of novel facts and observations, often offering the readers interesting and sometimes not at all obvious thoughts and insights. On the other hand its title seems to be to some extent misleading, and the readers do not get what they are expecting. This is not because "Pages from Historical Sociology" are not sociological enough, but rather because some of the topics would better serve a more intellectual discipline and more analytical approach – at least when they are dealt with not in dispersed papers, but in one, more or less coherent book.

Jarosław Kilias

Jan Čermák: *Kalevala Eliase Lönnrota a Josefa Holečka v moderní kritické perspektivě*. Prague: Academia, 2014, 1116 pages

During the last two decades science has entered into a wide interdisciplinary – one could almost say post-disciplinary – phase. Many topics of study form part of more than one scientific discipline, leading to a differentiation in the original sciences. The recently reviewed edition of The Kalevala can be placed not only at the intersection between literary science and folklore, but also the sociology of literature, or possibly historical sociology of text. Other areas that could be considered are general narratology or the sociology of knowledge (in this case

traditional). Undoubtedly there are other fields of science which could address the issue of cultural artefacts of this type. These could include cultural anthropology with an emphasis on the relationship between orality and literacy, or written, as well as the ethnography of reading, focusing on cultural specificity.

The new edition of The Kalevala, by the Czech linguist Jan Čermák, comprises several approaches. The edition itself is presented in a traditional format and this is for several reasons. At first glance it is surprisingly hefty so this is not a matter of an easy read and a "fat" book cannot easily be placed on a bedside table. I stress that I am not being ironic here. Standard practice dictates that the typeface used for the book is Preissig Antiqua, created by the painter, graphic artist and typographer Vojtěch Preissig (1873–1944). Furthermore it is decorated using illustrations by the famous Finnish painter Aksel Gallen-Kallela (1865–1931), whose art focused on Finnish mythology in a style that moves between realism and art nouveau. Still on the topic of the formal page, the edition is hardback with a sleeve. This is certainly not a paperback. Summa summarum – The Kalevala is actually a bibliophile edition. We should also mention the author of the introduction in the new Czech Kalevala, Markéta Hejkalová. She is a writer, Finnish translator and member of the PEN International club.

The original translation by the classic Czech writer Josef Holeček (1853–1929) complements this antique appearance. This exponent of realism and ruralism in literature learned Finnish and in 1894 published The Kalevala in Czech. Holeček's translation remained unchanged in further Czech editions of this Finnish cultural jewel [1953, 1980, 1999]. However the Anglicist and Finno-Ugric specialist Jan Čermák, currently the latest editor, provides the "foreign" translation with a rich critical commentary, notes to the text and a wide ranging study on the origins and structure of the epic based on modern research. The result is an unusually voluminous publication which can, without a doubt hold its own in the international field of the study of heroic epics. The editor Jan Čermák chose to keep the original translation by the writer Josef Holeček due to its excellence, rich vocabulary and accuracy. The editor of the new edition has provided detailed notes to the text showing possible deviations from the original. This demonstrates that nearly the majority of translators cannot adhere strictly to the original text. In this context it could almost be said that The Kalevala could also act as a text book for the theory of translation.

It may also be worth adding that Jan Čermák to some extent takes on the role of commentator, mediator and performer. He has already published a translation and critical presentation of the Anglo-Saxon epic Beowulf, the only manuscript dating back to the year 1000. It was while comparing the epic Beowulf and The Kalevala that he realised that both works represent the result of a long creative oral process culminating at the end with an imaginary "last singer": the anonymous creator of Beowulf and the Finnish revivalist Elias Lönnrot. Čermák maintains that although the two texts are very different in many ways and far apart in terms of age, nevertheless it is possible to use comparisons between the two in order to gain a better understanding of the circumstances surrounding the creation and structure of this genre. According to Čermák, Beowulf, which is a sixth of the size of the Kalevala, is unique: the manuscript does not exist in any other form. The Anglo-Saxon tradition did not last long. Beowulf was also heavily influenced by monastic culture as well as trying to accommodate a pre-Christian, mystical period. In the case of The Kalevala we do not find such a strong Christian influence. Moreover Catholic hagiography did not take root in Finland for long, the growth of the Lutheran reformation dissolved the Catholic cult of saints. In Karelia orthodoxy prevailed.

In the analysis of the heroic epic the concept of bricolage peeps somewhat impishly from behind the scenes. This concept is mainly connected with the social anthropologist and mythologist, Claude Levi-Strauss. Bricolage means do-it-yourself in terms of structural improvisation, shifting terms of reference, fixing and mending. It even includes veering from the original plot, using scraps, assembling etc. Nevertheless in general the result tends to be

professional, virtuosic, unique. At the end of the day these creative steps are applicable to all human activity. Even Elias Lönnrot, creator of the literary version of The Kalevala could not avoid some do-it-yourself when reconstructing this complicated multi-layered work. He created a single narrative structure of the epic by combining several variations and omitting irrelevant verses. Basically he codified oral literature. To a certain extent he used Homer's epics as a template for his work.

I will only make brief remarks on the work itself and will certainly not narrate the contents of which there are many other variations apart from the fixed literary form. Firstly I propose that The Kalevala shows a lesser representation of the heroic element. If we were to summarise then The Kalevala is the birthplace of the main heroes of the work which are Väinämöinen the fortune-teller, Ilmarinen the skilful blacksmith and Lemminkäinen, the womaniser. These heroes embark on a search for adventures which mainly take place in the northern kingdom of Pohjola. The Kalevala is set in a period of time stretching from the "beginning of the world" to the birth of Christ.

In Finnish-Karelian runes heroic battles play a much lesser role than so called "worldly occupation". For example the aim of an epic fight takes place in order to gain and take control of the Sampo mill which gives abundance. In short heroism is replaced by magic. The hero is more likely to wield spells than a sword and even then we are not talking about some young gun but rather a wise old man. There is further evidence of a certain idealisation of the shaman figure, which may lead to a consideration of shaman legends and the "role" of the shaman. However one of the main protagonists, Väinämöinen does not appear in the role of shaman – as a hunter of souls, he is only accompanied by magic.

The Kalevala should also be studied in terms of the myth-folkloric continuum. I have found it contains motifs which are characteristic of mythical cultural heroes. In the majority of the different versions about the sea voyages of the wounded Väinämöinen we find the cosmogonical myth about the creation of the world from the eggs carried by a duck, placed on the knee of this hero. It is told that a duck or a goose lays golden eggs into a copper nest on his knee. The eggs fall into the water and break into pieces. Väinämöinen magically turns the lower part of the eggshell into the earth and the top part becomes the sky, the yolk becomes the sun and the white the moon. The rest of the eggshells turns into stars and clouds. Clearly here we can identify the universal creation myth of the cosmic egg. Elsewhere a mythical prehistoric bird carries eggs on to a ship, to an island, to an elevated hillock etc.

Within the plot of this epic there are also allusions to the cosmic hunt of the elk, considered the guardian of the forest animals. Sometimes the hunt for the elk is carried out on skis made of sacred wood. Incidentally this plot also appears among smaller ethnic groups in Siberia: The Evenks, Khakas, Yakuts and Altays. Victory over a mythical or demonic creature is considered to be the first task of a young hero. As we can see the elk also functions on a cosmic scale.

In the Finnish-Karelian epic cosmogonical topics and motifs about the creation and population of the earth feature heavily. There are runes about the origin of things, the mythical origin of animals (for example the elk and the bear), about the discovery of fire and metal, creation of tools etc. Runes of an etiological nature do not deal with tribal leaders, warrior castes, there is no talk of ethnic identity or early states. The Kalevala creates literary strands where narrative is mixed with love poems, magical songs, spells and enchantments. The Kalevala is not an easy read, it is necessary to contend with so called cultural ambivalence where something appears thus and thus at the same time. At the same time one must not exclude the issues of monstrosity, hyperbole and gigantism.

The Kalevala contributed to the development of Finnish folklore which then significantly influenced the study of folklore. Researchers of world literature and folklore include the aforementioned Elias Lönnrot, also Julius Krohn (1835–1888) and his son Kaarle Krohn (1863–1933) and last but not least Antti Aarne (1867–1923) and Lauri Honko (1932–2002). During their research these researchers also studied the migration of plots and motifs using

a historical-geographical method. Kaarle Krohn's publication on The Kalevala (five-part *Kalevalastudien,* 1926–1928) should be considered as a reference book not just for Lönnrot's original. It was Krohn who accurately captured the etiological and magical character of Finnish runes (*Magische Unsprungsrunen der Finnen*, 1923). It would not be possible to carry out research on The Kalevala without these publications.

The presumed orality merits more attention since The Kalevala was performed as "loud" singing, and not "quiet" reading. Single chapters in The Kalevala are considered as runes which means a "song" relating to a single thematic plot. The Finnish term "runo" means "song" or "poem". Obviously this is a case of hypothetical assumptions on the performance of runes by singers based on relatively scarce knowledge or comparison with other ethnic groups. Furthermore it is not possible for us today to precisely imagine a performance of The Kalevala or other epics, presumably the whole could not have been presented in one single performance due to the limitations of human memory.

In order to assist memory the so called Kalevala verse was used. Only professional or semi-professional singers would have been able to manage this rhythmic speech. I would like to point out that a very thought-provoking study was carried out by Anna-Leena Siikala into the singing, customs and physical practices of the singers (*Body, Performance and Agency in Kalevala Rune-Singing*, in: Oral Tradition, 15/2, 2000: 255–278).

It is also important to note that Elias Lönnrot brings up the serious scientific problem of the textualisation of oral tradition. This is also connected to contextualisation based on the impact of nationhood and nationalism. In short it is a question of transforming oral poetry and a heroic epic into a textual discourse on nationalism and representing orality in the written form.

On the whole the new edition of The Kalevala graphically illustrates its influence on Finnish culture in creating a Finnish-Ugric ethnic identity. Last but not least, the heroic epic Kalevala, undoubtedly fulfils the essential desiderata necessary to be considered, according to Goethe's interpretation, as a supreme work of world literature.

Bohuslav Šalanda

***Dennis Smith v Ljubljani: s prispevki Avgusta Lešnika, Marka Kržana in Polone Fijavž / Dennis Smith in Ljubljana: with contributions by Avgust Lešnik, Marko Kržan and Polona Fijavž.* Ljubljana: Znanstvena založba Filozofske fakultete Univerze v Ljubljani, 2014, 154 pages**

Dennis Smith develops a brilliant panoramic of the current financial crisis in the European Union which is far from over, arguing what he calls "humiliation" of all the countries – without exception – that form part of the EU. With the collaboration of Avgust Lešnik, Marko Kržan and Polona Fijavž, Smith also clarifies what is the role of historical sociologists in this important fact.

In the lecture given by him in Ljubljana in 2014; past, present and future of the EU are treated carefully. In Smith's words, the future of this crisis is being decided on the margins and the only recipe to the European Intellectuals who wants to take part in this process of decision-making is to face the European truth that is "lived" on the peripheries (mainly Greece and Ireland). He reminds us that, the Humiliation does not stem from our cultural incompatibility, it is spreading across the EU, in its core and on the borders, attached to the only true motor of the current progressive demise; the global dictate of the capital.

To understand better the situation of Europe and its financial crisis, Smith arises two main metaphors based in children's stories. The first one is the well known "Hansel and Gretel". It is a story of a wicked witch who deceives and betrays two hapless infants. By "witch" he means bankers and financiers and instead of "hapless infants" he sees employers, workers, consumers and small investors. Hansel and Gretel pushed the witch into her over and made their escape. In this point, Smith argues that in reality, the bankers and the financiers have largely survived, with

a few bruises, mostly temporary. The second story is "The three little pigs", in this case the pigs are countries such as Portugal, Spain, Greece and Ireland. Ravenous wolves in the global market destroyed their badly built dwellings. Smith is right saying; "these predators huffed and puffed and blew the pigs".

The author talks about the struggles in Europe comparing the writers Jürgen Habermas and Ulrich Beck, who have both put their minds in this topic. In Beck's thought, we baldly assert that what is good for Germans economy is right for the European economy as a whole and beyond. The austerity programmes have only intensified the economic crisis in Europe, leading to the opposite of what was intended. In short, Beck talks about the plague of German "euro-nationalism". In this case, Habermas is not agreeing and prefer to talk about "executive federalism". He thinks that political austerity in Europe is gradually becoming less brutal and hierarchical. He places great hopes on the learning being done by Europe's political elites, as their constitutional lawyers educate them to be more cosmopolitan-minded. Nevertheless, both authors are agree in that we need to factor two crucial agents of change: governments, who are able to deploy the massive military, judicial and tax-gathering power to the state and big business with enormous financial, technological and persuasive characteristics.

Smith highlights two keys to understand the development of the European Union. The first one is the triad that links together the state, big business and ordinary citizens, but the question is; which kind of citizenship will have priority in the programmes of government, will it be what might be called "market citizenship" or will be "social citizenship"? The second key is the relationship between European Union and United States. The present crisis and the future of the European Union are a mirror of the American Civil War and the development of the United States. In both cases there is a framework of governance struggling to contain two opposite forms of political economy, there is a clash between property rights and human rights, there is hypocrisy, corruption, and some fanaticism as well.

Dennis Smith narrates the "European story" as two sequences; the first one is established between 1939–89 and is defined by catharsis, genesis and sclerosis. "Catharsis" refers to the period between 1939 and 1945 where three different interests and ideologies (German Nazism, Russo-Chinese communism and American capitalist democracy) killed at least 60 million people, probably half of them from Europe. The war and its aftermath make a deep impact in the European population and after 1940 people were ready to build peace rather than violence. Coming up next, the author sees the "Genesis", United States planted its tanks on west European land and turned Europe's bloody warriors chiefs into servile courtiers, as Norbert Elias's description, state formation in early modern Europe began with the establishment of strong centralizing royal courts. In 1951 The Coal and Steel Community led the European Community and therefore becomes a West European club giving its members a field of action that excluded ruthless economic protectionism. During these years the club's membership doubled. Going back to the story, in 1945 the highpoint of America pride and European submission arrived with a US-led victory subsequently reinforced by French and British humiliation in Dien Bien Phu, Algeria and Suez between 1954 and 1962. The tables changed when the US was unable to enforce its will in Vietnam, and had to accept the delight of many European intellectuals. Ultimately the period of "Sclerosis", during 1970s Europeans desired the peace at all costs and preferred to buy their way out of trouble rather than change their ways. As a result, they lost their flexibility and capacity to adapt. After that time, Brussels was knocked by two massive events; the "big bang" (1986), which opened up the City of London to American finance houses, developing the creation of a vast reservoir of public and private borrowing capacity, fuelling and funding the ambitious of politicians and consumers and second of all, the collapse of the Soviet Union, which meant the end of the Gold war and the re-unification of Germany.

The second sequence would be since 1989 and in this case the author splits it in hubris, nemesis and crisis. After 1989, business lobbyists

were promoting packages for providing healthcare education, management services and other functions in order to help the vacuum left. In the other hand, the EU set itself a very ambitious target: to be a disciplined and dynamic business-friendly economy: to be a post-humiliation polity for citizens, not just for governments; to build appropriate structures and systems to achieve these objectives; and to do all this while expanding its memberships, bringing in as many as possible of the countries "released" by the crumbling of the "socialist bloc", in Smith's eyes we are talking about "Hubris". The author follows his historical sequence with "Nemesis" in which the aftermath of the American-led wars plus Obama's lack of track record and the collapse of Lehman brothers were major background factors that contributed to the loss of financial confidence in September 2008, triggering the precipitate collapse of the vast international mountain of debt and the Eurozone crisis. "Crisis" is the last step of this route; banks on both sides of the Atlantic stopped lending to each other, taking massive amounts of liquidity out of the system. In consequence, many mortgages were foreclosed and national governments stepped in where they could to recapitalize the banks, increasing the own national debts. The cuts in public sector were imminent. The creation of a large amount of unemployment, especially in young people was the main cause of many protests. They have experienced being victims of humiliation.

In the wake of the crisis, a sharp distinction in EU between two types of political economy was clear, one of them operating in the "market" (Germany and UK) and another one oriented to serve "the people" (Greece and Italy). To understand better this period Smith designs one more classification in which as a chessboard he describes the struggles and collaborative relationships in the EU (after 2008) through 4 types of elites; "High priests" which represent the European Commission; "Puritans" or in other words, ordo-liberals mainly in Frankfurt and Berlin; "Cavaliers" formed by political clientelism in countries such as Italy, Romania and Hungary; and "Buccaneers" with neo-liberals in London. His point of view is clear, four political struggles are currently under way within the EU, in this point Smith raises the following question; so where that leave us? In his opinion, the EU is stuck in a rut due to the visceral conflict and pragmatic cooperation between elites. He argues that, the continuing low level of trust between member states inhibits serious movement towards internal reforms that would sharply increase economic growth, reduce high unemployment, improve wage levels and restore lost ground in the realm of social rights. The most effective way forward would be to overcome the structural incongruities between the EU's two political economies, one focussed on the rights of property in the market place, the other promising to protect human rights within a democratic polity.

Prof. Smith continues his speech now talking about America. Two bank panics (1857 and 2008) were instigated by the banks themselves, trying to protect their capital in the wake of a speculative boom fed by easy credit. This situation led to a sharpening of socio-political decisions, a spasm of uncertainty, as implications for the existing balance of power were considered. The United States added twenty-one new states in the seventy years after 1791, increasing the number of "voices" in the council. As in the Europe's case, the author uses the same characters but now applied in antebellum America; now "High priests" are southern planter elites; the "Puritans" would be northern abolitionists; the "Cavaliers" represented by fire-eaters or in other words, lawyers with military background; and "Buccaneers" defined by northern big business.

In conclusion, Dennis Smith proposes three possible future scenarios. The first option in which the EU will become an arena of resentment and revenge that could lead to a process of secession and fragmentation. Smith point out that in the hypothetic case that SYRIZA may enter government a very sizeable minority would be ready to consider leaving the Eurozone. We can add the fact that in January 2015, the head of SYRIZA, Alexis Tsipras, reached the prime minister position being the most voted party. Meanwhile the UK, between a third and half of MPs in the Conservative party would support Britain

leaving the EU as well. This is not that far from reality if popular hostility to immigrants became so great that throughout Europe voters demand a return to strong national border controls. The second scenario argues that the wake of austerity business lobbyists in national capitalists and in Brussels will press hard to ease the way for corporate capital to invest heavily in services traditionally provided by governments in the public sector. At the same time, they are likely to lobby for a lowering of standards (less bureaucracy), which still mean lower costs and higher profits but worse services and a dilution of social rights. The last forecast says that citizens may be brought to recognize that big business is acquiring increasing influence and control over their lives while their own influence through the workings of national parliamentary democracy is being gradually reduced. The author sees this idea as a serious challenge but a positive move in the direction of reducing the structural contradictions between big government and big business that are a major cause of sclerosis within the European economy.

In the second chapter of the book, the main concept switches from European Crisis to Historical Sociology. Avgust Lešnik performs a short view of Dennis Smith and his role in this field of study. Smith is considered one of the most renowned names of historical sociology and one of its founders. His work is an indispensable reference for scientists and researches but, what is historical sociology for him? Smith believes that, this discipline tries to make sense of the past (and present) by investigating how societies work and change. He defines the interest of historical sociologists as exploration and investigation of the mechanisms that could be subject to change in certain societies or their reproduction.

Smith develops a classification with two waves in historical sociology. The first wave began in the mid-eighteenth century in Britain and France. It was driven by the need to make sense of contemporary political events. This wave finally crashed against the wall of totalitarism in the late 1920s (Montesquieu, Hume, Tocqueville, Marx, Durkheim and Weber). Smith divides the second wave in three phases; the first one, before the mid-1960s, was built by the battle with totalitarism (Tatcott Parson and T. H. Marshall); the second one, from 1960 to 1980, is a period that contributed to protest movements for student rights, Black power, the end to the Vietnam War, inequality and resistance movements and women's rights (Marc Bloch, Norbert Elias, Barrington Moore, E. P. Thompson, Tilly and Skocpol); and the last phase that began in the mid-1970s and is developed under the impact of the fragmentation of the stable bi-polar world of the Cold War (Anderson and Wallerstein).

After this classification Smith emphasize that historical sociologists have the chance to give their fellow citizens knowledge and skills that may help them to assess competing views about what is "possible" or "impossible". In brief, historical sociology can be a positive force for democratic citizenship.

The book ends with two interviews done by Marko Kržan and Polona Fijavž in which Dennis Smith accentuates, one more time, the concept of humiliation in the European Union. In his opinion, the politics of the EU over the next decade are almost going to be influenced by the humiliating experiences that have been endured by all populations. He points out two main factors regarding this "humiliating experiences". The first one is about the widespread political effects of powerful emotions such as anger, fear and sorrow, these emotions can conclude in aggressive measures by different groups. The second factor says that the population that have become cynical about Brussels may be vulnerable to ethno-nationalist programmes proclaimed by demagogic politicians.

In his speech, Smith remarks that humiliation is a shared emotion and we are all experiencing it, we need collectively analyze what is happening to us to begin to talk about the problem openly. Smith argues that, this is not a problem that Brussels can solve for us; this is a problem that we have to solve for ourselves. In the last question of Polona Fijavž, Smith underscores the obligations of all populations saying that people have to be careful if they do not take themselves strong, dynamic, civilized, democratic and with a sense of purpose again. If

they do not remember that they are about something more than economics, more than individual profit. He ends up by reminding that we are about creating communities that are committed to making life worth living for all their members.

To conclude this review, I consider this short book as a brilliant and concentrates description of the current situation of the European Union explaining the past and present and even giving future scenarios of what can be the EU in a few years. The author plays all over the text with metaphors that make easier and understandable for the reader to follow his arguments. His clear view shows us a problematic situation (humiliation) where in his opinion all countries have been affected and therefore they play an essential role in order to solve it. We can perceive how Smith invites the lector to make a personal reflexion in order to understand the gravity of the situation. We are being humiliated and this is the time to do something in respect, something to revive the initial essence of the European Union.

Esther Martos

Jacques Le Goff: *Must We Divide History Into Periods?* Columbia University Press, 2015, 184 pages

Many basic aspects of human culture are closely related to the fact that people have to live their lives in time. In fact, the very act of colonizing time is amongst the foundations of all modern civilizations and societies. We are struggling to make sense of the endless timeflow, that we have no choice but to inhabit, in order to interpret the changes and continuities, and to attach meanings and interpretations to events in our shared and private pasts. Dividing time and history into different periods is amongst the most crucial activities in this sense-making effort.

Eminent French historian Jacques Le Goff (1924–2014) dedicated his 2013 essay precisely to the topic of periodization of history. This text had to become the very last work that he was able to prepare for publication himself. It is not very long, but highly inspirational, neat and sharp, filled with expertise, and not far from being even provocative. The essay is composed of seven chapters and aims to answer a simple but important question: "Is history really divided into parts?"

In order to provide his answer, Le Goff starts with ancient periodizations of the Old Testament and early Christianity. In his approach to periodization of history, Saint Augustine uses six ages of human individual development, from infancy to the old age. According to Le Goff, the world of the Middle Ages is therefore filled with pessimism, stemming from the phrase *mundus senescit* – world is getting old. In this worldview, there was no place for any explicit notion of progress, until the middle of 18th century. However, Le Goff dedicates much of his effort to show that there were some signs of the "progressivist" interpretation of historical development already present in the Middle Ages.

In the second chapter, Le Goff discusses the birth of the concept of "Middle Ages" in the 14th century. It was used to delimit certain distance from the previous age, which was seen as somehow a "middle" epoch between the idealized antiquity and a new era, which had yet to come. Any historical periodization, the author reminds us, is very often ideological, as it provides an interpretation and evaluation of the historical development. Periodization is inherently artificial and provisional, for it also changes itself in time.

The need for historical periodization, in Le Goff's perspective, results from the establishment of historical education at schools and universities, and he provides a review of these processes in the third chapter. Surprisingly, teaching history is quite a late achievement, and the subject of history was not widely taught until the end of 18th century. Then, during the 19th century, Jules Michelet's work gave birth to the contemporary conception of the Middle Ages as a dark age, defined in contrast with the later period of "Renaissance", being (supposedly) the time of growing enlightenment, reason and humanism.

From the fourth chapter onwards, Le Goff proceeds to one specific aim of the essay,

showing that such an approach to the Middle Ages and so-called Renaissance is not correct. This is the provocative aspect of the reviewed essay, which I have mentioned earlier. Le Goff argues that in fact, the "Renaissance" was not a specific historical period itself. Rather, we should speak of a "long Middle Age", which is delimited by the late antiquity (3rd to 7th century) and mid-18th century (publication of *Encyclopaedia* in France). Le Goff discusses many aspects of the so-called Renaissance, sometimes to show that they were neither groundbreaking nor historically new, including the orientation towards reason and the centrality of human individual. The Renaissance is, in his eyes, certainly an important era, which is to be seen as specific and important, but it was not in any case marked with profound social or economic transformations. In other words, there are more continuities between the Middle Ages and the"Renaissance", than there are differences. The Western "long Middle Ages" should be seen as a continual period following the fall of Rome, which includes several different renaissances, some of them longer and some of them shorter, sometimes more and sometimes less profound or influential (and the period we are used to call "the Renaissance" is just the last one in a row, and perhaps the most prominent). Rather than being a separate period itself, theRenaissance is an era when certain traits of the new modern period started to manifest themselves, including phenomena like fashion, colonization, national languages, or dietary customs.

In the brief conclusion, titled "Periodization and Globalization", Le Goff dedicates several paragraphs to the contemporary discussions about "world history". He does not advocate the elimination of historical periods from historical thought, but he proposes to combine them with Braudel's concept of *la longue durée*. Historical periodization can only be conceived in relation to certain civilizational areas, and studies in world history should then aim to uncover similarities between periods in different cultural contexts.

I stumbled upon Le Goff's essay just exactly at the time when I was trying to wrap my thoughts about something that I have provisionally called "ethno-historiography", in relation to analysis of oral history interviews, which is part of my doctoral thesis. Periodization seems to be a profound part of the "ethno-historiography" in oral histories. For instance, interview participants naturally and simply refer to general "pre-war", "war" and "post-war" periods. They seem to know what they are talking about, the knowledge is self-evident, and the basic structure does not only function for time periodization, but inseparably also as the basis for plot development and life story dynamics. Ruptures between the periods are moving the narrative forwards. Outbreak of the war and the liberation several years later mark the borders of the three periods, even though these events often took time on more or less different dates than the political historiography is teaching us. In other words, it is probably very natural and routine approach to past time, at least in Western society, to divide history into periods, and ordinary people themselves tend to do it when they are asked to speak about the(ir) past. There is a certain parallelism of the "great history" and "personal history"; people narrate their pasts on the background of political events, and historians sometime narrate history personified in the story of one person. Individual and collective dimension of human lives merge, as the very distinction is transcended through imagination and metaphors. Le Goff's essay does not really discuss any of these issues, but it provides basis for such discussions. As I have mentioned earlier, the text starts with the ancient approaches to periodization of history, and amongst the very influential periodizations is Saint Augustine's conception of history according to the human individual development. Le Goff also acknowledges (albeit marginally) that periodization had become a rule not only for Western historians, but also for anyone else who is providing an account of the past.

Jacques Le Goff's last work is indeed a thought-provoking and inspirational text, rooted in deep knowledge of secondary literature not only from historiography, but also philosophy (Kristeller, Ricoeur) and historical sociology (Elias). It is a respectable finale of the long and fruitful career of the great scholar,

perhaps one of the most important historians of the 20th century. Even though the essay is meant as a contribution to an expert historiographical debate, it is a pleasure to read even for a non-historian, and – in my opinion – deserves to be read by sociologists, anthropologists, philosophers and everyone else, who share some kind of interest in different human ways of conquering and grasping the times that people have lived through.

Jakub Mlynář

Historical Sociology as a Study Program at Charles University in Prague

In 2009, the *Department of Historical Sociology at the Faculty of Humanities at Charles University in Prague* began teaching a master's degree study program in historical sociology in the Czech language. This program aims to provide training for specialists with a focus on long-term social processes and trends in relevant research activities. Thematically, it deals with modernization and social change, religious and cultural pluralism, the forming of states and nations, globalization trends and effects, and integrating and disintegrating processes. The study program lasts two years and applications are accepted from those with bachelor degrees, subsequent to a written entrance examination. In the academic year 2012/2013 the teaching of this program in English commenced, and at the same time a doctoral studies program opened in Czech and English.

The study program has been conceived to reflect the contemporary state of the field, to react to ongoing academic controversies and monitor current research trends. The program is based on the assumption that historical sociology includes both classical authors (Marx, Weber, Elias etc.) and significant current personalities (Eisenstadt, Tilly, Skocpol, Mann, Wallerstein). It has its own professional journals (The *Journal of Historical Sociology*, originated in 1988, the Czech journal *Historická Sociologie*, from 2009), expert forums, and representation within the *International Sociological Association* ISA (*Working group 02 Historical and Comparative Sociology*). It also boasts an extensive scientific literature, a range of textbooks (Abrams 1982; Skocpol 1985; Smith 1991; Szakolczai 2000; Bühl 2003; Schützeichel 2004; Romanovsky 2009; Lachmann 2013), and works of an encyclopedic nature (Delanty – Isin 2003). In the Czech Republic there have been several recent notable publications about historical sociology (Šubrt 2007; Arnason 2009; Havelka 2010; Šubrt – Arnason 2010; Arnason 2010) and it is also represented in the *Czech Sociological Association* (*Section of Historical Sociology*).

The conception of teaching in the program underlines the fact that historical sociology cannot be understood as a hybrid of history and sociology. It is a discipline based on the assumption that the general subject of sociology is historical, spatio-temporally determined, social reality. The adoption of this ontological assumption has implications for both social theory and the strategies of sociological research, because both should be oriented not only to analyzing the present, but the past. In accordance with this premise, therefore, historical sociology cannot be defined as a special sociological discipline, but as a specific theoretical and methodological perspective relevant for general sociology and special sociological studies. It is a specialization strongly focused on long-term social processes, as well as analysis of the distinctives and commonalities of different historical periods.

The courses taught at the Faculty of Humanities at Charles University can be divided into three basic blocks. The first, theoretical-historical block, offers courses dedicated to general theoretical conceptions of historical sociology, and civilizing analysis, as well as the perspectives offered by historical sociology on the issues of knowledge, culture, religions, nations, nationalism, economics, politics, law, democracy and everyday life. The second, methodological-research block, familiarizes students with the basic approaches and problems of sociological, and to an extent historical, methodology. The explanation of research methods and techniques is focused on archival research and the application of quantitative and qualitative methodologies in areas such as oral history, grounded theory, discourse analysis, case studies, and secondary data analysis. The third block is characterised by selection and specialization. Its core consists of three optional subject areas: (1) the theory of social change and modernization processes, (2) the historical sociology of culture and the quotidian and (3) the historical sociology of politics and international relations. To these optional subjects students can supplement others offered by the Faculty of Humanities.

The above-described education in historical sociology is envisaged to prepare students, both

in terms of knowledge and essential practical skills, for the future exercise of their professions, whether in the academic or general sphere (offices, agencies, educational institutions, consulting firms, editors, etc.). The study program is designed so that students acquire a relatively broad set of professional bases which can be used in various types of employment with information of a socio-historical nature. Graduates should be skilled in seeking out information and accessing it, able to treat, evaluate, compare and analyse it using quantitative and qualitative approaches. They should also have an expansive intellectual outlook and be able to put the issues they deal with and the dilemmas they encounter into a broader, especially socio-historical, context.

The teaching of historical sociology at the Faculty of Humanities offers a subject of study that is not only diverse and internally differentiated, but that seeks to develop a general theory, and that contains a number of special theories, covers a range of specialized directions, and conducts research on the empirical level. Its study is neither narrowly professionally oriented nor based on any one theory or method. In the theoretical part emphasis is placed on the multi-paradigmatic nature of the field, while the research area emphasises the pluralism of methodological approaches. Interdisciplinary overlaps into other fields are also a feature, primarily in history, but also in anthropology, political science and economics.

Jiří Šubrt

Unique Collection of Interviews with Armenian Genocide Witnesses and Survivors is Available at the Charles University in Prague

Malach Center for Visual History at the Faculty of Mathematics and Physics at the Charles University in Prague was founded in 2009 as a licensed access point to USC Shoah Foundation's Visual History Archive. This audio-visual archival resource allows researchers to watch more than 53,000 oral history interviews with genocide survivors and witnesses, mostly people who have survived the Holocaust (Shoah). From 1994 to 2000, the former Survivors of the Shoah Visual History Foundation collected interviews with Jews, Roma and Sinti, but also political prisoners or homosexuals who were persecuted by the Nazi regime during the World War II. The videotaped interviews were later digitized and catalogued. In 2006, the first version of "Visual History Archive" (VHA) website was launched, to be made available at licensed access points across the world at universities, memorials, museums etc. The website provides users with useful search tools, necessary for a collection of such scale and extension, including people names database of nearly 1.8 million names, biographical information search, places search, and also detailed thesaurus of more than 65,000 keywords (such as "liberation-related aid giving", "war crimes trials history" or "ghetto time awareness"). Recorded interviews are stored in VHA in their original uncut form, average length of an interview being 135 minutes. Majority of the interviews (around 50%) are in English language, however, more than 35 other languages are also represented in the VHA (with no subtitles or transcripts available, with the exception of Kinyarwanda and Chinese languages). Apart from the speech and motion picture, historical documents and photographs have been captured on tape with the interviewee's commentary.

Even though the oral history collection started as an effort to capture the life stories of Holocaust survivors and witnesses, the scope widened after the year 2000 to include another similar historical events, like the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, Nanjing massacre in 1937/1938, or the Cambodian genocide of 1960s. In 2013, the first collection of interviews not related to European Holocaust had been published in the Visual History Archive, consisting of 65 interviews with the Rwandan genocide survivors and witnesses (out of estimated total number of 500 individual testimonies). The testimonies, recorded in cooperation with Kigali Genocide Memorial after 2008, follow the same methodology as the initial interviews with Holocaust survivors. Another important addition came in

April 2015, when the first set of interviews with Armenian genocide survivors and witnesses became part of available data.

The beginning of the genocide of Armenians in Ottoman Empire is usually dated to April 24, 1915, and it is estimated that during the following years between one and two million people were murdered. Czech Republic is amongst the 13 states that have officially acknowledged these killings as a genocide, according to the international laws. American director J. Michael Hagopian (1913–2010), who lived through the Armenian genocide himself, started filming interviews with other survivors and witnesses already in the 1970s. In the following decades he managed to collect nearly 400 interviews. He recorded them on 16mm film between 1975 and 2005 for a series of documentary movies. Hagopian, who passed away in 2010 at age 97, produced seventeen films about the Armenian Genocide and Armenians in diaspora, such as "The Forgotten Genocide", and the "Witnesses Trilogy". Near the end of his life, in April 2010, he had provided the collection to USC Shoah Foundation to incorporate it into the VHA. "Victimization and genocide perpetrated and denied in one part of the world can become the breeding ground for greater crimes against humanity in another part of the world," said Dr. Hagopian. "I have felt that it was my responsibility to educate and inform, so that history won't be repeated."

Interviews in the Armenian collection were conducted in 10 countries, primarily in English and Armenian (some of them in rare dialects). The interviewees were between the ages of eight and 29 at the time of the genocide. First set of 60 interviews, available in the VHA now, exemplify the value and uniqueness of the collection. It is mostly composed of survivor testimonies, but researchers can also view five interviews with members of the "second generation", one foreign witness, and one aid-provider. More interviews should be made available gradually over time, as the material is digitized, indexed and catalogued.

The recorded interviews are exceptional even in the USC Shoah Foundation's Visual History Archive itself, by its content as well as extent and form. Vast majority of the Holocaust and Rwandan genocide interviews are complete "life stories" and have been conducted in unified manner, according to the same methodological (and technical) standards. However, this does not apply to the Armenian genocide collection, simply because the primary purpose of the interviews was not oral history. J. M. Hagopian had conducted the interviews for his documentary movies, and it was often in multiple short sessions (sometimes even scattered over several years). Each individual interview may consist of several parts, and only exceptionally is longer than 30 minutes in total. In some cases there is picture without audio. Hagopian would record scenes without sound, knowing that he intended to use picture only from that location. Overall, the new material therefore provides not only valuable personal insights of the genocide survivors, but also a glimpse into the backstage of documentary movie production. From this perspective, the raw footage may be of interest for historians as well as the documentary moviemakers. Normally, these recordings are never seen by outsiders: only edited clips are used in the finished films.

For instance, Aram Zipper Mooshovian was interviewed by Hagopian in February 1981 in California. "Mr. Zipper", filmed in profile, is sitting at his sewing machine and working, while he is narrating about his tailoring business. This setting is very unexceptional for the VHA, and illustrates the specific nature of the Armenian collection. In the cases of Rwanda, Nanjing and of course Shoah, the narrators are focusing on the interview and facing the camera – the purpose of the recording was oral history. "Mr. Zipper", doing his usual tailor work while speaking about his past, is more typical for the documentarist's way of conducting interviews. Several short sections of the interview, which is around 14 minutes long, are audio recording only. The interview itself is a flow of chronologically more or less loose narrative, which is very typical for our every-day stories, which are patched together by topical and "causal" relationships rather than factual chronological sequentiality. We do not learn very much about the genocide itself from this particular interview, but rather about

the history of Armenian community in the United States.

Another example is interview with Alice Shipley (b. 1904), altogether almost 34 minutes long, conducted in April 1985 in Arizona. Sitting behind her typewriter, she narrates her first-hand account of the 1915 Armenian genocide. Starting with incarteration and executions of Armenian intelligence, property and livestock seizures, she goes on to describe how her family had been aided by a civilian aid giver. They went to an American hospital and took refuge there. "Somebody snitched on us and … the Turks came after us," says Alice. "The American chancellor took us to his chancelate, where we remained for three days. His wife wouldn't let us sleep in the house, we had to sleep out in the yard." Her father worked for the British government, and also the fact that their family had "miraculously" stayed together all the time led to some bad faith from other people. "When the Turks began to get after my older brothers and taking them to jail, then we decided it was time for us to leave the country. So we dressed in Kurdish beggar outfits … and walked out during the midnight of August 2nd, 1916." On a photograph shown to the camera, the family is pictured in the fake beggar's clothes. They arrived in Russia via Azerbaijan almost three months later. But their journey did not end there, the family migrated to Great Britain and ultimately to the United States of America. Alice Shipley also published a book about her experiences in 1983, titled *We Walked, Then Ran*.

As we can see from these two examples, the new Armenian collection is a variable and valuable addition to the USC Shoah Foundation's Visual History Archive. It extends its scope along the lines of the USC SF's determination in documenting genocides through the survivors' and witnesses' spoken accounts. But, once we compare the collection of Armenian interviews to the other sections of VHA, it also illustrates the different ways of speaking about the past for different purposes, and the fact that the past is never fully "settled", but rather interactionally negotiated again and again in various contexts. More explicitly than in the case of oral history recordings, the documentary interviewing help to unpack the history-talk as a collaborative production. There is much to be gained from secondary and comparative analysis of the interviews, which is the work that is now just about to commence. Researchers, scholars, students and any interested members of public can access the Visual History Archive, along with other oral history resources, in the Malach Center for Visual History at the Charles University in Prague (http://www.malach-centrum.cz), but also at more than 40 other access points across the world. Part of the testimonies is also available at Visual History Archive Online (http://vhaonline.usc.edu).

Jakub Mlynář

Conference "What's Next for Democratic Capitalism? Social and Systemic Problems of Central European Democracies", 7.– 8. 11. 2014

At the beginning of November 2014 Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw became an extraordinary place where tens of European researchers from various disciplines – that at the long-term make efforts to understand various aspects of capitalist structures established in East and Central Europe in the last twenty five years – had an opportunity to present their findings and discuss them with their colleagues. Put it more specifically, the aim of conference organizers "What's Next for Democratic Capitalism? Social and Systemic Problems of Central European Democracies" was to determine obstacles of democracy development and introduction of market economy, to comment upon structural development specificities of individual states in East and Central Europe, to discuss issues of post-communist capitalist development through the perspective of contradiction between objective mechanisms on the one hand and subjective perceptions of actors on the other, etc. The conference took place in Staszic palace in the capital Warsaw that had been built by Polish duke Stanislaw Staszic; as the result of its destruction during the World War II the palace was rebuilt and currently its architecture contains elements

of Byzantine and neoclassical style. Staszic palace was always meeting place of Polish scientific associations and currently it is the official seat of Polish Academy of Sciences.

Organization of the conference was excellent and information about conference (organizers, programme, contact and accommodation) has been and is still available at the following link: http://conference2014.psych.pan.pl/; active as well as passive participants of the conference who paid conference fee were also given Conference Book with abstracts concerning all contributions at the sessions. The conference was originally initiated by organizational committee of researchers working at the Institute of Psychology affiliated at Polish Academy of sciences by public call. The call addressed various international research institutions and it aimed at various research outputs or comparative studies of social, psychological, economic and political processes resulting from systemic transformation concerning establishment of democratic capitalism in various countries of East and Central Europe. The conference was introduced by four keynote speakers (experienced researchers); professor Gian Vittorio Caprara, professor Radoslaw Markowski, professor Steve Reicher a professor Janusz Reykowski.

Topics that were debated in six sections concerned various problems of capitalist structures: (1) Social Problems of Democratization (five contributions); (2) National Identities and Nationalism (five contributions); (3) Market Economy and Market Failure – Yes. Distortions – Not? (six contributions); (4)Mentality and Attitudes Towards Democracy and Capitalism (five contributions); (5) Social and Political Attitudes, Styles of Life and Well-Being (five contributions); (6) Social and Political Problems of Contemporary Capitalism (five contributions).

Fruitful international and interdisciplinary debates structured in above mentioned elementary six sessions were complemented by two specific sessions related to posters placed in the corridors of Staszic Palace: (1) Citizenship in the Times of Changes (ten contributions) and (2) Migrations and Identities (nine contributions). Working method in these two specific sessions was based on communication between Polish researchers or eventually doctoral students on the one hand and participants of the conference on the other regarding information (research result) placed at the poster. Posters located at various places in the building informed the audience about correlation of civic activity and voting behaviour, the role of self/efficacy and work/related affect in employees, dispositional attribution of company success by the external observers, the relationship between the sense of threat and authoritarian tendencies among university students in Poland, etc.

The most interesting contribution of the first session Social Problems and Democratization was *Politicians and Citizens: Cognitive and Dispositional Predictors of Acceptability of Aggression in Political Life* pronounced by Krystyna Skarzynska (Institute of Psychology, Polish Academy of Sciences). The contribution addressed the issue that there has been increasing discontent about political institutions (parties and politicians). The observed divorce between Polish citizens and politicians (governments) leads to building some negative beliefs about politics, political cynicism and also about acceptability of aggression toward politicians. Krystyna Skarzynska has been looking for relations between all these variables and she has focused on mental structures, such as normative beliefs about appropriateness of aggression in social life, negativistic beliefs about social system (its moral delegitimization) and about politics.

I have also found very interesting the paper read by Elzbieta Wesolowska (Warmia and Mazury University) *Deliberative Democracy and Education. Can We Train People for Conscious Participation?* Analyzing the deliberative debate model as depicted by Amy Gutmann and Denis Thompson, Elzbieta Wesolowska assumes that participation in a deliberation requires numerous intellectual and social skills on the side of the citizens. They should be able to analyze in-depth controversial issues, critically reflect on them, present argumentation and justification for the claims they make, respect opponents and their opinions. First, the cognitive development theories as possible mechanisms of fostering

deliberative skills were presented and second, some empirical data on practical implementation of deliberative debates were summarized.

The second session was dedicated to problems of National Identities and Nationalisms and in this context it is worth to mention speech of Martina Hřebíčková and Sylvie Grof *How We See the Ingroup Sometimes Mirrors How We See Outgroups: Polarization of National Stereotypes in Central Europe*. Authors argumented that context of national stereotypes can be influenced by multiple mechanisms, one of them possible being the polarization or mirroring effect; the effect describes a phenomenon whereby participants from one country rate their typical representative's characteristics as opposite to those typical of representatives from another country of reference. The aim of the research question was to examine polarization of national stereotypes in the Central European region and the sample was based on thousands participants from Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Poland and Slovakia (it rated typical representatives of their own and four other countries using National Character Survey).

At the fourth session Mentality and Attitudes Toward Democracy and Capitalism issues of social justice are highlighted in the paper elaborated by Velina Topalova (Bulgarian Academy of Sciences) *Perceived Social Inequality, Trust and the Feeling of Agency*. In her contribution Velina Topalova pointed to the fact that in the framework of social theories socially corrosive effects of the rising social inequalities have been recently discussed. Main consequence of systemic transformation – which has taken place in European post-communist societies – has been changes in social structure: dramatic social differentiation and social inequality and their impact on the people's mentality and quality of life. Survey data from the international comparative project with the participation of 13 Central-Eastern post-communist countries have been processed to reveal the relationship among the perceived level of social inequality, trust and agency. The results revealed significant negative correlation between perceived social inequality and the feeling of influence on public life and political effectiveness.

Through my sociological perspective the sixth session Social and Political Problems of Contemporary Capitalism has been the most important one and I was particularly impressed by contribution of Wolfgang Scholl (Humboldt University) named *Power, Corruption and Performance in Eastern and Western Europe*. Based on analyses about restrictive use of power and corruption at the personal and at the organizational level, the contribution extends the analysis onto the national culture level. It can be shown that these relations also hold on the national culture level, where corruption mediates the relationship between national cultural and gross national product in a sample of the eighty five most important nations. Within Europe, there are clear distinctions to be seen between Scandinavian, Germanic and Romanic countries in the West and between middle-European and south-eastern European countries from the former Soviet bloc. These distinctions can be further differentiated in terms of culture, corruption and GNP (based on more detailed analyses, causes and remedies were discussed).

I have also found very elucidating the article written by Katarzyna Lis (Nicolaus Copernicus University) called *Category of "Capture" as an Interpretative Tool of Large Corporation Activities under Conditions of Globalization.* The aim of the presentation was to identify dependencies between actions belonging to the communication and organizational strategies of large corporations and the decisions taken by democratic institutions, which may be taken as positive for corporations, interesting explanations can bring a description of large corporation activities in categories of "capture" of subjects, which have become ambassadors of transnational economic organisms. It is argued that vision of consumer action is the illusion of subjectivity, which in fact is only a response to the conditions created by the companies; the most important for them is the assumption that human behaviour is largely (but not entirely) dependent on external situational factors rather than on internal characteristics of individuals. Corporate actors who are able to regulate real factors that influence the actions of individuals, do it in such a way that these actions are seen by the individual as

an autonomous and independent on external circumstances.

It can be concluded that presentations at above mentioned sessions and conference debates contributed to advancement of interdisciplinary knowledge and particularly highlighted various theoretical aspects of post-communist evolution regarding selected aspects of capitalist structures. Despite the fact that results of data collection by means of various methods from different countries were also presented, composition of samples, limited number of countries investigated and disparate issues treated do not constitute sufficient epistemological basis to draw general conclusions concerning major developmental tendencies of capitalistic and democratic system in East and Central Europe.

Lucie Cviklová

Professor Johann Pall Arnason and his Czech Journey*

Professor Johann Pall Arnason celebrated his seventy fifth birthday this year. Johann Arnason is a founding member of the editorial board of *Historical Sociology: A Journal of Historical Social Sciences* and for many years has also been a leading member of the Department of Historical Sociology at the Faculty of Humanities at Charles University in Prague. So, we would like to wish professor Arnason a very happy birthday and good health. We also hope to carry on in the future with a mutually fruitful collaboration on numerous research, publication and educational projects in the broad field of historical sociology. We would also like to take this opportunity to describe Johann Arnason's long and rather adventurous journey into Czech academia in the context of his very rich academic career.

Johann Arnason was born in Iceland in 1940. However he works and lectures mostly in mainland Europe, particularly in the Czech Republic these days. He likes to go back to his home in northern Iceland regularly every summer. Initially, Johann Arnason studied philosophy and history in Prague and Frankfurt in the 1960s. Later he also focused on sociological theory and other social sciences, so today his research approach is very much interdisciplinary. Johann Arnason taught sociology in Heidelberg and Bielefeld from 1972 to 1975, and at La Trobe University in Melbourne, Australia, from 1975 to 2003. He has been a visiting professor at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris, and at the University of Leipzig. He has been also a research fellow of the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung, the Swedish Institute of Advanced Studies, the Kulturwissenschaftliches Institut (Essen), the Lichtenberg-Kolleg in Göttingen and the Max-Weber-Kolleg in Erfurt. Furthermore Professor Arnason carried out ground-breaking research on Japanese modernity during his stay in Japan (1991–1992). Professor Arnason has also been the editor of a journal *Thesis Eleven* for many years. He is now emeritus professor of sociology at La Trobe University in Melbourne and from 2007 to 2015 he has been teaching every winter semester at the Faculty of Humanities, Charles University in Prague.

Professor Arnason's research interests centre on social theory and historical sociology, with particular emphasis on the comparative analysis of civilizations. His most important monographs and publications so far include: *Praxis und Interpretation – Sozialphilosophische Studien* (1988), *The Future that Failed: Origins and Destinies of the Soviet Model* (1993), *Social Theory and Japanese Experience: The Dual Civilization* (1997), *Civilizations in Dispute: Historical Questions and Theoretical Traditions* (2003), *Eurasian Transformations, Tenth to Thirteenth Centuries: Crystallizations, Divergences, Renaissances* (2004, co-edited with Björn Wittrock), *Axial Civilizations and World History* (2005, co-edited with S. N. Eisenstadt and Björn Wittrock), *Domains and Divisions of European History* (2010, co-edited with Natalie Doyle), *The Roman Empire in Context: Historical and Comparative Perspectives* (2011, co-edited with Kurt Raaflaub), *Nordic Paths to Modernity* (2012, co-edited with Björn Wittrock) or *Religion and Politics* (2014, co-edited with Ireneusz Pawel Karolewski). Among the many forthcoming volumes are: *Collapses in the Context: Historical-Sociological Perspectives* (2015, co-edited with Karel Černý) or *Religion and Politics* (2016, co-edited with Milan Hanyš).

Johann Arnason's scholarly work and his large body of written material is renowned internationally, in particular his theory of modernity. For example, Wolfgang Knöbl summed up the "long but successful" development of Arnason's research on modernity in the Thesis Eleven article "In Praise of Philosophy: Johann P. Arnason's Long but Successful Journey Towards a Theory of Modernity" (May 2000, vol. 61, no. 1, pages 1–23) as follows: "There is a clearly discernible thread running through Johann P. Arnason's whole work. Starting with a highly sophisticated discussion of the Marxian

* This issue of the Historical Sociology journal coincides with the 75th birthday of one its editors, Johann Pall Arnason. For this reason the other editor, Nicolas Maslowski, together with the editorial team decided to include in this issue his profile.

term 'praxis' in the 1970s he was increasingly able to link his insights to macro-sociological questions. In the 1980s, focusing particularly on the notions of 'power' and 'culture', he formulated a theory of modernity which challenges the diagnoses of other major contemporary social theorists such as Habermas, Giddens, Castoriadis and others." Another of Wolfgang Knöbl's articles "Contingency and modernity in the thought of J. P. Arnason" published in the European Journal of Social Theory (February 2011 vol. 14, no. 1, pages 9–22) stresses the fact that Johann Arnason's approach to modernity takes contingency into consideration in contrast to other scholars dealing with civilizational analysis: "Arnason's writings succeed in pushing civilizational analysis – most prominently developed by the late Shmuel N. Eisenstadt – in a much-needed direction. Coming from an action-theoretical background in which the creativity of actors is strongly emphasized, Arnason is critical of approaches within civilizational analysis that tend to downplay contingency within historical processes. Especially by focusing on the role of political power and imperial encounters, Arnason demonstrates how civilizational analysis can be further developed in ways that do not automatically assume the linearity and long-term persistence of civilizational paths." One of Arnason's most acclaimed and inventive researches is on Japanese modernity. This has strongly contributed to the development of a more general theory of "multiple modernities" (together with S. N. Eisenstadt). Recently, Jeremy C. A. Smith summed it up in his article "Modernity and civilization in Johann Arnason's social theory of Japan" published in the European Journal of Social Theory (February 2011 vol. 14, no. 1, pages 41–54) as follows: "Johann Arnason's exploration of the historical constellation of East Asia has helped reproblematize the conceptual framework of modernity and civilization. (…) Two areas warrant closer attention: state formation and the institution of capitalism."

However, there has always been an important and higly influential "Czech dimension" in Johann Arnason's literally global journey. The story began in 1959, when the nineteen year old youth from Iceland came to a small spa town called Mariánské Lázně to study an "exotic" Czech language, that he speaks fluently and almost without accent today. Even though Iceland was at that time a strategic member state of NATO during the ongoing Cold war, the then communist Czechoslovakia had a vital student and cultural exchange with that Western island until the late 1960s. At that time Johann Arnason's interest to explore the Eastern block country was motivated mainly by ideology rather than the quest for academic knowledge, that only came some time later. He was a leftist and a young member of the Iceland communist party which was considered to be moderate, since it was often part of many government coalitions in Iceland. While in Czechoslovakia disenchantment with the reality of the communist country had existed for some time. During his studies of philosophy and history at the Faculty of Philosophy and Arts at Charles University in Prague (1960–1966), he was witness to the so called de-stalinization, that had started just after the 22nd Soviet Communist Party congress in 1961. Johann Arnason was also a witness to the officially declared decline of industrial output and the economic crisis in 1962. This was followed by the so called Prague Spring which led to the dramatic events of August 1968 and the ensuing Soviet military invasion. As professor Arnason says today: "Politically, it was a very complicated and complex time. But it was completely awesome and extremely stimulating studying in Prague at that time, especially liberal arts and social sciences."

During his studies in Czechoslovakia, Johann Arnason was strongly influenced by the philosopher Karel Kosík and the phenomenologist Marxist philosopher Jiří Pešek. Johann Arnason recently commented on these influences: "That was a decisive point for my conversion towards a phenomenological reading of Marxism." Besides this, Johann Arnason has also been strongly influenced by the leading Czech philosopher Jan Patočka, who had been prohibited from lecturing by the Czechoslovakian communists in the 1950s. Later he became an official speaker for the dissident group Charter 77 and died after a police interrogation

as a consequence of that activity. In 1963 Jan Patočka was officially allowed to lecture at the Faculty of Philosophy and Arts again but only to the faculty members, not students. Johann Arnason considers Patočka's essay "Super-civilization and its internal conflicts" dealing with the topic of modernity in an innovative way to be his best work. Finally, a very important Czech influence has been his Moravian wife, Marie, whom he married in 1963. Unfortunately, the young couple did not come back from abroad, because their flight to Czechoslovakia was cancelled on the 23rd August 1968 due to the Soviet military invasion to Czechoslovakia. The full-scale collaboration between Johann Arnason and his many Czech colleagues from a huge variety of disciplines could only be resumed following the Velvet revolution (1989). In this regard, we cannot avoid asking the question about how important, or even necessary, such an experience with so many different cultures and societies is for being able to carry out successful research in the fields of historical comparative sociology. As professor Arnason himself says: "Interactions with different social worlds are important, my long-term stay in an Eastern block country influenced me greatly." We hope that Johann Arnason will stay and work with us in the post-communist Czech republic as much as possible in the forthcoming years so that we can benefit from his rich knowledge of the different social worlds.

Karel Černý

Ivan Jakubec, Zdeněk Jindra a kol.: Hospodářský vzestup českých zemí od poloviny 18. století do konce monarchie
Praha, Karolinum 2015, brožovaná, 526 str., 1. vydání, cena: 430 Kč



Monograficky pojatá učebnice obsahově vychází z druhého dílu *Dějin hospodářství českých zemí od počátku industrializace do současnosti*, který vyšel téměř před deseti lety. Nová učebnice posunuje výklad do poloviny 18. století, aby se tak hospodářské, sociální, politické, právní a kulturní změny protnuly s podmínkami a vlastním průběhem klíčového období – industrializace. Současně se tak vychází vstříc didaktickému pojetí pro vysokoškolskou výuku. Učebnice pojednává o ekonomických, institucionálních, právních a sociálních základech vývoje, o jednotlivých sektorech ekonomiky a o hospodářské stránce první světové války. Autorský kolektiv tvoří přední odborníci na vývoj hospodářských dějin českých zemí v 18. a 19. století. Cílem knihy není poskytnout „jednotný" výklad, ale naopak prezentovat rozdílné přístupy ve výkladu jednotlivých autorů, dané jejich odbornou specializací, což neubírá výkladu na plastičnosti a nenarušuje celistvost díla.

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Igor Tomeš, Eva Dragomirecká, Katarina Sedlárová, Daniela Vodáčková: Rozvoj hospicové péče a její bariéry
Praha, Karolinum 2015, brožovaná, 168 str., 1. vydání, cena: 190 Kč

Monografie vypracovaná pracovníky katedry sociální práce a Filozofické fakulty Univerzity Karlovy v rámci výzkumu „Sociální souvislosti stárnutí obyvatelstva", zařazeného do širšího výzkumu PRVOUK Univerzity Karlovy, shrnuje výsledky výzkumu podpory správy paliativní péče státními a veřejnými institucemi. Soustřeďuje se zejména na otázky veřejné podpory hospicové péče. Na základě rozhovoru s řediteli velké většiny existujících hospiců v České republice a na základě skupinových rozhovorů (metodou focus group) se zaměstnanci ve vybraných hospicích docházejí autoři k závěru, že hospicová péče nemá dostatečnou podporu veřejných institucí a veřejnosti. Paliativní péče nabízená hospici je přitom obecně považovaná za podstatně kvalitnější než péče poskytovaná v nemocničních a jim podobných zdravotních zařízeních; vyšší kvalita byla zjištěna zejména v sociálních a duchovních dimenzích hospicové péče, které činí proces umírání důstojnějším. Ze zjištění je dovozena potřeba větší podpory státní a veřejné správy hospicům.

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