

Religions and religious institutions in the post-Yugoslav states between secularization and resurgence

REINHARD HENKEL

Geographisches Institut der Universität Heidelberg

Abstract

In a religiously very heterogeneous country where the Communist state was quite successful to impose secularization, the wars in the context of the dissolution of Yugoslavia which were mainly nationalist but implicitly had religious aspects led to a strengthening of the role of the religious institutions in all successor states. Therefore, for the time after 1990 we can speak of a resurgence of religion in all states of Ex-Yugoslavia. On the level of the individual, the situation can be best described with the term of “confrontational identity”: Religious, together with national or ethnic awareness came to be of great or even prime importance in the confrontation with “other” ethnicities, nations and religions. The religious resurgence manifests itself a stronger identification of people with their religious roots rather than in increased active church involvement. Special emphasis is put on the role of the Serbian Orthodox Church which is closely linked to the culture, history and politics of the Serbian nation and regards itself its “cultural guardian” (Ramet). In this context, the Orthodox concept of the “canonical territory” is crucial and will be explored in the paper.

Key words: Religion – Ex-Yugoslavia – State and Church – War

Introduction

Like in most former Communist countries in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, the means and actions applied by the Yugoslav Government between 1945 and 1990 to reduce the influence of religions and religious organisations were quite effective: While there was just a tiny group of people who regarded themselves to be without a religion before the Second World War (less than 0.1% of the population), this number grew to 13% in 1953 and to 32% in 1987. Due to the political developments in the late 1980s and in the 1990s, religions and religious institutions experienced a resurgence in their societal significance. The new nationalism which came to the open during this time was closely connected with renewed activities of the religious organisations. In each of the new post-Yugoslav states, the churches and other religious organisations play different roles, depending on the religious composition of the population in these states. The article focuses on these different

roles, taking into account the political developments during the last decades. It this, most emphasis is on Serbia and the Orthodox Church.

Religions and non-religiousness in Yugoslavia up to 1990

Like the Yugoslav state between the two world wars, the Titoist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was multicultural, multiethnic and multireligious. Three major religious groups were living side by side, and after 1945, a considerable and growing group of atheists and nonreligious emerged. The 1953 population census was the last one for decades which included a question related to religion (Table 1). In this, the pre-war situation was still present, but the atheist or non-religious¹ had already grown to a share 12.6% of the population. An outstandingly high percentage in Montenegro and a very low one for Kosovo are remarkable. Of the six constituent republics of Yugoslavia, four were clearly oriented towards one denomination: Serbia and Montenegro were dominantly Orthodox, Croatia and Slovenia Catholic. Bosnia and Herzegovina was mixed (Muslim/Orthodox/Catholic); so was Macedonia (Orthodox/Muslim). The autonomous province of Vojvodina was also mixed Orthodox/Catholic, and the autonomous province of Kosovo mainly Muslim. While before WW 2, the religious organizations played an important role in society, there was a strong process of secularization in Communist Yugoslavia after 1945 (Bremer 2003). Like in all other Communist countries, all religious organisations were suppressed and lost influence in society. In order to overcome the national/ethnic and religious differences, the government tried to establish a Yugoslav nationality which had an Atheist connotation. Perica (2002) speaks of the Yugoslav “civil religion of brotherhood and unity (*bratstvo i jedinstvo*)” and puts it in line

¹ The terminology of describing to belong or not to belong to a religious group is quite complicated. I use the term denomination to describe the different Christian traditions which originates from the Anglo-Saxon context characterized by a more pluralistic religious conception, religious freedom and state-church separation. In the German context, the term *Konfession* is generally used for the adherence of a person to a specific Christian tradition. For the growing group of people who declared (e.g. in population censuses) that they do not belong to any religious group, the term *konfessionslos* has been used. These terms are e.g. also used in the study by Flere (1990) in the Serbo-Croatian language. He uses the term *bez konfesije* (“without confession”) for the group of people who are in this article subsumed under the term “atheist and nonreligious”. In the population censuses in Yugoslavia and in the post-Yugoslav states, a different terminology was used. The 1953 Yugoslav census had the category *bez vere* (“without believe/faith/religion”), the Croatia 1991 census *bez vjeroispovijesti* (“without religious confession”). In most of the post-1990 censuses, two categories are used. Croatia 2001: *agnostici i neisjašnjeni* (“agnostics and uncommitted/undeclared”) and *nisu vjernici* (“non-believers”), Montenegro 2003: *nije vjernik* (“Atheist”) and *neizjašnjen* (“not declared”), Serbia 2002: *neisjašnjen* (“undeclared”) and *nije vernik* (“non-believer”). In the case of Slovenia 2002, a third group was introduced: people who are believers but do not belong to a religion.

It is interesting to note that the same term “undeclared” is (and was already in Yugoslavia) usually also applied to those who do not want to state their national or ethnic adherence. In Yugoslavia, one could, however, declare oneself to be of Yugoslav nationality which in a way meant a “confession” to what Perica (2002) calls a civil religion.

Tab. 1 Population and religious adherence (percentages) in Yugoslavia 1953

	Population (thousands)	Orthodox	Catholic	Muslim	Atheist/ Nonreligious
Bosnia & Herzeg.	2,848	35.2	21.1	32.2	10.9
Croatia	3,919	11.3	73.9	0.2	12.5
Macedonia	1,305	57.4	0.4	30.0	11.7
Montenegro	420	45.8	4.8	17.7	31.5
Serbia	6,979	65.8	9.1	10.0	12.8
Central Serbia	4,456	81.8	1.0	3.4	13.4
Vojvodina	1,713	45.3	32.8	0.2	13.5
Kosovo	808	21.4	3.3	67.3	7.8
Slovenia	1,466	0.3	82.8	0.0	10.3
Yugoslavia	16,937	41.2	31.7	12.3	12.6

Source: calculated from Popis stanovništva 1953.

Tab. 2 Population 1991 and religious adherence (percentages) 1987 in Yugoslavia

	Population (thousands)	Orthodox	Catholic	Muslim	Atheist/ Nonreligious
Bosnia & Herzeg.	4,377	21.9	14.1	34.4	29.1
Croatia	4,784	6.5	64.9	0.4	27.4
Macedonia	1,935 ^{b)}	54.7	6.0	21.3	17.7
Montenegro	615	29.8	2.1	13.0	54.0
Serbia	9,916	39.6	4.8	17.4	34.7
Central Serbia	5,855	53.5	0.9	2.7	41.7
Vojvodina	2,015	27.2	17.2	0.1	52.1
Kosovo	2,046	11.8	3.6	77.8	6.5
Slovenia	1,913	2.1	68.4	1.1	27.0
Yugoslavia	23,540	27.8	23.8	15.7	31.6

Source: Population Censuses and Flere 1990, 94^{a)}

a) The religious adherence survey was based on a systematic sample of n = 20,700.

b) 1994.

with Serbian Orthodoxy, Croatian Catholicism and Bosnian Islam. The percentage of people declaring themselves as Yugoslavs reached its peak at the 1981 census (5.4%). It was highest in Croatia, Vojvodina and Bosnia & Herzegovina and lowest in Slovenia, Macedonia and Kosovo. Although there were times of religious revivals in different parts of Yugoslavia, there is no doubt that during the Communist time, secularization increased. The results of a sample survey in 1987 reported by Flere (1990) show an increase of atheists and nonreligious to 32%. This group therefore had become the majority “religious group”, while 28% of the population were reported Orthodox, 24% Catholic and 16% Muslim (Table 2). According to these data, however, atheists and nonreligious were a majority only in the Republic of Montenegro where their percentage was highest already in the 1953 Census. The autonomous region of Vojvodina was the only other region with a majority of athe-

ists/nonreligious whereas in Serbia and Macedonia, the Orthodox Church, in Croatia and Slovenia the Catholic Church, and in Kosovo Islam still dominated. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Islam had taken the place of the religion with the most numerous adherents. Islam also was the only religion in Yugoslavia whose population share grew (from 12.3 to 15.7) between 1953 to 1987, while the two major Christian denominations lost adherents.

Religion in Ex-Yugoslavia after 1990

During the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the wars of the 1990s, the (West) Europeans had to realize that not only militant nationalism which many had already considered dead rose its ugly head again but that this nationalism was closely attached to religious identity. This applies especially to the Roman Catholic and the Serbian Orthodox Churches which have acted as the “cultural guardians” (Ramet 1984) of their respective peoples, i.e. of the Croats (and to a much lesser extent, the Slovenians) on the one hand, and of the Serbs, Macedonians and Montenegrins, on the other. For the third main religious group in Yugoslavia, the Muslims, national and religious identity are not only closely related, they are identical: After a long discussion process, it was decided in Communist Yugoslavia that the Muslims in Bosnia were officially recognized as a nation, alongside the Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians and Montenegrins who were the “constitutive nations” of one of the Yugoslav republics, under this very name in the 1960s (Steindorff 1997). Other Muslims in Yugoslavia (e.g. of Albanian and Macedonian nationality) were not regarded part of this national group.

After the collapse of the Communist regime, the religions in all Ex-Yugoslav states regained influence in society, so that one can to a certain extent speak of a re-emergence of religion. Table 3 shows that the percentage of atheists/nonreligious which had grown from 12.6 to 31.6% between 1953 and 1987 with 2.7% is very small again. At the same time, secularization processes are at work. In Slovenia, e.g., the share of the nonreligious has grown. The figures given above do not necessarily indicate a growth of participation in church life or an increase in religious beliefs. They do show a significantly greater identification with the religious heritage and institutions, however.

The main changes in the religious composition of the population between 1953 and 2000 are consequences of the wars: E.g., the Serb refugees from Croatia increased the number of Orthodox in Serbia and lowered that of the Orthodox in Croatia. Likewise, the number of Catholics (Croats, Hungarians and others) decreased in Vojvodina because many of them fled during the War. Many Serbs fled from Kosovo to Central Serbia, and so the number of Orthodox decreased in the former. In the following, the religious situation in the post-Yugoslav states will be considered individually.

Tab. 3 Population and religious adherence (in percent) in the states of Ex-Yugoslavia, around 2002

	Population (thousands)	Orthodox	Catholic	Muslim	Atheist/ Nonreligious
Bosnia & Herzeg.	4,140	33.0	12.0	46.0	5.0
Croatia	4,437	4.6	91.2	1.3	2.3
Macedonia	2,049	68.0	0.2	30.0	1.0
Montenegro	620	76.6	3.7	18.3	1.0
Serbia	9,398	71.6	4.8	21.7	0.6
Central Serbia	5,466	94.2	0.4	4.4	0.5
Vojvodina	2,032	74.2	20.6	0.4	0.7
Kosovo	1,900	8.0	1.0	89.0	0.5
Slovenia	1,964	3.2	78.4	3.3	13.8
Total	22,608	46.4	27.9	21.3	2.7

Sources: latest Census data: Croatia 2001, Montenegro 2003, Slovenia 2002, Serbia 2002. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Kosovo: own estimates based on Stojmilov 2000, Kocsis 2006, earlier censuses and other sources.

Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia

After 1990, the Serbian Orthodox Church has been trying to re-establish its position it had before World War 2. In the rural areas, many new churches are being built, and in the capital Belgrade, the biggest Orthodox church on the Balkans and the third biggest in the world, the church of St. Sava, was officially opened after a very long building period, in June 2004. It is located at the highest hill of the capital city and is regarded as much a national as a religious symbol.

Orthodox churches mostly have the character of national or ethnic churches, and therefore in history have usually had a close relationship with the State. In Orthodox theology and church law, usually the term “symphony between Church and State” is used (Buchenau 2004). It is not very well known that the Orthodox Church in Greece still is a State Church, and that the Greek State which has been a EU member (the only one with a majority Orthodox population) since 1981 regards itself to be an Orthodox state. Mavrogordatos (2003: 121–122) gives a long list of benefits which the Church can enjoy therefore. There is no mention of the separation of Church and State in the Greek constitution, but Greece is the EU member state with the highest number of convictions for violations of religious freedom by the European Court of Human Rights (Ilić 2005: 298–300) to which not only cases from the EU member states but from all member states of the Council of Europe (which include all East European countries except Belarus) can be brought, on the other hand.

The Serbian (then still: Yugoslavian) State was strongly involved, though not officially, with the war in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1991 to 1995. It supported the Serbian paramilitary forces in the two countries which had declared independence from Yugoslavia in 1991/92. These forces and their political repre-

sentatives in the “Srpska Krajina” (in Croatia) and in Republika Srpska (in Bosnia & Herzegovina) usually were stronger Serbian nationalists than the Serbian Government itself. Some observers interpret these actions as an attempt to create a “Greater Serbia” (Javorović 1996, Iveković 2002) which aimed at gathering all Serbs in one state. In its most extreme form, the Greater Serbia ideology claims that the Muslim and Catholic population of Bosnia originally was Serb and Orthodox as well as the population of Slavonia and Dalmatia. This resulted in the conviction that the territory of all Bosnia, Slavonia and Dalmatia is part of this Greater Serbia. In general, the Serbian Orthodox Church supported the actions of Serb nationalists: “The Orthodox hierarchy and a number of priests took an active part in the wars in Croatia and Bosnia ... Patriarch Pavle and his bishops toured the territories controlled by Serb forces, encouraging their sibilings to defend their ‘ancestral lands’. Priests blessed publicly known war criminals and found justifications for the blowing up of mosques and Catholic churches” (Iveković 2002: 525).

The Serbian Orthodox Church is not only closely linked to the Serbian State but highly politicized as well. This is very obvious in the Kosovo question. It is here that the political-religious myth of Serbia as the defender of Christianity against Islam (Turks) originated, materializing in the 1389 Battle of Kosovo Polje which the Serbs lost against the Turks but which still became the central symbol of Serb national identity. The numerous Orthodox monasteries in this area also are at the same time tokens of Serb claims to this territory. After the 1999 Kosovo War, they are now heavily protected by NATO forces, but the Orthodox Church sees to it that they are always staffed with monks or nuns although most of the Serbian Orthodox population has since left the province. On the webpage of the Serbian Orthodox Church (www.spc.org.yu) and of the Bishop of Raska and Prizren (= Kosovo, www.kosovo.net), the Kosovo question features prominently especially in accusing the Albanian extremists of their heavy attacks on the churches and monasteries in March 2004. In the latter, Kosovo and Metohija is called “the cradle of the Serbian Orthodox people and their Church” and “the very essence of Serbian spiritual, cultural identity and statehood since Middle Ages to date”. The religious identity of the Kosovo Albanians has also risen. They became more aware of themselves being Muslim in the confrontation with the Orthodox Serbs. However, Albanian nationalism has never had a strong link to religion. It is much more a nationalism based on historical, cultural and especially linguistic criteria. In Kosovo as well as in Albania and in Macedonia, the idea of the Albanians being “an Islamic nation” has never prevailed in the political discourse. There have been attempts by radical Islamists to disseminate ideas along these lines, but they have so far failed to take root. There are sizeable Orthodox and Catholic Albanian churches in the three territories contributes to this, and the fact that the Catholic nun and Peace Nobel Prize winner Mother Teresa who was an ethnic Albanian (born near Skopje, Macedonia) is regarded a national symbol (the only International Airport of Albania in Tirana is named after her) is an indication for this.

In April 2006, a new religion law was passed by the Serbian parliament. It awarded to the Serbian Orthodox Church a dominant status and a leading role in society. Apart from it, only six other “traditional” religious communities are recognized and have certain rights (Roman Catholics, Muslims, Jews, Slovak Lutherans, Hungarian/German Lutherans and Hungarian Reformed). These communities are all defined as national/ethnic communities in a similar way as the Orthodox Church is regarded the Serbian Church. The other religious communities, e.g. other non-ethnic Protestant churches like Adventists, Baptists, Methodists and Pentecostal churches, are left with very few rights. It seems that there are great similarities to the Russian religious law where there is a three-level hierarchy of religious communities with the Orthodox Church at the top as well. The original law proposal in Serbia which was even more in favour of the Orthodox Church was eventually withdrawn because of heavy criticism by national and international human rights organizations. “Although the (Orthodox) church no longer enjoys the status of an established religion, it has nonetheless de facto taken up the role of an indispensable national church. This is because religious and national identities are intertwined within the Serbian Orthodox Church; the belief is prevalent that all Serbs are (or should be) Orthodox ... In 2003 the state-owned postal service contributed financially to the construction of the St. Sava church in Belgrade by temporarily raising the price of every postage stamp available, so that citizens (Orthodox or not) had no choice but to ‘donate’ a few extra dinars to this cause with each letter they sent.” (Ilić 2005: 285). Serbian president Boris Tadić who had to sign the new religion law openly recognised that it violates the European Convention on Human Rights (http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=771, accessed May 30, 2007).

The concept of “canonical territory” is crucial to understand the attitude of Orthodox churches on the relationship to the State and the nation as well as to other churches and religions (Ionitã 2004: 57–58). Starting from the old Christian principle of “one city – one bishop” which emphasizes the unity of the Christian Church and all Christians, it claims that the territory settled by a (majority) Orthodox population is Orthodox canonical territory, and that on this territory, other religions and churches basically have no place. Exceptions are allowed just for population groups from other countries which have migrated to this territory and which traditionally belong to a different religion or church. The Enlightenment idea that it is the right of the individual to choose (and change) his/her religion has not yet taken a deep root in most Eastern European societies which have traditionally been Orthodox. The concept of canonical territory is closely linked to the notion of proselytism, i.e. the attempt to persuade other people to accept one’s belief(s) which has a very negative connotation in Orthodox societies. The Greek constitution (in Article 13,2) explicitly prohibits proselytism, and the Russian Orthodox Church strongly resisted the declaration of four Roman Catholic dioceses in Russia by the Holy See in 2002, and regards not only the area of the Russian Federation as its canonical territory but of all other former Soviet republics except Armenia and Georgia as well (Oeldemann 2006).

The canonical territory principle has its complicated consequences in the religious situation in Macedonia, too. In 1967 the Macedonian Orthodox Church split from the Serbian Church and unilaterally declared itself autocephalous. This status was acknowledged by the Yugoslav socialist government but neither by the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople who is regarded the head of Orthodoxy nor by the other Orthodox churches. After Macedonia became an independent state in 1991, the claim of having its church recognized became even stronger (Ramet 2005: 268–271). A similar situation recently arose in Montenegro when it finally seceded from Serbia after a referendum in 2006. The Orthodox Church there has been functioning autonomously for decades and declared itself autocephalous in 1991 already. The Serbian Church does not regard Montenegrins to be nationally distinct from Serbs and therefore still regards their church to be part of the Serbian Church (*ibid.*, 264–268). In both cases, the respective governments recognize “their” national churches, but there are bishops loyal to Belgrade. Very often, conflicts arise about ownership of churches and other real estate.

Croatia

While Orthodox churches perceive themselves to be national churches, the Roman Catholic Church claims to be a “global church” rather than a national one. It regards itself to be the cultural guardian of a particular people only if there is a strong national, religious or “Weltanschauung” (world view) opponent like Protestantism in Ireland, Communism in Poland or the Serbian Orthodox Church in post-Communist Yugoslavia. During the war 1991–95 (in Croatia termed “domovinski rat” = homeland war), most leaders of the Catholic Church in Croatia supported the Croatian national cause against what they regarded the Serbian aggression. The government under President Tuđman closely cooperated with the Catholic Church, and in 1997/8, four concordats with the Vatican were concluded. It is obvious to every observer, that in Croatia today many new churches have been built, not only in the regions in which they were destroyed but also e.g. in different city districts of Zagreb – including the large-scale residential areas built during Socialism. This points to a new position of the Catholic Church in Croatian society. It seems that in general the faithful in Croatia participate in church life more than those in Serbia. In the 1991 and 2001 population censuses, only 3.9 and 2.2% of the population respectively declared themselves to be non-religious in Croatia. In 1953, when the Communist movement was still relatively new, this figure was 12.5%, and has certainly risen during the 60s and 70s. Since the religious question was not asked in the census between, we do not have figures for the time in between. However, in a sample surveys carried out in the Zagreb region in 1972 and 1982, 55 and 44% respectively of the respondents declared themselves to be either “convinced believers” or “religious”, whereas this figure rose to 85% in 1999 (Marinović Jerolimov 2000, 49).

Tab. 4 Religious self-identification in macro-regions in Croatia in 2004 (%)

Macro-region	Firm Believers	Religious	Total 1 + 2	Insecure and Indifferent	Not religious & opposed to religion
East Croatia	51.9	29.0	80.9	12.7	6.3
Dalmatia	50.1	36.0	86.1	9.1	4.8
Central Croatia	37.0	40.1	77.1	14.4	8.5
Istria and Primorje	22.8	43.9	66.7	16.3	17.0

Source: Marinović Jerolimov & Zrinščak 2006, 284.

However, there are great regional differences in religiosity within Croatia which to an outsider seems to be a monolithic Catholic country. A recent study by Marinović Jerolimov & Zrinščak (2006) showed that religiosity, measured by religious self-identification, varied considerably between regions (Table 4). The highest percentages of “firm believers” and “religious” were found in Dalmatia and East Croatia, i.e. in those regions which were most affected by the War and where the “other”, or even the “enemy”, i.e. the Serbs = Orthodox or the Muslims is closest. Here, the role of the Catholic Church as the guardian of the Croatian nation is appreciated most. In the Western and Central parts of the country including the capital Zagreb, their percentage is much lower. Altogether, one can probably speak of a “nationalisation of Catholicism” in Croatia which emerged in a confrontational situation with Serbian orthodoxy. In the Banovina region, marginal area mainly populated by Serbs before 1990, many Serbs found a “spiritual niche” in the Baptist Church during and after the War of the 1990 (Šakaja & Henkel 2007).

In contrast to Serbia, Croatian legislation concerning the religious communities today can be regarded in line with European standards, especially since it respects minority rights. The main pressure to establish this legislation was exerted by the EU. Croatia is in the process of becoming its 28th member, and negotiations for membership are on their way.

Slovenia

According to Table 3, Slovenia now is the most secularized of the former Yugoslav republics. Almost 14% of the population in the 2002 Census declared themselves either as unbeliever or as atheist, a percentage which is close to that of some other Central European countries like Austria, Slovakia or Hungary (Tomka & Zulehner 2000). Within Yugoslavia, Slovenia was regarded the most liberal federal republic as far as religion is concerned. Although the Roman Catholic Church is by far the biggest religious institution in the country, it never played a political role like in Croatia or the Orthodox Church in Serbia. On the other hand, the Catholic Church perceives itself as the only guarantor of Slovenian identity (Flere n.d.)

After long negotiations, an agreement with the Holy See that delineated the legal status of the church was concluded by the Slovenian state in 2004 only, but this

does e.g. not grant the right to the church(es) to give religious instructions in public schools. In general, there is strong church-state separation. In a cultural sense, one of the reasons why the influence of the numerically dominating Roman Catholic Church is limited may be the impact of the Reformation. One of its leaders, Primož Trubar (1508–1586), is regarded the creator of the Slovenian language. Among others, he translated the New Testament into it and got it printed in Germany. The Counter-Reformation was very successful on the territory of present-day Slovenia so that Protestants (mainly Lutherans) only are a tiny minority of 0.8% of the population, to be found mainly in the east of the country. One of the symbols showing this cultural influence of Protestantism is that Reformation Day (31 October) is a national holiday in Slovenia.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the relations between the religious communities (which are at the same time ethnic/national ones) usually are reported to have been peaceful and unproblematic before the War of the nineties. There were many inter-religious marriages, and Bosnian Islam has always been regarded to be very liberal and tolerant. Until the sixties, the Yugoslav federal republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was the only one without a titular nation. Ethnically, people declared themselves as Serbs, Croats or “nationally undeclared Yugoslavs” in the population censuses (Steindorff 1997). Only in the sixties, the Slavic Muslims in Yugoslavia gradually were given the status of a nation under the name Muslims (Muslimani with capital letters in the Serbo-Croat language whereas the religious adherence was written muslimani). In the Yugoslav population census of 1971, for the first time the category “Muslims in a national sense” was introduced. 39.6% of the population in Bosnia & Herzegovina opted for this. With the rise of nationalism in Yugoslavia in the late 80s and during the War in the early 90s, rapid de-secularization occurred, because ethnic (national) and religious adherence were so closely linked here. For the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina which was internationally recognized as an independent state in 1992, this meant a certain degree of re-Islamization. The first president of BiH, Alija Izetbegović, had already in the eighties developed ideas on the role of Islam in a modern state which he always regarded a multiethnic and multireligious state, however. During the War, religious differences and symbols became more strongly emphasized than they used to be before (Velikonja 2001). It was clearly the Muslim population which suffered most. But because of the tolerant character of Bosnian Islam, while hundreds of mosques on Serb or Croat territory were damaged or destroyed, most of the Orthodox or Catholic church buildings on Muslim-held territory are still standing, (Iveković 2002: 530–1). Since the 1990s, the Bosnian Muslims increasingly use the name of “Bosniak” (in contrast to “Bosnian” which refers to all inhabitants of Bosnia) as the term of self-identification.

After the War, new mosques have been built or re-built in the Bosniak (or Muslim) cantons of Bosnia, many of them with financial aid by Muslim organizations from outside, especially from Saudi Arabia and from the Gulf states. The female veil which had not been seen for decades reappeared. The Muslim mayor of Sarajevo tried to ban public consumption of alcohol but could not enforce this decision. The attempts by radical Islamists (mainly from outside) to instrumentalize the situation which started during the War already can be regarded as failed. Although the influence of Islam in the Muslim cantons of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina certainly is stronger now and religious practice probably more widespread than before 1990, the main goal of the Bosnian authorities is to establish a multi-ethnic and multireligious state. So far, however, Bosnia and Herzegovina still is a country divided into three ethnic homelands, each with its own exclusive religion. Only few mosques which were damaged or destroyed during the War in the Bosnian-Serb Republic (Republika Srpska) have been allowed to be rebuilt or renovated, and this only happened because of strong international pressure. On the other hand, Orthodox churches mushroom in the Republika Srpska, and in Mostar which the Bosnian Croats regard “their” capital, a large Catholic church was built, and on a nearby mountain, a huge cross was erected which is illuminated at night and which demonstrates the city to be a Christian one.

Conclusion

In a religiously very heterogeneous country where the Communist state was quite successful to impose secularization, the wars in the context of the dissolution of Yugoslavia which were mainly nationalist but implicitly had religious aspects led to a strengthening of the role of the religious institutions in all successor states. Therefore, for the time after 1990 we can certainly say that resurgence of religion in all states of Ex-Yugoslavia was and still is stronger than secularisation. This resurgence, however, manifests itself in a stronger position of the religious organizations in society and state and a stronger identification of people with the religious organizations rather than in active church involvement. Probably the situation can be best described with the term of “confrontational identity”: Religious, together with national or ethnic awareness came to be of great or even prime importance in the confrontation with other nations and religions. Whether this also means that with the waning away of the confrontation situation religion will become less important remains to be seen.

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Résumé

Náboženství a církevní instituce ve státech bývalé Jugoslávie mezi sekularizací a obnovou

V nábožensky heterogenním státě vnutil komunistický režim poměrně úspěšně proces sekularizace, ovšem válečné konflikty, které doprovázely rozdělení Jugoslávie, byly často založeny na nacionalismu, který byl často spojen i veden náboženským vyznáním a církevními institucemi daného nástupnického státu. V individuální rovině lze tuto situaci nejlépe popsat termínem „konfrontační identita“. Religiózní, společně s národním a etnickým uvědoměním hrály nejdůležitější roli v konfrontaci s „jinými“ etniky, národy a náboženstvím. Náboženská obnova se osvědčila jako silná identifikace obyvatel s náboženskými kořeny a díky tomu stoupl také aktivní zájem o církev. Zvláštní důraz byl kladen na roli Srbské pravoslavné církve, která je úzce spjata s kulturou, historií a politikou srbského národa a je vyzdvihována jako jeho „kulturní strážce“ (Ramet). V tomto kontextu se jeví koncept pravoslavní „kanonického území“ jako zcela zásadní a byl proto také analyzován v předkládané studii.

Prof. Dr. Reinhard Henkel
Geographisches Institut der Universität
Berliner Straße 48
69120 Heidelberg
Germany
phone: +49-6221-544570
e-mail: reinhard.henkel@geog.uni-heidelberg.de