Zobecnění mikroekonomie (maximalizace pravděpodobnosti přežití subjektu) umožnilo autorům modelovat ekonomickou racionalitu i v oblastech, kde ziskové kriterium není vhodné, jako je přerozdělování, neziskový sektor, pozitivní i negativní externality, centrálně plánovaná ekonomika atd. Tam, kde je ziskové kriterium adekvátní, splývá zobecněné kriterium s maximalizací zisku.
FOREWORD
1. THE GENERALIZED PRINCIPLE OF ECONOMIC RATIONALITY
1.1 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HOMO ECONOMICUS PARADIGM
1.2 MINIMIZATION OF THE SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY OF ECONOMIC EXTINCTION
1.3 PARETO DISTRIBUTION OF THE PROBABILITY OF SURVIVAL
1.3.1 FIRST-ORDER PARETO PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION
1.3.2 SECOND-ORDER PARETO PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION
1.3.3 GENERAL PARETO PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION
2. MODELLING RISK AND HEDGING AGAINST IT
2.1 PROBABILITY OF SURVIVAL FOR INCOME AS A RANDOM VARIABLE
2.2 FORMULATION OF THE LENINGRAD CASINO PROBLEM
2.3 MODEL OF THE ST. PETERSBURG PARADOX
3. MORAL HAZARD AND ADVERSE SELECTION IN THE CONTEXT OF MAXIMIZATION OF THE PROBABILITY OF ECONOMIC SURVIVAL
3.1 PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL
3.1.1 ADVERSE SELECTION
3.1.2 MORAL HAZARD
3.2 APPLICATION OF GENERALIZED MICROECONOMICS: MAXIMIZATION OF THE PROBABILITY OF ECONOMIC SURVIVAL
3.2.1 THREAT TO THE AGENT DUE TO EXTINCTION OF THE PRINCIPAL
3.2.2 ADVERSE SELECTION IN THE CONTEXT OF PROBABILITY OF SURVIVAL
3.2.3 MORAL HAZARD IN THE CONTEXT OF PROBABILITY OF SURVIVAL
3.2.4 COMPARISON OF THE STANDARD HOMO ECONOMICUS WITH A SURVIVAL-PROBABILITY-MAXIMIZING AGENT
4. THE DEMAND FUNCTION IN THE INSURANCE MARKET: COMPARISON OF MAXIMIZATION OF THE PARETO PROBABILITY OF SURVIVAL WITH THE VON NEUMANN-MORGENSTERN EU THEORY AND KAHNEMAN-TVERSKY PROSPECT THEORY
4.1 INSURANCE IN THE MODEL OF MAXIMIZATION OF AN AGENT'S PARETO PROBABILITY OF (ECONOMIC) SURVIVAL
4.2 INSURANCE DEMAND IN THE VON NEUMANN-MORGENSTERN MODEL OF MAXIMIZATION OF THE EXPECTED UTILITY OF INCOME
(EU THEORY)
4.3 INSURANCE DEMAND IN THE KAHNEMAN-TVERSKY MODEL (PROSPECT THEORY, PT)
4.4 COMPARISON OF THE DEMAND FUNCTIONS OF MODELS A, B, AND C (FROM THE PREVIOUS THREE SECTIONS)
5. MODELLING NON-PROFIT INSTITUTIONS: THE UNIVERSITY SUPPLY FUNCTION
5.1 ECONOMIC RATIONALITY IN THE NON-PROFIT SECTOR
5.2 AN OPTIMIZATION MODEL OF UNIVERSITY BEHAVIOUR
5.3 UNIVERSITY SUPPLY FUNCTION
6. BEHAVIOUR OF A FIRM IN A CENTRALLY PLANNED ECONOMY - THE HOMO SE ASSECURANS MODEL
6.1 SET OF FEASIBLE PRODUCTION SITUATIONS IN A CENTRALLY PLANNED ECONOMY
6.2 THE INDEX PLANNING METHOD AND THE CRITERION OF A PRODUCER IN A CENTRALLY PLANNED ECONOMY
6.3 MAXIMIZATION OF THE ABSOLUTE RESERVE
6.4 MAXIMIZATION OF THE RELATIVE RESERVE (I.E. MAXIMIZATION OF THE PARETO PROBABILITY OF SURVIVAL IN A CPE)
7. MODEL OF AN ECONOMY WITH WIDESPREAD CORPORATE INSOLVENCY
7.1 THE PROBLEM OF SECONDARY INSOLVENCY
7.2 MODELS OF DECISION-MAKING IN AN ECONOMY WITH WIDESPREAD SECONDARY INSOLVENCY
7.2.1 MODEL A: MINIMAX STRATEGY
7.2.2 MODEL B: MINIMUM EXTINCTION RISK STRATEGY
8. THE PRODUCER'S OPTIMUM UNDER INCREASING RETURNS TO SCALE
8.1 MODEL A: UNIFORM DISTRIBUTIONS OF THE PROBABILITY OF EXTINCTION W.R.T. PRICE
8.2 MODEL B: UNIFORM DISTRIBUTIONS OF THE PROBABILITY OF EXTINCTION W.R.T. PROFITABILITY
8.3 MODEL C: NORMAL DISTRIBUTIONS OF THE PROBABILITY OF EXTINCTION W.R.T. PROFITABILITY
9. MODELS OF MARKET ALLOCATION OF EXTERNALITIES, GENERALIZED COASE THEOREM
9.1 EMISSIONS PERMIT MARKET
9.2 THE COASE THEOREM FOR NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES
9.2.1 THE COASE THEOREM FOR NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES: THE CASE OF TWO PRODUCERS
9.2.2 THE GENERALIZED COASE THEOREM FOR NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES IN THE CONTEXT OF SURWAL PROBABILITY MAXIMIZATION
9.2.3 THE COASE THEOREM FOR THE CASE WHERE A PRODUCER HARMS A CONSUMER
9.3 THE COASE THEOREM FOR POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES
9.3.1 THE GENERALIZED COASE THEOREM FOR POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES AND AGENTS MAXIMIZING THEIR OWN SURVIVAL PROBABILITY
9.3.2 SINGLE POSITIVE EXTERNALITY PROVIDER MODEL
9.3.3 MULTIPLE POSITIVE EXTERNALITY PROVIDERS MODEL
9.4 EFFICIENCY OF ACQUISITION AND TRANSFER OF INFORMATION BETWEEN AGENTS THAT DEPEND ON EACH OTHER TO SURVIVE
9.4.1 MODEL A: INFORMATION EFFECT = INFORMATION ACQUISITION AND TRANSFER COST
9.4.2 MODEL B: INFORMATION EFFECT < INFORMATION ACQUISITION AND TRANSFER COST
10. ALTRUISM AND REDISTRIBUTION INCREASING THE PROBABILITY OF SURVIVAL OF INDIVIDUALS
10.1 ALTRUISM AND BELONGING TO THE COMMUNITY
10.2 REDISTRIBUTION
10.2.1 THE SUPPLY SIDE OF REDISTRIBUTION (THE WILLINGNESS TO FORGO PART OF ONE'S PERSONAL PROSPERITY) DERIVED FROM THE SOCIAL NATURE OF INDIVIDUALS' PREFERENCES
10.2.1.1 TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE INTERESTS OF OTHERS WHEN SUCH ACTION DIRECTLY INCREASES THE PROSPERITY OF THE
INDIVIDUAL ("PSEUDO-ALTRUISM")
10.2.1.2 THE UNCALCULATED NEEDED TO DO GOOD (HARD-CORE ALTRUISM)
10.2.1.3 RECIPROCAL ALTRUISM
10.2.1.4 THE URGE OF INDIVIDUALS TO GROUP TOGETHER IN CLUBS
10.2.1.5 MUTUALITY (SOLIDARITY) OF COMMUNITY MEMBERS
10.2.1.6 RESPECT FOR AUTHORITY
10.2.2 THE WILLINGNESS TO REDISTRIBUTE IN FAVOUR OF PUBLIC GOODS (THE ACCEPTABILITY OF TAXATION)
10.2.3 HYPOTHESES REGARDING THE WILLINGNESS TO CONTRIBUTE TO REDISTRIBUTION
10.2.4 THE "DEMAND SIDE" OF REDISTRIBUTION: THE INFORMATION PROBLEM
10.2.5 EFFICIENCY OF REDISTRIBUTION IN RELATION TO THE DONOR'S PREFERENCES
10.3 ALTRUISTIC ALLOCATION MODELS
10.3.1 MODEL OF ABSOLUTE SOLIDARITY
10.3.2 MODEL OF MINIMIzATION OF THE RISK OF SIMULTANEOUS EXTINCTION OF BOTH INDIVIDUALS: CRUEL ALTRUISM
10.4 THE STATE IN THE ROLE OF DONOR
10.5 SOME DEBATABLE PRINCIPLES/RULES OF THE DONOR ACTIVITIES OF THE STATE
10.5.1 RESULT OF NON-TRANSFERABILITY OF A SUBSIDY TO THE NEXT PERIOD-OPTIMAL SUBSIDY TIMING MODEL
10.5.2 PRESCRIBED SUBSIDY USE STRUCTURE
