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EDITORIAL

Dear Readers,

We present you with the issue 2/2016 of our *Acta Universitatis Carolinae – Studia Territorialis* journal. It brings, among other contributions, three original articles stemming from our summer 2016 call titled “Sudden Impact: Migration between Reality and Interpretation.” They reflect on and contribute to the ongoing international debate on migration which has been triggered by the European migrant crisis.

Each contribution offers a different perspective on migration and analyzes the ramifications the recent crisis has had for Europe as a whole as well as for individual European societies. Yet they complement each other well. In the opening contribution to this volume, Monika Gabriela Bartoszewicz looks at the European migrant crisis through the prism of politicization and securitization of migration. Employing the theoretical framework of societal security developed by the Copenhagen School, the author conceives the latest population influx from culturally, religiously, ethnically, and linguistically distant areas as a factor causing societal insecurity in Europe due to perceived threats to social cohesion and identity. She goes on to argue that migration has served as a catalyst for deep societal changes manifested i.a. in the rise of populist parties across Europe and the radicalization of European societies.

Jarmila Androvičová, for her part, develops this theme in her study of the current political situation in Slovakia. The author explores how immigrants and refugees were discursively represented in Slovakia in the wake of the 2016 parliamentary elections. She finds that securitization is the dominant migration discourse in Slovakia and that this dominance had been institutionalized already before the outbreak of the European migrant crisis. To explicate the institutional foundations of this framing, she uses the concept of moral panic.

Finally, the third contribution is a case study of South Tyrol/Alto Adige province between 1990 and 2014. In this contribution, Merita Meçe investigates how diverse migration flows affected the special status of this autonomous province of Italy with respect to its political, socio-economic, and cultural settings. We hope that you will appreciate our new issue.

On behalf of the editorial team,

Jan Šír

ARTICLES

FESTUNG EUROPA: SECURITIZATION OF MIGRATION AND RADICALIZATION OF EUROPEAN SOCIETIES

MONIKA GABRIELA BARTOSZEWICZ

VISTULA UNIVERSITY

Abstract

Europe is undoubtedly changing into *Festung Europa* – Fortress Europe. While its external boundaries are daily traversed by hundreds of migrants and refugees, its heretofore invisible internal borders have begun to sprout barbed wires, barriers and armed patrols. This paper analyzes the problem of migration and the ongoing European migration crisis through the lens of societal insecurity, arguing that the trend toward radicalization of European societies and electoral politics is one the most volatile ramifications of securitized migration. The European migration crisis has led to a societal security dilemma resulting in a growing chasm between the political elites in member states of the European Union and their societies. The radicalization of those societies is visible in the rising popularity of anti-establishment (populist) parties, the push for direct democracy (demonstrations, manifestations, referenda), and the attractiveness of vigilante groups. Where the state responds to this trend, culture becomes a security policy and “immis skepticism” is the default approach. If it does not respond, society either looks for new political representatives or takes matters into its own hands, sometimes resorting to violence. While the former trend is more visible in the Eastern part of the European Union, the latter is more typical of its Western part.

Keywords: Europe; European migrant crisis; migration; politicization; securitization; radical politics; societal insecurity

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Introduction

The traditional approach to societal security was designed to tackle the changing reality in post-Cold War Europe and adjust to new settings. It was

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conceived in order to deal with the emerging political importance of the European Union (EU) and placed heavy emphasis on society as the focal point of European security concerns. If societies constitute the fulcrum of the security agenda, then the issues connected with migration underpin many perceived threats and vulnerabilities. States need independence to survive, but for societies, survival is determined by identity. Consequently, processes that undermine, disrupt or weaken a society's identity lead to societal insecurity, particularly when a society defines a given change, development or potentiality as a threat to its survival as a community.¹ An insecure society does not resort to military action; rather, it turns to processes that strengthen and juxtapose "us" versus "them." This leads to situations where one identity is challenged by another and each reinforces the other, reciprocally, leading to a societal security dilemma.

This paper analyzes the problem of migration through the lens of societal insecurity in the context of the European migration crisis, which is conceptualized here as a catalyst for political (securitization) and societal (radicalization) change. This theory implies that a vast influx of immigrants to Europe in a relatively short time span threatens society with powerful inflows of different languages, styles, cultures, and values that can weaken or even overwhelm their indigenous counterparts and damage the ability of local identities to reproduce themselves, leading to the afore-mentioned societal security dilemma. The theoretical foundations of this argument are laid out in the first part of this analysis.

Migration was already politicized in Europe before the current crisis. The German Interior Ministry estimated in 2008 that as many as 6 million immigrants were residing in Europe without a residence permit, and that each year that figure was growing by 4.5 to 8 million.² Migration, particularly irregular migration, was even then an important, but not the most important, problem on the political agendas of European leaders, both on the national and EU level. Although it was a divisive issue, this division cut vertically through all social strata and debate occurred mainly on the political margins. Furthermore, polarized groups holding various opinions did not have any capability to influence mainstream policies. Fringe parties like the *Front National* in France essentially existed as a form of political folklore. To a large extent, these various groups' existence was possible only because they differed from the political mainstream in all main respects, including their attitudes toward migration, and few took them seriously.

¹ Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (London: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 119.

² "Sarkozy Fails to Push through Fortress Europe Plan," *Der Spiegel*, July 8, 2008, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,564674,00.html>.

The year 2015 changed the situation dramatically. When Angela Merkel pledged to provide refuge to anyone seeking protection from violence and war abroad, she declared that Germany would not be a country closed to those in need and hostile to refugees.³ But European societies quickly became increasingly “immiskeptical.”⁴ More and more people believe that a country reluctant to put the needs and interests of its own society first is not *their* country and that politicians unwilling to defend their own constituencies, social systems, laws, cultures, and borders are not *their* politicians. The second, interpretative part of this paper explains how migration is at the root of societal insecurity and leads to a societal security dilemma.

Migration and migration-related policies are now shaping the European political landscape. Debates on border policies, irregular and economic migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, relocation schemes and integration programs reveal not a vertical but a horizontal societal fracture. There is a rift, a growing chasm, between the national and European political elites and their respective societies. Societies have discovered that EU officials are quite willing to announce sweeping and potentially irreversible societal changes, proclaiming that they are “inevitable” and that people will just have to adapt and get used to them.⁵ What is more, the political establishments in the EU member states have to a large extent only nodded in accord. But whereas Commissioners and High Representatives are neither elected by nor accountable to Europeans, national politicians are. Societies which do not feel they are represented seek new representation. Consequently, the final part of this analysis shows how the societal insecurity triggered by migration manifests itself in the political radicalization of societies, as evidenced by the rising popularity of anti-establishment (populist) parties, a push for direct democracy (demonstrations, manifestations, referenda), and the attractiveness of vigilante groups. Contrary to other analyses,⁶ my

³ “Mother Angela: Merkel’s Refugee Policy Divides Europe,” *Der Spiegel*, September 21, 2015, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/refugee-policy-of-chancellor-merkel-divides-europe-a-1053603.html>.

⁴ In Great Britain, more than 60 percent of the population, and in France nearly 70 percent, believes migration to be divisive and harmful because immigrants do not want to adjust to European values, according to research carried out by French IFOP, http://www.ifop.com/media/poll/3315-1-study_file.pdf, and British Populus, http://www.populus.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/download_pdf-180506-The-Daily-Politics-Immigration.pdf. Links direct to reports with details regarding survey results and methodology.

⁵ Andrew Bounds, “EU told to accept 20m migrant workers,” *The Financial Times*, September 13, 2007, <https://www.ft.com/content/a23dbdaa-6164-11dc-bf25-0000779fd2ac>.

⁶ Jeanne Park, *Europe’s Migration Crisis* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2015); Simone Bertoli, Herbert Brücker and Jesús Fernández-Huertas Moraga, “The European crisis and migra-

paper does not ascribe this rising popularity to a single phenomenon like economic concerns or xenophobia, but it does acknowledge that these are indirect factors resulting from the societal insecurities that are a by-product of migration. Where the state responds, culture itself becomes a security policy and “immis-kepticism” is the default attitude underlying action. Otherwise, societies either look for new political representatives, voting for political forces that securitize migration, or they take matters into their own hands, forming vigilante groups or resorting to violence. While the former trend is more visible in the Eastern part of the European Union, the latter is more typical for the Western part.

Societal In/security

In security studies, many battles have been fought over the depth and breadth of the security concept. For some, intangible factors such as identity, culture and religion constitute invisible frontlines, borders not to be trespassed. For others, these factors are powerful, albeit cumbersome weapons that are efficient yet difficult to wield. The focus of the traditional school of thought, centered on states, tended to ignore less material and palpable influences in international relations – even though they certainly have an impact on political actors.⁷ The critics of the traditional approach, on the contrary, embrace the concept of human security and drive the focus of analysis down to the level of the individual.⁸ However, this shift from the structural to the cognitive fails to acknowledge the unifying agency transmitted by the individual to groups and communities as a whole. In between these propositions, one can find a theoretical framework developed by scholars at the Conflict and Peace Research Institute (COPRI),

tion to Germany,” *Regional Science and Urban Economics* 60 (2016): 61–72; or Peter Scholten and Frans van Nispen, “Policy analysis and the ‘migration crisis’: Introduction,” *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice* 17, No. 1 (2015): 1–9.

⁷ With respect to the traditional works, readers should consult Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 2010); John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001); Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005); and Michael W. Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism* (New York: Norton, 1997) among others.

⁸ Starting with Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) and Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, *Security Communities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) and moving on to the analysis prepared by the Human Security Centre, *Human Security Report* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), also available at www.humansecurityreport.info, and Roland Paris, “Human security: Paradigm shift or hot air?” *International Security* 26, No. 2 (2001): 87–102.

collectively known as the Copenhagen School (hereinafter referred to as Buzan et al.). Barry Buzan there introduced the central concept of societal security, which was later elaborated by Ole Wæver in an attempt to bring together the material and the invisible, reconcile objectivity and construction, and combine the collective and the individual.⁹

One of the fundamental assumptions governing the societal security concept is that the state and a society “of the same people” are two different things.¹⁰ Consequently, the security of the state and security of a society are two different “securities” derived from two different sources: the former from sovereignty, the latter from “patterns of language, culture, religious and national identities, and customs of states”¹¹ – in short, from identity. Wæver argues that states can be undermined and destabilized by “their” societies being threatened or weakened in terms of social cohesion and identity. Society is thus more than just an aspect of state security through which the state’s security can be threatened; it becomes a referent object with its own security concerns. Since societal identity is able to reproduce itself independently of the state and even in opposition to it, it should be considered as something integral to, yet at the same time independent of, state security.¹²

Societies are understood here as large-scale collective units of individuals (and yet more than the sum of individual people) with a profound element of

⁹ This analysis is based on the following works discussing the concept and ramifications of societal security: Barry Buzan et al., *The European Order Recast: Scenarios For the Post-Cold War Era* (London and New York: Pinter, 1990); Ole Wæver et al., *Migration And the New Security Agenda in Europe* (London: Pinter, 1993); Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework For Analysis* (London: Lynne Rienner, 1998); and Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). By doing so, this paper does not follow the critical studies on societal security, like that of Didier Bigo, “Security and immigration: toward a critique of the governmentality of unease,” *Alternatives* 27, No. 2 (2002): 63–92; Didier Bigo and Anastasia Tsoukala, eds., *Terror, Insecurity and Liberty: Illiberal Practices of Liberal Regimes after 9/11* (London: Routledge, 2008); or Jef Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration,” *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 38, No. 5 (2000): 751–77. Furthermore, as this paper focuses on European affairs and political science, works like Mark B. Salter, “Securitization and desecuritization: a dramaturgical analysis of the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority,” *Journal of International Relations and Development* 11, No. 4 (2008): 321–49, epistemological enquiries like Claudia Aradau, “Political grammars of mobility, security and subjectivity,” *Mobilities* 11, No. 4 (2016): 564–74, and Michael Williams, *Culture and Security: Symbolic Power and the Politics of International Security* (London: Routledge, 2007), are not taken into consideration.

¹⁰ Buzan et al., *The European Order Recast*, 119.

¹¹ Barry Buzan, *People, States & Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era* (Colchester: ECPR Press, 2008), 122–23.

¹² Wæver et al., *Migration and the New Security*, 24–25.

mutual orientation (or sense of belonging) grounded in structures, institutions, and practices.¹³ Society's kernel is identity (i.e., all that enables a group of people to refer to themselves as "we"), the self-concept of a community and of individuals identifying themselves as members of that community.¹⁴ Naturally, the sense of shared heritage varies with respect to the size of the group, the intensity of the group's bond, and the reasons for its construction, but it remains necessary for the existence of every society. However, societal identity does not exist in peace; it experiences inner tensions and conflicts. Simultaneously, it demonstrates a willingness to defend itself against internal or external threats. Analyzed from such a perspective, society has both an objective and a subjective dimension, as well as a social and moral structure.

A society, as opposed to a nation, is not linked to the state. It is clearly distinguishable from other societies. Buzan et al. characterize the nation as a special case of a society defined by affiliation to territory – a community with continuity across time, linking past members to current and future ones "with specific customs, dances and stories, its songs and traditions."¹⁵ Notwithstanding the political deeds and views of individuals (pluralism), nations make people belong together (universalism) in one of the units that make up the global order.¹⁶ Constructing nationhood is not a question of applying an ambiguous category to various cases into which it fits more or less nicely. It combines two sets of factors, the objective, such as language or location, and the constructed (or inter-subjective), arising from a political or personal choice to identify with some community.¹⁷

By contrast, citizenship is the legal expression of membership in a national community.¹⁸ As such, it constructs the identity of individuals according to the role they play in a political community; it establishes the individual's relationship to the state. Simultaneously, it disrupts harmony in the broader society as migration and internationalization blur the distinction between "civic" and "national." In other words, citizenship challenges the relation of an individual to the society. This observation is crucial, because a societal security framework of analysis implies that by having citizenship one can be a part of the nation, while simulta-

¹³ Ibid., 21–22.

¹⁴ Buzan et al., *The European Order Recast*, 119.

¹⁵ Wæver et al., *Migration and the New Security*, 21–22.

¹⁶ Ibid., 29.

¹⁷ Buzan et al., *The European Order Recast*, 120.

¹⁸ William Safran, "Citizenship and Nationality in Democratic Systems: Approaches to Defining and Acquiring Membership in the Political Community," *International Political Science Review/Revue internationale de science politique* 18, No. 3 (July 1997): 313–35.

neously being excluded from the society due to cultural factors (ethnicity, religion, language, descent). For a state to be the carrier of an ordinate identity, as Jeff Spinner-Halev notes, would require going through a process of deculturation of the public sphere (similar to secularization) that would make culture a private matter.¹⁹ However, it is difficult to imagine a culturally neutral state, divorced from any kind of identitive affiliation. Furthermore, the proposition of the state as carrier of ordinate identity is hard to defend from the perspective of a societal security framework which argues that it is not always possible to have multiple identities and that competitiveness in identitive processes might trigger tensions and lead to a societal security dilemma.

The concept of societal security can be applied on the macro-level (e.g., the EU) where due to processes of migration, integration, homogenization, sincretization, and European cosmopolitanism, societies are forced to defend themselves against identitive threats they perceive to be existential. It can also be applied on the micro-level to analyze identitive configurations of national groups, subgroups (e.g., the Scots) and cross-state groups (European Muslims). For this reason, as Wæver et al. claim, on the macro-level “societal security issues may play a key role in determining not just the pace and scope, but also the success or failure of the European integration process.”²⁰ Meanwhile, on the micro-level the concept can be applied to deal with an EU reality suffused by intermestic matters such as migration, where the international mingles with the local to such an extent that it is almost impossible to differentiate between the two. Consequently, societal security dominates two interlocking security discourses, one about mass migration threatening national identities and the other about the revival of nationalism as a threat to Europe.²¹

The core argument of societal security acknowledges that while all people live in a complex constellation of multi-layered identities, most of the time no clear or permanent hierarchy governs those identities. Only when they come closer to conflicting, either literally or metaphorically, does the hierarchy appear. In such cases, it is national identity that tends to organize the other identities around itself as the most important form of large-scale social and political identity. Buzan et al. underlined that the only rival to nationalism has been religion, which is not only sufficiently comprehensive and robust, but also equally capable of reproducing a “we” identity across generations. The original societal security

¹⁹ Jeff Spinner-Halev and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, “National Identity and Self-Esteem,” *Perspectives on Politics* 1, No. 3. (September 2003): 515–32.

²⁰ Wæver et al., *Migration and the New Security*, 3.

²¹ Buzan and Wæver, *Regions and Powers*, 375.

concept did not dwell on the issue of religion. Authors acknowledged religion only when combined with nationalism. Such a typology seems quite inappropriate even if one admits that Northern Ireland, the Balkans or Cyprus were not only theological battlefields. To the contrary, since the prominence of religion in Europe has increased significantly in recent years (in regard to migration, Muslim minorities in Europe, Turkey's prospective membership in the EU) it should be acknowledged as a salient factor and the analytical framework should be modified to accommodate it. However, it is important to note that when religious and national identities reinforce each other they can create very strong identities (e.g. Muslim immigrants vs. indigenous Christian Europeans), and very strong patterns of fear, hostility and societal insecurity.²²

Contrary to the common perception of religion as a factor that is no longer relevant in the study of international relations,²³ it still influences politics on the national and international level. Sociologists and political scientists are rediscovering religion as a source of collective and individual identity.²⁴ Philip Jenkins argues that when historians look back at our century they most probably will see in religion the most basic, inspiring and destructive force of humanity, steering our approaches to politics, freedom and responsibility, our conceptualizations of nationality and, of course, our conflicts and wars.²⁵ At the heart of modernity we observe the de-privatization of religion in the public square.²⁶ Thus, religious and ethnic identities in contemporary Europe, fueled as they are by globalization, are being "reconstructed and forged anew by the means of the symbolic materials available in national and religious memories."²⁷ Jean-Paul Willaime neatly summarizes, saying that while cultural, religious and ethnic identities can be constraining to some degree, they are at the same time intrinsically connected to the concept of security, offering a sense of social belonging

²² Wæver et al., *Migration and the New Security*, 22–23.

²³ Jonathan Fox, "Religion as an Overlooked Element of International Relations", *International Studies Review* 3, No. 3 (Autumn 2001): 53–73.

²⁴ Jean-Paul Willaime, "The Cultural Turn in the Sociology of Religion in France," *Sociology of Religion* 65, No. 4, Special Issue: [Culture and Constraint in the Sociology of Religion] (Winter 2004), 373–89.

²⁵ Philip Jenkins, *The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

²⁶ Grace Davie, "Europe: The exception that proves the rule?" in *Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics*, ed. Peter L. Berger (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999), 76; Peter L. Berger, "Desecularization of the world," in *Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics*, ed. Peter L. Berger (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999), 9–10; and Jose Casanova, *Public Religions in the modern world* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1990), 106.

²⁷ Buzan, Wæver, *Regions and Powers*, 384.

and participation. If religion is considered from a Durkheimian perspective as expressing and reinforcing social solidarity, it implies the importance of religion in defining and maintaining the boundaries of any community of believers. In this context, religion is the most crucial thing to people's interest in maintaining or defining the boundaries between themselves and others.²⁸ Indeed, while today references to identity have less to do with reproduction and ascription and more to do with choice, in societal security that choice is restricted and dictated *a priori*. The boundary between "them" and "us" may change, but the division between them and us is necessary for the existence of the society's identity. In the society's perception, migrants are Muslims and their national affiliation is often of secondary importance.

In this atmosphere, Islam has grown in Europe over the years as a major complication and challenge. It has become the second religion of the continent, a development that has raised practical questions about societal life.²⁹ The concerns stem from the order-creating function of culture and its impact on societal identity. Robert Holton's study on the cultural causes of internationalized structures suggests that culture is harder to globalize than economics.³⁰ In that context, monotheism, which Islam espouses, encourages the development of imagined communities, and enhances spiritual bonds between believers even when they are separated geographically. What is more, it has particular appeal to those who perceive themselves as excluded from the society.

It has to be emphasized that all people perceived as outsiders are not necessarily immigrants. In this respect Buzan et al. pose a crucial question³¹ as to whether immigrants of different ethnic and cultural backgrounds can become members of a national group not in the state dimension, but in a purely societal one.³² This question refers to a situation where individuals born and bred into a certain society are still perceived as strangers, and it is particularly significant with respect to Muslims in Europe. This aspect was omitted in the founding

²⁸ Hugh Watson and Jeff Boag, "Ethnicity and Religion" (Paper presented at the 50th Annual Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs. Queen's College, UK, 2000). Retrieved from Columbia International Affairs Online: <http://www.ciaonet.org/conf/wat01/index.html>.

²⁹ Among many works tackling this topic, there are two excellent analyses: Olivier Roy, *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004); and Jocelyne Cesari, *When Islam and Democracy Meet: Muslims in Europe and in the United States* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

³⁰ Robert Holton, "Globalization's Cultural Consequences," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 570, Dimensions of Globalization (July 2000): 140–52.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 22.

³² Wæver et al., *Migration and the New Security*, 22, 156.

societal security work of Buzan et al. In Europe's past, this group constituted the main "other," and hence was a point of reference for identity construction. Tomaz Mastnak's thesis proposes that Islam was essential to the formation of European identity, and remains important to its maintenance. He argues that this identity was not formed by Islam but predominantly by the relationship to Islam, and that Europe has from that relationship developed a "collective identity" and the ability to orchestrate action, along with a unity constructed in relation to Muslims as the enemy.³³

The Societal Security Dilemma: Migration and Culture

As its name suggests, the idea of a societal security dilemma consists of two concepts: the security dilemma and societal security. Paul Roe explains that "societies can experience processes in which perceptions of 'the others' develop into mutually reinforcing 'enemy' pictures leading to negative dialectics whereby groups tend to define their national identity and national consciousness in negative terms, through distinction from or comparison with neighbors."³⁴ Competing identities can either be mutually exclusive or one identity can have overbearing influence that disrupts the reproduction of the other, thereby triggering demands for protection against seductive cultural imports. The term societal security dilemma denotes a process whereby a group perceiving its identity as threatened starts to act in a security mode.³⁵

For societal security, as with other forms of security, what is perceived as a threat and what can be objectively considered as threatening may be quite different. Real threats may not be seen accurately. Perceived threats may not be real, and yet still have real effects. Wæver argues that internal threats to society are symptomatic of weak states,³⁶ a claim that needs to be scrutinized in the context of the European migration crisis. Furthermore, a societal security dilemma is not a static configuration, but a process with its own dynamics whereby the nature of the threat is liquid and "some changes will be seen as part of a natural process by which identities adjust and evolve to meet alterations in historical circumstances."³⁷

³³ Tomaz Mastnak, *Islam and the Creation of European Identity* (London: University of Westminster, CSD Perspectives, 1994).

³⁴ Paul Roe, *The Societal Security Dilemma* (Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, 1997).

³⁵ Wæver et al., *Migration and the New Security*, 23, 43–44.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 43, 49.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 42.

Because identity is constructed, threats to identity always depend on something perceived as threatening to “us.” In spite of a restricted reservoir of ideas to draw upon, any identity can be constructed in many different ways, and, as Buzan reiterates, the main issue that often decides whether a security conflict will emerge is which self-definition is prevailing in society.³⁸ This, one could argue, is the reason why the current identitive debates being evoked in EU member-states by the migration crisis are so important, since they will set the tone for the whole of societal security discourse in the proximate future. These debates, present in virtually every country on the continent, are driven by the issue of migration (as its scope and breadth is formulated in a common European migration policy) and by pressures to accept migrants from outside of the European Community, particularly those coming from the Muslim world.

The vast influx of immigrants to Europe in a relatively short time span threatens society with powerful inflows of language, style, culture, and values that may weaken or overwhelm their indigenous counterparts and damage the ability of local identities to reproduce themselves.³⁹ This influx started in the previous century, but it has been exacerbated by the current migration crisis which started in 2015 and brought nearly two million migrants to Europe in that year.⁴⁰ The cultural, ethnic and religious otherness of these migrants, crucial to societal security, is clearly visible in data collated by Frontex, Eurostat,⁴¹ and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). IOM data reveals that 278,201 people arrived in Europe by the middle of August 2016, compared to 219,854 over the same period the preceding year, which indicates that the inflow is only strengthening.⁴² The international research project “Challenges of Nations,” carried out in spring 2016, investigated the greatest problems in 24 different countries all over the world and diagnosed migration and the integration of migrants as the primary problem faced by seven European societies. In Austria, Sweden, Switzerland, Belgium, The Netherlands, and Great Britain, between 33 and 66 percent of people described migration as their country’s biggest challenge. Interestingly, the results reached a record high in Germany, where 83 percent of respondents

³⁸ Buzan et al., *The European Order Recast*, 120.

³⁹ Wæver et al., *Migration and the New Security*, 42.

⁴⁰ EU’s external border force, Frontex, reported over 1,800,000 illegal border crossings into Europe in 2015. *Annual Risk Analysis 2016* (Warsaw: Frontex, 2016), http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annula_Risk_Analysis_2016.pdf.

⁴¹ “Migration and migrant population statistics,” Eurostat, May 2016, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics.

⁴² All trends and figures are available from the International Organization for Migration at <http://migration.iom.int/europe/>.

pointed to migration and integration. The fact that this result is almost two and a half times greater than that of a similar study conducted in 2015, when only 35 percent thought immigration was the biggest problem, shows the avalanche scale of deepening societal insecurity.⁴³

According to George Friedman, the notion of the European nation originated from a group of people living in a fairly defined area, sharing a language, a history, a set of values and, in the end, a tautological self-concept: a Frenchman knew himself to be a Frenchman and simultaneously was recognized by other Frenchmen to be French.⁴⁴ This definition of nationhood could transform into a near-mysticism of romantic nationalism and at times, into vicious xenophobia, but in general it worked well in practice. The obvious challenge contemporary Europe has to face arises from the heart of the theory that the nation – and therefore, national identity – is something into which one is born, not migrated.

Friedman poses a difficult question: What does one do with the foreigner who comes to your country and wants to be a citizen? And further: what happens when a foreigner comes to your country and wants to be not only a citizen, but to become part of the society? Citizenship can be granted; nevertheless, it is difficult both to adopt and to share an identity that is not expressed in official documents but in a reciprocal sentiment of belonging, rooted in mutual recognition. National identity for Europeans is not traditionally rooted in choice. The issue of the assimilation of immigrants into Europe creates a fault line that, under sufficient stress and appropriate circumstances, could rip Europe apart, and not only because of the large number of immigrants. European states are not configured to deal with immigration. They have a definition of nationhood that is incompatible in fundamental ways with immigration. Assimilation in such a situation is not impossible, but it is enormously more difficult. These features inherent in the nation and in society must be taken into consideration in the context of the current migration crisis. The reasons for this are the sheer scale and the different cultural background of migrants. Both factors are crucial to the conceptual frame of societal security.

Migration in the societal context needs to be conceptualized with respect to two factors. The first one is the fact that immigrants originate from non-European cultures, which greatly hinders their melting into the host societies. While

⁴³ The research took place in February and March 2016. It surveyed 2,104 people over 14 years old in Germany (and 27,600 all over the world). More details, including results and methodology, are available at GfK Verein, <http://www.gfk-verein.org/en/research/studies/challenges-nations>.

⁴⁴ George Friedman, "A Question of Integration," *Geopolitical Intelligence Report*, November 8, 2005.

the million Ukrainians who have come to Poland since the beginning of the war in Ukraine are nearly invisible on the streets of Polish cities,⁴⁵ similar number of refugees from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan in Germany are impossible to overlook. Secondly, the massive size of migration flows in this globalized world, which also provides everyone with means of communication enabling him or her to keep in constant touch with his or her place of origin, further impairs the capacity to integrate and acculturate into a host society already weakened by multiculturalism, aging and negative demographic trends. Both factors contribute to mass migration becoming tantamount to *Grand Replacement*⁴⁶ – a great replacement in which although the number of people in the country remains roughly the same, they are no longer German, French, or Belgian in the cultural, and therefore societal, sense.

Societal undercurrents in reaction to migration have been palpable for several years – not in mainstream academia or political discourse, but rather on the outskirts of official debate. Nevertheless, these currents of thought run deeply and feed off the same issues that now shape the political landscape in Europe. Already in 1982, a group of fifteen professors published the so-called Heidelberg Manifesto, which emphasized that nations have a natural right to preserve their identity when it is threatened because integration of large masses of foreigners is not possible for systemic reasons.⁴⁷ Three years later a brochure, *Germany without Germans*, called for an alternative immigration policy. One of its authors, Robert Hepp, who coined the term “self-genocide,” published a provocative book in 1988, *The Final Solution to the German Question: Foundations of Political Demography in the Federal Republic of Germany*, arguing that the costs of mass immigration from culturally different areas outweigh its benefits and warning of its disastrous consequences.⁴⁸ At the beginning of the 1990s, *Assault on Europe: Asylum Seekers and Economic Migrants: Are we in Danger of a New Migration Period?* by Manfred Ritter called open

⁴⁵ In 2015, Polish consular and diplomatic offices in Ukraine issued 922,240 visas to Ukrainian citizens. Between January 1 and February 29, 2016, a further 154,515 visas were issued. In comparison, in the same period of 2016 only 110,044 visas were issued. These numbers do not account for irregular migrants in Poland. Data based on the special report prepared by the Polish Office for Foreigners, *Raport na temat obywateli Ukrainy*, available at <http://udsc.gov.pl/statystyki/raporty-specjalne/biezaca-sytuacja-dotyczaca-ukrainy/>.

⁴⁶ A phrase coined by the French writer Renaud Camus.

⁴⁷ The whole text of the manifesto can be found in Appendix E of Michael S. Teitelbaum, *The Fear of Population Decline* (Orlando, FL: Academic Press, 2013).

⁴⁸ Robert Hepp, *Die Endlösung der Deutschen Frage: Grundlinien einer politischen Demographie der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Tübingen: Hohenrain, 1988).

border policies “a march into the abyss” that would lead straight to “the hell of multicultural society.”⁴⁹ While Ritter was under investigation for propagating hate speech, his book hit the bestseller charts. Jan Werner diagnosed the unsuccessful integration of migrants in *Invasion of the Poor: Asylum Seekers and Illegal Migrants*⁵⁰ and in 2010 Thilo Sarrazin wrote another bestseller, *Germany Is Abolishing Itself*, which reiterated all the points raised by Hepp nearly two decades earlier.⁵¹ Hepp, when asked about Sarrazin’s book, said that the word “Germany” in the title is a euphemism, a smoke screen, and a substitute for something that cannot be called by its true name. The problem is not, after all, the abolition of the state, but the “self-destruction of the German nation.” The state will survive, he said, whereas it is society that is faced with the threat of extinction.⁵²

The problems associated with a dying Europe, albeit a Europe understood as a social, not a political reality, were also raised in other countries. Walter Laqueur wrote about it in his book *The Last Days of Europe: An Epitaph for an Old Continent*⁵³ and Bruce Thornton in *Decline and Fall. Europe’s Slow Motion Suicide*.⁵⁴ The themes of demographics and immigration also appeared in the pamphlet-like *Death of the West* written by Pat Buchanan⁵⁵ as well as *Londonistan* penned by Melanie Phillips.⁵⁶ In Switzerland, Beat Christoph Bäschlin published *Islam Will Devour us! Islamic Assault on Europe and the European Associates of this Invasion*, in which the fatal consequences of mass immigration are analyzed in the context of Islam.⁵⁷ This topic has been taken up by another Swiss author, Dudo Erny, who in *Disappearing Europeans* emphasized the discrepancy

⁴⁹ Manfred Ritter, *Sturm auf Europa – Asylanten und Armutflüchtlinge: Droht eine neue Völkerwanderung?* (Mainz: Hase & Koehler, 1990).

⁵⁰ Jan Werner, *Die Invasion der Armen. Asylanten und illegale Einwanderer* (Mainz: Hase & Köhler, 1992).

⁵¹ Thilo Sarrazin, *Deutschland schafft sich ab: Wie wir unser Land aufs Spiel setzen* (München: DVA, 2010).

⁵² Tomasz Gabiś, “Masowa imigracja w oczach Niemców (Głosy zza Odry),” *Nowa Debata*, January 5, 2016, <http://nowadebata.pl/2016/01/05/masowa-imigracja-w-oczach-niemcow-glosy-zza-odry/>.

⁵³ Walter Laqueur, *The Last Days of Europe: Epitaph for an Old Continent* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2007).

⁵⁴ Bruce S. Thornton, *Decline and Fall: Europe’s Slow Motion Suicide* (New York: Encounter Books, 2013).

⁵⁵ Patrick J. Buchanan, *The Death of the West: How Dying Populations and Immigrant Invasions Imperil Our Country and Civilization* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2010).

⁵⁶ Melanie Phillips, *Londonistan* (New York: Encounter Books, 2007).

⁵⁷ Beat C. Bäschlin, *Der Islam wird uns fressen!: der islamische Ansturm auf Europa und die europäischen Komplizen dieser Invasion* (Tegna: Selvapiana-Verlag, 1992).

between the society and the state.⁵⁸ In France, long before Michel Houellebecq,⁵⁹ a peaceful takeover by foreign culture was depicted by Jean Raspail in the *Camp of the Saints*.⁶⁰

The decisive dimension of the presence of migrants is that it changes the balance of the indigenous European population. Although there is certainly no proportional formula, simple numbers can change identities. It is primarily a matter of how relative numbers interact with the absorptive and adaptive capacities of society, and whether migrants seek to maintain their identity rather than adapting.⁶¹ A more assertive trend among migrants seems to a certain extent to result from failures of integration, and partially as well from imported fanaticism. Most scholars point to the hidden hand of socio-economic issues, which are unquestionably prominent but still play a subservient role to the main set of identitive factors triggering the societal security dilemma in Europe. As Wæver voiced it, “Threats strengthen identities at which they are aimed. Attempts to suppress an identity may work, but equally they may reinforce the intensity with which the group coheres.”⁶² This mechanism was set in motion when waves of migration hit the European borders and further accelerated with the securitization of migration that has led to the emergence of *Festung Europa*.

Politicization and Securitization of Migration in Europe

The issue of migration has impacted European politics for several decades. It did not appear in 2015 out of the blue. Nonetheless, the ongoing migration crisis can be characterized with “before and after” due to profound differences in approaching the problem at those times. Before the crisis, migration was politicized, i.e. the state was expected to cope with it within the standard political system as “part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations, or more rarely some form of communal governance.”⁶³ Irregular migration (as opposed to migration *sensu stricto*) was targeted by national and EU policies,⁶⁴ and while the general phenomenon of immigration was somewhat

⁵⁸ Erny Dudo, *Das Verschwinden der Europäer* (Norderstedt: Books on Demand, 2015).

⁵⁹ Michel Houellebecq, *Soumission* (Paris: Editions Flammarion, 2015).

⁶⁰ Jean Raspail, *Le Camp des Saints* (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1973).

⁶¹ Wæver et al., *Migration and the New Security*, 45.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 43.

⁶³ Buzan et al., *The European Order Recast*, 23.

⁶⁴ On the European level, three main programmes affect migration and asylum policies: the Tampere Programme (2000–2005), the Hague Programme (2005–2010), and the Stockholm Programme (2010–2014). See Elizabeth Collett, “Future EU policy development on immigration and asylum:

contentious, the opinion divide was vertical, contributing to polarization of the political scene. Such polarization cut down from the highest-ranking politicians to the lowest echelons of society in both camps. This meant that one side of the debate, including but not limited to left-wing parties, non-governmental activists and groups such as Amnesty International and OpenDemocracy, fought against a so-called Fortress Europe (often embodied by Frontex) through lobbying and “No human being is illegal” campaigns.⁶⁵ They contended that the European approach to immigration was at odds with human rights and could not be sustained.⁶⁶

Conversely, the other side rallied under the nationalist banners of fringe political parties such as the British National Party in Great Britain, the *Front National* in France (under the leadership of Jean-Marie Le Pen, before his daughter took the leading position), the Freedom Party in Austria, *Lijst Pim Fortuyn* in The Netherlands (although Fortuyn, its founder and leader, explicitly distanced himself from “far-right” politicians) and *Vlaams Belang* in Belgium. Those parties exhibited “immis skepticism” and advocated things that were not included in the official narratives of the political mainstream. Still, the issue of immigration was only one of many items on their political agendas and not even the most important one. Furthermore, because their argumentation was compelling only to the electoral margins, the political consensus could deny these “radical” parties and movements any right of representation. Arguably, this *cordon sanitaire* would guarantee that those political parties who did not fit into the political status quo were securely marginalized. If any such party increased its sphere of influence, as did Jörg Haider’s Freedom Party in Austria in 2000, isolation and freezing of diplomatic cooperation would be immediately applied by fellow member states.

The escalation of the migration problem in 2015 prompted European Union leaders to reconsider their policies (although, on the European level, there is currently no real single immigration policy⁶⁷), not only due to the sheer number

Understanding the challenge,” *Migration Policy Institute Europe, Policy Brief Series*, Issue No. 4, May 2014.

⁶⁵ The campaigns were inspired by a speech by Elie Wiesel, Holocaust survivor and Nobel Peace Prize winner, who said: “You who are so-called illegal aliens must know that no human being is illegal.”

⁶⁶ For more on this issue, see Andrew Geddes, *Immigration and European integration: Beyond fortress Europe?* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008); and Robert Dover, “Towards a Common EU Immigration Policy: a Securitization Too Far,” *European Integration* 30, No. 1 (2008): 113–30.

⁶⁷ A vision for this policy was presented in the Commission communication “Towards a Common Immigration Policy” on December 5, 2007. The principles serving as the foundation for formulation of such policy can be found in the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament,

of migrants but also because of the fact that only four or five member states were receiving around 70 percent of the refugees crossing the external borders into the EU. In 2015 German chancellor Angela Merkel, a staunch proponent of open border policies and *Willkommenskultur*, proposed a new system of quotas to distribute non-EU asylum seekers across the EU member states. Under the Commission's emergency system for resettling asylum seekers, the 28 member states would be required to accept asylum seekers in proportion to the size of their economies, unemployment rates, and populations. The resulting quota is based on an algorithm that gives population size a weight of 40 percent, economic growth 40 percent, unemployment ten percent, and ten percent for previous engagement with asylum seekers.⁶⁸ Indeed, on September 22, 2015, European Union interior ministers meeting in the Justice and Home Affairs Council approved a plan to relocate 120,000 asylum seekers over two years.⁶⁹ However, support for the scheme was tenuous at best, and several of the countries that initially supported it withdrew as the crisis continued. For instance, in Poland the document was signed just before a change of government. Then-Prime Minister Ewa Kopacz assured the EU that Poland was both willing and ready to accept as many refugees as possible.⁷⁰ Her declarations were uttered without any societal support. Consequently, the next elections were won by the Law and Justice Party, which established itself in opposition to the pro-immigration stance of the Civic Platform, then in power. Thus, it should not come as a surprise that, seizing his first chance to opt out in the wake of the November 2015 Paris terrorist attacks, Konrad Szymański, Poland's European Affairs Minister-designate, stated that he saw no possibility of acquiescing to the EU refugee relocation scheme in Poland, due to security concerns.

the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions of 17 June 2008 – A Common Immigration Policy for Europe: Principles, actions and tools, available at EUR-Lex, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV%3Aj10001>. The future of EU migration policy is presented at the EU Immigration Portal: http://ec.europa.eu/migration/who-does-what/more-information/the-future-of-the-eu-migration-policy-general-context-and-new-initiatives_en.

⁶⁸ European Commission. European Solidarity: A Refugee Relocation System, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/2_eu_solidarity_a_refugee_relocation_system_en.pdf.

⁶⁹ European Commission. Press Releases. European Commission Statement following the decision at the Extraordinary Justice and Home Affairs Council to relocate 120,000 refugees, September 22, 2015, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-15-5697_en.htm.

⁷⁰ "Kopacz: przyjmimy uchodźców, bo to nasz obowiązek, test na przyzwoitość," *TVN24*, September 10, 2015, <http://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-z-kraju/3/kopacz-przyjecie-uchodzcow-jest-naszym-obowiazkiem,576031.html>.

In fact, passive resistance to the scheme has been so significant that as of April 2016, EU members have collectively fulfilled only 15 percent of the European Resettlement Scheme and less than 1 percent of the European Relocation Plan.⁷¹ For that reason, on May 4, 2016, the European Commission presented a draft regulation intended to overhaul the existing Dublin Regulation that dictated the asylum application system in Europe. That proposal was reinforced by an initiative to charge member states that do not implement the new system a “solidarity contribution” of 250,000 euro per asylum applicant.⁷² This decision further alienated member states’ societies and did not help with policy implementation. In fact, according to the European Asylum Support Office, of 32 states that volunteered to accept refugees, eleven did not admit a single person. Among those countries one can find Denmark, Austria, Great Britain, Hungary, Norway, Italy, Greece, Iceland, Slovakia, and Liechtenstein.⁷³ While the Visegrad countries (Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Poland) were the most vocal in resistance, and therefore incurred the odium of Brussels for their apparent lack of solidarity, Czech president Miloš Zeman, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, and Slovakian leader Robert Fico were not the only European leaders to reject and ridicule the European approach to migration; they just did so openly. In other countries, the words were more temperate, but the action (or lack thereof) speaks volumes. The “Refugees welcome” pro-migration manifestations became less numerous and significant in terms of societal impact and attendance. There is no alternative to PEGIDA that gathers similar crowds in any of the EU countries.

Migration Crisis as the Catalyst of Societal Insecurity

When looking for the factors causing such behavior, it is usually pointed out that in the last couple of years Europe has seen a real surge of anti-establishment

⁷¹ Solon Ardittis, “A Global Resettlement Scheme for Refugees in the EU,” *News Deeply*, May 10, 2016, <https://www.newsdeeply.com/refugees/op-eds/2016/05/10/a-global-resettlement-scheme-for-refugees-in-the-e-u>.

⁷² Matthew Holehouse, “EU to fine countries ‘hundreds of millions of pounds’ for refusing to take refugees,” *The Telegraph*, May 3, 2016, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/05/03/eu-to-fine-countries-that-refuse-refugee-quota/>.

⁷³ According to the European Asylum Support Office in June 2016, EU countries recorded 120,471 applications for international protection, the highest number of applications since November 2015 and a higher level than June 2015, when 97,462 applications were recorded. Detailed statistics regarding trends can be found at <https://www.easo.europa.eu/information-analysis/analysis-and-statistics>.

parties. These parties are commonly referred to as the “far-right,” “hard-right,” or “populist” parties, but this essentialist approach muddles the picture, because some of them (especially in economic terms, but not only) are firmly rooted in the leftist tradition. These parties have one thing in common: they are parties of protest that do not want to work within the current political status quo. On the contrary, their main political objectives are aimed at overturning the establishment. They want to change their governments’ present strategic objectives not by a revolution, but by using perfectly acceptable political means. Another peculiar feature of the anti-establishment parties is the fact that migration for them is now a top priority issue and question of security. They have different political programs and priorities. However, if there is something that binds them together, it is a negative stance on migration in its political (security), economic (re-distribution of resources) and cultural (Islamization) dimensions. In France, the *Front National* is the main political force opposing the “quiet conquest”⁷⁴ by Muslim migrants. At present it has 27 percent of steadily growing support among the electorate,⁷⁵ while its leader, Marine Le Pen, is one of the leading candidates in France’s upcoming presidential elections. The United Kingdom Independence Party, with a 17 percent share of the vote,⁷⁶ had its leader Nigel Farage (MEP) ferociously campaigning for Brexit as the only means of securing the UK’s borders against the inflow of migrants, especially from other EU countries. In Denmark, the Danish People’s Party (*Dansk Folkeparti*), with 20 percent support, has become the second political power in the country⁷⁷ and also proposes strict anti-migration policies. For instance, the party’s deputy leader called for a ban on Muslim asylum seekers.⁷⁸ The fact that one-third of Danes believe they are at war with Islam only helps their cause.⁷⁹ In The Netherlands, the Party for

⁷⁴ The phrase comes from the magazine article by Rachel Binhas, “Les Frères musulmans français: la conquête tranquille,” *Valeurs Actuelles*, July 28, 2016, <http://www.valeursactuelles.com/les-freres-musulmans-francais-la-conquete-tranquille-63871>.

⁷⁵ Current political standing of *Front National* is announced on its website at <http://www.frontnational.com/terme/sondages/>.

⁷⁶ “Poll results: Support for conservatives and UKIP up,” *ITV*, May 4, 2016, <http://www.itv.com/news/wales/2016-05-04/poll-results-support-for-conservatives-and-ukip-up/>.

⁷⁷ “Record Gains for Anti-Immigrant Party in Danish Vote,” *Breitbart*, June 20, 2015, <http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2015/06/20/record-gains-for-anti-immigrant-party-in-danish-vote/>.

⁷⁸ “Leading Danish politician calls for ban on Muslim asylum seekers,” *Deutsche Welle*, July 27, 2016, <http://www.dw.com/en/leading-danish-politician-calls-for-ban-on-muslim-asylum-seekers/a-19432668>.

⁷⁹ “1/3 Duńczyków uważa, że ich kraj jest na wojnie z islamem,” *Euroislam.pl*, August 2, 2016, <http://euroislam.pl/13-dunczykow-uwaza-ze-ich-kraj-jest-na-wojnie-z-islamem/>.

Freedom (*Partij voor de Vrijheid*) is the current number one, as Geert Wilders has announced proudly on his weblog.⁸⁰ Its “sister party” in Austria, the *Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs*, is currently at 30 percent and aspires to be the leading political power in Austria, with a possible future President in waiting (Norbert Hofer).⁸¹ The Austrian Chancellor, Christian Kern, announced recently that the migration crisis might lead to a state of emergency,⁸² but Hofer clearly spiraled the bidding for votes upward with calls for secure borders, a burqa ban, blocking entry of persons bearing Turkish passports, and withdrawal from the EU. The Swedish Democrats (*Sverigedemokraterna*) are often called a single-issue party⁸³ because migration is the central point on their political agenda. Clearly, Swedish society concurs, as the party currently holds first place in the country’s politics in spite of a *cordon sanitaire* imposed by other parties present in the *Riksdag*.⁸⁴ In Finland, the Finns Party (*Perussuomalaiset*, formerly the True Finns) has been a member of the ruling coalition since 2015,⁸⁵ while in Norway, the Progress Party (*Framstegspartiet*) has recorded its best result since 2011 in a recent survey.⁸⁶ Finally, in Italy, the Northern League (*Lega Nord*) secured nearly 20 percent of the vote in the last elections and its leader, Matteo Salvini, has a 33 percent approval rating, securing him a position as a rising political star.⁸⁷

Most scholarship still treats these radical parties as if they were marginal or fringe elements and assumes their support to be rather unstable.⁸⁸ As for the reasons for the increased popularity of radical parties, political science lacks a unanimous and convincing theory. Regarding electoral preferences, several

⁸⁰ Geert Wilders Weblog, <http://www.geertwilders.nl/index.php/94-english/1997-pvv-nr-1-in-dutch-polls>.

⁸¹ Philip Oltermann, “Austrian far-right party’s triumph in presidential poll could spell turmoil,” *The Guardian*, April 25, 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/25/austrian-far-right-partys-triumph-presidential-poll-turmoil-norbert-hofer>.

⁸² “Austria rozważa wprowadzenie stanu wyjątkowego przez uchodźców,” *NDIE.pl*, August 18, 2016, <http://ndie.pl/austria-rozwaza-wprowadzenie-stanu-wyjatkowego-uchodzcow/>.

⁸³ Gissur Ó. Erlingsson, Kåre Vernby, and Richard Öhrvall, “The single-issue party thesis and the Sweden Democrats,” *Acta Politica* 49, No. 2 (2014): 196–216.

⁸⁴ Oliver Lane, “Anti-Migration Sweden Democrats Once Again Largest Party In attest Opinion Poll,” *Breitbart*, January 21, 2016, <http://www.breitbart.com/london/2016/01/21/anti-migration-sweden-democrats-once-again-largest-party-in-latest-opinion-poll/>.

⁸⁵ Richard Milne, “True Finn finds power harder than protest,” *The Financial Times*, October 14, 2015, <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6fe11572-6d96-11e5-8608-a0853fb4e1fe.html>.

⁸⁶ Tor Ingar Oesterud, “Progress Party still on the upswing on new poll,” *Norway Today*, February 29, 2016, <http://norwaytoday.info/news/progress-party-continuing-recovery-on-remeasuring/>.

⁸⁷ Julia Paravicini, “Italy’s far right jolts back from dead,” *Politico*, March 2, 2016, <http://www.politico.eu/article/italys-other-matteo-salvini-northern-league-politicians-media-effettosalvini/>.

⁸⁸ Terri E. Givens, *Voting Radical Right in Western Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

early studies of the far-right parties adopted the most popular explanation, that post-industrialization and globalization have restructured the social strata in Western societies, thus creating new “pools of frustration” to be exploited by politicians.⁸⁹ This explanation attributes growing political support for radical parties to fear⁹⁰ or economic crisis.⁹¹ Others argue that the voters’ choices should be explained not in economic terms but rather in terms of socio-cultural policy preferences,⁹² which have become more salient in Europe. Theodore Kemper bases his analysis on a grievance theory,⁹³ while Jeff Goodwin and James Jasper discuss in-group versus out-group dynamics.⁹⁴ Finally, migration,⁹⁵ ethnic competition,⁹⁶ and discontent⁹⁷ are proposed as the ultimate factors leveraging political trends. More importantly, recent studies proposing causal models to explain the success of radical parties⁹⁸ seem one-dimensional when confronted with other political actors. Other studies aimed at measuring the impact of radical parties mistake correlation for causality,⁹⁹ putting forward quite a tautological argument, i.e., that the increase in anti-immigrant sentiment proves that right-wing parties have played a part in fueling these negative feelings. In her

⁸⁹ Jens Rydgren, ed., *Class Politics and the Radical Right* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 1.

⁹⁰ Herbert Kitschelt, *The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis* (Michigan: Michigan University Press, 1995).

⁹¹ Jörg Flecker, Gudrun Hentges and Gabrielle Balazs, “Potentials of Political Subjectivity and the Various Approaches to the Extreme Right: Findings in the Qualitative Research,” in *Changing Working Life and the Appeal of the Extreme Right*, ed. Jörg Flecker (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2016), 35–61.

⁹² Piero Ignazi, *Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

⁹³ Theodore D. Kemper, “A Structural Approach to Social Movement Emotions,” in *Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements*, eds. Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper, and Francesca Polletta (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 58–73.

⁹⁴ Jeff Goodwin and James M. Jasper, *The Social Movements Reader: Cases and Concepts* (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009).

⁹⁵ Elisabeth Ivarsson, “What Unites Right-Wing Populists in Western Europe? Re-examining Grievance Mobilization Models in Seven Successful Cases,” *Comparative Political Studies* 41, No. 1 (2008): 3–23.

⁹⁶ Marcel Lubbers, Mérove Gijsberts and Peer Scheepers, “Extreme Right-Wing Voting in Western Europe,” *European Journal of Political Research* 41, No. 3 (2002): 345–78.

⁹⁷ Eric Belanger and Kees Aarts, “Explaining the rise of the LPF. Issues, discontent, and the 2002 Dutch Election,” *Acta Politica*, 41 (2006): 4–20.

⁹⁸ Kai Arzheimer, “Contextual Factors and the Extreme Right Vote in Western Europe, 1980–2002,” *American Journal of Political Science* 53, No. 2 (April 2009): 259–75; Pippa Norris, *Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Wouter Van Der Brug and Fennema Meindert, “Protest or Mainstream? How the European Anti-Immigrant Parties Developed into Two Separate Groups by 1999,” *European Journal of Political Research* 42, No. 1 (2003): 55–76.

⁹⁹ Michelle Williams, *The Impact of Radical Right-Wing Parties in West European Democracies* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 66.

study, Michelle Williams entirely ignores the possibility of a bottom-up impetus or a dynamic of supply meeting demand.

While many of these propositions are partially true, they mistake effect for cause. In other words, the causal factors listed above are merely symptoms of societal insecurity, from which political radicalization is the last but not the least important emanation. By neglecting the societal factor, one may too-hastily ascribe the reaction in “mass politics” against migration¹⁰⁰ to a single phenomenon (racism, populism, or xenophobia) that is not able to provide a satisfactory explanation under the complex canopy of society. Only by employing the societal security framework may one delve deep into the real sources of the problem and account for the primary causal factors, instead of stopping half-way and focusing on what are merely by-products of societal insecurities. Large-scale migration from culturally alien areas leads to societal insecurity and securitizes all migration-related policies. Securitization often depends on the power and influence of the securitizing actor, which is most frequently the state or the elites, and hinges upon convincing those actors’ audience, usually the society, that a given development is indeed a threat. Hence “speech acts” are important and securitization retains a very strong discursive dimension. In this case, we observe a bottom-up securitization whereby the society pushes for extraordinary measures and politicians are compelled to oblige.

Societal insecurity also exposes the discrepancy between the state and the society, which is understandable when one considers that the elites and the general public each pursue a different logic. The elites are more closely linked to the state and the public to the society.¹⁰¹ In those countries where the political establishment and the elite in power ignore societal insecurities, radicalization of politics ensues because Europeans are no longer satisfied with the way their interests are represented. What is more, Europeans increasingly feel that they are not represented in government in the slightest. The gap between the political elite and ordinary Europeans is so vast that democracy in the form of marking an X on the ballot every few years begins to fail. When the people begin to believe that their representatives do not represent them but instead are standing up for different, “foreign” constituencies, or are simply making decisions guided by incomprehensible priorities that are impossible to explain using even the most elaborate rhetoric, when they suspect that politicians do not listen to what they

¹⁰⁰ Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 357.

¹⁰¹ Wæver et al., *Migration and the New Security*, 82.

have to say and do not care about their fears and needs, then there is no other choice, they need to look for new political representation.

For these reasons, the defining quality of the European radical parties is their negative stance on migration in the political (security), economic (re-distribution of resources) and cultural (Islamization) dimensions. A societal security framework allows one to understand the sources of the rising popularity of various social movements like PEGIDA, the urge to take democracy to the streets (in demonstrations, manifestations, and happenings), and the attractiveness of vigilante groups (like the Soldiers of Odin, who originated in Finland but already have branches in many different European countries) present both in the Eastern and Western part of the European Union.

When one's identity is threatened, one has to strengthen its expression. In that way, securitization implies a change of identity, a change in who "we" are, and the equating of culture with politics. Culture, thus, becomes a security policy.¹⁰² Over time, the physical and symbolic boundaries dividing communities may be reinforced even further.¹⁰³ Suffice it to mention the ubiquitous calls for a ban on burqas and burkinis to see how culture merges with security policy.¹⁰⁴ The growing chasm between the political elites and ordinary citizens both enables and forces societies to maintain their own security. Buzan explains that societies can either react to threats with activities carried out by the community itself or by forcing the threat onto the state's agenda.¹⁰⁵ The latter trend is visible in the movement of mainstream parties toward anti-immigration or xenophobic discourse in mass politics,¹⁰⁶ the former is supported by the fact that various – mostly non-state – actors have mobilized a resistance against integration of their states into the EU, based on the security claim that integration threatens their national identity.¹⁰⁷ A similar response can be observed to the Muslim presence in Europe.

In 1993, Wæver observed that although most European states have always had minorities, some of which have been or even now are irredentist, they have considered themselves relatively homogeneous, with a strong sense of national

¹⁰² Ibid., 70.

¹⁰³ Watson and Boag, "Ethnicity and Religion."

¹⁰⁴ In Cannes, France, municipal authorities justified their ban saying that the burkini "refers to an allegiance to terrorist movements which are at war with us." See "Burkinis banned on France's Cannes beaches by mayor," *The Telegraph*, August 11, 2016, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/08/11/burkinis-banned-on-cannes-riviera-beaches-by-french-mayor/>.

¹⁰⁵ Buzan et al., *The European Order Recast*, 122.

¹⁰⁶ Wæver et al., *Migration and the New Security*, 158.

¹⁰⁷ Buzan and Wæver, *Regions and Powers*, 356.

community founded on shared history, ethnic identity, language, culture and political experience.¹⁰⁸ This relative cultural and ethnic homogeneity has been transformed into cultural and ethnic heterogeneity and these factors have lost their capacity to bind the societies and at the same time the nation state has declined in importance. States weakened by the institutions and mechanisms of the European Union from without and by their own changing societies from within are more vulnerable when faced with mass migration. Societal factors move into the vanguard of radicalized politics and securitized migration becomes a source of low-intensity “societal wars.” This does not mean regular, structural violence, but random clashes along cultural lines in various configurations.¹⁰⁹

These clashes can involve a minority against the state, as when police cars are fired upon with air-guns or stoned, and when those perceived as representatives of the state are attacked.¹¹⁰ But with increasing regularity, they take place along minority vs. majority lines or, more recently, the migrants vs. the autochthonous. On July 14, 2016, there was an attack in Nice, as the result of which 84 people were killed and more than 300 were injured.¹¹¹ Four days later, on July 18, a 17-year-old refugee from Afghanistan attacked passengers on a train in Würzburg with a machete.¹¹² In the following week, on July 22, an 18-year-old of Iranian origin opened fire in the Olympia shopping center in Munich, killing 9 people and then committing suicide.¹¹³ On July 24, a refugee from Syria wounded 15 people by detonating an explosive device in Ansbach,¹¹⁴ while the next day another Syrian killed his Polish co-worker with a machete and heavily wounded

¹⁰⁸ Wæver et al., *Migration and the New Security*, 158.

¹⁰⁹ For an excellent analysis of the political responses to cultural conflict see Per Mouritsen, “Political responses to cultural conflict: Reflections on the ambiguities of the civic turn,” in *Constituting Communities: Political Solutions to Cultural Conflict*, ed. Per Mouritsen and Knud Erik Jørgensen (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 1–30.

¹¹⁰ In an interview for Radio Télévision Suisse, Fabrice Balanche from the University of Lyon speaks of this problem at length. See Fabrice Balanche, Interview with Radio Télévision Suisse, *Agoravox*, September 30, 2014, <http://www.agoravox.tv/tribune-libre/article/des-mini-etats-islamiques-en-46961>.

¹¹¹ Alan Yuhas, Matthew Weaver and Bonnie Malkin, “Bastille Day truck attack: what happened in Nice,” *The Guardian*, July 16, 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2016/jul/14/nice-bastille-day-france-attack-promenade-des-anglais-vehicle>.

¹¹² “Germany axe attack: Assault on train in Wuerzburg injures HK family,” *BBC News*, July 19, 2016, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36827725>.

¹¹³ Catherine E. Shoichet, Ralph Ellis and Jason Hanna, “Munich shooting: 9 victims, gunman dead, police say,” *CNN*, July 23, 2016, <http://edition.cnn.com/2016/07/22/europe/germany-munich-shooting/>.

¹¹⁴ Frederic Pleitgen, Tim Hume and Euan McKirdy, “Ansbach bomber pledged allegiance to ISIS,” *CNN*, July 26, 2016, <http://edition.cnn.com/2016/07/24/world/ansbach-germany-blast/>.

two people in Reutlingen near Stuttgart.¹¹⁵ Finally, on July 26 two teenage supporters of ISIS committed the ritual killing of a Catholic priest in a church of Saint-Etienne-du-Rouvray (Normandy, France).¹¹⁶ While these incidents, with the exception of the Nice terrorist attack, were relatively low-intensity violence, their frequency and the palpable “us versus them” pattern might spiral out of control on the purely societal level. In fact, Patrick Calvar, France’s director of domestic intelligence, estimated that “the confrontation [between communities] is inevitable,” hinting that another large scale terrorist attack in France might unleash a civil war.¹¹⁷

Conclusions

The application of the societal security concept, with its insistence on the importance of migration as a security issue, has brought about a structural change in analysis of the totality of societal experience by inverting traditional security studies, taking them from a purely “top down,” neo-realist analysis of political processes to a “bottom up” investigation, addressing the societal “grass roots” instead of focusing on the elites. On the macro-level, in the context of the current migration crisis, the theory allows for examination of the societal element in the security complex and its influence on the processes triggered by elite-driven political projects. On the micro-level, this approach enables exploration of how societal agency and the vagaries of cultural constructs work within the nexus of societal fragmentation and the societal security dilemma. By including strong cultural aspects it is possible to substantiate the validity of the concept through empirical study, and simultaneously provide a more thorough understanding of entangled, intertwined phenomena on the regional level.

Undoubtedly, as this paper shows, the European migration crisis has been a catalyst for a societal security dilemma that is inducing and accelerating change on the societal level. The table below summarizes the political and societal results of migration, both before and after the crisis.

¹¹⁵ Caroline Mortimer, “German machete attack: Syrian refugee kills woman and injures two other in Reutlingen,” *The Independent*, 24 July, 2016, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/german-machete-attack-stuttgart-reutlingen-crime-knife-attack-a7153561.html>.

¹¹⁶ Kim Wilsher and Julian Borger, “ISIS attackers forced French priest to kneel before he was murdered, hostage says,” *The Guardian*, July 26, 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/26/men-hostages-french-church-police-normandy-saint-etienne-du-rouvray>.

¹¹⁷ John Vincour, “Averting France’s War of All Against All,” *The Wall Street Journal*, July 18, 2016, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/averting-frances-war-of-all-against-all-1468870986>.

Table 1: Migration Crisis as a Catalyst

	Before the Crisis	After the Crisis
Focus on	Irregular migration	All types of migration and migration-related policies
Political Result	Politicization (one of many issues; the state is expected to cope within the standard political system)	Securitization (the most important issue; a threat that requires extraordinary measures)
Societal Result	Polarization (vertical, fringe parties)	Radicalization (horizontal, political elites versus their societies)

The societal security concept provides an alternative framework for cutting through the Gordian knot of identities and cultures and their causal roles in the context of the migration crisis and societal insecurity, the volatile result of which is political radicalization. Unfortunately, since the causal factor of identity is so dangerous in Europe, politicians have made a tacit agreement to mention it only in a positive context. Donald Horowitz argued that while elites often shape national identity, they rarely create it.¹¹⁸ Jürgen Habermas predicted that governments cannot continue to suppress crippling dissent within their societies and that they will have to admit that “they are at their wits’ end.”¹¹⁹ In the end, given the still-increasing rift between the political and the societal, if the people are incessantly chastised and penalized for their concerns about migration, they will soon be forced to take action against their own state in civil disobedience.

Finally, the developments analyzed in this paper imply the increasing importance of societal security given the ongoing migration crisis. At the same time, the societal security factor is to a great extent ignored by the European political establishment, for whom Fortress Europe, *Festung Europa*, is a worst-case scenario. Jean-Claude Juncker even lamented that “borders are the worst invention ever.”¹²⁰ Nevertheless, political actors bound neither by political nor cultural borders, remind us of John Rawls’ warning that “to tear down the walls of the state is not... to create a world without walls, but rather to create a world with thousands of petty fortresses.”¹²¹ *Festung Europa* may be created from without by

¹¹⁸ Donald L. Horowitz, *The Deadly Ethnic Riot* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 21.

¹¹⁹ Jürgen Habermas, “A Search For Europe’s Future: And the Wheels Stopped Turning,” *Der Spiegel*, June 18, 2008, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,560549,00.html>.

¹²⁰ Mat Dathan, “‘Borders are the worst invention ever!’ EU chief Jean-Claude Juncker widens rift with European leaders as he calls for open borders,” *Daily Mail*, August 22, 2016, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3752939/Borders-worst-invention-EU-chief-Jean-Claude-Juncker-widens-rift-European-leaders-calls-borders-opened.html>.

¹²¹ John Rawls, *The Law of Peoples* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 39.

tightening borders against mass migration or from within by reactions to societal clashes and political radicalization. The decisive issue for Europe is whether its societies will stop calling the state back in, either because the nation states have given their powers to the EU or because of the futility of such endeavors. When societal security concerns escalate to the point of securitization, migration becomes the fulcrum of the political agenda. This can be observed in those European countries, mainly in Central and Eastern Europe, where leading political forces have taken up a staunch anti-migrant position.¹²² In a situation where mass migration is perceived as an existential threat on the societal level, thereby triggering societal insecurity, but is ignored by the political elites, societies start looking for other political representation or act independently of the state (social movements, demonstrations, vigilante groups). In the former case, we can observe the radicalization of politics and the rise to power of new political forces, as migration is not only politicized, but framed as a security issue on the policy agenda. In the latter case, escalating societal tensions along cultural lines can have a damaging impact both on society and the state. Arguably, both trends can be a stimulus for further political fragmentation and regionalization within Europe, and both are conducive to violence.

¹²² "Premier Czech: Nie chcemy w kraju silnej muzułmańskiej mniejszości," *Polskie Radio*, August 23, 2016, <http://www.polskieradio.pl/5/3/Artykul/1658635,Premier-Czech-nie-chcemy-w-kraju-silnej-muzulmanskiej-mniejszosci>.

THE MIGRATION AND REFUGEE CRISIS IN POLITICAL DISCOURSE IN SLOVAKIA: INSTITUTIONALIZED SECURITIZATION AND MORAL PANIC

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Abstract

Immigration was a minor political topic in Slovakia before the outbreak of the refugee crisis in Europe in 2015. However, security discourse with regard to migration was institutionalized and represents the dominant view of migration. This paper analyzes the institutional basis for the dominant security discourse in Slovakia, using the concept of moral panic. It argues that the dominance of security discourse results from a consensus among politicians about cultural questions connected to migration and from a technocratic consensus among security professionals, experts and politicians who prioritize the security view of migration.

Keywords: Slovakia; migration; European migrant crisis; political discourse; securitization; moral panic

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Introduction

Slovak parliamentary elections do not usually draw much attention beyond Slovakia's immediate neighboring countries. The elections held on March 5, 2016, were an exception. One of the most significant, or perhaps the single

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most significant topic of the election campaign was refugees, immigrants and the so-called “refugee (or migrant) crisis.” Slovakia’s approach towards immigrants, refugees and solutions to the refugee crisis (especially those advanced by certain controversial politicians) captured attention from abroad, mainly from the European Union and its member states’ officials. One of the most significant manifestations of Slovakia’s controversial approach was the rejection by a majority of Slovak politicians of the quota-based system for redistributing refugees proposed by the European Commission,¹ coupled with the government’s subsequent decision not to implement Commission’s decision and to file a lawsuit against the EU-mandated mechanism in the European Court of Justice. This resolute attitude was in no doubt influenced by the approach of the 2016 national elections in Slovakia. Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico, leader of the social-democratic party Smer-SD, actively used anti-immigration rhetoric in his campaign. His statements concerning refugees (especially those of Muslim origin) caught the attention of the foreign media as well as of his political partners and colleagues from the EU’s supra-national Party of European Socialists.

This sudden interest in the topic of immigration, marked by the prioritization of national security questions connected to migration, was somewhat surprising given that Slovakia has not been among the countries significantly touched by the refugee crisis. Slovakia has neither been a destination country nor a country of transit for immigrants and refugees. In my paper, I will show that even before the outbreak of the refugee crisis, security discourse about migration had dominated and had become institutionalized in Slovakia.

The general methodological framework for my paper is discourse analysis. There are plenty of different approaches to discourse analysis; however, there are certain principal features common to all of them. The most important is that language as discourse creates performative effects in the social reality. That is to say, words may significantly change and influence the non-language world of social practice. Language is thus not only the description of a social practice but it is a social practice itself: To speak means to act.² Through analysis of the language employed, it is possible to reconstruct the meaning of a social action.

This is not to say that non-language practice can be revealed solely through language practice and is reducible to it. For me, analyzing discourse means

¹ This system was approved by the EU Council in September 2015 with the intention to resettle 120,000 refugees who “evidently need international protection.” According to the system, Slovakia should have received 2,300 refugees over the following two years. Four countries voted against the Council’s action (Slovakia, Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania).

² John Langshaw Austin, *How to Do Things with Words* (New York: Harvard University Press, 1975).

searching for the rules that constitute social practice: to analyze why, how and where those rules apply. This is not possible without analysis of the language itself – by examining relevant texts that shape practice – although it is always important to take into account non-language institutional practice as well. We can say that discourse is the whole of the meanings forming the rationality of social action. It means certain frameworks of rules that specify which things are good, correct, true and meaningful. This approach is typical of, for example, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe's theory of discourse,³ but also for Michel Foucault's.⁴

In defining the political discourse, I call upon Teun Van Dijk's definition.⁵ According to Van Dijk, there are two ways of determining the political discourse. First, we can study political practices by all participants involved in the political process. Another way of delimiting the object of study is by focusing on the nature of the activities or practices being effected by political texts. I apply a combination of both ways of delimiting the political discourse. Sometimes, important political texts, like official documents and laws, are my foremost interest; other times the choice of an actor, mostly a politician, was the priority, because of his or her position and activity in the discursive field of migration.

This paper is divided into three main parts. The first deals with the period before the outbreak of the refugee crisis and describes the general situation in Slovakia with regard to immigration, in order to explain the causes for the dominance of security discourse in the discursive field of migration in that country. In this part, the analysis is based on some three hundred different text sources (laws, political documents, parliamentary debates, statements of politicians in the media and interviews with selected representatives of the state administration), dating from 2004 when Slovakia joined the EU until the outbreak of the refugee crisis at the beginning of 2015.⁶ In the second part, I analyze migration discourse in Slovakia from the outbreak of the refugee crisis in April 2015 until the parliamentary elections in March 2016. This part is based on a selected segment of political discourse in Slovakia, namely politicians' statements to the

³ Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics* (London: Verso, 2001).

⁴ Michel Foucault, *L'Ordre du discours* (Paris: Gallimard, 1971).

⁵ Teun Van Dijk, "What is Political Discourse Analysis," in *Political Linguistics*, ed. Jan Blommaert and Chris Bulcaen (Amsterdam: Benjamins, 1997), 13–14.

⁶ This analysis draws on my previous research; see Jarmila Androvičová, "Migrácia a migračná politika na Slovensku – analýza diskurzu" (Doctoral Dissertation, Masaryk University, 2015).

media (television debates, press conferences, speeches; press; internet news portals), comprising some 90 sources in all. The main aim is to analyze the representation of immigrants and refugees in political discourse in Slovakia in this period, and the shift in the framing of the topic of migration compared to the previous period. In the third part, I explain the situation after the outbreak of the refugee crisis in Slovakia as an example of securitization, using the concept of moral panic.

Migration Discourse in Slovakia: Dominance of Security Discourse

The number of foreigners living legally in Slovakia has been continuously growing, particularly after its accession to the EU. It increased from 22,108 in 2004 to 84,787 in 2015.⁷ The largest share of foreigners comes from the countries of the European Union and the European Economic Area. In 2015, they accounted for 58.4% of all foreigners legally residing in Slovakia. The share of foreigners in the total population of Slovakia was 1.6% in 2015 – a share which has risen only slightly since then.⁸ Despite the fact that the Slovak Republic has no policy of active immigrant recruitment, economic immigrants are the largest group of immigrants in Slovakia. Refugees and asylum-seekers are specific, less numerous categories of immigrants. The number of asylum-seekers in Slovakia peaked in 2004, with more than 11,000 applicants. Since 2005, the situation has changed and the trend has been in the opposite direction – the number of asylum seekers has fallen continuously. The Slovak Republic has often been criticized for maintaining a strict asylum policy compared with neighboring countries. Refugees represent only a small proportion of immigrants living in Slovakia and that situation has not changed even since the outbreak of the refugee crisis.⁹

Although migration was not a major political topic in Slovakia before the outbreak of the refugee crisis, we can say that the security discourse of migration dominated long before that.¹⁰ Security discourse has been identified in other, mainly Western European countries and in the EU itself by several

⁷ *Štatistický prehľad legálnej a nelegálnej migrácie v Slovenskej republike* (Bratislava: Úrad hraničnej a cudzineckej polície, 2015), 9, http://www.minv.sk/swift_data/source/policia/hranicka_a_cudzinecka_policia/rocnky/rok_2015/2015-rocenka-UHCP-SK.pdf.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ In 2015, 330 people applied for asylum in Slovakia while in 2014 it was 328.

¹⁰ See e.g. Jarmila Androvičová, "Sekuritizácia migrantov na Slovensku – analýza diskurzu," *Sociológia* 47, No. 4 (September 2015): 319–39; and Karolína Koščová, "Ako naši politici rozprávajú o imigrantoch?" *Menšinová politika na Slovensku*, No. 3 (2012): 7, <http://cvek.sk/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/32012-sk.pdf>.

authors.¹¹ According to Didier Bigo, the popularity of the securitization view cannot be explained as a response to a real threat. “The securitization of immigration then emerges from the correlation between some successful speech acts by political leaders, the mobilization they create for and against some groups of people, and the specific field of security professionals.” As Bigo says, securitization also comes from a range of administrative practices such as “population profiling, risk assessment, statistical calculation, category creation, proactive preparation, and what may be termed a specific habitus of the security professional with its ethos of secrecy and concern for the management of fear or unease.”¹²

Securitization is, according to Bigo, significantly promoted by that discourse. “The securitization of migrants derives from the language itself and from the different capacities of various actors to engage in the speech acts.”¹³ Ole Wæver emphasizes that “the security is a speech act, in which the securitization actor marks the specific referential object as a threat and declares an emergency condition that implies the right to use the extraordinary means to handle the issue.”¹⁴ A particular problem is, however, securitized only after the relevant public accepts its definition and recognizes the right of the securitization actor to use extraordinary means beyond the common political practices. Bigo, on the other hand, does not consider the salience of an issue in some dominant discourse accepted by the public to be a prerequisite for securitization. Securitization is also possible without discourse, by non-discursive practices only – institutionalized processes and routines that influence perceptions of the issue.¹⁵ These are primarily the activities of administrative officials and bureaucratic networks, involved in the legislative process for immigration

¹¹ Alessandra Buonfino, “Between Unity and Plurality: The Politicization and Securitization of the Discourse of Immigration in Europe,” *New Political Science* 26, No. 1 (2004): 23–48; Didier Bigo, “Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease,” *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 27, Special issue (2002): 63–92; and Jef Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration,” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 38, (2000): 751–77.

¹² Bigo, “Security and Immigration,” 65.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 64.

¹⁴ Ole Wæver, “The EU as a Security Actor: Reflections from a Pessimistic Constructivist on Post-sovereignty Security Orders,” in *International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration: Power, Security, and Community*, ed. Morten Kelstrup and Michael Charles Williams (London: Routledge, 2000), 250–94, here 251.

¹⁵ Didier Bigo, “When Two Become One: Internal and External Securitizations in Europe,” in *International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration: Power, Security, and Community*, ed. Morten Kelstrup and Michael Charles Williams (London: Routledge, 2000), 171–204, here 193–94.

and internal security. Unlike government speakers, these actors are presumed to be only marginally interested in securing public legitimacy. They rather act according to a power-maximizing logic. Their interest is in expanding their influence through exporting technological and technical practices into other policy domains. Thus, they infiltrate the field of migration by applying policing and surveillance methods in order to confirm their role as providers of security.¹⁶

The key difference between Bigo and Wæver is that while Wæver emphasizes the need to voice the use of extraordinary means to eliminate a threat, Bigo advocates for conceptualization of securitization based on everyday practices. Bigo refers to the concept of the security “risk” while Wæver refers to the “threat” as a basis for securitization. Arne Niemann and Nathalie Schmidhäussler emphasize that a “threat” is much more concrete, requiring both the specification of its origin and its immediate removal because of its uncontrollability, whereas a “risk” does not have to be specified in detail and is usually defined as manageable. Based on analysis of key political documents, the authors claim that for migration into the EU, conceptualization of migration as a risk is more typical and more adequate.¹⁷ On the other hand, the discourse of some politicians and political parties of the far right (on the EU and national levels) is securitized differently, i.e., closer to the concept of threat. Moreover, security discourse is usually used exclusively and the logic of securitization is applied to all aspects of migration and to all political solutions in the cultural and/or economic areas. For this reason, I consider securitization as something scalable and gradual. This scalability can be judged on one hand by the prevalence of the logic of threat or the logic of risk in a particular discourse, and on the other hand by the prevalence of the security logic as a unique one or its use in combination with other discourses, be it economic, human rights, or other. At the same time, it is necessary to note that the use of more subtle forms of securitization does not mean that security discourse is not dominant.

Apart from the scalability of securitization, we can talk about its narrower and broader definitions. The narrow definition usually refers to a connection between migration and terrorism or crime, while the broad definition refers to the connection between migration and the entire, complex notion of security, considered in all its different dimensions (cultural, economic, political). In this

¹⁶ Arne Niemann and Natalie Schmidhäussler, “The Logic of EU Policy-Making on (Irregular) Migration: Securitisation or Risk?” (Paper presented at the UACES Conference, Passau, Germany, September 3–5, 2012), 64.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 16–17.

paper, I work with the broader definition of securitization, in which migrants are constructed as cultural, economic or social risks (in the sense that it is “risky” to build social relationships with them).¹⁸ This conceptualization creates social distance from immigrants and leads to direct discrimination against them. At the same time, negative representations of migrants form the basis for their securitization in the narrow sense as well – connecting them with terrorism and criminalizing them. These two perceptions of immigrants are especially interconnected with regard to some categories of immigrants, mainly those of Muslim origin, since their culture is often seen as inherently violent.

Political rhetoric in which immigrants were increasingly described as a threat or risk to the cultural integrity of the state and/or the nation was not very common before 2015 in Slovakia. However, it was the major framework with which immigrants were described by government officials. That is to say, if migration was discussed anywhere (e.g., by politicians), it most probably was in connection with security issues. Immigrants were described as a threat to the Slovak economy, culture and/or well-being. Analysis of parliamentary debates shows that those who were speaking about it most frequently were the Ministers of Interior – heading the ministry that is mainly responsible for the questions of security. Thus migration was most often framed in terms of security.

In the relevant period, from 2004 until now, January 2017, representatives of only two political parties held the position of Minister of Interior: two representatives from the Christian-Democratic Party (*Kresťansko-demokratické hnutie*, KDH) and one representative from the social democrats (*Smer-sociálna demokracia*, Smer-SD). Especially for the KDH ministers, migration was an important topic not only from the security point of view but as well from that of culture. They were the first to bring certain topics to the floor of Parliament, e.g., the problematic integration of certain categories of immigrants, especially non-European ones, the danger posed by marginalized immigrant communities, the danger of Islamization and the concomitant fading of the “traditional” Slovak culture and way of life – in particular Christianity. In the words of Vladimír Palko, a KDH Minister of Interior, “another upcoming huge problem, that Western Europe has already heavily experienced, but which we are also starting to experience, is the migration of millions of people from different cultures (...) by which the problem of the coexistence of different cultures and civilizations in a common space arises. There arises the serious task of determining a leading

¹⁸ Similar broad definition applies e.g. Buonfino, “Between Unity and Plurality,” 23–49.

culture, the original culture of the European majority population, that all who come to Europe must respect.”¹⁹

It is important to note that this conservative rhetoric was adopted by other politicians from different political parties and affiliations, including Smer-SD (which always remained in the opposition). Their framing of the topic of migration has been predominantly restrictive and has never encountered significant opposition from their political and ideological opponents. Those who did not openly support this kind of rhetoric did not openly oppose it either. We can say that the discursive, or ideological, struggle in Slovakia around immigration cannot be compared to the situation in Western European countries, where social democratic parties were usually more open to immigration and opposed conservative rhetoric. Polarization on the issue in Slovakia has not been significant inside the political spectrum, e.g. between political parties, but has been noticeable between individual politicians and other actors (mainly representatives of human-rights organizations, some NGOs, think-tanks, etc.)

While two Ministers of Interior from the Christian-Democratic KDH, Vladimír Palko (2002–2006) and Daniel Lipšic (2010–2012), actively framed the topic of immigration as a cultural threat, the two-term Minister of Interior from Smer-SD, Róbert Kaliňák (2006–2010; 2012–present), was not so much concerned about the cultural questions connected to migration (although he did not question this kind of rhetoric) as he was about the technical problems of border security. Approaching immigration predominantly as a security issue does not inevitably lead to the voicing of other political concerns. This is the case with Kaliňák, who has been rather preoccupied by practical questions of security, approaching immigration as a neutral, technical and apolitical problem. This strategy does, however, lead to the strengthening of security discourse, legitimizing placement of a high priority on the security dimension of migration. At the same time, it also legitimizes a broad scope of activities by different security professionals and experts, building discursive constructions in which their activities are seen as highly professional, very important, albeit costly and requiring sufficient financial resources. These discursive constructions are also easily adopted by other politicians; they are rarely questioned by political opponents or other relevant organized segments of society (as this would be highly unpopular). They are spread and legitimized by other important actors, including the

¹⁹ Transcript of the 3rd sitting of the National Council of the Slovak Republic, Bratislava, August 2, 2006, *Společná česko-slovenská digitální parlamentní knihovna*, <http://www.psp.cz/eknih/2006nr/stenprot/002schuz/s002008.htm>.

security professionals themselves, security experts, other institutions and organizations including think-tanks and parts of the academic sector, and also by the EU itself.

Not only state actors are involved in the reproduction of security discourse. In the civil sector, the new area of security studies has been gaining importance. The formation of new organizations, think-tanks, governmental and nongovernmental institutes, and university departments has been supported by immense financial inflows, partly of domestic, but mainly of foreign origin. Established organizations and institutions have expanded their focus into the area of security and strategic studies. At different conferences and security forums, analysts from the civil sector and universities, together with members of the army, the police and politicians sit side by side and discuss and mutually confirm the privileged position of security topics and the security view with regard to migration. Thus, migration is well represented as an example of so-called societal threats and risks. Moreover, if migration is discussed somewhere else (e.g. in political programs) it is usually in the chapters dedicated to security.

To conclude, we can say that the consensus (that is, the political consensus around cultural questions connected to migration, together with the broad political and professional consensus about the very high priority of the security aspects of immigration) has led to the institutionalization of security discourse in Slovakia regarding migration. The dominance of this security discourse can be documented by analyzing the language of official political documents and laws. In official strategic documents (governmental documents and directives), we find an accent on security and on framing immigrants as a possible threat. The strategic documents talk about “protecting society from increased migration,”²⁰ and about an “enormous increase of numbers of immigrants,”²¹ even though in the relevant period official statistics contradict that claim. In a government strategic document, the “Migration Policy of the Slovak Republic – Perspective to 2020,” it is stated: “The main criteria for the admission of foreigners in the management of economic migration is their potential for the development of the Slovak economy and society, with a preference for admission of migrants who have the necessary skills and competencies to cover the sustained demand in the national labor market for scarce professions, with an emphasis on

²⁰ “Dôvodová správa k zákonu č. 404/2011,” Official Site of the Economic and Social Council of the Slovak Republic, hsr.rokovania.sk/data/att/114533_subor.rtf.

²¹ *Koncepcia migračnej politiky Slovenskej republiky* (Bratislava: Ministerstvo vnútra SR, 2005), <http://www.minv.sk/mumvsr/koncepcia.htm>.

culturally-related countries.”²² The emphasis on “culturally-related countries” can no doubt be seen as contradicting the principle of non-discrimination. The rhetorical formulations, and the strict asylum policy that Slovak politicians are so proud of, together with the competence of the foreign police to refuse different kinds of stays in the country, or even citizenship without declaring any reasons, when they can apply the formula of “a danger to national security” – all have created a suspicious image of immigrants and foreigners, especially those of non-European origin. Important parts of immigration policy – such as proactive governmental recruitment policies and integration policies – are in fact missing. This suggests that Slovakia does not count on receiving immigrants nowadays or in the future.

In Slovakia, two main sources of the dominance of security discourse in the migration field are relevant. First, security discourse is based on political activity, which uses populist “enemy-seeking” strategies. Second, the rise of security discourse is a technocratic process, connected with the growing power of different professionals in the field of security, which penetrates into the civil sector.

Slovak Politicians and the Refugee Crisis

The dominance of security discourse in an institutionalized form has been an important factor underlying the character of the political debate in Slovakia since the outbreak of the refugee crisis in Europe. One important situation which stimulated the rhetoric was the up-coming parliamentary election campaign and the pre-election period in general. The refugee crisis started less than one year before the parliamentary elections in Slovakia held on March 5, 2016. The government at that time consisted of one party, the social democratic Smer-SD. Its leader, Prime Minister Robert Fico, had not previously commented on the topic of migration, with a few exceptions when Slovakia was preparing to enter the Schengen Area.²³ Suddenly, during the refugee crisis, he commented intensively on everything concerning migration and refugees. During the celebration of the 71st anniversary of the Slovak National Uprising in summer 2015 he dedicated more than half of his speech to the topic of migration, warning against its negative impact and against neglecting or underestimating

²² *Migračná politika Slovenskej republiky s výhľadom do roku 2020* (Bratislava: Ministerstvo vnútra, 2011), <http://www.minv.sk/?zamer-migracnej-politiky-slovenskej-republiky>.

²³ Slovakia entered the Schengen Area in December 2007. Fico’s first government was formed on July 4, 2006.

its threat.²⁴ Similarly, Richard Sulík, leader of the liberal opposition party SaS and a member of the European parliament, also commented extensively on the topic.²⁵

The topic of migration was actively used in the campaign by the political parties from which we might expect it. First was the nationalist party *Slovenská národná strana* (SNS), whose leader, Andrej Danko, had already spoken about Islamization in 2011. Secondly, the right-wing extremist party *Kotleba – Ľudová strana Naše Slovensko* (Kotleba – ĽSNS), whose leader, Marian Kotleba, formerly a neo-Nazi activist, employed far more radical rhetoric. The main difference between him and “mainstream” politicians was that Kotleba openly spoke about a goal of zero immigration. He also addressed different fora. He preferred speaking “to the street” during anti-immigration demonstrations, making direct contact with the people.²⁶

In the following text, I analyze the statements of the above-mentioned politicians concerning migration, refugees and connected problems and topics. My analysis is qualitative. To me, it was not important to gather all the relevant data for the studied period and quantify the results, but it was necessary to have enough data that would reveal certain regularities and provide answers for given research questions. I stopped gathering new data at the moment when it had not provided any substantial new information for a long period and did not change the research conclusions; rather, it just confirmed or slightly enriched them (in other words, the sample was saturated). I analyze statements by politicians in the media, but at this moment I am not interested in the role of the media in transferring and interpreting information. Prime Minister Robert Fico was the most active in speaking about immigrants and refugees in the media. That is why his statements and those of his party colleagues form the basis of my analysis and determine the structure of the following text. The statements of other politicians

²⁴ “Vystúpenie Roberta Fica na oslavách SNP v Banskej Bystrici,” online video, *Smer TV*, August 2015, <http://www.smertv.sk/c/940/1/0/vystupenie-roberta-fica-na-oslavach-snp-v-banskej-bystrici.htm>.

²⁵ While the Prime Minister had more space in the mainstream media, Sulík used more alternative media spaces such as blogs and participated in different public discussions. See e.g. a discussion about refugees, “Celá diskusia Denníka N o utečencoch,” YouTube video, 1:36:00, posted by *Denník N*, August 5, 2015, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mTh9xvJsQoM>; Sulík’s interview for Radio Express “Richard Sulík – 800 utečencov na Slovensku je len začiatok,” YouTube video, 12:25, June 1, 2015, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5CTKWtwYo2U&t=6s>; and Sulík’s articles on his personal website Richard Sulík – Spravme Slovensko lepším!, www.sulik.sk.

²⁶ See e.g. Kotleba’s speech on demonstration against Islamization of Europe, “STOP islamizácií Európy – Marián Kotleba,” YouTube video, 10:19, June 20, 2015, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B5-KxuO6bsM>.

are taken into account in relation to the “big picture” painted by Fico. In my analysis, I focus on representations of refugees and immigrants, as well as on other important collective identities involved in migration.

An important consequence of political discourse on power is how collective identities are represented. These are very important to those who are governed, i.e. those who are at the core of the analyzed discourses. During the campaign, immigrants and refugees were referred to as “they,” as opposed to “us.” Their otherness was seen mainly in their different ethnicity, culture or religion. But another way they were “othered” is that they were not portrayed as the subjects of proposed policies; they were perceived mainly as passive objects – something with which politicians had to cope. Their subsidiary position was openly articulated by Slovak politicians, who stated that for them, it is the interests of Slovak citizens that always come first. This was presented as an absolute priority. It means that politicians promoted the idea that they would not do anything that might endanger Slovak citizens in any way. Slovak citizens, in other words, were not expected to give up any share of their comfort and safety. This was a very important promise implied in the election campaign – that politicians would secure an unchanged status quo. In this view, refugees and immigrants must not change anything in the current way of life and living standards of the domestic inhabitants, because they are not entitled to do so; they are not citizens, not part of the society. “We” can help “them” only if it will not limit us at all.

The main idea advanced by most of the Slovak politicians (the strongest voice being that of Prime Minister Fico) was a restrictive, cautious attitude towards a potential “influx of immigrants.” This eventuality was seen as a potential threat to national security and to the traditional Slovak way of life. Most politicians, of course, did not directly demand that Slovakia not accept a single person. But they claimed the government must select very carefully, arguing that most of the refugees coming into Europe are undeserving “economic maneuverers,”²⁷ expecting only “social benefits,”²⁸ and that they have no chance to succeed in the labor market because they are “mostly uneducated.”²⁹ A characteristic suggesting that refugees do not need help was attached to them: “they are mostly

²⁷ “Vystúpenie Roberta Fica.”

²⁸ SITA, “Fico: Obávam sa, že EÚ nechce zastaviť migráciu,” *Pravda*, January 26, 2016 <http://spravy.pravda.sk/domace/clanok/381254-fico-obavam-sa-ze-eu-nechce-zastavit-migraciju>.

²⁹ SITA, “Krajiny majú právo povedať, že utečencov nechcú, tvrdí Sulík,” *HN online*, May 31, 2015, <http://dennik.hnonline.sk/slovensko/583632-krajiny-maju-pravo-povedat-ze-utecencov-nechcu-tvrdi-sulik>.

young men.”³⁰ This demographic category was also quite important to portraying immigrants as possibly dangerous, because “young men” are often associated with a higher risk of radicalization.

On the other hand, most politicians claimed from time to time that they were willing to help “deserving” immigrants, the real escapees from war and vulnerable categories of people like mothers with children, etc. At the same time, however, Fico stated that Slovaks will accept only those who are able to integrate to live on their territory. According to him, that would be only Christians. This attitude was criticized from some places (mainly from abroad) as “discriminatory.” The official reaction from the Ministry of Interior to this criticism was that “only Christians have good chances to integrate transparently into our society. We are not against religion and this is not discrimination. From the Slovak point of view it is just an effort to succeed with integration.”³¹ Islam was seen as inherently violent and thus all Muslims were potential terrorists. Robert Fico drew attention with his statement that “we are monitoring every single Muslim” on Slovak territory.³²

The Roma people were the most important example supporting the claim that Slovakia would not be able to culturally integrate different immigrants. “After all, we are not able to integrate our own Roma citizens, of whom we have hundreds of thousands. How can we integrate people who are somewhere else with their traditions, religion, and way of life?”³³ This argument was quite popular in Internet discussion groups. The comparison of refugees and Roma people highlighted certain immigrant characteristics, namely their “backwardness” and inability to work, which are the main characteristics connected with Roma people in Slovak popular discourse. Immigrants were also marked as people about whom Slovak society knows nothing. This was important not only culturally but also from the security point of view.

³⁰ “Fico po summite: Kvóty sa neriešili. Zhodli sme sa však, že musíme zabrániť ďalšiemu prílevu migrantov,” *HN online*, September 23, 2015, <http://dennik.hnonline.sk/svet/572531-fico-po-summite-kvoty-sa-neriesili-zhodli-sme-sa-vsak-ze-musime-zabranit-dalsiemu-prilevu-migrantov>.

³¹ ČTK, “Slovensko je kvôli ‘kresťanským utečencom’ pod palbou kritiky,” *O médiách*, August 21, 2015, <http://www.omediach.com/tlac/item/7267-slovensko-je-kvoli-krestanskym-utecencom-pod-palbou-kritiky>.

³² TASR, “Fico: Bezpečnosť Slovákov je na prvom mieste. Monitorujeme aj tábor v Gabčíkove,” *HN online*, November 15, 2015, <http://dennik.hnonline.sk/slovensko/554133-fico-bezpecnost-slovakov-je-na-prvom-mieste-monitorujeme-aj-tabor-v-gabcikove>.

³³ SITA, “Fico na oslave SNP: Príliv utečencov je hrozba pre európsky spôsob života,” *Pravda*, August 29, 2015, <http://spravy.pravda.sk/domace/clanok/366080-fico-na-oslave-snp-priliv-utecencov-je-hrozba-pre-europsky-sposob-zivota-tradicie-a-hodnoty/>.

This imaging, which portrays immigrants as substantially different and external to “us,” springs from the ideal of a cohesive society where “we all know each other.” According to Christian Joppke and Ewa Morawska, this ideal “rests on the premise of an already integrated, bounded society, which faces the risk of disintegration and unbinding due to immigration.” According to them, the underlying picture is of a society composed of domestic individuals and groups (the antithesis of “immigrants”), who are “integrated” (normatively by consensus and organizationally by the state). “Postclassical sociology, even before the arrival of ‘globalization,’ has shown that such a society does not exist anywhere, except in the imagination of some (especially political) actors.”³⁴ Contemporary culture is characterized by a plurality of lifestyles, so it is unclear into which of these cultures immigrants are actually supposed to integrate.

Something important in the discussion of “integrability or non-integrability” of immigrants into Slovakia is missing here. That is discussion about the role of the state, state policies and other domestic actors involved in the process of integration. Debate about what tools should be adopted to help the process along was completely missing. This lack resulted from the idea that Slovaks need do nothing and will not give up even a bit of comfort. It was also connected to the idea of zero-migration – if Slovakia admits no immigrants, no integration policy is needed. If Slovak politicians had discussed the active participation of the state in the integration process, they would have had to admit the possibility that at least a few immigrants would come. People might regard this as encouraging their arrival.

It is also important to analyze other collective identities involved in the process of integration. The self-definition of “us” is closely connected to the representation of the “others.” In this case “us” is mainly connected to national, ethnic, cultural and religious characteristics that make “us” Slovaks. Only in few cases is this self-definition broadened to “us” as Europeans. On the contrary, in some cases Europeanism was discursively distinguished. Partly it was excluded into “otherness” as I will discuss later. The representation of the Slovak nation as “us” was associated with several characteristics in politicians’ claims. Firstly, it was “our” Christianity, as already discussed above. Christianity was viewed as incompatible with the Muslim religion and thus with all immigrants of that faith. An interesting aspect of “us” was the ostensible parallel of Slovaks as refugees

³⁴ Christian Joppke and Ewa Morawska, “Integrating Immigrants in Liberal Nation-States: Policies and Practices,” in *Toward Assimilation and Citizenship. Immigrants in Liberal Nation-States*, ed. Christian Joppke and Ewa Morawska (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 3.

fleeing the former communist regime. This parallel was used mainly by those who sought to refute the need to show solidarity towards refugees because Slovaks had benefited from foreign refugee policies in the past. Many times, it was claimed that “we,” unlike current refugees, “have always accepted the rules of the state to which we had come with full respect for domestic norms.”³⁵

Another important, explicit or implicit, category was “small,” in the sense of a small and poor nation that does not have enough resources to take care of immigrants and refugees and that has enough problems of its own. “Small” was also associated with having a weak voice in the European Union. Politicians claimed that the EU in Brussels and its bigger member states do not take sufficient account of the opinions and needs of smaller states like Slovakia. “The problem of migrants has escalated because the big countries solve it at the expense of the small ones,” Fico said.³⁶ European identity was thus on some occasions considered as an “in-group,” mainly when talking about common policies and attitudes towards guarding the external borders of the EU, as well as when talking about endangered European culture. On the other hand, on some occasions, Europeanism was constructed as something external to Slovakia – something that usurps power and competences naturally belonging to nation states, a big machinery unable to work effectively. Solutions proposed by the EU administration were mostly seen as something opposed to Slovak interests.

Another important self-definition is connected with a narrower scope of “us” – that is, “us” as those responsible and rational persons who will not permit the decay of Slovakia and its culture, nor allow the security of its citizens to fade. Politicians related this definition to themselves and to similar “right-thinking” people. On the other hand, their opponents were emphasizing the “irresponsibility” of openness and solidarity – because they ignore or obscure true danger. Those opponents were explicitly or implicitly marked as irresponsible or even dangerous to Slovakia. “If today another government were in power in Slovakia, thousands of migrants would have been brought here into our country,” Fico said during a TV discussion. “Mr. President is not responsible for anything; thus, it is easy for him to talk like that. If something happened, he would be the first to criticize the government that we did not handle the problem.”³⁷ Other opponents

³⁵ SITA, “Krajiny majú právo.”

³⁶ TASR, “Fico o utečeneckých kvótach: Zauťočil na veľké krajiny,” *Pluska*, June 25, 2015, <http://www.pluska.sk/spravy/z-domova/fico-uteceneckych-kvotach-zautocil-velke-krajiny.html>.

³⁷ TASR, “Fico straší moslimskými getami: Iná vláda by sem navozila tisícky migrantov,” *Denník N*, January 16, 2016, <https://dennikn.sk/344942/fico-strasi-getami-ina-vlada-by-sem-navozila-tisicky-migrantov>.

from NGOs and media were denigrated as “sanctimonious human-rights advocates.”³⁸ “Let’s not pretend we do not see the people’s fear because the media and NGOs force us to not to.”³⁹ Some other collectivities and individuals were included into the realm of the irresponsible – the EU itself, some European leaders (first among them Angela Merkel) and some countries like Greece and Italy that, according to Minister Kaliňák, “failed to do their homework” while Slovakia did its own very responsibly.⁴⁰

To conclude, we can say that in that period migration became a politicized topic for the first time, actively used in the campaign by key political actors. Moreover, there was substantial interest among the media and the public (although the level of public involvement can be measured only partially and indirectly from discussions in the media and on the Internet – especially on social networks – and from shared personal experience). Comparing the level of interest dedicated to migration with that of the previous period, it seems like a sudden, intense, effusive interest (despite the fact that Slovakia was not directly stricken by the refugee crisis). The shift in the way the issue was framed was alarming – from institutionalized cautiousness towards immigrants, organized around the concept of risk, to emotionally-colored anti-immigration rhetoric used in an election campaign.

Immigrants as a Threat: Example of Moral Panic

As I have already stated, security discourse has been institutionalized in Slovakia (just as it has been in many other EU countries, albeit in different variants and usually with more significant political opposition to the security view). This means that practices based on the security view of migration have become part of the legal framework as well as of everyday dealings with immigrants and refugees. Viewing immigrants and refugees as a possible risk or threat to society is now widely accepted and an everyday reality in some specific sectors of Slovak society (the police, the academy, politicians, and bureaucrats).

On the other hand, migration was not such an issue of public concern that it became a major topic for politicians or the media before the outbreak of the

³⁸ Míro Kern, “Keď Fico a Mečiar hovorili o mimovládach: zahraničný kapitál, ľudskoprávni svätuškári (citáty),” *Denník N*, May 26, 2016, <https://dennikn.sk/471500/ked-fico-meciar-hovorili-mimovladkach-zahranicny-kapital-ludskopravni-svatuskari-citaty>.

³⁹ “Vystúpenie Roberta Fica.”

⁴⁰ Interview for Radio Express, “Robert Kaliňák – Povinné kvóty na presídľovanie utečencov nepodporíme,” YouTube video, 12:16, May 15, 2015, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TyxY5vDMMN4>.

refugee crisis. The sudden interest in the topic was not caused by an actual influx of immigrants, but it increasingly influenced agenda-setting by some media and political analysts and campaigning connected to 2016 parliamentary election. As I have already explained in this paper, security discourse can be reproduced in different ways and at different intensities. In the period before the outbreak of the refugee crisis, security discourse manifested itself mainly through everyday practices and was addressed in connection with the concept of risk. After the outbreak of the refugee crisis it became a priority topic for some politicians (mainly the leaders of particular political parties) and as well for the media. The framing of a connection between security and migration has changed and the concept of threat has become more prominent. Politicians started to call for extraordinary measures to cope with the problem. This way of securitizing the issue was close to Wæver's conceptualization of securitization, while before the crisis, Bigo's conceptualization would have been more appropriate. Wæver's conceptualization, with its emphasis on declaration of an emergency situation by politicians, public, media and other actors, can be in fact be considered as close to a so-called moral panic. Stanley Cohen describes a situation of moral panic as follows: "A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other right-thinking people; socially accredited experts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are evolved... or resorted to."⁴¹

Erich Goode and Nachman Ben-Yehuda introduce several definitional criteria for the concept of moral panic.⁴² First is *concern*. "There must be a heightened level of concern over the behavior (or supposed behavior) of a certain group or category and the consequences that the behavior presumably causes for the rest of the society."⁴³ Concern about migration in the studied period in Slovakia has been closely tied with the question of immigrants' behavior, or more precisely their supposed behavior, based on selected experiences with them in other European countries having large immigrant communities and in countries that have been significantly touched by refugee flows. Incidents such as the terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels and violent attacks on women in Cologne, Germany, were used as examples of behavior typical of a whole group. Although it was

⁴¹ Stanley Cohen, *Folk Devils and Moral Panics* (London: Routledge, 2002), 9.

⁴² Erich Goode and Nachman Ben-Yehuda, "Moral Panics: Culture, Politics, and Social Construction," *Annual Review of Sociology* 20 (1994): 149–71.

⁴³ Goode and Ben-Yehuda, "Moral Panics," 156–57.

sometimes admitted that not every immigrant or refugee behaves that way, it was emphasized that “you never know” who can be dangerous, and thus everyone in the group is suspect. Consequently, a risk was seen in every single immigrant entering the territory of Slovakia. Minister of Interior Kaliňák emphasized the impossibility of identifying the terrorists among the refugees. “He does not tell us anything. You don’t know who he is. He can say, e.g., that he is 20 and in fact he is 40. For ten years he can be the most beautiful person in the world and then we will be surprised. These are gigantic risks.”⁴⁴

The heightened level of concern can be easily measured. Although I do not quantify the indicators here, one example could be an increased number of articles dedicated to the issue by the media. Examination of the period before March 2015 and period from April 2015 until the election in March 2016 would no doubt show a huge difference. Another indicator could be the number of politicians’ speeches dedicated to the topic. Over the studied period, the politicians showed nearly zero interest at the start, but later you can hardly find a speech, press conference, or discussion where, for example, Prime Minister Fico did not mention migration and problems connected to it.⁴⁵ The indicators also show a decline in concern after the election, although it did remain bigger than before the refugee crisis hit. Other relevant indicators showing the level of concern could be activity by action groups (such as anti-immigration demonstrations) that previously were either not seen at all, or did not focus exclusively on migration. Likewise, the interest of the people can be observed from social networks like Facebook and in various on-line discussions.

The second indicator, according to Goode and Ben-Yehuda, is *hostility*.⁴⁶ An increased level of hostility is developed towards the category of people seen as engaging in threatening behavior. In Slovakia, fortunately, hostility has not manifested itself in a massively violent way, although a number of small incidents have taken place. For example, a group of anti-immigration demonstrators threw stones at a Muslim family (who were not immigrants but just attending the graduation ceremony of their son) and shouted “go home,” an incident that was

⁴⁴ Monika Tódová and Juraj Čokyna, “Kiska o utečencoch: Tým, čo ide o život, by sme mali pomôcť,” *Denník N*, June 11, 2015, <https://dennikn.sk/156931/kiska-o-utecencoch-tym-co-ide-o-zivot-sme-mali-pomocť>.

⁴⁵ Viera Žúborová, “Politika dvoch tvárí: vládny migračný diskurz,” in *Interpolis 16. Zborník vedeckých prác, medzinárodná vedecká konferencia doktorandov a mladých vedeckých pracovníkov, Banská Bystrica, 10. 11. 2016*, eds. Barbora Kollárová, Dominika Cevárova, Martin Čapljar a Vladimír Müller (Banská Bystrica: Fakulta politických vied a medzinárodných vzťahov, 2016), 120–28.

⁴⁶ Goode and Ben-Yehuda, “Moral Panics,” 157.

recorded on video and uploaded to the Internet.⁴⁷ Hostility, however, does not only mean sudden expressions of disgust or rejection. It can also be found in the creation of distance and a more radicalized dichotomization between “them” and “us,” including generating stereotypical “folk devils” on the one hand and “folk heroes” on the other. As I have already showed in this paper, this dichotomization was very significant during the analyzed period.

The third definition criterion advanced by Goode and Ben-Yehuda is *consensus*.⁴⁸ They claim there must be a certain minimum level of agreement in society as a whole or in designated segments of society that the threat posed is real, serious, and attributable to the behavior or wrongdoing of group members. This sentiment must be fairly widespread, although the proportion of the population that feels this way need not make up a majority. In the case of Slovakia, a consensus appeared not only among the public, but quite importantly, also among politicians and political parties. The truth is that the Slovak political elites in general agreed with the basic attitudes of Slovaks towards the problem and its solution, or perhaps toward what should not be its solution. In September 2015, the Slovak parliament adopted a resolution rejecting the system of redistributing refugees proposed by the European Commission. The resolution was all but unanimously supported by 115 of the 119 members of the parliament present for the vote. The voices emphasizing anything other than the security view, mainly those of the Slovak President, Andrej Kiska, the leader of the minority party *Most-Híd*, Béla Bugár, and of Monika Flašíková Beňová, a Member of the European Parliament for the party Smer-SD, were much weaker than the others. Proving the extent of a consensus among the Slovak public is more difficult; nevertheless, we can use the results of certain opinion polls showing that the majority of Slovaks are rather cautious about immigrants and agree with the strict immigration policy of the government.⁴⁹

Disproportionality is the fourth criterion. It is connected with exaggerations that overestimate the scope of the problem. The overestimation often results from the generation and dissemination of numbers and evidence that are imprecise or that are misinterpreted. Disproportionality is also connected to situations

⁴⁷ “Arabská rodina, ktorú napadli extrémisti, prišla na Slovensko synovi na promócie,” *Pravda*, June 23, 2015, <http://spravy.pravda.sk/domace/clanok/359421-arabska-rodina-ktoru-napadli-extremisti-prisla-na-slovensko-synovi-na-promocie>.

⁴⁸ Goode and Ben-Yehuda, “Moral Panics,” 157.

⁴⁹ See e.g. “PRIESKUM: Prijmeme utečencov za svojich? Takýto je postoj Slovákov,” *Pluska*, September 16, 2015, <http://www.pluska.sk/spravy/z-domova/prieskum-prijmeme-utecencov-za-svojich-takoty-je-postoj-slovakov.html>.

where the traits (e.g. the behavior) of one group are treated differently than the same traits in another group. A very good example of this is the case of criminality among immigrants. Many studies in different countries have shown that the crime rate among immigrants (especially asylum seekers) usually does not exceed the rate among the domestic population.⁵⁰ Still, violent crimes committed by immigrants call forth more attention than those committed by the domestic population and are understood to be general features of the behavior of the whole group.

In the Slovak case, disproportionality can be seen in alarming reports about the number of immigrants Slovakia was supposed to receive according to the proposed EU quota system. Fico described it as “one whole village,” suggesting that the number was too large without any real argumentation for why the proposed number (1502 asylum seekers in the first year) is too large for Slovak capacities for integration. The intensity of feeling around the quota issue was no doubt increased by the arrival of a new player on the political scene. The previously marginal far-right party ĽSNS, with its leader, Marian Kotleba, became significant when Kotleba won election to be the head of the Banská Bystrica region in 2013. His rhetoric was very radical, accusing other politicians of being traitors to the national interest. Politicians consciously or unconsciously tried to reassure the public that they were resolute and decisive on the issue of migration. Consequently, the answer to the entrance of an extremist party onto the political stage has been the radicalization of mainstream politics.

The fifth criterion of moral panic is *volatility*. Moral panic erupts fairly suddenly (often remaining latent for long periods of time and reappearing from time to time) and then, nearly as suddenly, subsides.⁵¹ To describe moral panic as volatile and short-lived does not imply that it does not have structural or historical antecedents. In Slovakia, structural preconditions were in fact formed by institutionalized security discourse, as described above. Historical antecedents for moral panic can be seen in various politicians’ more or less successful use of enemy-building strategies in Slovak public discourse, related to Slovakia’s Hungarian, Roma and sexual minorities. Interest in the topic of migration arose

⁵⁰ See for example Brian Bell, Francesco Fasani, and Stephen Machin, “Crime and Immigration: Evidence from Large Immigrant Waves,” *Review of Economics and Statistics* 95, No. 4 (October 2013): 1278–90; and Milo Bianchi, Paolo Buonanno, and Paolo Pinotti, “Do immigrants cause crime?” *Journal of the European Economic Association* 10, No. 6 (December 2012): 1318–47. See also “Kriminalita a migrácia v grafoch – mali by ste sa báť svojho suseda cudzinca?” *Denník N*, January 15, 2017, <https://dennikn.sk/634945/kriminalita-a-migracia-v-grafoch-mali-by-ste-sa-bat-svojho-suseda-cudzinca/>.

⁵¹ Goode and Ben-Yehuda, “Moral Panics,” 158.

suddenly, then significantly decreased after the elections in 2016, although it remains bigger than before the outbreak of the refugee crisis. Periods of moral panic, even though they subside after a period of time, usually leave marks on a society, and elements of panic may even become institutionalized.⁵² The situation in Slovakia after the outbreak of the refugee crisis can be described as being very close to a moral panic. In the analysis above, I have focused on domestic factors, but of course further attention should be given to the European and global contexts, which I do not discuss here. Episodes of moral panic have occurred elsewhere in Europe and the world on the national and the local level.⁵³

The concept of moral panic highlights certain important aspects of the political debate about migration and the refugee crisis in the period under study. In order at least to indicate possible directions of interpretation of the causes for the eruption of a moral panic, I will apply three models of moral panic proposed by Goode and Ben-Yehuda. Their theory is based on a typology that combines two relevant dimensions. The first dimension is that of morality vs. interest. This dimension addresses the question of motive: do concern and activism coalesce around a given issue because of a world-view, an ideology, or morality – that is, because of deeply and genuinely felt attitudes and sentiments – or because certain actors stand to gain something of value – a job, power, resources, respectability, wealth, recognition – if they can convince others to become concerned about that issue. And second, are there many actors who are responsible for the creation and maintenance of a panic, or just a few? Does a panic start from the bottom and progress upward, or does it operate from the top-down? Or does a panic begin not from the elite at the top nor from the undifferentiated general public but rather in the middle of a society's status, power, and wealth hierarchy, with representatives and leaders of specific middle-level organizations, agencies, groups, institutions, or associations?⁵⁴

Goode and Ben-Yehuda propose three explanations applying relevant combinations of these dimensions. First is *the grassroots model*. The grassroots model argues that panics originate with the general public. Concern about a particular threat in this case is a widespread, genuinely felt concern. Thus, even if

⁵² Currently (December 2016) amendments to the law on registration of churches have increased the number of members needed by a church for official registration by the state from 20,000 to 50,000. The official reason given was to prevent speculative registrations, but we believe that one of the important motives was to prevent Muslim groups from registering officially.

⁵³ See e.g. Greg Martin, "Stop the boats! Moral Panic in Australia over Asylum Seekers," *Journal of Media & Cultural Studies* 29, No. 2 (February 2015): 304–22; and Sarah Adjekum, "Violence in any Other Name" (Master thesis, McMaster University 2016).

⁵⁴ Goode and Ben-Yehuda, "Moral Panics," 159.

politicians or the media seem to originate or “stir-up” concern, in reality, that concern must have been latent in the public to begin with. Politicians and the media cannot fabricate concern where none exists initially. A panic is simply the outward manifestation of what already exists in more covert form. Politicians give speeches and propose laws they already know will appeal to their constituency, whose views they have already sounded out, and the media broadcasts stories that their representatives know the public is likely to find interesting or troubling.⁵⁵

In Slovakia, popular attitudes towards migration, immigrants and refugees were cautious and rather negative long before the outbreak of the refugee crisis.⁵⁶ It is very probable that politicians (such as Fico) knew that. As well as publicly available opinion polls, they have their own polls and sources of information that focus on their existing constituencies and possible new voters. Using this information, they can decide which political strategy is best for them.

The data shows that actual and possible voters for Smer-SD have been shifting from very intersectional (i.e., including all demographic categories) in the first years after the formation of the party and that nowadays, older voters and the inhabitants of small towns and rural areas predominate.⁵⁷ The latter categories of voter are often people with few experiences with immigrants and foreigners. They often hold low socio-economic status and low education levels. These are group characteristics which carry a (statistically) high possibility of rejecting immigrants and feeling significant social distance from foreigners. Thus, they are a group of voters that is possibly interesting to the far right. From this point of view, we cannot claim that Fico, in deciding to use anti-immigration rhetoric during the election campaign, created xenophobia among Slovak citizens. His political decision was rather based on good reason to believe this strategy would be successful for his party. However, that is not to say he did not significantly exacerbate xenophobia and anti-immigrant attitudes. He certainly did, not only during the refugee crisis but also previously, with some of his political steps and statements. It is nonetheless clear that there is receptivity to this kind of politics in Slovakia. Both politicians and the public share a negative attitude towards immigrants.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 161.

⁵⁶ See e.g. Michal Vašečka, *Postoje verejnosti k cudzincom a zahraničnej migrácii v Slovenskej republike*. (Bratislava: IOM, 2009).

⁵⁷ Oľga Gyarfášová and Tomáš Slosiarik, *Volby do NR SR 2016: Čo charakterizovalo voličov*, Working Papers in Sociology 1 (Bratislava: Sociologický ústav SAV, 2016), 2–11, http://www.sociologia.sav.sk/pdf/Working_Papers_in_Sociology_012016.pdf.

At the same time, to emphasize that Fico's decision (or that of any other politician) to use anti-immigration campaign rhetoric is pragmatic is not to say that his genuine opinions are in fact the opposite. It may have partially come from a personal attitude and predisposition to perceive certain political questions in a certain way. Politicians emerge from the population and more or less stay in interaction with the public. They thus share similar attitudes and values, although they are forced to act pragmatically in order to be re-elected. In the case of immigration, however, noting that politicians' interest in the topic erupted in the pre-election period and subsided after the election, their concrete interest in winning that election can be considered to be their basic motivation for participation in such a massive way in the creation of a moral panic.

The second theory is *the elite-engineered* model. This theory sees a moral panic as the result of a small and powerful group of people, or a set of such groups, that deliberately and consciously undertakes a campaign to generate and sustain fear, concern, and panic on the part of the public about an issue they consciously recognize is not terribly harmful to the society as a whole. Typically, this campaign is intended to divert attention away from real problems in society, whose genuine solution would threaten or undermine the interests of the elite.⁵⁸ This thesis is also worth consideration with regard to Slovakia. Shortly before the refugee crisis, Fico lost a presidential election to Slovakia's current president, Andrej Kiska. We could mention problems Fico had during the election campaign, namely the protests of teachers and nurses who were seeking a wage increase. We can say that the resonance of the immigration issue with the public might have been considered by Fico as coming in handy and that it may have enabled him to renew his image as a defender of the Slovak nation against threats from abroad. For Fico, and certainly for other politicians as well, this was an occasion to show their competence by proposing solutions for a relatively new problem.

The third theory is *the interest group* theory. The central question posed by the interest group approach is *cui bono?* – to whose benefit? Who profits? Who wins if a given situation is recognized as a threat to society? At first sight this model is not very relevant to the Slovak situation. It would fit another issue better, which is the referendum on banning same-sex marriages, or “referendum on the family,” that took place in Slovakia in 2015. That referendum was promoted

⁵⁸ Craig Renarman and Harry G. Levin, “The crack attack: politics and media in America's latest drug scare,” in *Images of Issues: Typifying Contemporary Social Problems*, ed. Joel Best (New York: Aldine, 1989), 115–37, quoted in Goode and Ben-Yehuda, “Moral Panics,” 164.

by conservative segments of society in order to prevent the establishment of the equality of homosexual relationships with traditional marriage.⁵⁹

In the case of immigration, it is hard to accuse any interest group of exacerbating moral panic in order to profit from it. However, we can think about the above-mentioned technocratic dimension of securitization in this regard. There are certain segments of society that act in the area of security whose prestige and finances can be positively influenced by an outbreak of moral panic concerning immigration. That is not to say they were the principal agents of moral panic in this case. However, by not questioning whether panic was justified, they directly or indirectly supported that outcome. A good symbolic example was the situation on June 20, 2015. That day, the annual Globsec Conference took place in Bratislava.⁶⁰ An anti-immigrant demonstration promoted mainly by the far right and extremist forces took place at the same time. Both events were completely separate and the proponents and participants of each event distanced themselves from the other group. However, the import of both events, as read by the people, was very similar: immigrants and terrorism are huge security threats. Although they were said in different words to different audiences, very similar ideas were expressed by participants from both events and were presented on the evening TV news.⁶¹ In a sense, security professionals and security experts can be understood as an interest group that profits from moral panic around immigration. Even though they may have distanced themselves from panic, they did not contradict the basic premises that directly or indirectly contributed to it.

To conclude, the arguments for the *elite-engineered* model are the strongest in the case of the moral panic that accompanied the Slovak response to the 2015 refugee crisis. The fact that it coincided with the pre-election period suggests that the temptation to use the immigration question for political purposes was strong, and probably much stronger than the “naturally” felt concern or fear of the population. At the very least we can plausibly argue that this concern was significantly elevated by politicians’ characterizations of events. A central role here can be attributed to mutual interaction between politicians and the

⁵⁹ Michal Smrek, “The Failed Slovak Referendum On ‘Family’: Voters’ Apathy and Minority Rights in Central Europe,” *Baltic Worlds*, March 4, 2015.

⁶⁰ International conference that takes place in Bratislava since 2005 dedicated to the issues of security that has become in the last years attended by very important guests like current or former heads of states.

⁶¹ “Správy RTVS,” online video, June 20, 2015, <https://www.rtv.s.sk/televizia/archiv/11580/68387>; TASR, “O migrácii hovoril Kaliňák s americkým exministrom pre bezpečnosť,” *Sme*, June 19, 2015, <https://domov.sme.sk/c/7869194/o-migracii-hovoril-kalinak-s-americkym-exministrom-pre-bezpecnost.html>.

public (with the politicians displaying stronger and quicker reactions), together with the ongoing activities of some interest groups involved in the process, all of which contributed directly or indirectly to the prominence of the issue. It is however necessary to remind that in this paper I have focused on domestic factors and did not study the external factors that are important for complete analysis of the topic.

Conclusion

The dominance of security discourse in Slovakia with regard to immigrants and refugees is based on the prioritization of national security interests and security measures in the different migration policies and administrative procedures devised to deal with migration and refugee issues. It is taken for granted that immigrants represent a risk to Slovakia's domestic society. As a result, the main policies and administrative procedures concerning migrants' stay on Slovak territory are restrictive. Institutionalized securitization based on the concept of risk manifests itself in everyday practices towards immigrants and has been typical of Slovak migration policy from the beginning of the studied period in 2004. On the other hand, until the outbreak of the refugee crisis in 2015, migration was a marginal issue for politicians, the public and the media. The "enemy-seeking" strategies adopted by some politicians with regard to immigrants and refugees were outgrowths of existing policies for dealing with certain demographic categories, such as Roma people, the Hungarian minority and sexual minorities.

However, these two preconditions, institutionalized security discourse and the success of enemy-building strategies towards autochthonic minorities, were important to the outbreak of moral panic around a possible "influx" of immigrants and refugees to Slovakia in 2015. The broad consensus on the political scene that migration is first of all a security issue allowed politicians to believe that their opponents would not significantly criticize their anti-immigration rhetoric. Their previously successful use of securitization strategies towards autochthonic minorities allowed them to think that if such opposing views did appear, they could easily be dismissed as unpatriotic.

Anti-immigration rhetoric became an integral part of the 2016 parliamentary election campaign. The leaders of the relevant mainstream political parties, mainly Smer-SD and SaS, adopted anti-immigration rhetoric typical of the far right. They actively tried to instill a sense of danger among the public and to persuade voters that they were best able to protect the nation from the threat. A perceived need for immediate action became obvious not only in the rhetoric,

but also in certain measures adopted by the Slovak government. The Slovak parliament, for example, ratified counter-terrorism legislation that included extending the period of detention allowed for persons suspected of terrorism. The government, for its part, convened its Security Council, increased the number of police officers, and prepared mobile barrier fencing for a possible big wave of immigrants at the borders. All these measures were presented as a response to what was going on in other European states and as a preventative against similar incidents taking place in Slovakia. However, the intensity of the political activities aimed at persuading the public and the media indicate the extreme politicization of the issue. Thus we can say that the primary agents of moral panic in this case were (some) Slovak politicians.

Migrants were stigmatized in politicians' statements as "others" in a significant sense – as people who endanger ordinary Slovaks with their different culture and different (read violent) behavior. Moreover, those Slovaks who declared their solidarity and willingness to help immigrants and refugees were also subjected to "othering" themselves, branding them as "irrational," "irresponsible," and even "dangerous." In this way, new discursive borderlines were drawn between Slovak citizens – between those who are only talkers, "sanctimonious human-rights activists," and intellectuals on the one hand and on the other hand, real hard-working Slovaks who have no time to think about human rights because they are striving for their "daily piece of bread." The politicians, consciously or unconsciously, helped to strengthen the symbolic barriers. Moreover, the politicians' statements indicated that they do not consider migration to be a natural process that concerns the entire nation and will as a matter of course concern Slovakia even more in the future. When politicians refuse to admit that fact, they can avoid preparing adequate policies, measures and a social climate of integration, which are all important preconditions for the peaceful and safe coexistence of different groups in liberal democratic societies.

CHALLENGES OF DIVERSE MIGRATION FLOWS IN ITALY'S AUTONOMOUS PROVINCE OF SOUTH TYROL

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Abstract

Diverse migration flows have significantly increased in Italy's autonomous province of South Tyrol since the 1990s. This new social phenomenon has presented a range of challenges to the province's special autonomy status, which is based on power-sharing, proportional representation, a minority veto and the preservation of three old cultural and linguistic groups: German-, Italian-, and Ladin-speaking. This paper examines the challenges of diverse migration flows in South Tyrol with special emphasis on: a) the civil/political dimension, b) the socio-economic dimension, and c) the cultural dimension. It employs secondary quantitative data drawn from the statistical yearbooks of the autonomous province and conducts qualitative desk research on various legal and policy documents as well as other reports and studies. It finds that in the highly-divided society of South Tyrol, a defensive approach to migration propagated by the political elite and supported by provincial policies and laws increases the gap in legitimacy between new minorities arriving in migration and older existing linguistic minorities. Such a situation calls for more welcoming and inclusive approaches to address the issues raised by migration in the autonomous province.

Keywords: South Tyrol; migration; human rights; linguistic minorities; local representation in power-sharing

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1. Introduction

Migration has been an increasing phenomenon in Italy during the last decades. The 2011 census data showed that the number of foreign-born people

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who permanently reside in Italy tripled over the period 2001–2011.¹ The growing migrant population, especially since the 1990s, has inevitably contributed to the diversity and heterogeneity of society in terms of cultures, languages, religions and ethnicities. But new minority groups arriving in migration over the last decades further complicate an existing complex reality of autonomous territories where older, traditional minorities live.² The new migrants' settlement in these territories is transforming the migration issue into a hot topic on the local political agenda,³ which cannot be analyzed in isolation from the defensive position and interests of the older minority groups.⁴

It can be argued that in cohesive societies, group boundaries do not exist, and the inclusion of a migrant population into a common vision of the society's territory is thereby facilitated. By contrast, in societies divided by ethnic, linguistic, cultural or religious characteristics, existing strong group boundaries can exclude a newly arriving migrant population.⁵ Even though these societies themselves are neither hostile nor friendly to migration, they respond differently as they address new forms of their heterogeneity.⁶ As the state's dominant political community and the minority community have a dual sense of belonging,⁷ the societies do not always consider migration to be important and do not always have a clear position on it.⁸

This situation is obvious in South Tyrol, which is a divided society dominated by three traditional linguistic groups, German-, Italian-, and Ladin-speaking people, whose institutions and daily life are organized along those three main

¹ Gabriele Guazzo, *Cities, languages, stereotypes and discrimination: An Italian study* (Roma: Cittalia fondazione anci ricerche, 2015).

² Roberta Medda-Windscher, "Migration and old minorities in South Tyrol: Beyond a 'NIMBY' approach?" in *Migration and Autonomous Territories. The case of South Tyrol and Catalonia*, ed. Roberta Medda-Windscher et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 100–37.

³ Andrea Carlà, *Old and new minorities: Migration politics in South Tyrol* (Bolzano: European Academy of Bozen/Bolzano, 2013).

⁴ Sanjay Jeram, "Immigration and minority nationalism: The Basque country in comparative perspective" (Doctoral Dissertation, University of Toronto, 2012), http://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/34067/1/Jeram_Sanjay_201211_PhD_thesis.pdf.

⁵ Verena Wisthaler, "Immigration and Regional Identity Politics: An exploratory comparison of Scotland (UK) and South Tyrol (I)" (Paper presented at the 42nd Annual Conference, UACES, Passau, September 3–5, 2012).

⁶ Cristina Isabel Zuber, "Comparing the politics behind the immigrant integration laws of Catalonia and South Tyrol." GRITUM Working Paper 22 (2014), <http://repositori.upf.edu/bitstream/handle/10230/23042/GRITIM%20%2822%29.pdf?sequence=1>.

⁷ Ricard Zapata-Barrero, *Immigration and self-government of minority nations* (Brussels: Lang, 2009).

⁸ Carlà, *Old and new minorities*.

linguistic lines.⁹ According to 2011 census data, the newer migrant population in South Tyrol represented 8 percent of its total population, almost double the total population of the Ladin-speaking group.¹⁰ Despite this fact, the authorities of South Tyrol have underestimated the impact of migration over the years as it affects multi-ethnic power-sharing relationships among the three older linguistic groups.¹¹ This could open up a Pandora's box of unresolved divisions accumulated over decades¹² in the context of protecting the existing system from the new diversity.

Various scholars have written about the highly divided nature of South Tyrolean society,¹³ but few of them have examined its consequences for the accommodation of new minority groups arriving in diverse migratory waves, and the challenges they pose to its unique status.¹⁴ Migration is a new phenomenon in South Tyrolean society that has significantly increased since the 1990s and has been little-explored in terms of its implications for the successful accommodation of both old and new linguistic minority groups. The main purpose of this paper is to examine the challenges of these diverse migration flows in the autonomous province of South Tyrol during the period 1990–2014, with special emphasis on: a) the civil/political dimension, b) the socio-economic dimension, and c) the cultural dimension. Its main research question is: How have diverse migratory flows challenged the special status of the South Tyrolean province during the period 1990–2014?

⁹ Wisthaler, "Immigration and Regional Identity Politics," 15.

¹⁰ Carlà, *Old and new minorities*, 108–9.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 96.

¹² Medda-Windischer, "Migration and old minorities in South Tyrol," 105.

¹³ Melissa Magliana, *The autonomous province of South Tyrol. A model of self-governance?* (Bolzano: European Academy of Bozen/Bolzano, 2000); Dorothy Louise Zinn, "Not a backlash, but a multicultural implosion from within: Uncertainty and crisis in the case of South Tyrol Multiculturalism," Working Papers 6, EASA workshop 2012, http://scholarworks.umass.edu/chess_easa/6/; Gabriel N. Toggenburg and Günther Rautz, *The protection of minorities in Europe. A legal-political compendium leading from A to Z* (Trento: Autonomous Region Trentino-Südtirol, 2012); Stefan Wolff, "Conflict management in divided societies: The many uses of territorial self-governance," *International Journal on Minority and Group Rights* 20, No. 1 (2013): 27–50; Stephen Larin and Marc Roggla, "Participatory Consociationalism? The development of South Tyrol's autonomy arrangement toward a third autonomy statute" (Paper presented at the 24th Congress of Political Science, IPSA, Poznan, Poland, July 23–28, 2016).

¹⁴ Carlà, *Old and new minorities*; EURAC, *Migration and cohabitation in South Tyrol. Recommendations for civic citizenship in the Province of Bozen/Bolzano* (Bolzano: European Academy of Bozen/Bolzano, 2013); Günther Pallaver, "South Tyrol's consociational democracy: between political claim and social reality," in *Tolerance through law. Self governance and group rights in South Tyrol*, ed. Jen Woelk et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 303–27; Medda-Windischer, "Migration and old minorities in South Tyrol."

As a recent and still ongoing social phenomenon in the autonomous province of South Tyrol, migration is a very hot topic, especially in political discourse and the political agenda of the ethnically-organized political parties in that autonomous territory. Because the phenomenon of migration there is very complex and recent, limited research has been conducted so far to address the consequences and implications of diverse migratory flows for South Tyrol's status as an autonomous province. This paper will provide an added contribution to the discussion and push forward research on this matter, looking for suitable, sustainable options to address migration concerns in the autonomous province of South Tyrol.

There is no universally agreed definition of migration. However, in a broader context, migration is defined as the movement of a person or a group of people, either across an international border or within a state, encompassing any type of movement despite its length, causes, or composition.¹⁵ In the context of the European Union, migration is defined as an action by which a person: a) establishes his or her usual residence in the territory of a Member State for a period of at least 12 months, after having previously been resident in another Member State or a third country; or b) having previously been resident in the territory of a Member State, ceases to have the usual residence in that Member State for a period that is at least 12 months.¹⁶

This paper will apply the definition of migration provided by the European Union. This means that its focus will be on the migrant population which lawfully resides in the territory of the autonomous province of South Tyrol for at least 12 months. Thus, other types of migratory waves are not considered in this paper.

Article 6 of the Italian Constitution considers language to be a distinctive feature identifying minorities and clearly mentions that the Republic safeguards linguistic minorities through appropriate norms.¹⁷ Law 482/1999 provides regulations for the protection of historic linguistic minorities who are present in Italian territory.¹⁸ This means that the Italian state uses the term "linguistic" minority instead of "ethnic" or "national" minority. Besides this, in Italy minori-

¹⁵ IOM, *Glossary on Migration*, 2nd Edition (Geneva: IOM, 2011), 62.

¹⁶ European Commission, Asylum and Migration. "Glossary 3.0, a tool for better comparability," produced by the European Migration Network (European Migration Network, 2014), 190, ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/European_migration_network/docs/emn-glossary-en-version.pdf.

¹⁷ Senato della Repubblica, *Constitution of the Italian Republic* (as amended June 12, 2003) (Official Gazette No. 298, 1947), www.constituzionnet.org/files/Italy.Constitution.pdf.

¹⁸ Legge No. 482 "Norme in materia di tutela della minoranze linguistiche storiche" dated 15 December 1999.

ty rights follow a territorial principle rather than recognizing individual rights of minorities.¹⁹ This means that persons who belong to an officially-recognized linguistic minority group can exercise their rights within the particular territory where their group resides. Therefore the same term will be applied in this paper to speak about the three traditional linguistic minority groups in the autonomous province of South Tyrol: the German-, Italian- and Ladin-speaking populations.

To answer the main research question and support its core argument, this paper employs quantitative data and presents qualitative desk research. Quantitative data is taken from various statistical yearbooks and publications produced by the Provincial Institute of Statistics (ASTAT) of the Bolzano/Bozen autonomous province in South Tyrol. Qualitative desk research is extensively focused on analysis of various legal documents as well as studies, policy papers and reports concerning the autonomy status of South Tyrol and its migrant population after 1990.

This paper is organized in five parts. Following an introduction in the first part, a brief overview of the historical, political and legal aspects of South Tyrol and its autonomy is provided in the second part. Diverse migratory flows during the period 1990–2014 are described and analyzed in the third part. Challenges presented by the migration flows in South Tyrol after 1990, particularly in a) the political dimension, b) the socio-economic dimension, and c) the cultural dimension are examined and analyzed in the fourth part. Finally, some conclusions are drawn in the fifth part.

2. A Brief Overview of the Historical, Political and Legal Aspects of South Tyrol and Its Autonomy

This part aims to provide a short overview of the historical, legal and political aspects of South Tyrol and its autonomy status, briefly describing the complex mosaic of its history including: a) the tensions between its German and Ladin linguistic groups and the Italian State that led to their autonomy; and b) the long-term efforts to ensure that the Italian State fully implements its obligations derived from international agreements. This will help better understand the challenges that new migration waves pose to South Tyrol's special autonomy status.

¹⁹ Eva Pförtl, "Tolerance established by law: The autonomy of South Tyrol in Italy," http://www.mcrg.ac.in/EURAC_RP2.pdf; Elisabeth Alber and Carolin Zwilling, "Continuity and change in South Tyrol's ethnic governance," in *Autonomy arrangements around the world: A collection of well and lesser known cases*, ed. Levente Salat et al. (Cluj-Napoca: Romanian Institute for Research on National Minorities, 2014), 39.

2.1 Historical and Political Background of South Tyrol

South Tyrol is a mountainous territory of 7,400 square kilometers of which only eight percent is habitable.²⁰ Situated in northeastern part of Italy, it borders on Switzerland and Austria. Figure 1 shows the map of South Tyrol.

According to 2011 census data, South Tyrol's total population was 511,750 inhabitants or about 0.86 percent of the total population of Italy.²¹ Of that, 69.41 percent is affiliated with the German-speaking group, 26.06 percent with the Italian-speaking group and 4.53 percent with the Ladin-speaking group.²²




Figure 1: Map of South Tyrol

Source: Wikipedia, https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/bf/Map_of_South_Tyrol_%28de%29.png

²⁰ Autonomous Province of South Tyrol, *South Tyrol in figures 2012* (ASTAT, 2012).

²¹ Autonomous Province of South Tyrol, *South Tyrol in figures 2013* (ASTAT, 2013); Italy – Demographics, *Repopa*, <http://www.repopa.eu/content/italy-demographics>.

²² Autonomous Province of South Tyrol, *South Tyrol in figures 2013* (ASTAT, 2013).

The German-speaking linguistic group is mainly located in rural areas and valleys, while the Italian-speaking population is concentrated in cities and urban areas.²³ Currently, South Tyrol is part of the Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol Region which is composed of two autonomous provinces, the province of Bolzano/Bozen and the province of Trento. Each of them enjoys a special autonomous status granted by Article 116 of the Italian Constitution.

The history of South Tyrol in the twentieth century consists of continuous efforts and struggle on the part of the German- and Ladin-speaking groups to obtain autonomy in their homeland, where they have lived in compact groups for centuries.²⁴ Before the First World War, South Tyrol was part of the Habsburg Empire, to which it had belonged for centuries.²⁵ The majority of the South Tyrolean population was German-speaking (about 93 percent), followed by the Ladin-speaking group (about 4 percent), which was mainly located in some mountainous valleys of the area, and which had maintained its culture, tradition and distinct Ladin language throughout the centuries. The Italian-speaking group constituted about 3 percent of the population.²⁶

The defeat of Austria at the end of the First World War led to the transfer of South Tyrol to Italy by the Treaty of Saint Germain.²⁷ The post-war Italian government did not keep its promise to protect the rights of the German linguistic minority. During the period 1922–1942, it aggressively repressed the German-speaking South Tyroleans, trying to Italianize their territory and their administrative apparatus.²⁸

²³ Medda-Windischer, "Migration and old minorities in South Tyrol," 114.

²⁴ Antony Alcock, *The South Tyrol autonomy. A short introduction*, 2001, <http://www.buergernetz.bz.it/en/downloads/South-Tyrol-Autonomy.pdf>.

²⁵ Gabriel N. Toggenburg and Günther Rautz, *The protection of minorities in Europe. A legal-political compendium leading from A to Z* (Trento: Autonomous Region Trentino-Südtirol, 2012); Hurst Hannum, *Autonomy, sovereignty and self-determination. The accommodation of conflicting rights*. Revised version (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996).

²⁶ Toggenburg and Rautz, *The protection of minorities in Europe*, 15; and Oskar Peterlini, "The Autonomy statute of the region Trentino-South Tyrol. A short overview of historical, political and legal aspects" (Christian Democratic Academy for Central and Eastern Europe, Conference for Minorities, 19 May 1994, Budapest Hungary, Regional Council of Trentino-South Tyrol).

²⁷ Alcock, *The South Tyrol autonomy*, 1; Hannum, *Autonomy, sovereignty and self-determination*, 433.

²⁸ Zinn, "Not a backlash, but a multicultural implosion from within"; Emma Lantschner, "History of the South Tyrol conflict and its settlement," in *Tolerance through Law Self Governance and Group Rights in South Tyrol*, ed. Jens Woelk et al. (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2008), 3–15; Hannum, *Autonomy, sovereignty and self-determination*, 433; Roland Benedikter, "East Ukraine's four perspectives: A Solution According to the South Tyrol Model," *Ethnopolitics Papers* No. 37 (Orfalea Center for Global and International Studies, University of California at Santa Barbara, 2015): 12; Alber and Zwillig, "Continuity and change in South Tyrol's ethnic governance," 36.

Lengthy and intensive bilateral negotiations between Italy and Austria (as the kinship state for the German-speaking South Tyroleans) concluded with the De Gasperi-Gruber international agreement of September 5, 1946,²⁹ which paved the road for self-determination and guaranteed a degree of autonomy and self-governance.³⁰ The agreement's core idea was the creation of an autonomous local government under the Italian state³¹ to safeguard the cultural and economic development as well as the ethnic characteristics of the German-speaking group.³² The 1948 First Autonomy Statute required proportional representation of all three linguistic groups in the distribution of local and regional ministerial portfolios.³³

Non-implementation of the obligations derived from the Autonomy Statute during the 1950s and 1960s escalated conflict, tension and violent actions between South Tyroleans and the Italian authorities.³⁴ The situation of South Tyrol came to the attention of the world and in 1959 the United Nations addressed its case.³⁵ The Italian government negotiated a new agreement to protect linguistic groups and to distribute spheres of influence and powers from the regions to provinces. As a result, a new document containing 137 measures was enacted in 1969, establishing a new political basis for a second de facto Autonomy Statute in 1972.³⁶

A quota system was introduced in 1972 that aimed at ensuring proportional representation of the three linguistic groups in the public sector in South Tyrol based on census data and proportionally distributing social and financial benefits according to an individual's affiliation with a linguistic group.³⁷ This involves completing a declaration of affiliation to a linguistic group as part of the cen-

²⁹ Alcock, *The South Tyrol autonomy*, 4; Hannum, *Autonomy, sovereignty and self-determination*, 433; Oscar Peterlini, "The Autonomy statute of the region Trentino-South Tyrol," 8.

³⁰ Melissa Magliana, *The autonomous province of South Tyrol. A model of self-governance?* (Bolzano: European Academy of Bozen/Bolzano, 2000).

³¹ Eva Pfössl, "Tolerance established by law," 2; and Hannum, *Autonomy, sovereignty and self-determination*, 433.

³² Alcock, *The South Tyrol autonomy*, 5; and Peterlini, "The Autonomy statute of the region Trentino-South Tyrol," 9–10.

³³ Alcock, *The South Tyrol autonomy*, 7; Magliana, *The autonomous province of South Tyrol*, 43.

³⁴ Peterlini, "The Autonomy statute of the region Trentino-South Tyrol," 11.

³⁵ Benedikter, "East Ukraine's four perspectives," 12; Peterlini, "The Autonomy statute of the region Trentino-South Tyrol," 11; and Toggenburg and Rautz, *The protection of minorities in Europe*, 16.

³⁶ Alber and Zwilling, "Continuity and change in South Tyrol's ethnic governance," 38; Hannum, *Autonomy, sovereignty and self-determination*, 434; Benedikter, "East Ukraine's four perspectives: A Solution According to the South Tyrol Model," 12; and Peterlini, "The Autonomy statute of the region Trentino-South Tyrol," 12.

³⁷ Toggenburg and Rautz, *The protection of minorities in Europe*, 16.

sus that serves to define each group's size in South Tyrol, allocate public goods proportionally and permit individual residents to claim the rights to which their linguistic group is entitled in the public, social and cultural spheres.³⁸ In 2001, the Autonomy Statute was amended again, granting a range of rights and liberties to the Province of South Tyrol in order to effectively protect and accommodate the German and Ladin linguistic minority groups.³⁹

2.2 The Special Autonomy Statute of South Tyrol Province

The Italian Constitution divides the country's administration into municipalities, provinces, metropolitan cities, regions and the State (Article 114). It recognizes and promotes local autonomies through administrative decentralization and by adapting the principles of its legislation to the requirements of autonomy and decentralization (Article 5). It provides that the legislative powers of the State and the regions must be in compliance with the Constitution (Article 117).⁴⁰

The Constitution of Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol (South Tyrol) states that this autonomous region is composed of the territories of the autonomous provinces of Trento and Bolzano, which are given legal status within the political structure of the Italian Republic in conformity with the principles of the Constitution and current statute (Article 1, Autonomy Statute).⁴¹ Even though the provisions for autonomy are applicable in both provinces in the same way, South Tyrol has some additional special provisions regarding bilingualism, culture, schools, mother tongue, quotas for representation in public sector employment and so forth.⁴²

So, on an *administrative level*, equal representation in high level offices and proportional representation by language groups in the provincial government are crucial elements of self-governance.⁴³ The Province of Bolzano/Bozen

³⁸ Benedikter, "East Ukraine's four perspectives," 13; and Toggenburg and Rautz, *The protection of minorities in Europe*, 16.

³⁹ Jens Woelk, Joseph Marko and Francesco Palermo, *Tolerance through law: Self-government and group rights in South Tyrol* (Boston: Brill, 2008); Alber and Zwilling, "Continuity and change in South Tyrol's ethnic governance," 42.

⁴⁰ Senato della Repubblica, *Constitution of the Italian Republic* (as amended June 12, 2003).

⁴¹ Parliament of the Autonomous Province of Bolzano/Bozen, *Special Statute for Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol* (Parliament of the Autonomous Province of Bolzano/Bozen, 2001).

⁴² Oskar Peterlini, "The South-Tyrol Autonomy in Italy. Historical, political and legal aspects," in *One country, two systems, three legal orders – Perspectives of evolution. Essays on Macau's Autonomy after the resumption of sovereignty by China*, ed. Jorge Costa Oliveira et al. (Berlin: Springer, 2009), 143–70.

⁴³ Magliana, *The autonomous province of South Tyrol*, 48.

(South Tyrol) has a Provincial Parliament, a Provincial Government and a Provincial President (Article 47).⁴⁴ The Provincial Government is the executive organ responsible for enactment of laws approved by the Provincial Parliament and for administrative issues that affect the Province, as well as management and supervision of various matters related to public services in the Province (Article 54).⁴⁵ The Provincial Parliament elects the Provincial President who represents the whole province and decides on the allocation of responsibilities (Article 52).⁴⁶

On a *legislative level*, Article 8 of the Special Statute for Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol (South Tyrol) lists a range of competencies of the Province to promote its socio-economic, cultural, environmental, educational and tourism development. As for the *judicial aspect*, there is one Regional Court of Administrative Justice established in Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol (South Tyrol) with an autonomous section for the province of Bolzano/Bozen (Article 90) whose members belong equally to the two major linguistic groups, Italian and German (Article 91). In addition, the Special Statute guarantees a right to education in the mother tongue to the three linguistic groups (Article 19) and use of their languages in the courts and collective organs of the Bolzano/Bozen Province (Article 100).⁴⁷

Communication between the autonomous provincial authorities and the national government in Rome is ensured by a Government Commissioner who supervises the activities of the province and regularly communicates with national authorities. In addition, the President of the province is regularly invited to meetings held by the Italian Cabinet on issues related to province.⁴⁸

3. A General Overview of Migration Flows and Their Characteristics in South Tyrol

This part examines the dynamics of the diverse migratory waves into South Tyrol during the period 1990–2014 and analyzes their complexity in this sub-national autonomous territory, traditionally populated by three linguistic minorities. It points out that this increasing phenomenon after 1990 is becoming an

⁴⁴ Parliament of the Autonomous Province of Bolzano/Bozen, *Special Statute for Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol*, 20.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 26.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 25.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 5–6; 38–41.

⁴⁸ Magliana, *The autonomous province of South Tyrol*, 51.

important reality and the sub-national unit must deal with the new minority groups arriving in migration.

Migration is a new phenomenon in the autonomous province of South Tyrol, beginning in the early 1990s.⁴⁹ Formerly, South Tyrol experienced a short-term seasonal migration of workers primarily employed in agriculture and tourism.⁵⁰ In 1990, there were 5,099 migrants living in South Tyrol, mainly from Germany and Austria.⁵¹ After 1990, long-term migration became a major trend. During the period 1990–2014, the migrant population increased from 1.2 percent to 8.9 percent of the region’s total population.⁵² Table 1 shows the share of the migrant population in the total population of South Tyrol during the period 1990–2014.

Table 1: Share of the Migrant Population in the Total Population of South Tyrol, 1990–2014

Year	1990	1995	2000	2002	2004	2005	2011	2014
Share of the Migrant Population	1.20%	1.83%	3.01%	3.63%	4.67%	5.31%	8.77%	8.90%

Source: Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano-Alto Adige, *AstInfo* No. 17 (June 2006), 2; Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano-Alto Adige, *AstatInfo* No. 41 (June 2012), 5; Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano-Alto Adige, *Annuario statistico 2015* (ASTAT, 2015), 109. Calculations done by the author.

The political and economic mobility of nationals of the Western Balkan countries due to the collapse of the former Republic of Yugoslavia, the weak process of state building of the newly independent states created in its wake and the failure of the socialist system in Albania contributed to a rapid increase in the migrant population in South Tirol during the period 1992–1994. The European Union enlargement process, whereby new countries from Eastern Europe, including Romania and Slovakia, joined the EU, permitted a further increase in the migrant population during the period 2005–2007. Political instability and humanitarian crises in Africa and Asia led to even more migrant arrivals thereafter.⁵³

In 2014, there were 46,343 migrants living in South Tyrol. The majority of them are from EU countries (15,150 persons, or about 32.7 percent of the total migrant population), followed by non-EU European countries (15,044 persons or about 32.5 percent of the total migrant population), Asian countries (8,329 persons or about 18.0 percent of the total migrant population), African countries (5,738 persons or 12.4 percent of the total migrant population), Latin America

⁴⁹ Medda-Windischer, “Migration and old minorities in South Tyrol,” 100.

⁵⁰ Franco Grigoletto, *Bilancio Positivo per l’occupazione* (Provincia Autonoma, 1998).

⁵¹ Carlà, *Old and new minorities*, 11.

⁵² Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano-Alto Adige, *Annuario statistico 2015* (ASTAT, 2015).

⁵³ Carlà, *Old and new minorities*, 3.

and other American countries (2,062 persons or about 4.4 percent of the total migrant population).⁵⁴ Table 2 shows the distribution of the migrant population in South Tyrol by place of origin in 2014.

Table 2: Distribution of Migrant Population in South Tyrol by Place of Origin, 2014

EU countries	32.69%
Non-EU European countries	32.46%
Asia	17.97%
Africa	12.38%
Latin America and other American countries	4.44%

Source: Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano-Alto Adige, *Annuario statistico 2015* (ASTAT, 2015), 109. Calculations done by the author.

Statistics indicate that migrants represent a very heterogeneous group composed of various sub-groups. The size of migrant sub-groups varies but the one most represented is Albanians, followed by Germans, Moroccans, Pakistanis and Macedonians.⁵⁵ Table 3 shows the distribution of key migrant groups by nationality in South Tyrol in 2014.

Table 3: Main Migrant Groups by Nationality in South Tyrol, 2014

Nationality	Total	% of the Total Migrant Population	% of the Total Population
Albanian	5,314	11.54	1.02
German	4,607	10.01	0.89
Moroccan	3,368	7.31	0.65
Pakistani	2,811	6.10	0.54
Macedonian	2,270	4.93	0.44
Slovakian	2,109	4.58	0.41
Romanian	1,947	4.23	0.38
Kosovar	1,860	4.04	0.36
Austrian	1,570	3.41	0.30
Ukrainian	1,200	2.61	0.23

Source: Autonomous Province of South Tyrol, *Annuario statistico 2015* (ASTAT, 2015), 109.

⁵⁴ Autonomous Province of South Tyrol, *Annuario statistico 2015* (ASTAT, 2015). Calculations are made by the author.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

The high number of Albanian migrants in Italy as a whole is linked to their mass exodus at the beginning of the 1990s, when Albania's totalitarian regime collapsed. Desperately seeking relief from economic disaster, civil war and lack of confidence in democracy at home, 24,000 Albanians took to the sea in over-crowded ships.⁵⁶ Economic and political instability during the harsh years of transition increased the total number of migrants to Italy. Estimated data from the Albanian Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs indicate that there are about 200,000 Albanian migrants in Italy.⁵⁷ To a certain degree, this explains the high number of Albanian migrants in South Tyrol.

Migration of Moroccans to Italy commenced in the mid-1970s, but it remained very limited until the 1990s.⁵⁸ Their irregular migration flows then significantly increased even though an annual quota system was activated by the Italian government.⁵⁹ Arriving in various ways, Moroccans obtained residence permits either thanks to regular amnesties for undocumented migrants granted by the Italian government over the years, or pursuant to an annual quota for foreign workers.⁶⁰ Statistics show that in 2010 there were 431,529 Moroccans in Italy. More than half of them were located in the northern regions of the country.⁶¹ This helps to explain the high number of Moroccan migrants in South Tyrol.

The majority of the migrant population in South Tyrol is female (24,794 persons or 53.5 percent of the total migrant population). For both sexes, the 18–39 age group is most highly represented, accounting for 10,240 persons or 41.3 percent of the total female migrant population and 8,536 persons or 39.6 percent of the total male migrant population.⁶² The majority of migrants are settled in the main cities and urban areas of the autonomous province of South Tyrol, Bolzano/Bozen and Merano/Meran.⁶³

⁵⁶ Giovanna Campani, "Albanian refugees in Italy," *Refuge* 12, No. 4 (October 1992): 7–10.

⁵⁷ Russell King and Julie Vullnetari, "Migration and Development in Albania," Working Paper C5 (Sussex: Development Research Center on Migration, Globalization and Poverty, 2003), 26, http://www.migrationdrc.org/publications/working_papers/WP-C5.pdf.

⁵⁸ Camilla Devitt, *Circular migration between Italy and Morocco: A case study* (Florence: European University Institute, Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies, 2011), 43, <http://www.eui.eu/Projects/METOIKOS/Documents/CaseStudies/METOIKOScasesstudyItalyMorocco.pdf>.

⁵⁹ Giuseppe Sciortino, *Fortunes and Miseries of Italian labor migration policy*. CeSPI, 2009.

⁶⁰ Asher Colombo, *La sanatoria per le badanti e le colf del 2009: fallimento o esaurimento di un modello?* Turin. Fieri, 2009.

⁶¹ Devitt, *Circular migration between Italy and Morocco*, 43–44.

⁶² Autonomous Province of South Tyrol, *Annuario statistico 2015* (ASTAT, 2015). Calculations are made by the author.

⁶³ Ibid.

4. Challenges of Diverse Migration Flows in South Tyrol

A widespread social phenomenon after the 1990s, migration presents a big challenge for the dynamic political autonomy of South Tyrol. Migration policies must consider the impact of migration on relations between the three traditional South Tyrolean linguistic groups and the protections granted to the German and Ladin language groups.⁶⁴ Article 117 of the Italian Constitution grants to the State exclusive legislative power over migration, citizenship, foreign policy, relations with other EU countries, the right to asylum and the legal status of non-EU citizens.⁶⁵ Article 21(1) of the 1998 Consolidated Act on Immigration gives the Italian state exclusive decision-making power over determining quotas and other issues related to migration. The criteria and quotas for migration are set every year based on local economic conditions. The autonomous province cannot impose limitations on the implementation of agreements affecting migration that the Italian state negotiates with other countries.⁶⁶ The autonomous province must coordinate its role in migration matters with the state (Article 118 of the Italian Constitution),⁶⁷ and should adopt measures that favor the integration of all residents based on the powers granted to it in Article 42 of the 1998 Consolidated Act on Immigration.

It has been argued that in European nation-states, the migrant population must find its place within the triangle formed by the state (the civil/political dimension), the nation (the cultural dimension) and the market (the socio-economic dimension).⁶⁸ This part of this paper examines the challenges posed by the diverse migration flows in South Tyrol during the period 1990–2014, focusing on those three dimensions.

4.1 Challenges of Diverse Migration Flows on the Civil/Political Dimension

The political system of South Tyrol corresponds to the consociational democracy model of power-sharing developed by Arend Lijphart.⁶⁹ Consoci-

⁶⁴ EURAC, *Migration and cohabitation in South Tyrol. Recommendations for civic citizenship in the Province of Bozen/Bolzano* (Bolzano: European Academy of Bozen/Bolzano, 2013), 1.

⁶⁵ Senato della Repubblica, *Constitution of the Italian Republic* (as amended June 12, 2003).

⁶⁶ Carlà, *Old and new minorities*, 60.

⁶⁷ Senato della Repubblica, *Constitution of the Italian Republic* (as amended June 12, 2003).

⁶⁸ Entzinger, “Immigrants’ political and social participation in the integration process.”

⁶⁹ Günther Pallaver, “South Tyrol’s consociational democracy: between political claim and social reality,” in *Tolerance through law. Self governance and group rights in South Tyrol*, ed. Jen Woelk et al. (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008), 303–27.

ational theory suggests that power-sharing institutions help leadership elites facilitate accommodation and cooperation in order to achieve stable democracy and good governance in socially-segmented societies.⁷⁰ The functioning of a consociational democracy in an ethnically divided society requires a climate of tolerance and dialogue fostered by institutional equality and common management of all problems on the society's territory.⁷¹

Four key characteristics of consociational constitutions in a situation of linguistic diversity are a) *executive power-sharing* through participation by linguistic groups in governmental and second-level institutions, ensuring inclusion of all linguistic groups; b) *minority veto* over government decision-making for all linguistic groups, based on agreement by all political parties participating in the executive; c) *proportional representation* of all linguistic groups in the public sector and in the allocation of public funds, based on an ethnic quota system; and d) *cultural and educational decision-making autonomy* for language groups, to protect them when issues arise that are not of common interest.⁷²

Consociational theory emphasizes the importance of providing incentives for participation in governance in a top-down, two-stage process. First, it is argued that power-sharing arrangements mitigate conflicts among leadership elites and maximize the number of stakeholders interested in playing by the rules of the game. For this purpose, proportional electoral systems with low thresholds for participation in government are used to produce multi-party parliaments composed of minor parties that represent distinct segmented communities. Second, community leaders who have a stake in national or regional governments promote conciliation and encourage acceptance of compromises. In this way, each distinct linguistic or religious community will have its voice counted because its leadership will participate in the legislature and the government.⁷³

When migrants settle into a new society they start interacting and participating in the various institutions of that society.⁷⁴ In Italy, the status of migrants

⁷⁰ Pipa Norris, "Stable democracy and good governance in divided societies: Do power-sharing institutions work?" (Paper presented at the 46th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Honolulu, 5th March 2005), www.hks.harvard.edu.

⁷¹ Pallaver, "South Tyrol's consociational democracy," 304.

⁷² Arend Lijphart, "Constitutional Design for Divided Societies," *Journal of Democracy* 15, No. 2 (2004): 96–109.

⁷³ Norris, "Stable democracy and good governance in divided societies," 4.

⁷⁴ Han Entzinger, "Immigrants' political and social participation in the integration process," in *Political and social participation of immigrants through consultative bodies*, ed. Council of Europe (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1999).

and their political rights are regulated by the state.⁷⁵ In 1994, Italy ratified two of the three parts of the 1992 Council of Europe Convention on the Participation of Foreigners in Public Life at the Local Level. The first part deals with the right to join associations and freely express opinions. The second part deals with the establishment of consultative bodies at the local level to represent foreign residents. The third part, which deals with the voting rights of foreign residents and the right to be elected to office at the local level, has not yet been ratified.⁷⁶

Even though the 1998 Consolidated Immigration Act includes a provision granting local voting rights to permanent resident non-nationals, a similar amendment to the Italian Constitution was never passed.⁷⁷ Thus, third-country nationals do not participate in local elections.⁷⁸ This means that political rights related to voting in general and local elections, and the right to be elected to office, in the case of migrants, are limited to European Union nationals and foreigners who have become citizens of Italy.⁷⁹

In the case of South Tyrol, Article 6 of the 2011 Provincial Law on Integration of Foreign Nationals foresees the establishment of a Provincial Immigration Council aimed at presenting proposals and expressing opinions about migration issues in the Province.⁸⁰ It is composed of representatives of foreign nationals as well as of trade unions, various institutions, voluntary organizations and employers.⁸¹ These immigration councils for foreign nationals have only advisory powers, and there is no obligation imposed on the authorities to consult them. Therefore, they are effectively powerless, inefficient and formal.⁸²

A gap in the legitimacy of the process of selection of local administrators and the election of local parliament members exists because the officials are elected and chosen by only part of residents, without seeking the consent of migrant non-EU-national residents who contribute to the prosperity of the

⁷⁵ Carlà, *Old and new minorities*, 87.

⁷⁶ Roberta Medda and Orsolya Farkas, *Legal Indicators for Social Inclusion of New Minorities Generated by Immigration – LISI* (Bolzano/Bozen: EURAC, 2003), 23.

⁷⁷ Enrico Grosso, “Aliens and rights of political participation at local level in the Italian Constitutional system,” (Paper presented at the colloquium on Political Participation of Aliens at Local level, Institut de Dret Public, Barcelona, 19–20 July, 2007).

⁷⁸ Kees Groenendijk, *Local voting rights for non-nationals in Europe: What we know and what we need to learn* (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2008).

⁷⁹ Entzinger, “Immigrants’ political and social participation in the integration process,” 14.

⁸⁰ Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano-Alto Adige, Legge Provinciale No. 12 “Integrazione delle cittadine e dei cittadini stranieri” (28 Ottobre 2011), http://lexbrowser.provinz.bz.it/doc/it/194047/legge_provinciale_28_ottobre_2011_n_12.aspx?view=1.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, Article 6/3.

⁸² Medda-Windischer, “Migration and old minorities in South Tyrol,” 103.

autonomous province. Article 5 of the 2011 Provincial Law on Integration of Foreign Nationals foresees the establishment of an anti-discrimination center aimed at monitoring discriminatory practices and actions, supporting victims of discrimination and setting up a reporting system.⁸³ But this center has not yet been established.⁸⁴

Limited exercise of civil and political rights by the migrant population in South Tyrol is also linked to an unclear provincial approach to migration. The political class serves as a gatekeeper, taking exclusionary actions and constructing boundaries between the new minority groups originating in migration and the traditional German-, Italian- and Ladin-speaking linguistic groups.⁸⁵ German-speaking South Tyroleans are a hegemonic majority in their territory. Having such an advantageous position, this group has sufficient power to dominate and bring great resources to bear in order to construct visible boundaries that hinder the access of groups it finds undesirable.⁸⁶

The majority of the seats in the Provincial parliament of Bolzano/Bozen (South Tyrol) are held by political parties that do not favor migration. They see migration as a) a problem that drains their resources; b) a threat of demographic change in the area, because new migrants tend to integrate mainly with the Italian-speaking group, thereby shifting the ratios of the old linguistic groups; and c) a violation of the measures instituted to protect the traditional linguistic groups in South Tyrol.⁸⁷ These parties' anti-migration position and rhetoric rejects the concept of a multi-ethnic society and calls upon the migrants to assimilate.

4.2 Challenges of Diverse Migration Flows in the Socio-Economic Dimension

According to the autonomy statute, public jobs available in the autonomous province of Bolzano/Bozen (South Tyrol) are distributed among the three linguistic groups in proportion to their size. For that reason, at the time of the census, every resident makes a declaration of his or her language group affiliation,⁸⁸

⁸³ Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano-Alto Adige, Legge Provinciale No. 12 "Integrazione delle cittadine e dei cittadini stranieri" (28 Ottobre 2011).

⁸⁴ Medda-Windischer, "Migration and old minorities in South Tyrol," 104.

⁸⁵ Zinn, "Not a backlash, but a multicultural implosion from within," 5.

⁸⁶ Enzo Colombo, "Multiculturalismo quotidiano: La differenza come vincolo e come risorsa," in *Multiculturalismo quotidiano. Le pratiche della differenza*, ed. Enzo Colombo et al. (Milan: Franco Angeli, 2007), 15–36.

⁸⁷ Carlà, *Old and new minorities*, 12–38.

⁸⁸ Alber and Zwilling, "Continuity and change in South Tyrol's ethnic governance," 48.

which is fundamental to taking a side.⁸⁹ Even though foreign nationals were not required to declare their membership in one of the traditional groups in the 2011 census, they still have to affiliate with one or another of them in order to qualify for jobs reserved for the three linguistic groups. They have to visit the local administration and officially declare their affiliation to one of the groups.⁹⁰ This creates identity problems, especially for those foreign residents who become Italian citizens, because the South Tyrolean system does not recognize multiple identities.⁹¹ A 2015 survey showed that the linguistic quota system was considered outdated by the majority of the Italian-speaking population. More than 70 percent agreed that it favored the German-speaking group.⁹² This suggests that the existing autonomy status is unable to accommodate linguistic groups originating from migration unless their members affiliate with one of the three traditional linguistic groups.

The existing autonomy statute shows an overlap of territorial principles and personal principles. This double legal nature has created a tense relationship between the collective rights of minorities and individual rights because, on the one hand, the statute grants the territorial autonomy of the province, and on the other hand, it includes a series of collective rights to protect minorities who reside in its territory.⁹³ But these measures refer to the protection of the group, not to the protection of the individuals. For instance, the individual declaration of affiliation with a certain linguistic group is certified by name in South Tyrol and serves to define the size of each old linguistic group. Since a list of rights is connected to linguistic declaration, migrants who reside in the autonomous province subordinate themselves to the collective protections afforded the three old linguistic minorities.⁹⁴ Since the resources of the province are distributed according to the percentages of these declarations, this means that from a personal and economic perspective, migrant taxpayers who contribute to the well-being of the autonomous province do not have the ability to influence provincial resources distribution. This restriction is justified as a protection of the old linguistic groups who traditionally live in the province.⁹⁵

⁸⁹ Zinn, "Not a backlash, but a multicultural implosion from within," 4.

⁹⁰ Fahim-Tarsia, "A European autonomy seen with South Asian eyes," 52.

⁹¹ Medda-Windischer, "Migration and old minorities in South Tyrol," 102.

⁹² Andrea Carlà, "South Tyrol: a model for all? The other face of minority accommodation" (Paper presented at the 66th PSA Annual International Conference, Brighton, UK, 21–23 March 2016), 19.

⁹³ Pallaver, "South Tyrol's consociational democracy," 322–23.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 323.

⁹⁵ Roberta Medda and Orsolya Farkas, *Legal Indicators for Social Inclusion of New Minorities Generated by Immigration – LISI* (Bolzano/Bozen: EURAC, 2003).

4.3 Challenges of Diverse Migration Flows in Cultural Dimension

It is the responsibility of the autonomous province of Bolzano/Bozen (South Tyrol) to regulate the rights and duties of the migrant population that resides within its territory. Article 1 of the 2011 Provincial Law on Integration of Foreign Nationals defines integration of the migrant population as a process of reciprocal dialogue and exchange, where the local authorities of the autonomous province should encourage mutual recognition of linguistic identities and value diverse cultural, linguistic and religious identities based on principles of equality and freedom of religion.⁹⁶

Procedural inclusion and a series of checks and balances shape the substance of the autonomy granted to South Tyrol, producing a system of forced cooperation among different linguistic groups.⁹⁷ It has been argued that migration is a threat to the protection and preservation of minority cultures if it is not controlled directly by the minority populations themselves.⁹⁸ Increased migration flows for long-term residence in South Tyrol after 1990 have raised concerns about maintaining group boundaries among the three historic linguistic groups (German, Italian and Ladin) in relation to the new minority groups originating from migration.⁹⁹

The principle of linguistic minority protection that is systematically emphasized by the political parties organized along ethnic lines¹⁰⁰ has led to segregation, social disconnection and rigid separation of the traditional linguistic groups in order to preserve the integrity of each of them.¹⁰¹ Even though bilingualism is obligatory in order to ensure proper standards of communication in both the German and Italian languages,¹⁰² each group resists speaking the second language of the province and insists on communicating in its own language.¹⁰³ This separation and dislike of each other's culture and habits has been systematically nourished over the years in the family and the social environment,¹⁰⁴ leading to

⁹⁶ Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano-Alto Adige, Legge Provinciale No. 2 "Integrazione delle cittadine e dei cittadini stranieri" (28 Ottobre 2011).

⁹⁷ Pallaver, "South Tyrol's consociational democracy," 307.

⁹⁸ Will Kymlicka, "Immigrant integration and minority nationalism," in *Minority Nationalism and the Changing International Order*, ed. Michael Keating et al (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 61–83.

⁹⁹ Wisthaler, "Immigration and Regional Identity Politics," 15.

¹⁰⁰ Pallaver, "South Tyrol's consociational democracy," 309.

¹⁰¹ Magliana, *The autonomous province of South Tyrol*, 80.

¹⁰² Alber and Zwilling, "Continuity and change in South Tyrol's ethnic governance."

¹⁰³ Fahim-Tarsia, "A European autonomy seen with South Asian eyes: South Tyrol," 54.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 54.

an understanding of linguistic identities as mutually exclusive.¹⁰⁵ The separation of education systems is producing social boundaries between the Italian- and German-speaking groups.¹⁰⁶ Such a divided system does not value the presence of other linguistic groups or bi- or trilingual persons and offers no possibility for closing the gaps between them. Increased linguistic and cultural diversity in the autonomous province is seen as changing the equilibrium among traditional identities. That is why migrants' mother tongues have not been added to the official linguistic mix in South Tyrol.¹⁰⁷

Conclusions

This paper examined the challenges of diverse migration flows in South Tyrol with special emphasis on a) the civil/political dimension; b) the socio-economic dimension; and c) the cultural dimension. It argues that even though South Tyrol's model of autonomy and accommodation of its traditional minority groups is perceived as a positive and proud example of cohabitation,¹⁰⁸ latter-day migration poses a range of challenges which are deeply rooted in the nature of the autonomy. The existing autonomy statute strictly and rigidly maintains the separation, the divisions and the tensions among the three traditional linguistic groups, German-, Italian-, and Ladin-speaking.¹⁰⁹

The autonomous province of South Tyrol shows a NIMBY (Not-In-My-Back-Yard) orientation to migrant communities¹¹⁰ and is reluctant to address their presence, which challenges the ability of the existing South Tyrolean system to protect both the traditional linguistic minorities and maintain the rigid separation among them.¹¹¹ This defensive attitude is clearly mirrored in the 2011 Provincial Law on Integration of Foreign Nationals which is focused more on keeping the migrant population at arm's length, even though they contribute to the prosperity of the province where they live. Their access to public and social

¹⁰⁵ Carlà, *Old and new minorities*, 10.

¹⁰⁶ Zinn, "Not a backlash, but a multicultural implosion from within," 7.

¹⁰⁷ Carlà, *Old and new minorities*, 136.

¹⁰⁸ Farah Fahim-Tarsia, "A European autonomy seen with South Asian eyes: South Tyrol," in *Solving ethnic conflict through self-government. A short guide to autonomy in South Asia and Europe*, ed. Thomas Benedikter (Bolzano/Bozen: EURAC, 2009), 51–55; Jens Woelk, Joseph Marko and Francesco Palermo, *Tolerance through law: Self-government and group rights in South Tyrol* (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2008); Alber and Zwilling, "Continuity and change in South Tyrol's ethnic governance," 34.

¹⁰⁹ Magliana, *The autonomous province of South Tyrol*, 80.

¹¹⁰ Medda-Windischer, "Migration and old minorities in South Tyrol," 120.

¹¹¹ Carlà, *Old and new minorities*, 114.

services is limited, the need to learn the local culture and language is emphasized, and the non-EU migrant population is discriminated against vis-à-vis the EU-national migrant population in access to services and local resources.¹¹²

Finally, the autonomous province does not have a clear official approach to migration and delivers contradictory messages to its migrant population. On the one hand, there are local economic needs to which the migrants are invited to contribute, enhancing prosperity. On the other hand, they are urged not to create problems for the political equilibrium of the province and to avoid draining its social services. Attitudes toward them are biased in that migrants who are culturally similar to the existing population are favored over those who are culturally different. The provincial authorities simply want to avoid cultural problems.¹¹³

All the problems described and the challenges highlighted in this paper will require an open-minded approach to comprehensively, sustainably and suitably address the migration issues in the autonomous province. It may be time for the political elite and South Tyrolean society at large to start a new dialogue and facilitate broad-based discussion to redesign the autonomy statute of the province in order to take its migrant population into account.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Ibid.

REVIEWS

Marlene Laruelle and Johan Engvall, eds.: **Kyrgyzstan beyond “Democracy Island” and “Failing State”: Social and Political Changes in a Post-Soviet Society.** Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2015. 275 pages. ISBN 978-1-4985-1516-0

How does one bring to the fore the dynamic, core discussions of a country sitting in a far overlooked part of the globe that for the past 25 years has repeatedly been subjected to the conceptualized extremes of “democracy island” and “failing state”? Marlene Laruelle, Associate Director and Research Professor at the Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies at George Washington University, and Johan Engvall, Research Fellow at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs and a Non-Resident Research Fellow with the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, sought to answer this question by coordinating this anthology and striving to present a far more nuanced look at particular under-analyzed aspects of Kyrgyzstan. They simply state that, “the ambition is for the book to represent a counterweight to simplistic descriptions found in much of the reporting of the country” (xi). Once a route for the famed Silk Road, Kyrgyzstan has seen countless events traverse its landscape since independence. A pro-Western orientation after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the ouster (one bloody) of two presidents, the first female president in Central Asia, once the only country in the world to host both American and Russian military bases, inter-ethnic violence between the two largest ethnic groups, and the site of Central Asia’s first foray into parliamentary democracy make the country a fascinating case study for all Central Asia watchers. With the nation seemingly existing in a constant state of flux, the enclosed studies offer pragmatic examinations of several well-trodden themes but also expose readers to often overlooked aspects that further our understanding of dynamism inherent in the country.

Originally conceived as individual essays delivered at a conference in Uppsala in 2012, Marlene Laruelle and Johan Engvall assembled together some of the regions’ most important academics, writers, and independent researchers concerning a wide range of topics: party politics, public corruption, social and ethnic identity, civic nationalism, Islam in society, urban change, Soviet legacy, and grassroots entrepreneurship. Well-balanced between foreign and local perspectives, the work incorporates rigorous methodologies while still remaining largely approachable to those with a cursory knowledge. The extent of English and Russian language sources is also prolific and is a fantastic bibliography for any graduate student or researcher to scour from. All contributing authors have at one time or another lived or worked in the country thus bringing invaluable firsthand experiences and understanding along with theoretical constructs. Several chapters, notably Ch. 4 & 8, support their assertions by factual analysis aided by new empirical research and opinion polls. This new empirical research data will prove invaluable to future study efforts as well as enlighten readers on previously murky topics.

Far from being a general work on the country, the collection of papers is divided into three core sections and covers politics, society, and identity formation. The logic of the arrangement begins with overarching themes that are pertinent to all Kyrgyzstani citizens and then slowly progresses towards focusing on minute and exact groups or issues such as

urban development around the capital, Bishkek, and political moderates' efforts to stem ethno-nationalism. In the introduction, a broad overview of Kyrgyzstan since independence is given, with most attention paid to large events and main actors. The subsequent four chapters cover topics well known to frequent observers: party politics, state sponsored corruption, grassroots mobilization, and NGO engagement. In the second section, the discussion moves on to society in regards to class-consciousness, Soviet-era influences, and urban development. Lastly, the third segment covers identity with a focus on nationalism, ethnic sovereignty, civic identity, and Islam.

Kyrgyzstani politics are anything but boring and predictable, thus making for lively processes. Johan Engvall, who parallels Henry Hale's ("Regime Cycles: Democracy, Autocracy, and Revolution in Post-Soviet Eurasia", 2005) analysis of Kyrgyzstan as a *competing-pyramid* scheme where several distinct patron-client pyramids with no single dominating group vie for resources and power, provides a synopsis of predominantly political and economic events. Comprehensive, though brief, the chapter succinctly outlines the country post-independence while closing with the most pressing issues such as inter-ethnic relations, erosion of state sovereignty, and corruption. In the following chapter, Shairbek Juraev pragmatically examines the evolving role of political parties as many continue to lack Western-style platforms and ideologies while remaining a means of mobilization for the Janus-faced state official/businessman. Also, the increased competitiveness in parliamentary elections, along with the new proportional system, has incentivized parties to adopt practices from Russia, such as locomotives where elected representatives abdicate their seats immediately after election in favor of fellow party officials further down the rolls (pg. 30). Johan Engvall then returns to the discussion in Ch. 3 that officials, upon attaining office, facilitate corruption by "creating a private market within the state" that provides means for a "distinct political-economic order" (pg. 39–41). Offices are basically franchised and looked upon as lucrative job opportunities as opposed to the view largely held in the West where bureaucratic offices are bastions of job security. With all political parties requiring constituents and a means to mobilize them, Asel Doolotkeldieva posits the concept of "brokerage" as a means to "partially explain the weak sustainability of grassroots movements" (pg. 59), thus handicapping efforts at mass mobilization. Running counter to Scott Radnitz who posits that civil mobilization in Kyrgyzstan is not grassroots in nature but rather a top-down, political leveraging tool used by local oligarchs and power players (*Weapons of the Wealthy*, 2010), uncertain politics and brokers' use of informal types of engagement actually undermine the assertive foundation of local mobilization thus hindering change. Lastly, Madeleine Reeves focuses on local NGO efforts to foster *yntymak* (positive harmonious coexistence/solidarity) among potentially volatile border groups or locales while institutionalizing means of "preventative development" that will retard potentially explosive scenarios. Using a mainly anthropological approach, she seeks to contest aspects of cosmopolitan theory previously applied to the region and topic and rather concentrate on basic issues of coexistence while conceding that the best laid plans cannot account for inherent uncertainty (such as trigger happy border guards).

With only 25 years of independence under its belt, Kyrgyzstan is still left with vestiges of the Soviet Union, and this is most vivid in society at large. As class-consciousness was central to Marxist-Leninist theory, Elmira Satybaldieva makes the argument that class and its accompanying values must be reexamined due to over two decades of social, political, and, especially, economic stratification. Using Osh as the case study and Bourdieusian class analysis as her methodological framework, she seeks to reveal “alternative values” held by the bottom strata, such as the Aristotelian view of money, within “practical moral reasoning” (pg. 113). This makes perceptions among different classes as much a moral stance as arguing what one group states they are for or against. Aisalkyn Botoeva and Regine A. Spector then examine how entrepreneurs and SMEs are utilizing Soviet training and skill sets in the garment industry. Using the Association of Folk Arts and Crafts, a Soviet founded institution, as their case study, both authors argue that networks and traits garnered before independence are utilized for capitalist success while fostering modern business qualities (professional self-worth, incentivized creativity, competitiveness) in those involved. In one of the most intriguing and captivating chapters of the book, Emil Nasritdinov, Bermet Zhumakadyr kyzy, and Diana Asanalieva empirically debunk myths concerning a topic that vexes Bishkek residents to this day, the issue of *novostroiki*. Long held myths and a propensity to problematize settlements fictionalize *novostroiki* as bastions of unlawful behavior and squalor, whereas the reality is that most are fully integrated communities with a population of ordinary, working citizens. Using open-question opinion polls and a recently declassified Bishkek city plan, they largely dispel common misconceptions of *novostroiki* held by various neighborhoods of Bishkek proper.

Since the collapse of the Soviet supranational identity, the debate over the nation’s character has raged with foci not only at the local and national levels but also among certain debatable topics such as ethnicity, religion, and nationalism. Marlene Laruelle posits that state sovereignty and identity are not mutually exclusive and that competing notions of nationhood threaten said sovereignty in the regime’s mind, as well as usurp their prerogative. Influenced by Soviet-era historiography and the introduction of the national concept, emphasis on Kyrgyz ethnogenesis is maintained by the government but debates on nationhood are now fragmented and drowned out by competing claims from political elites and academics (pg. 180). Building off of the previous chapter, both David Gullette and John Heathershaw probe how identity and an ethno-nationally defined state are possibly synonymous in the ethnic Kyrgyz mind and its implications for the country’s international relations. What seems to be a theoretical constructivist lens, it portrays that the State is woven into *Kyrgyzsness* and that an impingement or fictionalized threat (from minorities, predominantly) of the latter endangers the sovereignty of the former. Also, political moderates and their attempts at stymying extreme nationalists is analyzed by Erica Marat, who speculates that the moderates’ efforts of civic identity/nationalism is done “not at the expense of the state... but along with it” (pg. 222). A fairly balanced status quo under incumbent head of state Atambayev, while conducive for the time being, is not a sustainable long-term consensus, as can be seen with recurring calls for the nationalization of the

Kumtor gold mine, for example. Lastly, David Montgomery investigates how Islam acts as a moral impetus for democratic and civil engagement. The state's inability to understand the religious motivation for communal involvement in certain areas the state reserves as their own purview means that they misjudge Islamic groups as oppositional agents to state power whereas in reality it is purely a new form of civil engagement.

This volume was extremely successful in achieving its goal of presenting a multi-faceted approach to Kyrgyzstan. However, its incorporation of overly complex theoretical premises, predominantly borrowed from anthropology, and analyses at times was both exhausting and distracting. This emphasis detracted from the honest, practical examinations and revelations that will attract most readers to the book and prove to be the greatest contribution this scholarship offers. Furthermore, given that most of the works were sheer examinations with no testable hypothesis, the subject matter may be slightly skewed by the subjective, conjectural lens of the authors. At other times, various authors seem torn between pragmatism and theory within their own debates such as in Ch. 10. Additionally, some common pitfalls committed by even the most grizzled Central Asia observers, such as lauding individual successes within minute case studies such as Kyrgyzstani textile workers' impact on global fashion in Ch. 7, are prevalent. Some of the work does successfully argue against predominant tropes and largely held public perceptions; yet the general analysis should be more vigilant in recognizing that these results may still fall within the minority when compared to the overall state of Kyrgyzstani society, economy, and politics. While containing a sense of optimism in regards to understanding, some of the chapters would fair better in tempering their conclusions with the idea that these are the exceptions rather than the rule.

Overall, this edited volume presents well-organized and mutually supporting chapters that flow succinctly and elucidate upon each other's work while providing engaging topical discussion relevant to followers of Kyrgyzstan. It does surprisingly well in challenging preconceived notions not only held by outside observers but also those held by Kyrgyzstanis. By doing so, the book not only contributes to one's understanding of the country but also motivates one in rethinking established approaches to aspects of society, politics, and identity within Kyrgyzstan. From this aspect, it will prove to be an invaluable resource for Central Asia followers and enthusiasts, as well as a great tool for academics and researchers in the field for years to come.

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Frank Trommler: **Kulturmacht ohne Kompass. Deutsche auswärtige Kulturbeziehungen im 20. Jahrhundert.** Köln: Böhlau, 2014. 732 pages. ISBN 978-3-412-21119-6

“The drama of the rise and fall of cultural diplomacy on the background of the national expansion” – those are the words which Trommler, professor emeritus at University of

Pennsylvania in Philadelphia, uses to introduce his extensive book on Germany as a “cultural power.” The author’s main thesis says that the political use of the cultural power should have enabled Germany to successfully weather the storms of the twentieth century. Instead, the cultural mobilization swayed off course and led to “national excesses,” which harmed both other nations and Germans themselves. In his monograph, Frank Trommler tries to capture the period in which the German Empire presented itself to the audiences both at home and abroad as a cultural power, and also the later efforts of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic to bear the burden of the past and to establish a new German cultural presence in the world. The keywords used throughout the text are “culture” and “power,” “dynamics” and “mobilization,” “nationalism” and “internationalism.”

Frank Trommler has roots in the German cultural milieu (he studied in Berlin, Vienna, and Munich); nevertheless he spent years in the United States of America, which significantly influenced his approach to studying the German history, culture, and foreign policy. The book *Kulturmacht ohne Kompass* is starkly distinct from other scholarly works on German cultural diplomacy published so far,¹ which is mostly thanks to its exceptionally broad subject matter and transnational perspective. Culture as understood by the author is not only the arts, but also education, science, and also the ideological orientation and values of the society. The author details the full scope of cultural relations and follows politicians and diplomats, but also artists, scientists, journalists, and other public figures. He explores the domestic culture and the way it was presented abroad, and also the interaction between the cultural diplomacies in Germany and abroad. Doing so, he never fails to consider the context of the political and social developments both in Germany and on the international stage.

The author examines different levels of cultural relations. He alternately offers observations on local cultural activities, characteristics of selected activities on regional and provincial level and also state or national perspectives, and analyses of international cooperation and transnational influences and transfers. The German national culture is understood very broadly by Frank Trommler; he tries to capture not only its mainstream, but also the activities of the Jews and other national minorities living in Germany and also the participation of the German expatriates (minorities, emigrants and so on) on the

¹ See, for example, Nicole Colin et al., eds., *Lexikon der deutsch-französischen Kulturbeziehungen nach 1945* (Tübingen: Narr, 2013); Ulrich Bauer, *Auswärtige Kulturpolitik als Handlungsfeld und “Lebenselixier”: Expertentum in der deutschen Auswärtigen Kulturpolitik und der Kulturdiplomatie* (München: Iudicium, 2011); Kurt Düwell, “Zwischen Propaganda und Friedensarbeit: 100 Jahre Geschichte der deutschen Auswärtigen Kulturpolitik,” in *Kultur und Außenpolitik: Handbuch für Studium und Praxis*, ed. Kurt-Jürgen Maaß (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009), 61–111; Johannes Paulmann, ed., *Auswärtige Repräsentationen: Deutsche Kulturdiplomatie nach 1945* (Köln: Böhlau, 2005); Steffen R. Kathe, *Kulturpolitik um jeden Preis: Die Geschichte des Goethe-Instituts von 1951 bis 1990* (München: Meidenbauer, 2005); Kurt Düwell and Werner Link, eds., *Deutsche auswärtige Kulturpolitik seit 1871* (Köln: Böhlau, 1981); Kurt Düwell, *Deutschlands auswärtige Kulturpolitik 1918–1932: Grundlinien und Dokumente* (Köln: Böhlau, 1976).

international cultural relations. He observes the connection between defining and political utilization of culture and the establishment of national identity. Particular attention is dedicated to the question whether to include the activities of the inhabitants of Austria, or more precisely the Habsburg monarchy, into the German culture.

The integration of the transnational perspective, which is not limited to two or three states and their comparison and an analysis of their bilateral relations, is the main feature distinguishing Trommler's book from other works on the topic and an original contribution to the research on the German cultural diplomacy. The political mobilization of the German culture construed as active, deliberate and organized use of culture to political ends is presented by the author in dialogue with other cultures and, among other things, through the eyes of the foreign partners and competitors. Throughout the book, Frank Trommler devoted a great attention to the German relations with France, the United States, Russia, or, more precisely, the Soviet Union, and Italy. However, he also takes notice of the Benelux countries and Scandinavia, Central and Eastern Europe, particularly Poland, Switzerland, Spain, and also China or Israel.

In his synthesizing monograph, Frank Trommler analyzes the period from the unification of Germany in the early 1870s to the German reunification in 1990. The book is divided into six chapters ordered chronologically; the periodization corresponds to the usual periodization of the German history of the twentieth century. However, the individual chapters are structured topically, rather than chronologically.

In the first two chapters, the author characterizes the cultural relations and cultural diplomacy of the German Empire prior to the First World War. Both chapters focus on the whole period of 1871–1914, which gives one the impression that the main reason for the division is to make all chapters roughly the same in terms of the number of pages. The first chapter emphasizes the emperor's influence on the presentation of the German culture abroad and on the competition between the modern and conservative approach to art in that period. The second chapter predominantly focuses on the definition of the German national culture and the matters of establishment and overlaps of identities.

The third chapter details the cultural propaganda of Germany and other European countries and the United States during the First World War, 1914–1918. It was the defense of culture which was often cited as the reason to wage war. Consequently, Frank Trommler analyzes the relations between culture and the army, both in national and transnational contexts. He accomplishes that in two ways: firstly he compares the cultural mobilization for war in Germany and other warring nations; and secondly he describes how the German cultural propaganda was received abroad. The fourth chapter is devoted to the cultural diplomacy and the international cultural relations in the era of the Weimar Republic, 1918–1933. Trommler explores the humanistic "spirit of Weimar," the efforts to break the isolation after the First World War and the state's active cultural diplomacy advocated by the foreign minister Gustav Stresemann. The author addresses both the German schools abroad and the establishment of the intermediary organizations (Deutsche Akademie, DAAD, Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung) and the contacts between artists and scientists giving ample evidence of examples and names. Furthermore, he

explores the international context of the dissemination of ideas. He again analyzes the cultural relations and transfers between Germany and France and also Germany and Austria, including the topic of the competition between Berlin and Vienna. Other parts of the chapter are dedicated to the contacts with Central and Eastern Europe, the cultural activities of the national minorities living in Germany, and the connected issue of the ethnification of culture.

The fifth chapter is titled “Mobilization of the German Culture in the Third Reich” and examines the years 1933–1945. It observes the contradictions between the nationalization of German culture and the need to accept, at least to a certain degree, internationalism in the international cultural relations. It analyzes the Nazi cultural propaganda both for the domestic and foreign audiences, the opposition to modernism and “Americanization” of culture, and also the racist and anti-Semitic direction of the cultural agenda of the Third Reich. Particular attention is devoted to the expulsion of the Jews from the cultural life of the Reich, and also the cultural activities and publication of the Germans living in exile, especially the scientists who emigrated. Apart from the cultural relations with France, Austria, and the United States, the author retraces the efforts to gain sympathies of the politicians and public in Italy, Poland, and the United Kingdom. The last part of the chapter examines the mobilization of the national culture during the Second World War, particularly the role of radio broadcasting and movies, and the role of scientists in defending the Germanization of the Slavic Central and Eastern Europe.

As the title of the last chapter, “After 1945: East-German and West-German heirs to the cultural power,” suggests, the analysis of the latter part of the twentieth century in Trommler’s book focuses predominantly on the question of coping with the burdensome past. It is as if the author’s reflections on the cultural relations of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic were a mere epilogue to the detailed study of the events of 1871–1945. The latter part of the twentieth century occupies not a half of the book as one might expect from its name, but a mere sixth of it. The period after the establishment of the Federal Republic and the GDR occupies mere 66 out of 732 pages. The central focal point of the last chapter is the second half of the 1940s and the 1950s. The key research questions seek answers on continuities and discontinuities of the post-war development of the German culture and cultural diplomacy. The main focus is on the renewal of the cultural scene in post-war Germany, which referred to the traditions of the past, drew from the regional activities, and was affected to a large extent by the policy of the occupying powers, whether in the form of directives or examples, role-models, and the transnational cultural transfers. The author observes how Germany after the Second World War ceased to assert the position of a cultural power and examines the consequences of this for the Jews or neighboring countries.

Frank Trommler reaches the conclusion that the cultural diplomacy of the Federal Republic of Germany at the end of the 1940s and in the 1950s had a strong continuity in terms of content, personnel, and administrative aspects with the cultural diplomacy of the Third Reich, Republic of Weimar, and in some aspects also with the German Empire. The post-war cultural diplomacy was characteristic for its modesty, but it did not

represent a new beginning. The cultural diplomacy of the GDR was, according to Trommler, also significantly persistent in the mobilization of culture for the interests of the state. Trommler argues that a fundamental change in concept of the cultural diplomacy of West Germany occurred only in the period of reforms of the 1960s and 1970s when the Federal Republic abandoned the traditional power perception of culture and the perception of Germany as a cultural power. Instead of the traditional and very narrow understanding of culture, preference was given to internationality which allowed Germany to return to confident cultural diplomacy. The national focus was weakened not only by the internationality, but also relatively rigorous cultural federalism. Trommler interprets these changes in cultural diplomacy as an expression of democratization and coping with the Nazi past in West Germany. The author considers the 1960s to be a sharper turning point in cultural diplomacy than 1945. The sixth chapter of the book dedicated to the latter part of the twentieth century is also in a way a summary of the whole book; there is no conclusion in the book. After the last chapter, there is only a select bibliography and index.

The focus on the examination of the ways German culture was mobilized for the sake of national expansion enabled to keep consistency throughout this immense piece of work, which is a great value. Unfortunately, the same focus effectively forbade analysis of the new impulses occurring in the latter part of the twentieth century; among other things the increased rate of motor vehicle ownership and tourism, radio and most importantly television broadcast, and changes due to the growing media coverage of politics, the politicization of foreign aid and environmental protection. The development of the international cultural relations and German cultural diplomacy not related to the coping with the past is only a peripheral issue in the book and it is not explored in the social context and transnational perspective. The fall of the iron curtain and the development since the reunification are not addressed in the book at all and it reveals only a little of the gradual steps towards Germany's contemporary approach to cultural diplomacy. To give an example, whereas the integration of the expelled into the German society is discussed at length, the issue of integration of the *gastarbeiters* is omitted completely.

Trommler's book is not a typical piece of historical writing resting mostly on archival research and interpretation of new findings. Trommler does not focus on listing all the facts, but rather on selecting different details which enable him to view the issue in question from different perspectives. This is one of the reasons why it cannot be decided without a doubt whether to rank this work among political or rather cultural history. The author relies mostly on printed publications; he often quotes from the works of artists, scientists, politicians, and journalists of the respective period. Trommler's work also benefits from knowledge from a vast array of literature published in German, English, and French. To a lesser extent the author uses archival primary sources; from the Political Archive of the Federal Foreign Office (Das politische Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Berlin) for the period before 1945 and from the Federal Archive in Koblenz (Das Bundesarchiv, Koblenz) and materials from SAPMO (Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv, Berlin) for the period after 1945.

Although the central narrative of the book is very broad in its nature, the author provides the reader with countless examples and interesting details. The chapters are divided into a number of short topical subchapters. General observations are interwoven with descriptions of particularities often accompanied by quotes from the works of artists, scientists, philosophers, politicians, and journalists. It is also commendable that despite the variety of topics and multitude of layers and perspectives the book is consistent in its style. Altogether the book gives a surprisingly integrated impression, but it demands a great degree of focus and thought from the reader. The readers versed in the issue will not fail to notice references to the main milestones and key figures of the history of the German cultural diplomacy. However, they will be confronted with rather unconventional viewpoint in which the well-known matters are put into a broad context and often viewed from unusual particular perspective resulting in a whole new context. This is the goal the author set for himself in the introduction, and he achieved it.

Trommler's extensive monograph *Kulturmacht ohne Kompass: Deutsche auswärtige Kulturbeziehungen im 20. Jahrhundert* is an excellent analysis of the mobilization of the German culture and the connected excesses in the broadly defined first half of the twentieth century. Its main contribution is to be found in its original addition to the interpretation of the German history and foreign policy of the first two thirds of the twentieth century. And yet, despite the promise of its title and from the annotation the book is not a unified synthesis of the German cultural diplomacy in the whole of the twentieth century. Nevertheless, the book is a valuable contribution to the research of the German cultural diplomacy. It contains a multitude of interesting ideas, details, and general observations. It explores not only relatively obvious causalities and direct influences, but also more subtle interactions and transfers and transcend into the fields that are not directly related to cultural diplomacy. Trommler's book is worth reading not only for its interesting findings and summaries, but also for its inspiring concept.

Petra Baštová

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Kenneth Morrison and Elizabeth Roberts: **The Sandžak: A History**. London: Hurst, 2013. 285 pages. ISBN 978-0-19933-065-2

This monograph with a short title, *The Sandžak: A History*, is the joint work of British author Kenneth Morrison, a reader in modern Southeast European history at De Montfort University in Leicester, England who specializes in security affairs, and Elizabeth Roberts, who teaches Balkan history and politics at Trinity College in Dublin. Roberts is a former Australian diplomat and the wife of Sir Ivor Roberts, the British ambassador in Belgrade, Yugoslavia in the 1990s. In the reviewed publication, Roberts focuses on the history of the region from prehistoric times to the beginning of World War I. Morrison authored the chapters in the book on the period since the Great War. Morrison and

Roberts are also authors of two books on the history of Montenegro and some shorter studies and journal articles.¹ The ambition of both authors to expand their studies into the topic of the past and present of the Sandžak region of the ex-Yugoslavia therefore seems natural.

The cover of the book announces that it “attempts to demystify the enigma of this little-known part of the Western Balkans.” Considering its strategic location between Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo and Bosnia, and its ethnically diverse population professing Islamic and Orthodox faiths, the Sandžak represents one of the important crossroads of the “Balkan worlds.” *The Sandžak: A History* therefore has the considerable ambition to offer a comprehensive analysis of the cultural, social, religious, ethnic, national and political dynamics that have been shaping the history of this region in multifarious ways since prehistoric times, including medieval Serbian statehood, the period of conquests, the dominance, decline and fall of the Ottoman Empire, and the century of three different Yugoslavias, right up to the present.

The Sandžak (in Ottoman Turkish, a standard, banner, or coat of arms), or Sandžak of Novi Pazar, remains, as the authors somewhat pompously emphasize, “one of the few remaining unexamined pieces of the Balkan jigsaw.” It is however certainly true that, apart from a few, mainly Yugoslav works,² the topic of the Sandžak in all its complexity is not dealt with in the scholarly literature, with the exception of local, national(istic) ly-oriented Sandžak historians. Thus, after the monograph *Sandžak: Porobljena Zemlja* by Harun Crnovršanin and Nura Sadiković,³ *The Sandžak: A History* is only the second attempt at a systematic interpretation of the region’s past from the “dawn of history” until the present.

Two short introductory chapters in this book are dedicated to the ancient history of the region from prehistoric times to the period of Serbian medieval statehood. However, in terms of sources and their possible interpretations, they do not bring anything new to the table. I might say that they do not even have the ambition to do so, since the topic of medieval Raška, the larger region that includes the Sandžak, has been traditionally and frequently addressed in Serbian historiography. These chapters are therefore mostly a historical entrée to the monograph.

The chapters on the history of the Ottoman Sandžak, in particular those accenting the period of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, are slightly more interesting and considerably more extensive. In regard to earlier Ottoman history, Roberts successfully, if somewhat incompletely, portrays the gradual transformation of the Christian rulers’ domains of the old Serbia into the provinces that administratively were fully subordinated

¹ Kenneth Morrison, *Montenegro: A Modern History* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2009); and Elizabeth Roberts, *Realm of the Black Mountain: A History of Montenegro* (London: Hurst, 2007).

² Well-known is the autobiography of Milovan Djilas *Besudna Zemlja*, first published abroad as Milovan Djilas, *Land without Justice* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1958).

³ Harun Crnovršanin and Nura Sadiković, *Porobljena zemlja* (Wuppertal: Bosanska riječ – Bosnisches Wort, 2001).

to Constantinople. The process of Ottomanization, not merely in the sense of subordination to the center but also of the urbanization and Islamization that followed, is addressed in subsequent chapters. There the author tries to give the reader an insight into urban development as the cornerstone of Ottoman rule, the style of life in urban dwellings, and the impact of Muslim immigration and the conversion of Christians to Islam. She outlines the *millet* system and confessional divisions under the Ottomans. However, her attempt at social rather than purely political history faces a problem in the lack of sufficient historical sources on the Sandžak. Fragmentary, locally documented facts are “sandwiched” into a general model of the historiography of the Balkans of the Ottoman period, which does not paint a particularly vivid picture of the Sandžak itself in those days.

The authors dedicate even more space in their book to the period of the “decline and fall of the Ottoman Empire.” They especially accentuate the attempts by the center to modernize the empire, as well as local resistance to such novelties (Sandžak was a part of Bosnia where the strongest opposition in the whole empire to the reforms threatening the interests of local Muslim notables was found). They describe the rise of the “renegades” – local rulers who were de facto independent of Constantinople, whose power increased proportionally to the declining effectiveness of the central administration. They deal extensively with the events of the First Serbian Uprising, including combat operations conducted in the Sandžak and the reaction of the Muslim nobility. After the Serbian revolt was suppressed, the nobility made every effort to preserve the socio-economic order – especially as it involved exploitation of the dominantly Christian *rayah*, which was the very basis of its material wealth, political power and social prestige. The authors pay particular attention to the character of one leader of the Bosnian Muslim upper-class’s revolt against the “Carigrad reforms,” Husein Gradašević, who is considered by the contemporary Bosniak national(ist) narrative to be one of the founders of the modern Bosniak nation.

Issues concerning the Great Eastern Crisis are also extensively discussed, as well as the Annexation Crisis and the Balkan Wars, which suddenly turned into a world war. Morrison explains great-power politics with an emphasis on the Sandžak’s strategic geographic location linking north and south as well as east and west on the Balkan Peninsula. We find some inaccuracies and simplifying in the text; for example, the Sandžak was not taken by Montenegrin and Serbian troops at the end of the First Balkan War, but for obvious strategic reasons, at its very beginning (pg. 74). Somewhat more attention should be paid to matters of internal development in the region, especially the genesis of ethno-national identities based on inter-confessional and socio-economic cleavages, the process of modernization of the region in general, and last but not least, the question of how the turbulent period of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was experienced by the diverse inhabitants of the Sandžak. Regarding the book’s recounting of historical developments in the Sandžak, we do not for the first time come across problems raised by the specialization of the book’s authors. The limitations of their primary interest in international politics, accompanied by the failure to use primary sources, is a significant weakness in such a monograph on regional history.

The chapter on the Sandžak in the Yugoslav kingdom introduces issues regarding the course and complexity of political developments in the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Morrison characterizes the Sandžak at that time as a territory of considerable political and security instability. He accentuates the massacres of the local Muslims and the initial resistance by a substantial part of their traditional elite against the Yugoslav state with its dominant Christian religion. Furthermore, the author deals with the Muslims' political party organization within the turbulent political system of the Kingdom. He generally depicts the basic dilemma between cooperation and resistance that not only the Sandžak Muslim elite was facing in that system. Somewhat more attention could be paid to analysis of structural contradictions manifested in the cleavage between the old nobility of landowners and religious dignitaries, and the slowly emerging new elites who already were more or less thinking in modern categories.

At the beginning of World War II, the Sandžak found itself under Italian and German occupation with participation by the Ustasha. The Muslims were viewed as "the purest Croats" by the nationalist propaganda out of Zagreb. Thus, the occupation rekindled the old-new dilemmas for a substantial part of Sandžak Muslims (*Sandžaklije*) who did not perceive interwar Yugoslavia as their patria and who were given an opportunity by the occupation regime(s) to settle accounts with the Serbs. The claimed participation of *Sandžaklije* in the Holocaust is interesting. Also intriguing, but unfortunately not sufficiently elaborated, is information on the activities of the *Balli Kombëtar* organization in the region, which may indicate a still-high level of national ambivalence, or more precisely, a persistent (neo-)Ottoman identity among the local Slavic Muslims. Morrison deals fairly extensively with the communist resistance in the Sandžak and its local communist leaders: Rifat Burdžović Tršo and of course, Milovan Djilas, especially in connection with the Montenegrin Uprising, and the battles among partisans, Chetniks, Muslim militias and the occupiers. The author also describes at length the activities of British military missions.

Establishment of the National (Land) Anti-Fascist Council of the People's Liberation of Sandžak (ZAVNOS) as an autonomous unit within the Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ) represents a key moment in the war-time history of the Sandžak, according to Morrison. It should be noted that the Yugoslav Republics and the autonomous Kosovo and Vojvodina regions emerged later on from the other national/land antifascist councils. Consequently, an obvious question is why this did not happen in the case of the Sandžak. Morrison cites an often-quoted dictum by Edvard Kardelj that the "Sandžak cannot survive as an autonomous unit because there are no political, economic or ethnic reasons for it." As Morrison tells it, the decisive factor was what he calls the "Montenegrin clique" within the Communist Party, who wanted to shape the borders of its new republic roughly as they were before World War I. The fact remains that an autonomous Sandžak would simply be too small and insignificant, and would further complicate the already quite complex federal structure of Yugoslavia. ZAVNOS was therefore disbanded over the objections of many of its leading cadres and ordinary participants in the liberation struggle.

The historical period of socialist Yugoslavia is very inadequately elaborated, almost as if nothing remarkable happened in this “dark wilayah.” In a total of five pages, Morrison covers the 35 years from the end of the war to 1980, the very period that brought fundamental changes in both material and immaterial terms not only to the Sandžak but also to other peripheral regions of Yugoslavia. Since many contemporary witnesses are still alive and the archives are “hiding” large quantities of documents from this period, such a cursory approach is surprising, to say the least. The chapter only briefly addresses issues such as communist repression and the general development of national consciousness among Sandžak Muslims.

The 1980s in the Sandžak, as everywhere else in Yugoslavia, augured badly for “Brotherhood and Unity.” Morrison explains the tendency towards nationalism primarily in economic terms, as do many other discussions of the disintegration of socialist Yugoslavia. He devotes sufficient space to the growth of Serbian nationalism and its impact on the fate of Yugoslavia. However, other factors were gaining in strength and encouraging the break-up of the federation, including the nationalisms of other peoples. They also deserve the author’s attention. According to Morrison, political institutions representing the national interests of the Sandžak Muslims were born in an atmosphere of Serbian nationalism in the former Yugoslavia. This specifically concerned the Muslim National Council of the Sandžak (MNVŠ), an umbrella platform that included all the national(ist) Muslim organizations from the region, and the local branches of the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), which similar to their mother party in Sarajevo, were characterized by an increasing rift between their radical and realistic wings. In my opinion, however, we are dealing with much more complex interactions than those described by Morrison, not simply with a reaction by Muslims and other “endangered” peoples of Yugoslavia to rising Serbian nationalism.

In the chapters that follow, Morrison describes the suffocating atmosphere that prevailed in the Sandžak in the shadow of the war in Bosnia, as well as Belgrade’s repression of local Muslims and Bosniaks, especially their elites. Needless to say, some of the author’s theses, such as “tensions were invoked from the center and ranks of radical Muslim nationalists but ordinary people in contrast tried to maintain good neighborly relations,” are somewhat idealistic. Proper attention is paid to ethnic cleansing and pogroms perpetrated by Bosnian Serb troops, Belgrade’s security forces, and local Serbs, as well as to attempts to internationalize the “Sandžak question” and the role of *Sandžaklije* in the Bosnian war. The question of the extent to which the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the conflictual environment in the Sandžak shaped the development of a national identity among local Muslims/Bosnians certainly deserves more elaboration. Simply stating that this was reflected by a change in ethnonyms is somewhat superficial.

The last part of the book is dedicated to the Sandžak in the period after the Bosnian war, which according to Morrison is, except perhaps for a brief period during the Kosovo conflict, characterized by disputes and power struggles among the political and religious leaders of the local Bosniak community, with a certain amount of interference from Belgrade. Here the author clearly deviates from his original intention to write the history of

the entire region and addresses only topics almost exclusively related to the Sandžak Bosniaks and their interactions with the Serbian capital. Orthodox Christians, who make up half of the region's population, remain outside the scope of Morrison's work. In addition, the part played by the Bosniaks in the process of the emancipation of the Montenegrin state from Belgrade, and their role in the transformation of Serbia after 2000, when they became a significant element of at least the political system of the country, are properly emphasized. Finally, Morrison also opens up the theme of radical Islam. To conclude, the author quite realistically observes that introducing of any form of autonomy to the Sandžak is out of the question for three reasons: the new international border that divides Montenegro and Serbia and cuts the Sandžak in half; the mistrustful attitude of the government in Belgrade toward the Bosniaks of Serbia (and vice versa); and the relatively successful incorporation of Montenegrin Bosniaks and Muslims into the political and social structures of that small country.

Overall, we must note that while the monograph *The Sandžak: A History* is based on rather classical political history, its lack of social, cultural and economic context is somewhat striking. Despite its title, which refers to the territory and not the ethnicity, the book focuses primarily on topics bound to the Muslim and Bosniak communities. The Orthodox people(s) of the Sandžak themselves seem to be reduced to a topic of secondary importance, considered much less important than the international, Ottoman or Yugoslav context of the study. In addition, the two basic components of the 200-page work, i.e., the wider context which takes up roughly half of the text and the individual political history of the Sandžak, leave insufficient space for elucidation of Balkan/Yugoslav concepts or even an exhaustive history of Sandžak Muslims and Bosniaks. That is why the most significant contribution of the publication can only be found in its detailed exploration of the British diplomatic archives concerning the history of the Sandžak. In general, we can appreciate *The Sandžak: A History* as the first attempt at a comprehensive monograph on the theme written by non-Yugoslav authors. The "dark wilayah" of the Sandžak therefore remains a white space for the imagination in the Balkan historical atlas, offering a wealth of opportunity for further in-depth anthropological, political and historical research, especially as concerns its recent past and the present.

Daniel Heler

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REPORTS

Conference Report

Annual Conference of the International Association for the Study of German Politics (IASGP), June 16–17, 2016, Prague

On June 16–17, 2016, Prague hosted the 42nd Annual Conference of the International Association for the Study of German Politics (IASGP), co-organized by the Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University and the Goethe-Institut Prague. The conference took place under the auspices of the German Ambassador to the Czech Republic, H.E. Arndt Freiherr Freytag von Loringhoven, and the Rector of Charles University, Tomáš Zima. The event attracted experts from both Europe and the United States and offered insights into several different dimensions and areas of German politics. The conference was divided into six panels and a keynote lecture sponsored by the Association's flagship journal, *German Politics*. Among the honored guests were Ambassador von Loringhoven; Charles University's Vice-Rector, Jan Konvalinka; the Director of the Goethe-Institut in Prague, Berthold Franke; and the Head of the Chair of German and Austrian Studies at Charles University, Ota Konrád.

The German Politics Lecture was delivered by Hanns W. Maull of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (*Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik*), Berlin and the Mercator Institute for Contemporary China Studies. Building upon thirty years of his research in the field of Germany's foreign and European policies, Maull provided a critical reflection on the leading conceptualizations in current debate about Germany's power. Discussing Constanze Stelzenmüller's "shaping power," Hans Kundnani and Stephen Szabo's "geo-economic power," and his own work on "civilian power," Maull concluded that none of these concepts are able to capture Germany's multifaceted and changing policies. For Maull, German power is not clearly definable, but is a "highly complex, contingent, uncertain and therefore fragile phenomenon," which is being influenced by a number of factors, including the mismatch between the demand for and supply of governance, dysfunctional features of democratic systems, and the rise of populist politics. As a final provocation, Maull suggested that Germany's power has become increasingly "autistic," that is, preoccupied with itself and unable to reflect and influence its external environment.

Similar concerns arose in two other panels, making Germany's foreign and European policies two of the key themes of the conference. A panel entitled "New Directions in German Foreign Policy: Theory and Cases" offered a series of conceptually-oriented presentations, interpreting Germany's foreign policy through explicit engagement with theoretical developments in international relations and other disciplines. Alister Miskimmon (Royal Holloway, University of London) discussed the strategic narratives through which Germany demonstrates and communicates continuity and change in its foreign policy. Through narratives, actors create shared meanings of their identities and pasts, so as to shape their courses of action and influence their partners. For his part, Jakub Eberle (Charles University, Prague) criticized the current state of the literature on Germany's foreign policy, arguing that leading accounts tend to provide too-rigid concepts that are unable to capture the ambiguities and complexities of decision-making. As an alternative,

he presented a theoretical framework that emphasizes the contextual and contradictory nature of foreign policy. Patricia Daenhardt (University of Lisbon) discussed the relationship between Germany's foreign policy and the international order, arguing that Germany is ultimately a status quo power with an interest in maintaining the liberal global order. The problem, however, is that this order has been under attack, and Germany is only now slowly developing a strategic vision of how to respond to these challenges. Finally, Vladimír Handl (Charles University, Prague) provided a reading of Germany's policies towards Russia using the concept of ontological security, which focuses on the subjects' perception of themselves as coherent and unitary actors, which is reflected in and maintained through policy routines. Russia's invasion of Ukraine shattered Germany's ontological security, which is based on a view of Russia as a part of the civilized European order. Handl then tracked how different voices in the German debate made sense of the crisis and attempted to reconstruct Germany's identity in that context.

Additionally, a panel on "Germany's European Policy" brought together two very different papers, both of which, however, provided interesting and rather compatible insights into Germany's policies in the EU context. Simon Bulmer (University of Sheffield) and William Paterson (Aston University) offered a conceptual perspective on the politicization of Germany's European policy. Analyzing the country's party politics and public opinion over the last thirty years, they tracked a movement from "permissive consensus" to "constraining dissensus" with respect to European integration. They conclude that while the EU is still seen in a favorable light by the political and societal mainstream, Germany has increasingly been prone to favoring national decision-making over further Europeanization, a trend that has been accelerated by the crisis in the Eurozone. For her part, Kirstin Lindloff (TU Braunschweig) examined Germany's vehicle emission policies as compared to those of the European institutions and other member states. Challenging the image of Germany as a leader in environmental policy, she contended that the Federal Republic has only occasionally stood up in the role of pacemaker, while it often has been notably reluctant to push for stricter environmental regulation.

The second overarching theme of the conference focused on parties and elections, spanning multiple panels. Wade Jacoby (Brigham Young University) outlined a comparison of grand coalitions. In his contribution he argued for incorporating insights from Germany and Austria into political science's broader discussion of coalitions. After reviewing the different functions of grand coalitions, he offered a cautiously optimistic view of their impact on democracy. Following that, Johannes N. Blumenberg (Johannes Gutenberg University, Mainz) discussed the 2016 regional election in Germany in the context of the theoretical debate about the impact of political leaders on party success. With the help of statistical methods, he produced evidence for the argument that Winfried Kretschmann's personality played a key role in the Green Party's victory in Baden-Württemberg. Michael Angenendt (Heinrich-Heine University, Düsseldorf) used a similar approach to analyze anti-party sentiment among members of German independent local lists, demonstrating much higher levels of skepticism about the role of parties on the local level than in the national context. Next, Manuela Blumenberg (Johannes Gutenberg

University, Mainz) provided a comparative statistical analysis of the amounts of party spending in the European context. Frank Bandau (Bamberg University) explained the CSU's failures with respect to Germany's federal child care subsidy and its highway toll for foreigners, with the help of a "multiple streams framework." Adam Jarosz (University of Zielona Góra) compared the formation of local governments in the post-socialist urban contexts of Rostock, Germany and Toruń, Poland. Finally, Aleksandra Kruk (University of Zielona Góra) provided a historiographical analysis of the development of the FDP's image in Poland.

Other issues discussed at the conference included a heated exchange between Joyce Mushaben (University of St. Louis-Missouri) and Lothar Funk (HS Düsseldorf) on the economic, political and moral aspects of Germany's refugee and asylum policy, and Ed Turner's (Aston University) analysis of private rented housing in Germany and Britain.

The next, 43rd annual conference of the IASGP will be held in London on May 30–31, 2017.

Jakub Eberle

INSTRUCTIONS FOR AUTHORS

1. Manuscript Submission

The journal *Studia Territoria AUC* publishes original scholarly manuscripts that have not been published anywhere else, are not currently awaiting publication in other journals, and are not being considered for publication by another journal. Manuscripts are accepted in English, Czech, and German. In the case of English-language manuscripts, American English is preferred, but British English is also acceptable so long as the quality of the writing meets the necessary standards and the spelling is consistent. Insofar as style is concerned, authors should consult either the *Chicago Manual of Style* or the *Oxford Style Manual*.

Manuscripts for consideration are to be uploaded online through the *AUC Studia Territoria* journal management system, or sent to the editorial team via the e-mail address stuter@fsv.cuni.cz, in a standard document format (.doc or .rtf). All correspondence between the author and the editorial team will take place via e-mail.

Manuscripts considered for publication shall be sent to external anonymous reviewers. The period between the submission of manuscripts and their return to respective authors for authorization, resubmission of the revised manuscripts based on reviewers' comments, or with an outright rejection will not exceed four months. The editorial team reserves the right to edit the article in accordance with its own editorial standards or to reject the article with no further obligation to provide reasons.

Manuscripts requiring excessive editing due to the failure to respect the journal's editorial guidelines, poor quality of the text or not meeting the necessary language standards will be returned to the respective authors.

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The copyright of each journal issue rests with the publisher Karolinum (Charles University Press). Authors of accepted articles will be required to conclude a standard license agreement with the publisher before publication.

3. Editorial Guidelines

The journal *Acta Universitatis Carolinae Studia Territoria* publishes articles, book reviews, and reports.

An article should normally be between 25 and 40 pages in length, whereas a book review would ideally be 5 to 10 pages in length. Longer texts may also be considered if the subject matter warrants such treatment. All articles, regardless of language, must contain an English-language abstract between 100 and 150 words in length as well as four to six keywords.

A submitted manuscript must contain the following items: title page, abstract, keywords, main text, and annexes (if there are any). In a covering letter, the author must provide his or her full name, institutional affiliation, a brief biographical note in the language of the manuscript, an address to which author's copies are to be sent, and additional contact information. Articles by more than one author must have a single contact person designated for the purposes of correspondence.

Words from other alphabets must be provided in the Latin alphabet. A transliteration table valid for the given language must be consulted when transliterating bibliographical items in footnotes (Library of Congress, Oxford Dictionary, ČSN). Standard transcription should be used for foreign terms and names in the main text.

4. Reference Style

Authors should adhere to the classical reference style. References should be presented in the form of footnotes. Bibliographical information from consulted works should be included in the footnotes themselves, not in a separate bibliography. Journal articles should always include a DOI (Digital Object Identifier), if the journal has one. Electronic sources may be cited including the access date, if appropriate.

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